In this bulletin:

• At least 34 killed in Afghan snowfalls
• Afghan gov't dismisses reports on civilian causalities in Musa Qala
• Envoys urged Taliban chief to 'abandon' rebels
• 'Bribes' free top Taleban leader
• Afghan officials show desire for U.S. attacks in Pakistan
• Taliban Tiff Turns Toxic
• Two Wars, One Enemy
• Germany Faces U.S. Calls for More Afghan Commitment, Aide Says
• Bulgaria will not send troops to Afghanistan provinces- PM
• Liberal Party Submits Recommendations on Afghan Mission to Independent Panel
• The great Afghan juggle
• Run for President of Afghanistan? Zalmay, Zalmay Not
• Afghan Civilians Were Killed Needlessly, Ex-Marine Testifies
• Polish General implicated in Afghan village scandal
• Bagram detention centre now twice the size of Guantanamo
• Britain jails would-be Taliban fighter
• Looking for Afghanistan's "Anbar moment"
• Editorial: Getting madrassa reform wrong – Daily Times 01.09.08
• Saving Afghanistan's Art
• Private security firms flooding Afghanistan

At least 34 killed in Afghan snowfalls

Herat (AFP) - Authorities said that at least 34 people had been killed in days of heavy snowfall across trouble-torn Afghanistan.

Hundreds of isolated communities were cut off after days of constant snowfall and rain blocking their roads to the major cities, authorities said.

Afghan health officials meanwhile have called on tens of thousands of health workers to stay on a state of alert.

In the worst incident, eight members of one family died when their mud-brick house collapsed under the weight of snow in western Herat province Monday night, Nooruddin Ahmadi, head of the Afghan Red Crescent in Herat, said.

Among others killed were six shepherds from a mountainous region in the province and two people in an avalanche nearby, he added.

Seven others, including two female health workers, were killed in another avalanche in central Ghor province, an official said, while five others perished in another avalanche in neighbouring Farah province.

Most parts of poverty-stricken Afghanistan is mountainous and extremely vulnerable in winter. Officials in western, central and northern parts of the country said that most roads leading to small towns and villages were closed.

"Our roads are blocked and we can't access communities in the districts," Sultan Uruzgani, the governor of the central province of Daikondi, said. He said two people were killed from cold and heavy snowfall there.

The Red Crescent's Ahmadi called on the Kabul government and the international community for urgent support before it turns into a "real disaster."

Afghan gov't dismisses reports on civilian causalities in Musa Qala

KABUL, Jan. 9 (Xinhua) -- Afghan Defense Ministry on Wednesday dismissed reports that at least 20 civilians were killed in a Taliban former fiefdom in southern Helmand province during a government operation.

"The reports that at least 20 civilians had been killed after recapturing Musa Qala by government troops are merely one sided and groundless," Defense Ministry spokesman Zahir Azimi told a press conference.

The spokesman criticized the BBC World Service for quoting an unnamed individual in its reports without verifying with the government. He put the number of civilian casualties at four.

Government forces backed by NATO troops regained the control of Musa Qala early last December. According to Azimi, some 200 Taliban insurgents had been killed during the operation.

Envoys urged Taliban chief to 'abandon' rebels

Belfast News - The Northern Ireland diplomat who was expelled from Afghanistan for talking to the Taliban was attempting to convince a prominent leader to change sides, it was claimed yesterday.

High-ranking UN official Mervyn Patterson and Republic-born Michael Semple – acting head of the EU mission to Afghanistan – held secret meetings with Mansoor Dadullah in Musa Qala, to the north of Helmand province.

Both envoys are vastly experienced and knowledgeable about the region and were, according to the Sunday Times, attempting to persuade the Taliban leader to abandon his rebel allies.

The fluent Dari speakers could have claimed a huge coup had their mission succeeded, but instead the Afghanistan government expelled them from the country when word about the meeting leaked out.

Dadullah succeeded his half-brother as Taliban military commander after the latter was killed by Afghan forces in May last year.

Afghan representatives who accompanied the envoys at the meeting later revealed details to Assadullah Wafa, Helmand province governor. He in turn complained to President Hamid Karzai, demanding that action be taken against the diplomats.

Dadullah, meanwhile, was removed from his post last month by the Taliban. The warring faction claimed he had been insubordinate and had refused to obey orders.

'Bribes' free top Taleban leader

By Alastair Leithead - BBC News, Kabul, 8 January 2008

A Taleban commander in Afghanistan responsible for leading attacks on British troops says he has been freed from prison after paying a bribe. Mullah Sorkh Naqaibullah told the BBC he paid $15,000 (£7,500) to the Afghan authorities to win his freedom.

It was the third time that the leader, known as the "Red Mullah", had been captured and released, he said. Mullah Naqaibullah operates in Helmand province, where there is a large concentration of British troops.

He told the BBC he had been released from custody for the third time in three years after paying a bribe to an Afghan National Directorate of Security official.

On the last occasion he said that he had been held for more than five months, but was now back in the Gereshk and surrounding districts of Helmand province leading a group of insurgents.

"I was arrested on 24 July and then they sent me into Kabul National Directorate of Security (NDS) custody," he said.

"The law is they can keep suspects in the NDS for two months and after that they have to send them to court.

"But I was in NDS custody for five months. On Friday (4 January) a visitor came to see me, and met the NDS officer on the gate. "He paid $15,000 to the officer, who then released me."

Mullah Naqaibullah also explained how in 2004 he had bribed his way out of Kabul's notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison, 16 months after being caught in Helmand.

He said he did the same thing the following year - 2005 - by bribing police to let him go after he had been caught again. An NDS spokesman refused to comment on his allegations, saying he could not confirm whether the reports were right or wrong.

But another NDS source confirmed that Mullah Naqaibullah had been released, and that an investigation had begun to track down those responsible. A Taleban spokesman said Mullah Naqaibullah had returned to Helmand.

Afghan officials show desire for U.S. attacks in Pakistan

(CP) - KABUL - Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders operate "outside the country."

The war on terror "should know no borders." The world should address the "root causes of terrorism - wherever they are." Afghan officials weave hints and suggestions but their meaning is becoming increasingly clear: Afghanistan would be more than happy for U.S. forces to attack Taliban and al-Qaida safe havens in Pakistan.

After the bloodiest year since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion, some analysts say the United States and NATO won't make lasting progress in Afghanistan, unless the militants' ability to command and control the insurgency from across the border is tackled.

The prospects of a U.S. military deployment inside Pakistan, a key U.S. ally in its war on terror, remain slim, because of the outrage it would trigger from the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the wider public.

