Ladies and gentlemen,

Good morning,

Let me thank Dr. Jackman, as well as Julie Lindhout and Col. McKenna, and all their colleagues at the Atlantic Council of Canada, as well as the co-sponsors, for organizing this timely conference. I am also very happy to see many familiar and friendly faces here today… whose views today will further enrich the discussions. I am also delighted that some members of the Afghan-Canadian community of Toronto, the largest in Canada, are here today. It is always encouraging to see the community sincerely take part and act as an important liaison between the country of origin and their adopted country.

Afghanistan is, and continues to be, top news these days in Canada, which keeps me busy and on my toes, but the interest is obviously focused more on the Canadian military mission than on the equally important rebuilding efforts. Having dedicated most of my time in the past few months speaking about the significance of the security engagement from the Afghan perspective, it is actually refreshing to be able to speak about the other facets of the Afghan equation, which is aptly reflected in the title of this conference, “Building a new Afghanistan: a Comprehensive Approach to Reconstruction”.

Reality is that we will not be able to totally disassociate ourselves from the security aspects. As reflected in the 3D approach, all facets are inter-twined and complement each other. The comprehensive approach cannot succeed without security. We will not be able to claim success in Afghanistan if we partially succeed in the security sector, but fail in rebuilding the country or vice versa. We all realize now that it is of vital importance for all stakeholders to succeed in Afghanistan.

Allow me at this point also to pay tribute to the men and women of your country, and more than 30 other nations, who serve in Afghanistan as soldiers, diplomats, aid workers, policemen, negotiators, contractors, civil society promoters, in short as front-line defenders of dignity, freedom and democracy. I want all Canadians to know that we mourn your losses as we mourn ours. President Karzai, in a letter to Prime Minister Harper this week, expressed his condolences for the four brave Canadian soldiers who fell in Afghanistan. He said, “the people of Afghanistan share your pain, for we too have lost many of our young people in our common struggle against terrorism.”

If faut savoir que l’Afghanistan d’avant le 11 Septembre 2001 sous l’occupation des Talibans et Al Qaida ressemblait a un champs de ruine sans espoir. En quatre ans, l’image du pays s’est transforme d’une manière remarquable grâce au soutient du peuple Afghan pour le processus de la paix et la présence de la communauté internationale. Mais le travail de reconstruction ne fait que juste commencer.

Afghanistan, not long ago a failed state, is today considered, in my opinion, as a fragile state. This fragility requires special attention, thoughtful treatment, strategic vision, a comprehensive approach and above all, steadfastness. As I have said before, those spoilers who, in the name of holy war, drug war or plain power-struggle, want to disrupt the process of democracy and development in Afghanistan, are on the wrong side of history. Moreover, they do not represent true Islamic or Afghan values. The door has been opened to bring them into the fold so that they could join the caravan of revival in my country. Hundreds have given up on militancy, but the diehards and those with vested interests tied to terrorism, drug-lordism and extremism in our region, will find any excuse to weaken the resolve of the Afghans and their international partners. This tactic requires that we be a step ahead, by denying them the base of operations they lost and are seeking to re-acquire in Afghanistan. Once secured, we also need to help develop the volatile tribal belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan to weaken the forces of extremism. Let us not repeat the errors of the 1990s when Afghanistan was neglected and forgotten, and right in front of our eyes, it became a failed state and the main training camp and headquarters for terrorism.

The truth is plain and simple. Peace, stability, nation-building and democratization in Afghanistan reinforce global peace and security, as well as regional stability and prosperity. Peace and rebuilding in Afghanistan do not threaten anyone. This is what the Afghans want, and this is what the donors have generously promised to deliver. We are thankful for the worldwide pledges made over the past four years.

The January 2006 Afghanistan Compact rightly reminds international actors to be mindful that Afghanistan’s transition to what might be described as normalcy is not yet assured, and that strong international engagement will be essential to address remaining challenges.

This Compact assures continued high-level global support for Afghanistan over the next five years. A blueprint for the next stage of Afghanistan’s rebuilding follows the completion of the Bonn process, which ended with a new Constitution, presidential elections, inauguration of an elected parliament and provincial councils.

