In this bulletin:

• NATO air strikes leave 50 dead in S Afghanistan
• Air raid kills civilians in Afghan south: lawmaker
• Taliban claim responsibility for Afghan south suicide attack
• Shooting rocks main Afghan prison – BBC
• US Marines start deploying in southern Afghanistan
• Poland sends 400 troops to Afghanistan in autumn
• U.S. Launches Aggressive Training for Afghan Police
• Pakistan envoy to Afghanistan still missing
• Afghanistan will require perseverance
• Pakistan: Bomb Hits Afghan-Bound Truck
• Afghan security forces kill two Taliban militants, capture five: police
• Afghan govt must bring rights abusers to justice: U.N.
• Warlords rule Afghanistan
• Store admits some mistakes after terrorist attack in Kabul
• Afghanistan Launches the Privatization of Afghan Telecom
• IDPs Assisted In Kabul
• Former Taliban foreign minister rejects political role, urges "reconciliation"
• Editorial: Twin threats from Tribal Areas
• U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists
• Afghan escape hatch opens in 2009

NATO air strikes leave 50 dead in S Afghanistan

KABUL, March 18 (Xinhua)-- NATO's air raids against Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan's southern Helmand province claimed the lives of 50 persons including 18 rebels, a parliamentarian from the restive province said Tuesday.

    "It was Monday afternoon when villagers were busy in playing local game the stone throwing in Marmal village of Sangin district, suddenly the aircraft of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) appeared and dropped bombs, killing 50 on the spot," Hajji Dad Mohammada told Xinhua.

    He added that 18 of those killed in the raid were Taliban fighters.

    However, Mohammad Hussain Andiwal, the police chief of Helmand province, when reached by Xinhua expressed ignorance by saying, "I have no information."

    Meantime, Carlose Branco, the spokesman of the NATO-led ISAF forces, utterly rejected the claim as groundless, adding the military alliance did not carry out any operation in Sangin district on Monday.

    "First of all, ISAF strongly deny the claim. There has been no ISAF operation in Marmal area of Sangin district yesterday," he told Xinhua.

    However, he added that ISAF conducted an operation in the vicinity of Malmandcina area in Ghorak district of Kandahar Monday, destroying a vehicle of insurgents and killing 12 armed militants aboard.

    He also stressed that the place where the operation conducted was two kilometers away from residential areas and air reconnaissance indicated there were no civilians.

    Similar incidents in the past had claimed the lives of civilians in parts of the country mostly in the southern region.

    President Hamid Karzai had more than once called on the international troops based in Afghanistan to coordinate military operations with local authorities in order to avoid harming non-combatants.

Air raid kills civilians in Afghan south: lawmaker

KABUL (Reuters) - An air strike by foreign forces has killed more than 30 people, including civilians, in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand, a lawmaker said on Tuesday.

The raid happened on Monday in a village in the province's Sangin district, scene of a series of battles between Taliban insurgents and foreign troops in recent years, she said.

Civilian deaths are a sensitive issue for the foreign forces in Afghanistan under the command of the U.S. military and NATO and for President Hamid Karzai's government.

"More than 30 people have lost their lives and it is said that the Taliban and civilians were amongst those killed," Nasima Niyazi, who is a member of the lower house of the Afghan parliament representing the province, told Reuters. She did not have any more details about the air strike.

But several people who identified themselves as residents of Sangin said the raid targeted a picnic spot where civilians had gathered to play traditional sports. The Taliban said 40 civilians were killed and 60 more wounded.

Both NATO and U.S.-led troops are stationed in Helmand, a bastion for Taliban insurgents and the key drug-producing region of Afghanistan, the world's top supplier of heroin.

A spokesman for NATO in Kabul said the alliance had carried out an air attack to the south of Sangin and a total of 12 insurgents were killed while driving in three cars.

The strike comes amid spiraling violence in the past two years in Afghanistan, the bloodiest period since U.S.-led troops overthrew the Taliban's hardline Islamist government in 2001. More than 12,000 people, nearly a quarter of them civilians, have been killed by the violence.

Civilian deaths have sparked protests and added to growing frustration among ordinary Afghans that Karzai's government and its Western backers have not brought more security to the country.

Taleban claim responsibility for Afghan south suicide attack

Text of report by private Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press news agency

Kandahar, 17 March: Three foreign soldiers have been killed, including two Danish soldiers, and four others wounded in a suicide attack [in southern Afghanistan]. The NATO press office in Kandahar Province a short while ago told Afghan Islamic Press [AIP] that today a suicide attack was carried out on its soldiers in Greshk [District of Helmand Province], killing three NATO soldiers and one Afghan interpreter, and wounding four others.

Earlier, the Danish Army Central Command in Copenhagen announced that two Danish soldiers had been killed and another wounded in a suicide attack in Helmand's Greshk District today.

The Military Command also said the soldiers were working in the Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] in Greshk and fell prey to a suicide attack today.

Earlier, Helmand Police Chief Col Mohammad Hosayn Andiwal reported the incident to AIP and said three civilians had been killed and seven others wounded in the attack. However, a number o! f residents of Greshk told AIP that soon after the suicide attack, NATO forces opened fire on a car, which local people call "Saracha", wounding a number of civilians.

Meanwhile, Taleban spokesman Qari Mohammad Yusof Ahmadi claimed responsibility for the incident and told AIP that Abdorrahman, a resident of Helmand, carried out the attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the foreign forces.

Shooting rocks main Afghan prison – BBC

Afghan security forces have sealed off the country's main high-security prison after days of unrest there. Gunfire has been heard from the Pul-e-Charkhi prison, a huge complex built in the 1970s on the outskirts of the capital, Kabul.

The BBC's Alastair Leithead in Kabul says inmates are in control of parts of the prison. Pul-e-Charkhi is now used to house common criminals as well as al-Qaeda and Taleban suspects.

Our correspondent says the stand off between prisoners and Afghan security forces, which began on Sunday, appears to be worsening.

Large numbers of soldiers and police have been arriving at the notorious jail which houses some of Afghanistan's most dangerous criminals and Taleban militants.

Inmates had taken control of sections of the building as part of a continuing protest against the authorities.

A number of prisoners contacted the BBC by mobile phone and said that seven inmates had been injured.

They also said that two Afghan national army soldiers had been captured and they would be killed unless mediators were sent in to resolve the dispute. Our correspondent says it has not been possible to verify if the soldiers had been held.

There has been no official response from the Afghan government, but the defence minister told parliament an operation was being planned to raid the prison after parts of the building were overrun.

An Afghan member of parliament who visited the jail on Monday said the situation had become very tense.

The dispute has been going on for two weeks since an attempted jail-break and the arrest of a large number of prison visitors.

There have been sieges and riots in the past at the prison. Four years ago the jail was raided by the military after some prisoners tried to escape.

US Marines start deploying in southern Afghanistan

The Associated Press - Tuesday, March 18, 2008

KABUL, Afghanistan: Some of the 3,200 U.S. Marines slated for a seven-month deployment to Afghanistan's volatile south have begun arriving at the region's largest base following a call from Canada for more troops there.