Last weekend, Pakistan said it would not let U.S. forces hunt militants on its soil after the New York Times newspaper said President George W. Bush's administration was considering expanding CIA and Special Forces operations into Pakistan's tribal regions.

But that doesn't mean Afghan officials won't lobby for military strikes anyway - a call likely to enflame already touchy relations with Pakistan just two weeks after the countries' presidents met in Pakistan and pledged to share intelligence and tighten border controls to quash militancy.

"Terrorism is like a spring. It is better to go to the main source than to fight the water's flow," said Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, Afghan Defence Ministry spokesman.

The chief of Afghanistan's intelligence service, Amrullah Saleh, said recently terrorism's defeat requires either Afghanistan's borders be sealed or "the strategy of the coalition forces toward Pakistan should change."

"We believe the war on terror should know no borders," Saleh told Afghanistan's Tolo TV.

"This was the first slogan by the Americans and the U.S.-led international coalition forces. But this war has unfortunately been confined to borders."

The 2,400-kilometre Afghan-Pakistan border has long been a complicating factor in U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

Top al-Qaida and Taliban leaders are suspected of running their operations out of tribal areas in Pakistan, where U.S. forces cannot pursue them and the region is considered a likely hiding place for accused terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri.

Pakistan army and Foreign Ministry spokesmen did not respond to calls seeking comment but the government has repeatedly denied Taliban leaders orchestrate the Afghan insurgency from its soil - and U.S. intelligence reports that al-Qaida leaders have regrouped there.

Taliban militants, in fact, pose a growing threat to Pakistan's own security. Hundreds of people have died, many of them security forces, as Islamist fighters have grabbed control of tracts of Pakistan's northwestern frontier. In the last three months alone there have been 19 suicide attacks, mostly targetting the army or government.

In the highest-profile attack, Pakistan's government said it suspects the top Taliban leader in Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud, was behind the Dec. 27 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

Bush's top security advisers - including Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice - debated last week whether to expand the authority of the CIA and the military to "conduct far more aggressive covert operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan," the New York Times reported Sunday.

Humayun Hamidzada, spokesman for Afghan President Hamid Karzai, said Tuesday: "Wherever the international community carries out operations against terrorism," it would have a positive effect in Afghanistan.

"I'm not going to comment about the specifics about operations inside Pakistan. All I'm going to say is that we should address the sources, the root causes of terrorism wherever they are," Hamidzada said, hinting heavily Afghanistan believes that to be in Pakistan.

Saleh, the intelligence chief, said political pressure, financial incentives and informational exchanges with Pakistan have been ineffective. The Taliban has leadership councils in the Pakistani cities Quetta, Miranshah and Peshawar, he said.

Karzai has previously alleged Taliban supreme commander Mullah Omar hides in Quetta, which Pakistan denies.

Saleh said although the terrorist organizations are not strong enough to resist Pakistan's army, "the system in Pakistan has no political determination to eliminate these elements and forces."

Yet U.S. commanders in Afghanistan are quick to praise Pakistan's role in fighting militancy, saying Pakistani forces have killed or arrested scores of insurgents while taking heavy casualties. The Pakistan army has also improved border co-ordination and communication with Afghan and NATO officials, U.S. officials said.

But Seth Jones, a Washington-based analyst with the RAND Corp. who follows Afghanistan, said that is not enough.

"If in 2008 the U.S., NATO in general, is unable to make any notable differences in the (Pakistani) tribal areas, the situation in Afghanistan will not get better," he said, suggesting Pakistani government or tribal forces could root out militants.

"That would be a multiyear effort to clear and hold those regions," he said.

"I'm not saying it's going to happen but it's one key factor that will influence the next year."

Taliban Tiff Turns Toxic

strategypage.com - January 8, 2008: In Afghanistan, the Taliban are fighting among themselves via press releases. It all began late last month when Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar publically dismissed one of his top military commanders, Shah Mansoor Dadullah, for disobeying orders. Dadullah was also expelled from the Taliban. Shah Mansoor Dadullah was in charge of Taliban operations in Kandahar and Helmand province. This is the most active area of combat with the Taliban. Dadullah refused to accept the order, and responded with claims that this was all the work of other Taliban leaders who were jealous of the Dadullah family.

Shah Mansoor Dadullah is the younger brother of Mullah Dadullah, another Taliban leader who was killed last May by NATO troops. Shah Mansoor Dadullah succeeded his older brother, but apparently not to the satisfaction of the top man in the Taliban; Mullah Omar. Mansoor says that he tortured the truth out of some traitors, who informed him that his elder brother was murdered by other Taliban, who made it look like NATO troops got him. This goes over well with pro-Taliban Afghans, who prefer to think that their badass leaders are being knocked off by other Taliban, rather than government or NATO troops.

Both Dadullah brothers had a reputation for greed and ruthless behavior. The Dadullah boys took well to working with the drug gangs. Apparently the Taliban leadership is having second thoughts about the un-Islamic behavior of this new generation of field commanders. But now that this is spat is being fought via press releases, and perhaps, eventually, violence, it is providing much entertainment, and encouragement, for government and NATO troops. The government sees all this as a falling out among thieves, and something that can only help the government in their war with the Taliban and drug gangs.

Two Wars, One Enemy

Strategypage.com - January 9, 2008:  The Taliban offensive, that has been going on for nearly a year now, is transnational. About 40 percent of the action takes place across the border in Pakistan. Thus while the fighting has killed about 6,500 in the past year (two-thirds of them Taliban) in Afghanistan, 3,600 have died just across the border in Pakistan (40 percent of them Taliban). Civilians are more likely to be the victims in Pakistan, where they are 42 percent of the dead, compared to Afghanistan, where civilians are only 14 percent of those killed in the fighting. NATO is better at killing Taliban, and avoiding civilian casualties.

While the Taliban managed to take control of the Afghanistan in the late 1990s, the movement has its origins in Pakistan, where it still has lots of support. But the Taliban faces a different kind of war on each side of the border. In Afghanistan, the government does not have a lot of military manpower, but does have foreign allies who have aircraft and smart bombs. That means Taliban fighters are more likely to be killed, but that there is not enough manpower to halt the production of dangerous drugs (opium and heroin). The drugs provide more cash to the Taliban on the Afghanistan side of the war. One Taliban leader recently boasted of paying a $15,000 bribe to get out of jail, and this was the third time he had done that. Not a wise move, as he will end up in a U.S. or NATO run jail next time around. But you get the picture.