The Afghanistan Compact sets out goals and timelines in security, governance, human rights, and social and economic development. The Compact is accompanied by the Interim National Development Strategy. Both the Compact and the ANDS will help ensure Afghanistan meets its longer term development objectives. The compact also prescribes ways for the Afghan government and donors to make aid more effective and establishes a mechanism to monitor adherence to the timelines and benchmarks.

Afghanistan has experienced many accomplishments over the last four years, however, we need to focus on the real challenges that we face. Let me highlight a few:

* As discussed, we are still facing an attempt in certain parts of the country by insurgents to make a come back and disrupt the process of nation-building. At times this threat is exacerbated by druglords and armed gangs who at times find common interest in fostering instability.

* Practical solutions should be explored to address post-conflict administrative and institutional weaknesses, governance inefficiencies and low administrative capacity to run state and local institutions. This is particularly true of the Justice system.

* We see sustained levels of foreign aid and international pledges, but levels of human security, development and poverty put Afghanistan near the bottom of global indexes. It is also a fact that aid and drug monies subsidize cheap imports and hinder economic growth.

* Despite tremendous achievements in gender equality, Afghan women face high rates of illiteracy and low standards of health. Afghanistan has the youngest population in the world, and we need to build up the new economy by taking the youth factor into consideration.

To the average Afghan, progress at the national level means jobs, infrastructure, especially electric power and roads, institutions, good governance, service-oriented administration and security. At the individual level, they ask for schools, healthcare and land for housing.

A few words about the threat of narcotics. The livelihoods of many Afghan farmers are more dependent on illegal narcotics than any other country in the world. The UN says that the total export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan in 2005–2006 equaled about 38 percent of non-drug GDP, down from 47 percent the previous year. There is also 20% less land cultivated with poppy this year. However, 80 percent of the income from narcotics did not go to farmers but to traffickers and heroin processors.

According to a recent study by the Center on International Cooperation, “counter-narcotics strategies must be comprehensive. Alternative livelihoods need to include rural development, including electric power, water, roads, credit, debt relief, agri-cultural extension, and non-farm employment, particularly in rural industries. Counter-narcotics policy must also address the macroeconomic measures needed to minimize the negative effect of this sector’s contraction on the whole economy. Such policies need over a decade to become fully effective.”

Despite a slow start with aid levels, the cost of delivery of assistance has been higher than expected, so that the money disbursed has produced less on the ground than planned, and much of the increase in aid has, for obvious reasons, gone to the security sector. A former Afghan minister once said that “we cannot build Afghanistan on the cheap,” and I tend to agree with that assessment.

The Afghan government has committed itself to transparency and accountability, and to raising more domestic resources. This is why it is important to receive aid in accordance with the ANDS priorities through such mechanisms as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund managed by the World Bank, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, and the Counter-narcotics Trust Fund.

Our goal is also to connect Afghanistan – a land-bridge - to the regional economic grid, in infrastructure, trade and transit, water use, energy, migration and manpower, and development of border regions, by establishing dedicated funding frameworks for regional economic cooperation.

NATO will play a more prominent role in our quest for stability, and the PRTs will continue to mesh the security component with the civilian reconstruction team. There are options about merging the US-led Coalition operations with ISAF, while the training and equipping of Afghan security forces reach a pivotal stage that will need acceleration. In regards to the new Afghan army and police, we need to strive for quality and excellence.

We know that the failing is not an option. This means reviewing our common objectives, re-assessing and re-adjusting our delivery methods. As all Afghan stakeholders look forward to improving the future structure of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the Afghanistan Compact provides many elements of a plan for sustainable security, governance, and development. Let me say that Canada has played an important and constructive role as a donor and 3D partner. We look forward to working with Canada on the next phases of the Afghan development strategy, the Canadian role, by discussing the options between now and 2009, when Canadian pledges come to an end, and beyond 2009, a critical period to consolidate our development efforts in Afghanistan.

End.