About 2,300 troops from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, will be based in Kandahar, the Taliban's former power base. A majority of those Marines arrived in the last several days.

Canada has 2,500 troops in Kandahar province but has threatened to end its combat role in Afghanistan unless other NATO countries provide an additional 1,000 troops to help the anti-Taliban effort there.

The Marines will conduct a "full spectrum of operations" to capitalize on recent gains by NATO and Afghan forces, said Brig. Gen. Carlos Branco, a spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force. They began arriving this week.

"I believe that the arrival of the Marines simply reinforces what is proving to be a successful strategy. It also demonstrates the commitment of the United States to Afghanistan over the long-term," U.S. Ambassador William Wood said Tuesday.

After arriving, key personnel began meeting with other military leaders and collecting lessons learned from those who have been operating in the area, said Capt. Kelly Frushour, a spokeswoman for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

About 1,000 Marines from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, based in Twentynine Palms, California, will also be deployed in the south to train Afghan police and soldiers. They are expected to arrive in April or May, said Lt. Col. David Johnson, a U.S. Army spokesman.

"Their deployment is counterinsurgency at its finest," said Johnson. "They're going to be integrated as part of the U.S. team here with those districts and communities, and they will be working very closely with the police and some of the Afghan National Army guys."

NATO's ISAF is some 43,000-strong, but commanders have asked for more combat troops, particularly for the country's south, where the insurgency is the most active. About 13,000 U.S. troops operate in a separate U.S.-led coalition.

Troops from Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States have done the majority of the fighting against Taliban militants. France, Spain, Germany and Italy are stationed in more peaceful parts of the country.

Last year was Afghanistan's most violent since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban. More than 8,000 people died in violence, the U.N. says.

Poland sends 400 troops to Afghanistan in autumn

Text of report in English by Polish national independent news agency PAP

Cracow, 17 March: Poland will send more troops to Afghanistan in the autumn, Defence Minister Bogdan Klich said Monday adding that to make it possible the president should sign an appropriate document by the end of March.

Poland's ISAF force currently numbers about 1,200 troops. Their number will go up to 1,600.

ISAF's key military tasks include assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan national security forces, mentoring and supporting the Afghan national army, and supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.

U.S. Launches Aggressive Training for Afghan Police

By Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Npr.org March 17, 2008

The U.S. military has launched a plan to dramatically improve Afghanistan's national police force, amid persistent concerns over growing terrorism and crime.

At Patrol Base Wilson, in Kandahar province's volatile Zhari district, American and Canadian military trainers are trying accomplish a top-priority task, something many Afghans believe can't be done: create a police force that will maintain law and order in a country where few feel safe anymore.

Many of the thousands of police officers across the country are recruited off the streets; many lack training, equipment and even uniforms. Low pay has led to widespread corruption among the ranks and shakedowns of the people they are supposed to serve.

Officers aren't trained to be beat cops, much less to fight insurgents. Many smoke hashish. Some demand illegal "taxes" from drivers on nearby roads. Often, the local police force is more of a militia answering to the local strongmen.

This is not the national police that U.S. Maj. Gen. Robert Cone envisions for Afghanistan. He is heading up the U.S. training program, which launched this year. It ensures pay parity for police officers who meet acceptable standards, so they don't earn less than Afghan army privates

The limited but aggressive program focuses on some of the country's most dangerous districts in Kandahar and Helmand provinces.

"I think there are a number of districts … that frankly are the heart of Taliban country where we think it's particularly important after we've done clearing operations that we have a police force that can come in and earn the trust of the Afghan people and provide them with at least a first line of defense and security," Cone says.

The program, called "Focused District Development," targets police officers in areas key to commerce and security, mainly in the south and east. Officers in these districts are being sent to regional training centers staffed by Western military personnel and by police officers hired by U.S. security firm DynCorp. There, the Afghan policemen train for eight weeks.

At the regional training center near Kandahar city, it's clear the national police have a long way to go.

Even so, one of their American trainers, Army Spc. Andrew Shook, is confident the current class will eventually become effective police officers.

He says the main issue with training the Afghans involves refining the role they are expected to play. The U.S. State Department envisions the Afghan officers as taking on a traditional police role, while the Department of Defense wants them to be more of a paramilitary force, Shook says. "We are trying to find a balance," he says.

Finding adequate resources is another issue. Maj. Gen. Cone admits he's stretched thin and that there are simply not enough U.S. military trainers to transform the police quickly.

"It will take time to determine if these young Afghan policemen can represent the face of the Afghan government to a satisfactory way," Cone says, "and again, it's in the eyes of the people, so we will see."

He estimates it will take years to train all of Afghanistan's police. The U.S. Army officers involved in the training here say it will take a generation.

Pakistan envoy to Afghanistan still missing

Text of report by Pakistani newspaper The News website on 16 March

Peshawar [North-West Frontier Province], 16 March: Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan is yet to be recovered even 34 days after his kidnapping by unidentified criminals.

Tariq Azizuddin went missing along with his bodyguard and driver soon after leaving the home of his daughter in University Town on 11 February. Later, it was disclosed the senior official had been kidnapped from the area between Jamrud and Ali Masjid.

Azizuddin had opted to travel to his Kabul office by road instead of taking a flight. The missing envoy also did not demand escort from the political authorities, which is provided to every VIP while travelling on the Peshawar-Jalalabad Highway.

The Foreign Office had hoped the ambassador would be recovered very soon. However, the political administration of the Khyber Agency and the Peshawar police, that were making joint efforts for the recovery of the envoy, are still clueless about his whereabouts.

The Mangal Bagh-led Lashkar-i-Islam has also failed to trace out the missing envoy. Two jergas [assemblies] of the elders of Malikdinkhel and its sub-tribe, Jhandakhel, which is suspected to be involved in the crime, had also denied the presence of Tariq Azizuddin in their respective areas.

Elders of the tribe had announced to set on fire the houses of kidnappers if proved to be hailing from the area. The abduction of an ambassador is the first incident of its kind in the country's history.

Afghanistan will require perseverance

OTTAWA, March 17 (UPI) -- Despite recent threats of a Canadian troop pullout from Afghanistan, Canada's top defense official says rebuilding the country will require perseverance.

Canadian Minister of National Defense and Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Peter MacKay recently spoke at the 2008 Brussels Forum in Belgium to discuss Canada's role in Afghanistan. MacKay says despite continued security challenges, rebuilding Afghanistan will require perseverance, the Canadian Office of National Defense reported.

"Rebuilding Afghanistan after decades of war is a long-term undertaking that requires perseverance and commitment," MacKay said in a statement. "Challenges remain, yet real progress is being achieved in partnership with the international community and the Afghan people themselves and is improving the lives of millions of Afghan men, women and children."

During the two-day foreign policy meeting, world leaders discussed pressing challenges in Afghanistan, including continued militant conflict regions and the economics of the country. MacKay called on NATO allies to address the need for further troop commitments needed for security.