Pakistan also has a problem with many of its troops, who are not eager to fight the tribesmen. For thousands of years, the fierce, and fearless, tribesmen have terrified the lowlanders. Not so in Afghanistan, where everyone is a badass tribal warrior. Most of the foreign troops in Afghanistan are also ready for a fight, and regularly beat the Taliban fighters at their own game. Indeed, there is currently a British Gurkha battalion serving in Afghanistan, whose reputation has preceded it. Taliban fighters are avoiding the Gurkhas, which is hard to do. The Gurkhas come from a similar mountainous region to the east, and are noticeably faster, than the British and Canadian troops they work with, when moving cross country.

Gurkhas were the least of the Taliban's troubles in 2007. Playing the bad guy has hurt morale. The Taliban were ordered to attack aid and reconstruction projects. As a result, at least a hundred aid workers were killed or kidnapped in 2007, and 55 relief convoys looted or destroyed. That has meant some remote areas are facing starvation this Winter because those convoys could not get through before snow closed the passes. For the Taliban, it's "God's will." For the starving villagers, it's all about not being pro-Taliban enough to please the Islamic terrorists. The Taliban leadership is openly feuding over these tactics, with loud accusations of "traitor" and "butcher" being tossed about.

In Pakistan, the security forces are numerous enough to literally seal off the tribal areas, making it uneconomical to run major drug operations. That's why the heroin business moved across the border to Afghanistan two decades ago. But the Taliban have not gone anywhere, and more of their al Qaeda allies have moved in. The Pakistanis are bucking thousands of years of tradition by putting the pressure on the tribes. But there isn't much choice. Unlike in the past, the tribesmen aren't moving raiding parties down into the lowlands. They are sending terrorists instead, who use suicide bombers and other forms of assassination to go after the national leadership. That makes it kind of personal for the big shots. Self-preservation will motivate a politician as well as anyone else. The war on the Pakistani side of the border is heating up. You can tell by the flow of refugees. Many more are moving from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In the last week or so, over 5,000 have been counted entering Afghanistan to avoid the fighting.

The Pushtun tribes are always ready to make deals, and negotiations continue on both sides of the border. But because the Pushtuns are 40 percent of the population in Afghanistan, and only 15 percent in Pakistan, the demands are more compelling on the Afghan side. There, the government has managed to pry many conservative tribes from the Taliban. But in the process, the government has lots more influential Islamic conservative clerics and tribal leaders demanding new laws, for things like outlawing racy (by Islamic standards) media (especially television) and banning Christian missionaries (even if they are delivering vital aid and reconstruction.)

Afghanistan would like to move more of the fighting into Pakistan, and NATO forces are eager to do that, even if only for raids. Basically, NATO troops can go anywhere in Afghanistan. Any Taliban base in Afghanistan is essentially temporary, until it is discovered, and NATO troops decide to visit. In Pakistan, there are large areas where Pakistani troops do not go, or go rarely and only with great effort. Here the Taliban and al Qaeda can rest and train. Here Osama bin Laden and Taliban leaders have been hiding out for the past seven years. Here, the NATO commandos are planning to come in and look around on the ground.

Germany Faces U.S. Calls for More Afghan Commitment, Aide Says

Jan. 9 (Bloomberg) -- The German government expects to be pressured by the next U.S. administration to step up its efforts to fight Taliban insurgents and train police officers in Afghanistan, a government adviser said.

``Whatever the color of the next government, it will want us to increase our engagement in Afghanistan,'' Karsten Voigt, the German Foreign Ministry's coordinator for U.S. relations, said in a telephone interview in Berlin today. ``Expectations are crystal clear.''

U.S. calls for more active support from Germany in Afghanistan ``would stand in stark contrast'' to parliament's agreement to extend the deployment of about 3,500 German troops, most of them under North Atlantic Treaty Organization control, Voigt said. NATO has about 41,700 troops in Afghanistan, according to the organization's Web site.

German lawmakers voted in October last year to extend the country's involvement with NATO forces in Afghanistan to assist rebuilding efforts. A month later, parliament renewed a mandate for troop participation in U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations, including the fight against Taliban insurgents.

While U.S., British, Canadian and Dutch troops do the bulk of the fighting in the south of Afghanistan, German forces are largely confined to the more peaceful north of the country. The government has repeatedly said troops will not be sent to fight in the south, other than to help out allies on an ad-hoc basis.

``The Afghanistan mission has exposed real limitation in the way the alliance is organized, operated and equipped,'' U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who is leading calls for NATO allies to increase troop levels, told the House Armed Services Committee in Washington Dec. 11.

Bulgaria will not send troops to Afghanistan provinces- PM

16:11 Wed 09 Jan 2008 - Elitsa Savova

At this stage Bulgaria would refrain from taking part in missions in the provinces of Afghanistan, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev said.

These missions required “more serious financial engagement and efforts of civilian experts” and Bulgaria was not prepared for them, he said as quoted by Bulgarian news agency BTA.

Bulgaria could not take up such mission, especially in Southern Afghanistan, Stanishev said. At the same time it was natural for Bulgaria to continue its participation in NATO’s ISAF mission.

The PM said that Bulgaria’s priorities were security and stability on the Balkans. The country was interested in the former USSR, Near and Far East and its relations with the US and Russia. A new national security strategy was to be discussed, Stanishev said.

India hands over rehabilitated dams to Afghan govt

KABUL, Jan 6 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Two dams rehabilitated by India at a cost of $3.5 million were given in control of the Afghan government at a handover ceremony here on Sunday.

At the ceremony attended by a hundred people, Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan Rakesh Sood handed over the control of Qargha and Amir Ghazi Dams to Deputy Minister for Energy and Water Eng. Shujauddin Ziayee.

The project was undertaken under the Indian governments programme for assistance to Afghanistan, with the Water & Power Consultancy Services Limited serving as implementing partner.

According to the Indian Embassy here, the works undertaken included repair of the dams, construction of the feeder and supply canals, spill channels, control rooms, desilting works as well as construction of approach roads leading to the reservoirs.

Speaking on the occasion, Ziayee appreciated the Indian governments assistance, hoping it would contribute significantly to the economic development of the region and the empowerment of the outlying communities.

A press release emailed to Pajhwok Afghan News by the Indian Embassy quoted Ambassador Sood as renewing New Delhis commitment to Afghanistans reconstruction and development, which was of a long-standing nature.

The project will benefit the populace living in the vicinity of Qargha to Badam Bagh as well as along the command areas around Bathak, Kalizaborkhan and Janabad villages. The dams will Around 10,000 families will be able to use dam water for irrigation and domestic purposes.

After the construction of the project, construction equipment including heavy excavators and dumpers were also handed over to the Afghan government for operation and maintenance of the rehabilitated dams.

Liberal Party Submits Recommendations on Afghan Mission to Independent Panel

January 8, 2008 - OTTAWA – Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion today publicly released his party’s submission to the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, which calls for an end to the combat mission in February 2009 and deals with some vital issues that must be addressed before the federal government commits to a new military role.

“As we have been saying for the past year, Canada should notify NATO immediately that the current counter-insurgency combat mission in Kandahar will end as scheduled in February 2009,” said Mr. Dion.

Mr. Dion stressed that the decision to end the combat mission does not represent an abandonment of Afghanistan.

“The Liberal Party believes that lasting peace and security can not be achieved in Afghanistan by military force alone. The ultimate purpose of any military role to which Canada commits must be to create the necessary space and conditions to allow the Afghans themselves to achieve a political solution,” he said.

Mr. Dion added that Canada must remain engaged in Afghanistan, which should include diplomatic and development efforts and potential continued military presence.

“We are open to other possible military roles in Afghanistan to continue training the Afghan National Army and police, protect Afghan civilians or for reconstruction efforts. But we will not accept the simple re-branding of the current combat mission as a training mission. Any new military role must be crafted in such a way as to ensure that other significant Canadian Forces deployments in other parts of the world are possible,” he said.

Other key points of Mr. Dion’s submission to the Panel included:

• Canada should join with those, like Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, who question the utility and effectiveness of air and artillery strikes as a counter-insurgency technique;
• Diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan should focus on Canada’s strengths as a nation, such as the pursuit of a “good government” strategy on the ground and addressing the chronic fresh water shortages in the country;
• The domestic management of the mission must improve, with a strengthened cross-departmental Afghan Secretariat to improve coordination among the relevant domestic government institutions;
• Canada must use its current influence within NATO to lead a necessary discussion on reform of the institution; and
• Canada must call for an immediate NATO-wide solution that ensures that detainees are not transferred into a situation where they could face torture. This may require the construction and maintenance of NATO holding facilities completely under the control and supervision of NATO personnel.

Finally, Mr. Dion called on the Harper Conservatives to show greater commitment to accountability and transparency on all aspects of the mission.

“They must abandon the practice of abusing the excuse of national security to withhold from the public politically embarrassing information,” he said.

The great Afghan juggle

Both the Grits and the NDP will take shelter in anti-Americanism

J.L. GRANATSTEIN – Commentary, Tuesday's Globe and Mail, January 8, 2008

At the end of January, John Manley's panel on Canada's future role in Afghanistan will report to the government. We don't know how it will phrase it or what nuances will be encompassed, but the Manley report is likely to recommend that Canada continue its military presence in Afghanistan, if not necessarily in Kandahar. If so, what will the political response be?

There is no doubt about the New Democratic Party's position. Leader Jack Layton wants Canada out of Afghanistan immediately rather than waiting for the mandated end of the mission in 2009. He also wants negotiations with the Taliban. Those who faithfully parrot the NDP line put it more baldly. Steven Staples of the Ottawa-based Rideau Institute sees Canada as "part of a NATO force but really fighting for George Bush," while the University of British Columbia's Michael Byers argues that "it's time to move from a combat-oriented approach to one that focuses on negotiation, peacemaking and nation-building. ... It's time to move NATO troops out, and UN peacekeepers in." If only there was some peace to keep, someone with whom to negotiate and enough stability to permit nation-building to take hold.

The Liberals' position has been different than the NDP's. They were, after all, the government when the decision was made to go into Afghanistan in 2002 and into Kandahar in the current combat role in 2005. Officially, the Grits still continue to support the continuation of the mission until 2009, something for which many Liberal MPs voted - including deputy leader Michael Ignatieff and Bill Graham, the defence minister when the decision to go into Kandahar was taken.

But Bob Rae, the party's foreign affairs critic and now a candidate in the St. Patrick's Day by-election in Toronto Centre, Mr. Graham's old riding, is pushing the party position leftward. "If we continue down the path that [Prime Minister Stephen] Harper wants to take us on, we're really going to be essentially engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, and I think that's extremely unwise," he was quoted as saying in an article published at year-end. "I don't think that's where people want to be. I think they want to see us in a peacekeeping role. I think they want to see us in a peacemaking role." You can take Bob Rae out of the NDP, it seems, but it's going to be pretty difficult to get NDP ideas out of Bob Rae's orations.

But recent opinion polls do suggest that Mr. Rae is correct in describing public attitudes. Leaders, however, are supposed to help shape public opinion, not simply follow it. Does Mr. Rae now reflect the new Liberal position? Paul Martin's government sent troops to Kandahar precisely to play a counterinsurgency role, not for peacekeeping or peacemaking. The government of 2005 understood that there could be no peace until the Taliban were either defeated or had their support reduced to a level at which the elected Karzai government could gradually extend its control across the country. What has changed since 2005? Perhaps the Liberal foreign affairs critic will enlighten us.

What these opposition positions mean is that the Manley report and the Harper government's probable decision to try to extend the Afghan mission beyond 2009 will face a rough ride in the House of Commons. But should it?

The opposition parties and those who support them have forgotten a few facts. Yes, the United States led the way into Afghanistan after the attacks on New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001. The Taliban regime had given terrorists sanctuary, and the plans for 9/11 had been hatched there. The United Nations authorized the intervention and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization picked up the burden.

In other words, Afghanistan is part of a UN-authorized mission now being conducted by NATO-led forces. Canada, then, is not, as Mr. Staples puts it so crudely, "really fighting for George Bush." It is, in fact, trying to help fulfill a UN mandate. Nor, as Prof. Byers has it, "is it time to move NATO troops out, and UN peacekeepers in." The NATO troops are the UN forces.

Canadians are quick to argue that they stayed out of Iraq in 2003 because it was not an approved UN mission. Fair enough (although, contrarily, most Canadians approved intervening in Kosovo in 1999 even though the Security Council pointedly did not authorize that war). But consistency surely demands that, when UN authorization is given, Canadians, as self-professed enthusiasts for the world body, support its efforts.

The NDP and the Liberals talk a good game on the UN, praise Mike Pearson, and prattle on about peacekeeping's great virtues (which are many). The contradictions in their positions, however, suggest that sanctimonious, opportunistic anti-Americanism plays a large part in deciding where they sit. Nothing Washington supports can be good in Liberal and NDP eyes, it seems, not when anti-Americanism remains a prime vote-getting tactic in Canada.

J.L. Granatstein writes on behalf of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. The opinions expressed are the author's own.