"Canada is playing a leading role in the United Nations-mandated NATO mission to Afghanistan," MacKay said. "Our Allies recognize our value as a responsible partner in this mission. The findings of the Manley Panel have been well received by our Allies and they are aware of the need for further commitments by NATO forces."

Pakistan: Bomb Hits Afghan-Bound Truck

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) 18 March 2008 — Pakistan's state news agency says a roadside bomb has struck an oil tanker carrying fuel for U.S.-led coalition forces in neighboring Afghanistan. No one was hurt.

The Associated Press of Pakistan says the truck "burst into flames" after the explosion Tuesday near Peshawar, a city near the Afghan border. The tanker carrying 11,624 gallons of fuel was destroyed.

The report did not say who may have been involved. But authorities have blamed Islamic militants for similar attacks in the past.

Afghan security forces kill two Taliban militants, capture five: police

KABUL (AFP) — Afghan security forces killed two Taliban militants who were involved in a recent attack on a mobile phone tower in western Afghanistan, police said Tuesday.

Five other rebels were captured following the clash in Obe district of Herat province late Monday, regional police spokesman Abdul Rauf Ahmadi told AFP. One of the captured men was wounded, he added.

"The terrorists killed were part of a group which is responsible for attacking a cell phone mast in the district on March 11," Ahmadi told AFP.

Taliban rebels have attacked about a dozen cell phone masts since issuing a warning last month that they would target the technology, which they say is being used to pinpoint their hideouts.

Taliban were ousted from power in late 2001 but the remnants of the militia are still waging an insurgency which was in its deadliest phase last year. Their insurgency includes suicide bombings and roadside explosions.

In a suicide attack Monday two Danish and one Czech solider were killed in southern Helmand province. Taliban claimed responsibility.

In a separate incident Afghan army troops on Monday killed a Taliban-linked rebel who was planting a mine on a road in the eastern province of Kunar where the insurgents are active, the defence ministry said in a statement.

More than 60,000 international troops, the bulk of them under the command of NATO, are based in Afghanistan to help the Afghan government provide security and speed up a post-Taliban reconstruction of the war-ravaged nation.

Afghan govt must bring rights abusers to justice: U.N.

KABUL (Reuters) - The Afghan government needs to take more action to bring human rights abusers to justice and end the culture of impunity that undermines faith in the state, the United Nations said on Tuesday

Six years ago, the United States relied on air power, special forces and a loose alliance of Afghan warlords to topple the Taliban government after the hardline Islamist movement refused to give up al Qaeda leaders behind the September 11 attacks.

Many of the warlords are accused of serious rights abuses during Afghanistan's three decades of war. They now dominate the parliament and some hold key positions within the state, but little has been done to bring them to book.

"You have heard of the phrase 'action speaks louder than words'. Here in Afghanistan the lack of action speaks volumes," Norah Niland, the UN's Chief Human Rights Officer in Afghanistan told a news conference.

"I think there is a lack of political will both within Afghanistan and without," she said.

Afghan forces and more than 50,000 foreign troops are now struggling to contain a resurgent Taliban campaign of guerrilla war, backed by suicide and roadside bomb attacks. Some 6,000 people were killed last year, the most violent since 2001.

Many Afghans are growing weary of the presence of foreign troops, official corruption and the ongoing lack of security.

Alongside the military campaign, analysts say President Hamid Karzai's government and his Western backers need to do more to strengthen governance and state institutions to help bring peace.

"There is a realization that the conflict cannot be overcome by military means alone, and that an overarching civilian-led strategy is necessary to help bring about Afghanistan's long-term stability and development," the United Nations said in a recent report.

Suspects are often released without proper investigation and police have failed to act when confronted with powerful local interests, the report said. The result was a lack of public confidence in the government and state institutions.

Despite disappointments, most Afghans are committed and determined to end human rights violations, she said.

"Re-establishing the rule of law and ending impunity for past and present crimes remains key to securing peace and stability in Afghanistan," the U.N. report said.

Other areas of concern for human rights in Afghanistan were the position of women, poverty and poor access to healthcare.

Although women enjoy more freedoms since 2001, Niland said they are still excluded from certain areas of society and often suffer high levels of violence. Many women victims of sexual offences are imprisoned on charges of immorality.

Warlords rule Afghanistan

By Govind Talwalkar Asianage.com – 18 March 08

Recently, a NATO commander in Afghanistan said that two-third of the country is not under State control. As expected, this was refuted by President Hamid Karzai. The BBC now reports that Canadian troops in Afghanistan feel the country could get rid of insurgents only if there is a troop surge.

Both these observations speak poorly about the Karzai government’s ability and the Bush administration’s policy — or lack of it — vis à vis Afghanistan. Sarah Chayes’ The Punishment of Virtue helps us understand the current unsteady conditions of the mountain state.

Chayes was a reporter of the US National Public Radio (NPR) in Paris. She then covered the conflict in Kosovo and went to Afghanistan after 9/11, when President Bush, along with the UN, sent troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban, which had brought the country under its control in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal. Chayes left the NPR and joined an institution started by Hamid Karzai’s elder brother. She also collected money in the US. This institution, Afghanistan For Civil Society, had built houses and school buildings.

Local resistance to Taliban rule was ineffective. The US entered the fray only after 9/11 to chase Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda extremists and Taliban fundamentalists. Sarah Chayes had seen the last days of the Taliban and decided to stay on to see how the reconstruction of the new country would proceed. The war on terror was not only to bring peace to the ravaged country but also bring democracy.

However, this experiment was flawed right from the beginning. Democracy is built and strengthened by the evolution of several institutions and laying a foundation by the rule of law. Chayes shows how Karzai as president and the Bush administration as his mentor relied not on building institutions but in engaging with the warlords, who were and still are a law unto themselves.

Based in Kandahar, Chayes travelled a lot risking her life and meeting several officials of the Karzai government and also American civil and military officials. She got acquainted with Hamid Karzai when he was consolidating the forces opposing the Taliban and, thus, helped US to defeat the Taliban. She had the confidence of his brothers, relations and him. Written with great passion, she draws personal sketches of several people with the history of their tribes in her book.

Kandahar is still the most troubled spot but the tragedy of not only Kandahar but the whole of Afghanistan is manmade. By assigning responsibility of the local administration to the warlords, the US and the Karzai government have taken a suicidal course. No wonder then, that Gul Agha Shirzai, a warlord, defied president Karzai and usurped the powers of Kandahar. The de-throned governor, Muhammad Akrem Khakrezwal, then became Kandahar’s police chief. Strangely, this coup was helped by the US, which provided military escort to Shirzai. Thus, though the US was supporting Karzai, it was also propping up a rebel warlord, who was opposed to Karzai.

But Karzai did not protest. Chayes ultimately found out that Karzai was not averse to a warlord taking the post of a governor. When Shirzai was deprived of the army by Karzai, he built a militia of his own, which was paid from the custom duty money, which was never deposited with the central government’s treasury.