Run for President of Afghanistan? Zalmay, Zalmay Not

The Washington Post, 01/09/2008 By Al Kamen - Seems everyone is riveted to news reports about the presidential campaign here. Everyone, that is, except some folks at the United Nations, where persistent chatter has it that Zalmay Khalilzad, our ambassador to the U.N., is also thinking of running for president . . . of Afghanistan.

The Afghan-born Khalilzad, a former Pentagon official, former ambassador to Afghanistan, then to Iraq and now to the U.N., is said to be in the mix for a run, which would probably be in the fall of 2009.

Honest. This is a real rumor. So real that we hear Afghan President Hamid Karzai asked Khalilzad about it when the two met in London back in October. But Khalilzad didn't give a Shermanesque response.

Another U.N. official asked him to say no more definitively, but Khalilzad declined, another official told our colleague Colum Lynch. On Dec. 12, a reporter asked Khalilzad about his "plans after your current job, if you have any."

"Well, I have no particular plan at this time," he replied, other than to leave at the end of the administration and "work in the United States in some job" in the private sector. "As to other plans," he said, "it is only plans in the United States after I finish this job." Which may have been his way of saying he isn't running.

But that apparently wasn't good enough. The rumors persist. Asked about this on Monday afternoon, Khalilzad said through spokesman Richard Grenell: "He is not a candidate for president of Afghanistan."

Of course he isn't. Not yet, anyway.

Iran seeks Pakistani cooperation in fighting terror

ISLAMABAD, Jan 5 (Pajhwok Afghan News): With a view to warding off threats to peace and stability in the region, Iran has urged greater Pakistani cooperation in battling the menace of terrorism.

In a letter addressed to his Pakistani counterpart, Iranian President Dr Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stressed increased Islamabad-Tehran collaboration in dealing with te challenges posed to the region by militancy and extremism.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki Friday delivered the letter to President Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad, a Pakistan newspaper reported on Saturday. The letter says Iran views terrorism a problem of the entire Ummah and region.

Dawn quoted a member of the visiting Iranian delegation as saying that since both the countries were victims of terrorism, President Ahmadinejad felt they should make joint efforts to defeat the scourges.

At a separate meeting with Caretaker Prime Minister Muhammedmian Soomro, the Iranian minister denounced the assassination of ex-prime minister Benazir Bhutto. The assassins had attacked the integrity and unity of Pakistan and they could not be friends of the people of the region, he believed

The government and people of Iran share the grief and express complete solidarity with the government and people of Pakistan, said Mottaki, who also visited the PPPs central secretariat to convey condolences to the party leadership and family members of the Oxford-graduate.

Speaking on the occasion, Soomro agreed terrorism represented a grave threat to the entire region and all countries should work together to contend with the challenge. The Pakistani government and people were determined to curb extremism, he added.

Afghan Civilians Were Killed Needlessly, Ex-Marine Testifies

The New York Times, 01/09/2008 By Paul von Zielbauer

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. — A former member of an elite Marine combat unit that operated last year in eastern Afghanistan testified Tuesday that his comrades appeared to have needlessly killed civilians after their convoy was attacked by a suicide car bomb.

Nathaniel Travers, a former Marine intelligence sergeant assigned to the 30-man Special Operations convoy that was patrolling on March 4 last year, testified in a military court here that a few marines fired at civilians and other unarmed noncombatants after the suicide bomber struck.

No marines have been charged with a crime in the episode. The hearing was held to determine whether troops had violated the laws of war.

The three judges on the Marine Corps court of inquiry are examining the actions of two officers who led the elite unit, Company F, Second Battalion, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. They are Maj. Fred C. Galvin, the company commander, and Capt. Vincent J. Noble, the platoon leader.

Shortly after the March 4 shootings near Jalalabad, Company F was ordered to leave Afghanistan by Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney of the Army, the commander at the time of all Special Operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Weeks later, an Army Special Operations commander in Afghanistan publicly apologized to the families of 19 people who he said had been unjustifiably killed by members of the Marine unit.

But the Army apology, given before military investigators had concluded their inquiry, was later condemned by senior Marine commanders as inappropriate and premature.

Mr. Travers, the first witness to testify, said the unit’s trip from its base at Jalalabad to the Pakistani border and back was uneventful until a minivan detonated near the convoy’s second Humvee. After the blast, Mr. Travers said, he heard gunfire and saw bodies in at least two vehicles as the Marine convoy sped away.

Only a few gunners in the heavily armed convoy fired, he said, until Captain Noble radioed a command to the entire convoy to stop firing.

The account by Mr. Travers, who left the Marines last year, contrasts sharply with those given by the American military and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

The commission, which conducted its own inquiry, said marines had fired indiscriminately at pedestrians and people in cars, buses and taxis over a 10-mile stretch of road after the attack. No marines were seriously wounded in the suicide bombing.

Polish General implicated in Afghan village scandal

Warsaw Business Journal, 01/08/2008 - According to documents held by the prosecutor investigating the shooting in the Afghan village Nangar Khel obtained by daily Rzeczpospolita, a few days after the incident the troops responsible for the shooting were visited by general Marek Tomaszycki.

"He said that we should not discuss it at all, help each other and watch each other so that nobody committed suicide, as then it would all come out," said an arrested soldier.

The general also allegedly promised that he would transfer the soldiers to a base in Bagram where they were supposed to peacefully serve till the end of their tour. Eventually, according to the testimony, two of them were sent there. General Tomaszycki admitted having visited the military base, but denied promising to cover up the incident.

For the time being general Tomaszycki will be questioned as a witness in the investigation, however, before Christmas Justice Minister Zbigniew Æwi¹kalski suggested that it is not known if he would be interrogated as a witness or suspect.

Bagram detention centre now twice the size of Guantanamo

By Andrew Gumbel in Los Angeles - The Independent, 08 January 2008

The United States has quietly expanded the number of "enemy combatants" being held in judicial limbo at its Bagram military base in Afghanistan, a facility which has now grown to more than twice the size of the controversial and much more widely discussed military prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

Bagram has received just a fraction of the world attention paid to Guantanamo, but the two facilities have prompted very similar complaints – about prisoners held incommunicado for weeks or months, the lack of recourse to any system of legal redress, and persistent reports of prisoner mistreatment that many human rights campaigners have characterised as torture.

The New York Times, which has seen confidential documents relating to the running of the Bagram prison, reported yesterday that the military base north of Kabul now contains around 630 prisoners, a far greater number than the 275 still being held at a rapidly emptying Guantanamo.