Shirzai was a thug, running narcotic trade, and was in league with Pakistan. After a while, Shirzai was appointed minister in the central government; but his successor was his partner in all the illegal activities and also helpful to Pakistan

In Kandahar, Chaman and other places Chayes had seen with her own eyes how Pakistani arms were unloaded at night and then transferred to the Taliban. Near the Southern University, several Pakistani students were admitted in schools, which were the recruiting ground for the Taliban. ISI agents had a free access to Kandahar and even Kabul. They were supplied the money and the weapons by the US to fight Taliban. But Pakistani agents were transferring a large number of weapons to the Taliban, which, in turn, is killing US and Nato troops. Thus, because the Bush administration had no clear cut Afghan policy, its arms were used to kill its own soldiers in Afghanistan.

Muhammad Akrem was a friend of Karzai and devoted to him. He was an efficient police chief but Karzai could not save him from the mechanisation of Shirzai. He was transferred first to Kabul and then to Mazar-i-Sharif. He was friendly with Chayes and used to give confidential information to her. He, as well as Karzai’s brothers, could not understand why Karzai was tolerating warlords. Ultimately, Muhammad Akrem was killed. It was palpable that Shirzai’s hand was in this crime but nothing happened to him.

Some elders of the tribes were also agitated and they wanted the Taliban as well as Al Qaeda to be ousted. So Chayes made them write two petitions, one to Karzai and the other to the US military command. They wanted Taliban to be brought under control. They also demanded the ouster of Pakistan’s agents. But nothing happened. It was found that Pakistan, Iran and China were taking all efforts to keep the fires burning in Afghanistan.

Karzai blames Pakistan for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. He is right. Pakistan has delivered some Al Qaeda leading figures to the US, but practically no Taliban leader. Nevertheless, Pakistan alone is not to be blamed.

Both Bush and Karzai administrations have allowed the Taliban to grow under their noses. At the beginning of the war on terror, then US defence secretary, in his quest for more power, successfully sidelined the state department. The Pentagon was conducting the foreign policy in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. It was in that period that the warlords were protected and given various posts of influence. Karzai continued with this policy. Thus, instead of preparing the ground for democracy, they strengthened the warlords, who are after power and wealth, and are in league with Taliban and Pakistan.

So who governs Afghanistan? The war lords rule. And both Karzai and Bush administrations are responsible for the continued turmoil and the bloodshed.

Støre admits some mistakes after terrorist attack in Kabul

Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told a parliamentary committee Wednesday night that some things "could have been done differently" when his staff suddenly needed to deal with a terrorist attack in Kabul in January

Støre continued to vehemently deny any suggestion that ministry officials favoured one of their own wounded staff members over another wounded journalist for Oslo newspaper Dagbladet.

The ministry staffer survived after emergency transport was arranged for him. Journalist Carsten Thomassen's evacuation from the site of the terrorist attack at a Kabul hotel was delayed, and he later died.

"We did what we could to assist both the wounded Norwegians," Støre told members of parliament who have questioned the ministry's handling of the attack. "I will deny any suggestion that we differentiated between the two of them."

Støre admitted, however, that "I see that one thing or another could have been done differently."

That was a welcome admission for Thomassen's widow, who earlier this week criticized the Foreign Ministry for failing to answer her own questions about how ministry staff reacted to the attack. Thomassen had been covering Støre's visit to Kabul in mid-January, along with other Norwegian journalists, when the hotel where the Norwegian delegation was staying came under attack.

It's been reported that Norway's Defense Ministry has sharply criticized the Foreign Ministry for planning the trip to Kabul poorly, and downgrading the need for military protection. Foreign Ministry officials have admitted they wanted the trip to be seen as civilian in nature, not military.

Member of Parliament Per-Kristian Foss of the Conservatives, a former government minister himself, claimed at the committee hearing Wednesday that the planning had been criticized, and wasn't contradicted by Defense Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, one of Støre's government colleagues.

Strøm-Erichsen, however, refuses to release military documents believed to contain such criticism. "She wants to protect Jonas," Foss said.

Afghanistan Launches the Privatization of Afghan Telecom

Afghanistan's government has announced plans for the privatization of Afghan Telecom Corporation. The Ministry of Communications and IT released a Request for Expressions of Interest (REI) in the sale of 80% of the shares of the company, in what it says will be the most ambitious privatization project in Afghanistan to date.

Interested Parties have until the 4th of April to submit their expressions of interest.

Afghan Telecom currently operates a fixed wireless CDMA network in 110 districts, with coverage expanding to 365 districts. The company also plans to introduce village communications network that will connect 5,000 villages to telecoms services.

IDPs Assisted In Kabul

18 Mar 2008 11:03:00 GMT - Source: Dorcas Aid International - Netherlands, C. Langejan-Candelin

Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are the author's alone.

-"It breaks you heart when you see the skinny children running around on their bare feet in the cold" says a representative of ORA Afghanistan.

Dorcas Aid International and ORA Afghanistan are in a joint operation assisting 3,000 IDPs in Kabul this week and one month forward. ORA Afghanistan, that implements the project, works together with the local authorities in order to assure that the truly needy people receive food and blankets and that double efforts are avoided.

"Pakistan and Iran are closing a lot of their refugee-camps and so many IDPs have no other choice than to return to their country of origin, Afghanistan. Here the government sometimes makes a plot of land available - outside the city - for the refugee families. But that's all. The IDPs have no food, no electricity, no drinking water and no shelter. Many of them come to Kabul in search for food, a job, a future. Often they end up living in basic tents. You can understand the circumstances are even more difficult now when it's winter and the temperature can drop to -20 C. In addition, this is the worst winter in decades!" says a representative of ORA Afghanistan.

The relief items are purchased in Kabul in order to keep the transport costs low and also stimulate the local economy. Staple food prices have increased 100 % in global markets and by over 60 % in Afghan markets in the past 12 months, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported.

Dorcas Aid International and ORA the Netherlands recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the aim of jointly serving the suffering people in the world better.

Former Taliban foreign minister rejects political role, urges "reconciliation"

Text of interview with Mullah Wakil Ahmed Motawakkil, former foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan -Taliban, by Muhammad al-Shafi'i by Saudi-owned leading pan-Arab daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat website on 15 March

Once again, Afghanistan is in the eye of the storm and at the heart of events. The bloody violence in the south has escalated and reached the heart of the capital Kabul, which has caused the Western coalition forces to review their strategy and ask for more troops. This has come amid differences among NATO members regarding the rapidly deteriorating security situation and the demands for more troops that are better trained and more flexible to fight the influence of Taleban, as well as offer the support, training, and equipment needed by the Afghan National Army. All this has caused some to inquire about the fate of Afghan President Hamed Karzai before the Afghan elections scheduled for next year. There also are the unceasing questions about the tens of billions of dollars that the Western countries have spent in vain to restore security and stability to the streets of Afghanistan since the fall of the Taleban six years ago, as the latter is threatening to spread througho! ut the country now.

Over the past two weeks, Al-Sharq al-Awsat has visited Afghanistan and travelled between the Bagram Base, where the most famous US prison and military bases are, and the capital Kabul, as well as the provinces of Konar and Bamian, in order to convey a picture of the hot events taking place on the ground. Al-Sharq al-Awsat also has conducted a series of investigations and discussion in the field with important persons to discover the truth of what is going there, and has acquainted itself with the social and economic changes in the capital Kabul.

Mullah Wakil Ahmed Motawakkil, the former foreign minister in the Taleban government, has been trying to avoid the media by all means since he was released from prison three years ago. This has been in marked contrast to what he did before his government was toppled and he was arrested or surrendered himself to the coalition forces in Kandahar. Today, Mullah Motawakkil is the only person capabl! e of revealing much of the circumstances that accompanied the fall of the Taleban and is an eyewitness to that era. He was the link between the leadership of the Taleban movement and the external world that besieged it from all sides until its fall at the hands of the United States and the war it led against Afghanistan after the 11 September attacks. However, the more important role is that which he might play in the present changing circumstances in Afghanistan, and the failure of the United States to impose security and stability after six years of war and promises of development, stability, and reconstruction.

Characteristic of Mullah Motawakkil, the former foreign minister of the Taleban government, is his openness, calm, frankness, simplicity, and his ability to manoeuvre in a very small space. Al-Sharq al-Awsat has met with him twice; the first was in his office a few months before the fall of the Taleban government in 2001. At that time, he talked about following world news on satellite channels in his office, in spite of the tot! al ban of television broadcasting by the Taleban government throughout Afghanistan, and spoke in defence of the movement as a whole. The second time was in his humble private villa on an unpaved street adorned by holes and stagnant rain water in Khoshal Khan in the western part of Kabul. At the door of the villa there were a number of fierce Pashtun guards.

Mullah Wakil himself has not changed much since I last saw him at his office more than six years ago. He still wears his white cloak, and his facial features have not changed either, with the exception of a few grey hairs in his beard. In his sitting room, he told me that the guards outside are "for us and on us." I did not understand what he meant until my escort explained it to me. My escort was an intermediary source; he was an Afghan who speaks fluent Arabic and has facilitated the conducting of this interview. He told me that the guards are elements of the Afghani secret services; that is, they are there to pr! otect Mullah Motawakkil, but also to inform about his guests and movem ents.

At his first meeting with an Arabic-language newspaper since his release from Bagram Prison, Mullah Wakil revealed at his residence that he wanted to keep away from politics by all means. He pointed out that he is keeping busy by translating major Islamic sources on interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah, as well as the Hadith or sayings and deeds of the Prophet, and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), into Pashto and Dari, the two major local languages in Afghanistan. He stated that if the clock could be turned back he would refuse to become Taleban foreign minister, which he accepted unwillingly as a result of pressure put on him by Mullah Omar. He added that he tried to leave his post, but he was not able to do so.

Mullah Wakil revealed that he met with Mullah Omar in Kandahar one day before the war started in November 2001. His mind was miles away and he could not concentrate, but he believed the United States would not launch war against a small state like A! fghanistan. Mullah Motawakkil talked about his prison experience in Kandahar and the Bagram Base, where he spent two years and 12 days, and another year under house arrest. He explained that he is a free man today; he goes out for Friday prayers at a nearby mosque and he receives visitors. He admitted that the movement made mistakes such as forbidding the school education of girls, but he stated that was a temporary measure. He denied having any relations with the present Taleban leadership, and he gave a copy of his book Taleban and Afghanistan as a gift to Al-Sharq al-Awsat.

Mullah Motawakkil speaks Pashto, Dari, and English. The following is the text of the discussion that Al-Sharq al-Awsat held with him.

[Al-Shafi'i] What is Mullah Wakil doing after his release from Bagram Prison?

[Motawakkil] These days, I am busy with cultural and religious activities; I am translating major Arabic and Islamic sources into Pashto, so that the Islamic teachings will r! each the general public in Afghanistan. I am translating books like th e interpretation of the Koran and Sahih Bukhari and Muslim and commentaries on faith.

[Al-Shafi'i] Are you going to put yourself forward as a candidate in the forthcoming general election?

[Motawakkil] If the situation continues as it is at present with no reconciliation and no security in the streets, it will be difficult for me to run for election.

[Al-Shafi'i] Is Afghanistan still paying the price for playing host to [Usamah] Bin-Ladin and the Arabs in the days of the Taleban?

[Motawakkil] Afghanistan is still in a state of war, and I cannot say that what we are going through is the price for playing host to Bin-Ladin. We have inherited Bin-Ladin and the Arabs; they were here in Afghanistan long before the arrival of the Taleban government in 1996. Yes, we were responsible for Bin-Ladin, but the government of the day in Afghanistan is not the Taleban government and the war is different today. It is a domestic war and Usamah Bin-Ladin is not present! on Afghan territory. Although Bin-Ladin was basically a contractor, a profession he inherited from his family, he did not offer anything to the people in the street; not even the present government has offered anything to the people in the street. Yes, Bin-Ladin destroyed the twin towers and claimed responsibility for that, but the war against the Afghan people still is continuing six years after the fall of the Taleban. It is a question that all the Afghan people are asking: why is the war still ongoing?

[Al-Shafi'i] Immediately before the war, meaning days before the fall of the Taleban, did Mullah Omar consult you as foreign minister?

[Motawakkil] No he did not: Mullah Omar believed the war would not happen. He believed that a superpower like the United States would never launch a fierce war against a small state like Afghanistan. Personally, I used to believe the opposite; that is, that the war was coming and there was no doubt about it. The consultations a! mong the brothers in the Taleban and others were continuous, and Mulla h Omar was in a state of "pondering" one day before the war. After the war, there was no contact between us.

[Al-Shafi'i] How many times did you see Mullah Omar in the last decisive days before the fall of the Taleban?

[Motawakkil] As I stated, one day before the war started, I remember seeing Mullah Omar. He was under immense mental pressure and was immersed in his thoughts, but he believed the war would not happen.

[Al-Shafi'i] How long did you stay in the prison at the Bagram Base?

[Motawakkil] Two years and 12 days. That was a time very hard to bear.

[Al-Shafi'i] What is the hardest thing to put up with in a US military prison?

[Motawakkil] Note that I am here talking about the US government. I discovered that the officials and the interrogators I came across in prison do not keep their promises. They were supposed to be operatives of a Western government that knows the rules of democracy and transparency. For instance, when I surrende! red myself to them in Kandahar, they stated that the matter would not take more than days or a few weeks at the most and "we are going to ask you a few questions relative to you. You will not stay with us long; then you will return to your family". However, the days and weeks exceeded two years. They also stated that they were not going to take me to Guantanamo in Cuba, but they took me in a military plane that landed in Turkey, and then brought me back to Bagram again. That was half-way to Guantanamo. Perhaps, they wanted to tell me that taking me to Cuba was not a difficult matter.

[Al-Shafi'i] What was the Koranic Ayat or verse that you always memorized and always repeated in prison?