Although conditions are generally reckoned to have improved at Bagram since December 2002, when US officials admitted that its guards beat two Afghan prisoners to death, the base's warren of isolation cells have still prompted high-level complaints from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

As recently as last summer, the ICRC complained that prisoners were being denied access to its inspectors for weeks or months at a time, and were sometimes subjected to cruel treatment in violation of the Geneva Conventions, the newspaper reported.

"The problem at Bagram hasn't gone away," said the human rights lawyer, Tina Foster, who has filed numerous lawsuits on behalf of the detainees. "The government has just done a better job of keeping it secret."

Prisoner numbers have swelled because of the ever deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, and the mounting threat posed by the resurgent Taliban to the fractious pro-American government headed by Hamid Karzai. Since 2005, US officials have harboured plans to hand over the prisoners to the Afghan authorities, who would house them at a brand new $30m (£15m) facility financed by the United States on the outskirts of Kabul.

Every aspect of the handover has been mired in problems, however, with the Afghans raising objections to US attempts to persuade them to establish a similar home-grown regime of indefinite detentions and trial by military commission already endorsed by the Bush administration, and the Americans fearing for the security and day-to-day conditions of the proposed new facility.

The agreement first broke down in 2006, soon after a high-security detention centre run by the Afghan military began its US-sponsored overhaul, when President Karzai refused to sign a decree establishing a legal framework for the prisoners based on the discredited Guantanamo model.

The plan then hit crisis point last May when two US soldiers overseeing the project were shot dead by a suspected Taliban sympathiser who had infiltrated the guard corps. The killings led to two months of vetting of the other guards and the dismissal of almost two dozen trained recruits, according to The New York Times.

The first 12 Bagram detainees moved into the new facility at Pul-i-Charkhi prison in April 2006, and those numbers grew to 157 over the next nine months, including 32 transferred from Guantanamo. Despite initial American concerns that the Afghans could not be trusted to imprison such "enemy combatants", it now appears that some prisoners will remain at Bagram indefinitely.

Britain jails would-be Taliban fighter

By Andrew Hough, January 8, 2008

LONDON (Reuters) - A London dentist who planned to fight for the Afghan Taliban against British and U.S. forces was jailed on Tuesday for preparing to commit terrorist acts.

Sohail Qureshi, 30, was arrested in October 2006 at London's Heathrow airport as he prepared to fly to Pakistan carrying around 9,000 pounds ($17,800) in cash, medical supplies and night vision gear.

Qureshi, who was born in Pakistan, was sentenced to 4-1/2 years but in practice is likely to be free within a year, after serving half that term and allowing for time he has already spent in custody.

Describing him as a "dedicated supporter of Islamist extremism," prosecutors said material on his computer's hard drive showed he had intended to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan against British and U.S. forces.

Police also uncovered a discussion with an associate on a militant Web site referring to his Pakistan trip.

"All I know is that it is a two- or three-week operation. Pray that I will kill many, brother. Revenge, revenge, revenge," it read.

Prosecutor Jonathan Sharp told London's Old Bailey court that Qureshi also had fighting and first aid manuals, theological notes justifying terrorism, a book he had written called "My Dad the bomb maker" detailing how he had become a militant, and CD-Rom pictures of him brandishing an M16 rifle.

"There were also appalling pictures and videos of mutilated corpses and videos of executions and the 9/11 atrocity," Sharp said. "He was taking it on the trip to keep his mind focused on his terrorist goal."

Qureshi pleaded guilty to preparing for the commission of terrorist acts, possessing an article for a terrorist purpose and possession of records likely to be useful in terrorism.

It was the first conviction under a 2006 law covering cases where suspects are preparing to commit an act of terrorism but fall short of having a concrete plan in place.

The court was told that his arrest also led to the conviction of Samina Malik, 23, who had written poems praising Osama bin Laden, supporting martyrdom and discussing beheading.

Police had uncovered Internet contact between Qureshi and Malik, who worked airside at a shop in Heathrow's Terminal 4.

The court was told that before his planned Pakistan trip, he e-mailed her and asked: "What is the situation like at work? Is the check-in very harsh or have things cooled down a bit?"

In a statement, Scotland Yard's Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations, Peter Clarke said: "Qureshi is a trained and committed terrorist, who by his own admission had contacts within al Qaeda since the mid-1990s.

"He wanted to carry out terrorist acts overseas and gathered the equipment to help him do this."

Malik was found guilty of possessing terrorism-related documents and was given a suspended sentence last month.

(Editing by Mark Trevelyan and Sami Aboudi)

Looking for Afghanistan's "Anbar moment "

European Council on Foreign Relations - 01/08/2008 By Daniel Korski

After six years of warfare and a massive aid effort, Afghanistan's reconstruction teeters on the brink. The U.S administration and its close allies are casting about for an "Anbar moment", a decisive juncture which, like in Iraq, can signal a turn of fortunes.

Historical narratives of warfare are replete with such moments, perhaps the most famous of which is Abraham Lincoln's speech at Gettysburg when he rallied a war-weary nation with century-lasting oratory.

But like the "Anbar moment", real change in Afghanistan will not come down to a single event or a change of loyalties among one of the country's many tribes. No doubt, a decisive shift is necessary, but it must come from elsewhere and must, if it is to make a difference, lead to sustained change.

What, then, is the moment?

Easy: Spring 2008. The place: Bucharest.

"What", I can hear you say. Surely the problem lies in Afghanistan's tribal areas, or in the mountainous, dust-covered capital rather than in "Mitteleuropa".

Let me explain what I mean. The biggest problem facing Afghanistan's reconstruction remains the disjointed nature of the international effort. We are, in part, the pugnacious tribes that have to unite. In the words of Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina: "Our partners in the Afghan government are baffled by the stream of contradictory instructions and the absence of an international partner with a clear view of what must be done".

The disarray has existed from the outset of the mission in 2001, when the U.S-led coalition ousted the Taliban. For the U.S, the mission was a clear response to the attacks of 9/11. For a few European countries - like Denmark and the Netherlands - the link to national security was stronger and led to their support for both the U.S-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF. In some European chanceries support for the UN-backed mission in Afghanistan was seen as an easy way to restore transatlantic links after fall-outs over the 2003 U.S-led Iraq War.

For most, however, the Afghan mission fitted perfectly the profile for a risk-free peace-building mission; the repressive and misogynist Taliban regime would be replaced by a democratic government that would build hospitals and allow European soldiers to escort smiling school girls to their classrooms - pictures of which would be beamed back to a satisfied European public. In Germany, for example, the word krieg - war - was studiously avoided in the public debate.