[Motawakkil] "The Lord is my Shepherd."

[Al-Shafi'i] From your own point of view, what is behind the Taleban's present sudden rise six years after the fall of Kabul?

[Motawakkil] I cannot answer this question, because I have no relations with the Taleban. What I can t! alk about is mere perception based on a reading of indicators from sid es, the government and the Taleban. The government claims that Pakistan is the financier of the Taleban, while Taleban states that Islamic people, ordinary Afghans, and others like them finance the movement.

[Al-Shafi'i] A US report states that Karzai's government controls only 30 per cent of Afghanistan; what do you say?

[Motawakkil] If the calculation relates to the land surface, then perhaps it is appropriate statistically. However, from the administrative point of view, the government declares that it controls all the provinces in Afghanistan.

[Al-Shafi'i] Were you allowed to wear your headdress in Bagram Prison?

[Motawakkil] We were not allowed to wear Afghan headdress in prison. Those were difficult times; they took from us our Afghan costumes and gave us a blue suit instead. They gave me an orange one before they tried to transfer me to Cuba.

[Al-Shafi'i] Television was forbidden in the Taleban era and there are 11 television channels now! . What do you watch at the moment?

[Motawakkil] Television was not forbidden under the Taleban; it was suspended for a certain period. Television teams were there and so were the TV archives; there also was a post of chairman of television. In other words, television broadcasting only was suspended for a limited period. Even in the days of the Taleban, I used to watch the CNN, Sharjah, Iqra, and Al-Jazeera channels through the television dish. Nowadays, I watch the same channels, but sometimes I watch the Afghan national television channel.

[Al-Shafi'i] Why are drugs so widespread in entire provinces like Helmand? Statistics state that Afghanistan produces 50 per cent of the world production of heroin?

[Motawakkil] In the days of the Taleban, when a fatwa or an order was issued, it used to be obeyed strictly. Mullah Omar issued a fatwa (a religious advisory opinion) that made the planting of drugs illegal; the farmers obeyed. Now, the situation is complete! ly different.

[Al-Shafi'i] What does Afghanistan need at present , and what is lacking?

[Motawakkil] It needs reconciliation among Afghans.

[Al-Shafi'i] If your eldest son Khaled came to you and stated "I want to be a TV announcer", would you agree?

[Motawakkil] He is learning about religion and religious sciences at present. When he graduates, I will not stand in the way of his choice of employment.

[Al-Shafi'i] Have you written your memoirs?

[Motawakkil] I am busy with my cultural and religious activities. I do not write memoirs, and I do not have time for that at present.

[Al-Shafi'i] What role do you think you can play in the shadow of the United States' failure to impose its will and restore stability and security to the land of Afghanistan?

[Motawakkil] The person who can play an important role now is a person with plenty of spare time. I am busy with religious and cultural activities and I am doing what I can.

[Al-Shafi'i] Six years after the fall of the Taleban, can you point out the! positive and negative aspects of the Taleban Movement?

[Motawakkil] Every human movement has its negative and positive aspects; however, I can tell you that the governments that have followed the Taleban are not able to solve the problems of this country. As for the Taleban, I can state that we were weak and the country was in ruins. We were not in a position that allowed us to host anybody, but we agreed to host the Arabs because of the religious responsibility. I do not want to state that we ought to have delivered them to the countries demanding their extradition, but basically we were not in a position that allowed us to host others. In other words, we ought not to have hosted Bin-Ladin; this was the gravest mistake that the Taleban committed. With respect to the economy and the educational field, the Taleban Movement ought to have carried out certain projects, such as girls' education, even though it was suspended. Something ought to have been done with regard t! o the elementary stage; the university stage was there and there was a medical school that had male and female students. There was a Shari'ah college.

[Al-Shafi'i] Do you think the foreign forces will leave Afghanistan one day?

[Motawakkil] Afghanistan is a country with history, and I believe the foreign forces cannot live here forever. The history of our country is older than that of our neighbouring countries, and history proves that the foreign forces will leave. Previously, this happened before to the British and to the Russians. They might not leave soon, but they will leave. It is the Afghans who will live in their country.

[Al-Shafi'i] If you could turn back the clock, would you have rejected the office of foreign minister under the Taleban?

[Motawakkil] I am telling the truth and being frank; even when I was the foreign minister in the Taleban era that was not my wish. I was not happy about it. Mullah Omar put pressure on me to accept the position of foreign minister. I was, as the saying goes: "Your brother was! forced; he was not a hero." I had to listen and obey him because he was in charge. If I could turn back the clock, I would imagine myself without an official position.

Editorial: Twin threats from Tribal Areas

Daily Times 18 March 2008

A bombing strike on Sunday near Wana in the tribal agency of South Waziristan has destroyed a house, killing, it is said, 20 people, most of them Arab “foreigners”. Another version puts the death toll at much less but says the killed included Arabs, Central Asians and “non-locals” from Punjab. The “precision” strikes are variously described as having come from high-flying aircraft and from drones. The local “militants” hurriedly collected the charred remains of the bodies and buried them before the identity of those killed could be ascertained by the local population.

There are two clear threats to the security of Pakistan in the Sunday incident and the ones that have taken place prior to that. One threat is of course the “internal” threat posed by the rise of the Taliban who are said to be of “three types”: the local enthusiasts for an Islamic order put off by the American invasion of Afghanistan; those organised as a militia but aligned to the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Umar; and those working for Al Qaeda and the “Arabs” still active in our Tribal Areas.

The other threat is the threat of intervention from the international force stationed inside Afghanistan under a UN Security Council resolution. The strikes from the air are routinely denied by the NATO command, and the bombings from across the border are assumed to be, at worst, “missiles gone astray”. But no one is deceived by this explanation and the strikes are seen by many in Pakistan as violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Thus the latest Wana strikes have been condemned by the leader of Jama’at-e Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmad. A large number of politicians and members of civil society also believe this to be the case.

There is “loss of territory” associated with the dominance of the Taliban under the warlord Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. His spokesmen have repeatedly warned Islamabad about its membership in the global coalition against terrorism. They seem to be actually offering a deal: get out of the “coalition” and the suicide-bombings will cease. Most of the opposition parties under the Musharraf regime remain convinced that the right course to adopt with the threat in the Tribal Areas is “negotiations”. The ANP, a party included in the coming coalition government in Islamabad, has offered such a dialogue to Baitullah Mehsud whose spokesman has welcomed it.

The problem with the state of Pakistan is loss of territory and the establishment of a parallel sovereign authority in the Tribal Areas by the Taliban. Can the state negotiate its right to have its writ re-established? The moment you negotiate with Baitullah Mehsud you indirectly grant him the status of an equal party. If the politicians talk to him “unofficially”, the conditionality of abandoning the coalition against terrorism will be immediately posited to them. The argument will appeal to the politician who is already worried about “loss of sovereignty to America”. But if we grant this conditionality, “the other threat” will immediately stare us in the face.

Getting out of the war against terrorism would mean a number of things. It would first mean a declaration taking Pakistan out of its commitment to resolution 373 of the UN Security Council. The consequence of that action will be loss of political and financial support Pakistan has enjoyed since 2001 when it supported the UN resolution. There is no need here to recount the economic benefits that have accrued since then, especially in the shape of the rescheduling of Pakistan’s debts, the increase in Pakistan’s conventional military forces and the removal of sanctions that came in the wake of the 1998 nuclear testing. But the biggest disadvantage will come from the free hand it will give to the ISAF-NATO forces in Afghanistan to hit targets deep inside Pakistan with untold collateral damage.

It is Pakistan’s partnership within the global coalition against terrorism and its refusal to allow a free run of its territory to the ISAF-NATO forces that is restraining all possibility of deep strikes so far. Once out of it, Pakistan will have a weak case against such a trespass owing to its loss of control over territories being used today for infiltration into Afghanistan and retreat back into Pakistan by terrorists after they have completed their operations there. A policy of defiance may worsen the situation. Any economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan by America and the NATO states will have immediate adverse effect on the population of Pakistan.

Conceptually imprecise solutions will not help the new parliament as it comes into being in the coming days. Simple negotiations with Baitullah Mehsud will not get us rid of terrorism and suicide-bombings. A simple defiant “boo” to the international forces in Afghanistan will not clinch the matter either. A steady but firm approach towards the militants, supported by a political consensus in parliament, on the other hand, will yield gradual dividends. The sooner parliament and the next government assume “ownership of the war on terror”, the better. *

U.S. Adapts Cold-War Idea to Fight Terrorists

NY Times, By ERIC SCHMITT and THOM SHANKER Published: March 18, 2008

WASHINGTON — In the days immediately after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, members of President Bush’s war cabinet declared that it would be impossible to deter the most fervent extremists from carrying out even more deadly terrorist missions with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

Since then, however, administration, military and intelligence officials assigned to counterterrorism have begun to change their view. After piecing together a more nuanced portrait of terrorist organizations, they say there is reason to believe that a combination of efforts could in fact establish something akin to the posture of deterrence, the strategy that helped protect the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack during the cold war.

Interviews with more than two dozen senior officials involved in the effort provided the outlines of previously unreported missions to mute Al Qaeda’s message, turn the jihadi movement’s own weaknesses against it and illuminate Al Qaeda’s errors whenever possible.

A primary focus has become cyberspace, which is the global safe haven of terrorist networks. To counter efforts by terrorists to plot attacks, raise money and recruit new members on the Internet, the government has mounted a secret campaign to plant bogus e-mail messages and Web site postings, with the intent to sow confusion, dissent and distrust among militant organizations, officials confirm.

At the same time, American diplomats are quietly working behind the scenes with Middle Eastern partners to amplify the speeches and writings of prominent Islamic clerics who are renouncing terrorist violence.

At the local level, the authorities are experimenting with new ways to keep potential terrorists off guard.

In New York City, as many as 100 police officers in squad cars from every precinct converge twice daily at randomly selected times and at randomly selected sites, like Times Square or the financial district, to rehearse their response to a terrorist attack. City police officials say the operations are believed to be a crucial tactic to keep extremists guessing as to when and where a large police presence may materialize at any hour. “What we’ve developed since 9/11, in six or seven years, is a better understanding of the support that is necessary for terrorists, the network which provides that support, whether it’s financial or material or expertise,” said Michael E. Leiter, acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

“We’ve now begun to develop more sophisticated thoughts about deterrence looking at each one of those individually,” Mr. Leiter said in an interview. “Terrorists don’t operate in a vacuum.”

In some ways, government officials acknowledge, the effort represents a second-best solution. Their preferred way to combat terrorism remains to capture or kill extremists, and the new emphasis on deterrence in some ways amounts to attaching a new label to old tools.

“There is one key question that no one can answer: How much disruption does it take to give you the effect of deterrence?” said Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of a new study, “On Nuclear Terrorism.”

The New Deterrence

The emerging belief that terrorists may be subject to a new form of deterrence is reflected in two of the nation’s central strategy documents.

The 2002 National Security Strategy, signed by the president one year after the Sept. 11 attacks, stated flatly that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.”

Four years later, however, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism concluded: “A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists and supporters from contemplating a W.M.D. attack and, failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack.”

For obvious reasons, it is harder to deter terrorists than it was to deter a Soviet attack. Terrorists hold no obvious targets for American retaliation as Soviet cities, factories, military bases and silos were under the cold-war deterrence doctrine. And it is far harder to pinpoint the location of a terrorist group’s leaders than it was to identify the Kremlin offices of the Politburo bosses, making it all but impossible to deter attacks by credibly threatening a retaliatory attack.

But over the six and a half years since the Sept. 11 attacks, many terrorist leaders, including Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, have successfully evaded capture, and American officials say they now recognize that threats to kill terrorist leaders may never be enough to keep America safe.

So American officials have spent the last several years trying to identify other types of “territory” that extremists hold dear, and they say they believe that one important aspect may be the terrorists’ reputation and credibility with Muslims.

Under this theory, if the seeds of doubt can be planted in the mind of Al Qaeda’s strategic leadership that an attack would be viewed as a shameful murder of innocents — or, even more effectively, that it would be an embarrassing failure — then the order may not be given, according to this new analysis.

Senior officials acknowledge that it is difficult to prove what role these new tactics and strategies have played in thwarting plots or deterring Al Qaeda from attacking. Senior officials say there have been several successes using the new approaches, but many involve highly classified technical programs, including the cyberoperations, that they declined to detail.

They did point to some older and now publicized examples that suggest that their efforts are moving in the right direction.

George J. Tenet, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote in his autobiography that the authorities were concerned that Qaeda operatives had made plans in 2003 to attack the New York City subway using cyanide devices.

Mr. Zawahri reportedly called off the plot because he feared that it “was not sufficiently inspiring to serve Al Qaeda’s ambitions,” and would be viewed as a pale, even humiliating, follow-up to the 9/11 attacks.

And in 2002, Iyman Faris, a naturalized American citizen from Kashmir, began casing the Brooklyn Bridge to plan an attack and communicated with Qaeda leaders in Pakistan via coded messages about using a blowtorch to sever the suspension cables.

But by early 2003, Mr. Faris sent a message to his confederates saying that “the weather is too hot.” American officials said that meant Mr. Faris feared that the plot was unlikely to succeed — apparently because of increased security.

“We made a very visible presence there and that may have contributed to it,” said Paul J. Browne, the New York City Police Department’s chief spokesman. “Deterrence is part and parcel of our entire effort.”

Disrupting Cyberprojects

Terrorists hold little or no terrain, except on the Web. “Al Qaeda and other terrorists’ center of gravity lies in the information domain, and it is there that we must engage it,” said Dell L. Dailey, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief.

Some of the government’s most secretive counterterrorism efforts involve disrupting terrorists’ cyberoperations. In Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specially trained teams have recovered computer hard drives used by terrorists and are turning the terrorists’ tools against them.