Underlying this support was a belief in "liberal peace-building"; freed from the constraints of the Cold War, the West could - and should - promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law, gender equality, sustainable development and private sector reform, civil society associations, and transitional justice. The idea belonged to a genre of planned social change, much like the modernization programmes undertaken in Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1970s and by the international community in the Balkans and East Timor in the 1990s.

Yet despite this broad-based ambition, planning for large-scale reconstruction, only began months after the military operation had already started. Having criticized his predecessor's nation-building efforts during the 2000 presidential election, when it came to post-war planning, President George W. Bush favored a limited mission, with a circumscribed UN mandate and a "light military foot-print". The military campaign relied on air power, and alliances with Northern Alliance war-lords who had formed part of the anti-Soviet resistance. In the main, civil-military cooperation focused on avoiding bombing aid convoys.

In the end, a mix of U.S and European viewpoints emerged in the Bonn Agreements of December 2001, negotiated under the chairmanship of UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and with the support of now-EU Special Representative Fransec Vendrell. These saw the creation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to provide civilian and political support to the nascent Afghan authorities and sanctioned the U.S-led military efforts.

For four years, the Afghan mission was successful. A progressive constitution was adopted, Presidential and parliamentary elections were held, major militia were dismantled, non-opium GDP grew at 8 percent - an impressive rate for a developing country - and reconstruction was brought to all corners of the country. Since 2001, 3500 schools were built in and the number of pupils has increased more than fivefold to some six million - a third of whom were girls.

When, in 2004, diplomats met in Berlin to renew their commitment to rebuild Afghanistan, the Afghan government had met most of the deadlines and benchmarks required of it under the Bonn Agreement. To focus efforts, a "lead nation" concept was approved, which saw the G8 countries parceling out the responsibility for various reconstruction programmes among them.

But despite the progress, in 2005 the U.S-led intervention began to falter. Originally in favour of the effort by wide margins, European publics are now divided about the mission. Despite effort to shore up the international effort, principally through the "Afghanistan Compact" agreed in 2006 - a five year commitment by the international community and the Afghanistan government to achieve a number of targets - problems remain.

Afghanistan can now be divided into three parts: the more stable north, where a cautious ISAF and powerful Northern Alliance warlords have developed a modus vivendi; the capital Kabul - complete with London-level rents, French restaurants, and bustling night-clubs for diplomats, but pot-holed, litter-filled streets for its denizens - where diplomats and Afghan officials are building the state; and thirdly, the insurgency-racked, and poppy-covered south and east where the U.S, UK, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands are battling a resurgent Taliban.

The latest incident, involving the expulsion of EU and UN diplomats, charged by the Afghan government of illicitly negotiating with the Taliban, underscores the international community's manifold and uncoordinated strategies.

With a plethora of strategies, the international community needs a reconciliation of its own. The need to unite around a clear, prioritized two-year "campaign" plan, worked out with the Afghan government. Moreover, the embasies and agencies working in Kabul need leadership that cuts across military, political and development lines, as well as institutional boundaries. Leadership that, realistically, only the UN can provide.

Even though orthodoxy holds that unity of command will never be possible given the legal and political constraints on interjecting civilian into the military chain of commands, unity of purpose has not proven sufficient in dealing with the challenges confronted by the international community in Afghanistan. Like the U.S CORDs programme in Viet Nam, which, at President Lyndon Johnson's insistence, united military and civilian operations (too late, as it turned out), the international missions in Afghanistan need to be united.

With the imminent departure of the current UN envoy, Tom Koenigs, the UN Secretary-General has a unique opportunity to make the UN the central player in the Afghan mission by appointing a replacement who can unite the international community.

This is where Bucharest comes in. In April 2008, NATO will gather for its annual summit. NATO's Afghan mission will be a key topic for discussion as will the over-all reconstruction effort. Everyone who is anyone in Afghanistan will be there. If the international community can agree amongst themselves, and with the Afghan government, to support a two-year plan, the implementation of which will be lead by a new UN envoy, then this could become Afghanistan "Anbar moment".

Like the original Iraq experience, success wil depend on what happens afterwards. In Afghanistan's case, this means the lead-up to the 2009 elections. In this period, the international community will need to be held together, and the Afghan government will need to make a number of tough and unwelcome decisions. One discernible - and publishable - event will not be enough. But without an international "Anbar moment" like one I have described, success will surely remain elusive.

Editorial: Getting madrassa reform wrong – Daily Times 01.09.08

A survey funded by the Washington-based US Institute of Peace (USIP) says 64 percent of Pakistanis who were questioned wanted a reform of the madrassa system by the government. At the same time, however, the respondents preferred an “Islamic state” even as they thought that Al Qaeda was a “critical” (41 percent) or “important” threat (21 percent), thus making up a two-thirds majority who fear Al Qaeda. A similar majority also expressed the same hostile opinion about the Taliban “activity” in Pakistan even as it approved it against American troops in Afghanistan. The sample comprised 907 individuals examined in 19 cities.

If you want confusion, there is more. Sixty percent wanted Sharia and thought that Pakistan was not run on Islamic principles and gave the state a poor four out of ten marks on this point. Yet when Talibanisation wants to deliver “real Islam”, over 60 percent want the state to prevent it from spreading across the country. One can therefore say that the people have no alternative to Islamic government in their mind and will hopelessly judge all governance against a utopia they have in their imagination. But one thing is proved by the survey and that is they don’t want the Islam spread by the madrassas and they don’t want the version being enforced under duress by the Taliban and their patron, Al Qaeda.

The verdict against the madrassa is clear enough. Yet “expert” opinion on the subject is divided in Pakistan and abroad, even at the level of the United Nations. Seminaries examined by experts concluded there was no jihadi seduction practised by them. The basis of this conclusion was the textbooks read there and depositions made by the vested madrassa administrations. Clearly this was an unsatisfactory method. Then the government promised reform but failed to carry it out because it did believe in the correction, constantly saying there were “good” madrassas too and they were in a majority. The madrassas were registered and that was that, they said. But the violence never stopped and the seminarians came out again and again to defend their teachers, as in the case of Lal Masjid in Islamabad.

The confusion stems from the false separation everyone makes between the seminary and the mosque. The fact is that a mosque is a branch of the madrassa where its imam has been educated. Not finding normal employment, a madrassa graduate builds his own mosque and is helped by his institution, and this help is supplemented by the jihadi organisation affiliated with the madrassa through its leader. An Islamabad psychiatrist who has produced a competent study based on the “Afghanistan returnee” prisoners after 2001 has found that most recruits were engaged from the mosques and knew nothing about any madrassa. Yet the “minders” who hooked them for jihad belonged to the community of madrassa graduates that have led Pakistan’s covert war through jihadi militias.