“If you can learn something about whatever is on those hard drives, whatever that information might be, you could instill doubt on their part by just countermessaging whatever it is they said they wanted to do or planned to do,” said Brig. Gen. Mark O. Schissler, director of cyberoperations for the Air Force and a former deputy director of the antiterrorism office for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since terrorists feel safe using the Internet to spread ideology and gather recruits, General Schissler added, “you may be able to interfere with some of that, interrupt some of that.”

“You can also post messages to the opposite of that,” he added.

Other American efforts are aimed at discrediting Qaeda operations, including the decision to release seized videotapes showing members of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi group with some foreign leaders, training children to kidnap and kill, as well as a lengthy letter said to have been written by another terrorist leader that describes the organization as weak and plagued by poor morale.

Dissuading Militants

Even as security and intelligence forces seek to disrupt terrorist operations, counterterrorism specialists are examining ways to dissuade insurgents from even considering an attack with unconventional weapons. They are looking at aspects of the militants’ culture, families or religion, to undermine the rhetoric of terrorist leaders.

For example, the government is seeking ways to amplify the voices of respected religious leaders who warn that suicide bombers will not enjoy the heavenly delights promised by terrorist literature, and that their families will be dishonored by such attacks. Those efforts are aimed at undermining a terrorist’s will.

“I’ve got to figure out what does dissuade you,” said Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, the Joint Chiefs’ director of strategic plans and policy. “What is your center of gravity that we can go at? The goal you set won’t be achieved, or you will be discredited and lose face with the rest of the Muslim world or radical extremism that you signed up for.”

Efforts are also under way to persuade Muslims not to support terrorists. It is a delicate campaign that American officials are trying to promote and amplify — but without leaving telltale American fingerprints that could undermine the effort in the Muslim world. Senior Bush administration officials point to several promising developments.

Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, Grand Mufti Sheik Abdul Aziz al-Asheik, gave a speech last October warning Saudis not to join unauthorized jihadist activities, a statement directed mainly at those considering going to Iraq to fight the American-led forces.

And Abdul-Aziz el-Sherif, a top leader of the armed Egyptian movement Islamic Jihad and a longtime associate of Mr. Zawahri, the second-ranking Qaeda official, has just completed a book that renounces violent jihad on legal and religious grounds.

Such dissents are serving to widen rifts between Qaeda leaders and some former loyal backers, Western and Middle Eastern diplomats say.

“Many terrorists value the perception of popular or theological legitimacy for their actions,” said Stephen J. Hadley, Mr. Bush’s national security adviser. “By encouraging debate about the moral legitimacy of using weapons of mass destruction, we can try to affect the strategic calculus of the terrorists.”

Denying Support

As the top Pentagon policy maker for special operations, Michael G. Vickers creates strategies for combating terrorism with specialized military forces, as well as for countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

Much of his planning is old school: how should the military’s most elite combat teams capture and kill terrorists? But with each passing day, more of his time is spent in the new world of terrorist deterrence theory, trying to figure out how to prevent attacks by persuading terrorist support networks — those who enable terrorists to operate — to refuse any kind of assistance to stateless agents of extremism.

“Obviously, hard-core terrorists will be the hardest to deter,” Mr. Vickers said. “But if we can deter the support network — recruiters, financial supporters, local security providers and states who provide sanctuary — then we can start achieving a deterrent effect on the whole terrorist network and constrain terrorists’ ability to operate.

“We have not deterred terrorists from their intention to do us great harm,” Mr. Vickers said, “but by constraining their means and taking away various tools, we approach the overall deterrent effect we want.”

Much effort is being spent on perfecting technical systems that can identify the source of unconventional weapons or their components regardless of where they are found — and letting nations around the world know the United States has this ability.

President Bush has declared that the United States will hold “fully accountable” any nation that shares nuclear weapons with another state or terrorists.

Rear Adm. William P. Loeffler, deputy director of the Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction at the military’s Strategic Command, said Mr. Bush’s declaration meant that those who might supply arms or components to terrorists were just as accountable as those who ordered and carried out an attack. It is, the admiral said, a system of “attribution as deterrence.”

Afghan escape hatch opens in 2009

March 18, 2008 - James Travers, Toronto star

OTTAWA - There are so few ways of escaping a quagmire that Canada's trouble in finding a Kandahar partner could prove more blessing than curse. Should NATO fail to meet Parliament's minimum conditions for extending the mission until the end of 2011, Canada can and should march away next year with a clear conscience.

That's not what Stephen Harper wants or John Manley intended when he effectively set the bar for staying the Afghanistan course at 1,000 more troops and additional air support. But honourable withdrawal is better than wasting more lives and billions on a failing rescue of a failing state.

Sooner rather than later, the United States and the ambivalent alliance it leads must decide to go big in Afghanistan or come home. Three, five or 10 more years of equivocal, disjointed effort won't make that country secure or drag it from clan feudalism to modern democracy.

More troops, more reconstruction and, most of all, a more cohesive, co-ordinated strategy are required to morph wishful thinking into any real hope of making peace talks more attractive to insurgents than prolonged war.

To their credit, Manley's panellists spotted that central problem and addressed the best available solutions. Before attaching caveats to Canada's post-2009 role, their report urged NATO to quickly get its act together. Along with more boots and cash it argued for tough talk about porous borders with Afghanistan's neighbours and a crackdown on the Karzai administration's own endemic corruption.

Predictably, the importance of that sound advice was lost in Ottawa in politics. Conservatives determined to neutralize Afghanistan as an election issue and Liberals desperate to paste a veneer over internal cracks happily limited the discussions to the terms for keeping Canadians in Kandahar longer. Sidelined in last week's pro forma, shamefully poorly attended parliamentary debate was serious examination of the conditions necessary for Afghanistan success.

The net result is not encouraging. In setting low thresholds for its continued participation, Canada is making it too easy for NATO to maintain an unsatisfactory status quo. Worse, the alliance will escape any serious self-examination of its resolve if, as is increasingly expected, the U.S. either directly or indirectly provides Canada's additional support.

What's needed in Afghanistan goes far beyond another battle group, new helicopters and surveillance drones. As Manley stressed, NATO must fit action to words by proving that the mission is the priority.

If that's beyond member nations' political will – as it may well be – Canada deserves to know now, not at the end of 2011. Since first sending troops to help secure Kabul after the Taliban fled, this country has exceeded all clichéd expectations for middle powers. It has punched above its weight, stood shoulder-to-shoulder with allies and repeatedly paid the ultimate price.

This week that cost rose to 81 soldiers and one diplomat. It's certain to keep rising no matter how much the focus shifts from fighting to training the Afghanistan army and police. So it's neither unreasonable nor premature for this country to seek assurances that stretch well beyond the modest help the Prime Minister is now trying to winkle out of reluctant allies.

Supporting the troops is about more than flag-waving patriotism. It's about doing everything possible to create winning conditions and knowing when to stop asking soldiers to do the impossible.

James Travers' national affairs column appears Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]