Religious radicalisation in Pakistan has occurred through madrassas generously funded by the Arab governments and private individuals from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. This has happened since 1980 when the Arabs of the Gulf began fearing the rise of Revolutionary Iran. The centre from where this radicalisation radiated across the globe was the university system in Saudi Arabia presided over by radical Wahhabi clerics who propounded a faith akin to what Al Qaeda and the Taliban are spreading in Pakistan these days. Youth from Pakistani madrassas were taken to Saudi Arabia and trained in a new tough faith. In Karachi, the big Deobandi seminaries were plied with funds and persuaded to change their syllabi.

Pakistan provided the most important ingredient to this radicalisation. It enlisted the madrassa-based jihadi militias to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir. That led to the proliferation of lethal weapons and the creation of centres of power in the country other than the state. State employees who handled these outfits were “reverse-indoctrinated” because of the personal empowerment their charges bestowed on them. So today the state is more vulnerable than the madrassa. President Musharraf has many failures to his name, but his biggest failure was his inability to rein in the madrassas after having used them. The chief of the militia that tried to kill him twice was the favourite student of a madrassa in Karachi which Islamabad kept pampering. He is still around as are some leaders of other Saudi-supported militia-madrassas.

The reform of the madrassa is not possible because there are no texts to abrogate in them. But madrassa can be made less attractive for our youth if the state can gear up to producing alternative places of learning. However, that would be useless unless the writ of the state is established in a large part of the country and away from the big cities of the “normal” areas. Today, the madrassa is wining and the state is losing because of radical Islam’s power to intimidate. Maulana Fazlullah’s mushroom growth of madrassas in Swat was backed by coercion. Now that he is gone the people wish to return to their tourism-based economy. But will the state hold on to Swat? Will it clean up the madrassas in Swat now that it has the opportunity?

Second Editorial: Talking peace in Waziristan

A “peace committee” in South Waziristan has been attacked and decimated. Those who insist that Talibanisation can be resolved through friendly parleys should take a close look at the culture of “spread of creed through violence” and see if they get anyone to talk peace without accepting terms from the radicals.

The “peace committee” of nine belonged to Maulvi Nazir, considered pro-government because he fought and drove out Al Qaeda’s Uzbek militia from the precincts of Wana. The killing of his peace committee is clearly an act of revenge. The revenge is tribal too. Maulvi Nazir is a “Wazir Taliban” whereas the big warlord of the area Baitullah Mehsud is a Mehsud. The government may have helped in the split but the truth is that Pakistan’s tribal society is based on the principle of fragmentation and functions fitfully only under threat of violence. If Al Qaeda wins, it will have to be in the fighting mode constantly to keep the population in check. But if it wins in the rest of Pakistan, it will gain a firmer foothold. Those who go to “parley” with Al Qaeda will then have to accept terms under Al Qaeda’s “universal caliphate”, after which all may not be well again. *

Saving Afghanistan's Art

By Lauren Comiteau/Amsterdam – Time/CNN Jan. 08, 2008

Left: Standing ram, Tillya-tepe, grave IV, Second quarter of the 1st century AD., Gold. Right: Hermes pillar, Ai Khanum, Gymnasium, 2nd century BC., Limestone National Museum of Afghanistan © musée Guimet / Thierry Ollivier

The Taliban's dynamiting of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan in March 2001 was only the most dramatic expression of their mission to obliterate all "idolatrous" images from Afghanistan's pre-Islamic past. They also destroyed 2,500 other cultural artifacts from Kabul's National Museum of Afghanistan, many of them priceless. But thanks to the heroic efforts of curators, they didn't get it all. Hidden Afghanistan, a traveling exhibit that recently opened in Amsterdam's Nieuwe Kerk (New Church), gives a tantalizing glimpse of Afghanistan's stunningly diverse cultural legacy, and tells an engrossing tale about how these remnants of it were saved. In May the exhibition will go to Washington to start a 17-month tour of the U.S.

"The message of this exhibit is that Afghanistan is not only a country of war, destruction and terrorism, but of life, culture and art," said Omar Sultan, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, at the exhibition's opening. "We have a cultural heritage that belongs not only to Afghanistan, but to the world."

That's partly because the world has so often come to Afghanistan. Located on the trade routes between East and West, the country has always been at a crossroads of civilizations. The Silk Road provided a vector for Buddhism to come from the east, while Hellenistic and even Egyptian influences flowed the other way. Alexander the Great's eastward conquest essentially ended there in the 4th century B.C., and Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang passed through in the 7th century A.D. on his quest for Buddhist texts. "Amsterdam, Berlin and London today are the Afghanistan of 2,000 years ago," says Khalid Siddiqi, a former Afghan refugee who is on the advisory committee for the exhibit. "It was a crucible of different cultures that came together and melded, showing the enrichment — not impoverishment — of different cultures."

The Amsterdam exhibition presents 250 objects from four archaeological sites — Tepe Fullol, Ai Khanum, Tillya-tepe, and Begram — dating back as far as 4,000 years ago. It includes gold and silver vases from the Bactrian Bronze Age; a Greek limestone pillar and sundials from the 2nd century BC; Indian-related ivory figures and furniture from the 1st century AD; and a spectacular gold collection from Tillya-Tepe that includes bracelets, hearts, a crown, and even a pair of golden shoe soles meant to convey an aristocrat's disinclination for walking.

But just as Afghanistan's geography invited cultural influence, so too did it draw a sequence of invasion and conquest that has put the country's heritage in constant peril. The Taliban's destruction of art was the culmination of years of catastrophe visited on the National Museum, and the extraordinary story of how the surviving art got here is as much part of the exhibit as the art itself.

The National Museum first opened its doors in 1922, and by the time the Soviets Union invaded in 1979, it had some 100,000 objects on display. But many of its treasures were plundered in the course of the ensuing war against the Soviet invaders, which left two million dead. In the years following the Soviet Army's withdrawal in 1989, what remained of the museum's collection survived further looting, a direct rocket attack, fire, a collapsed roof and resulting snow damage. The victorious Taliban had every interest in completing the destruction.

That anything is left at all is in large part due to the efforts of museum director Omar Khan Massoudi, his staff, and a small group of concerned archeologists and politicians. In 1988, they secretly moved the highlights of the collection to a vault in the Central Bank at the presidential palace. Massoudi, who risked his life to preserve his country's cultural heritage, was one of seven men who had keys to the vault. All seven keys were needed to open it, so by spreading them around and keeping their locations secret (in case of death, a key reverted to the keeper's eldest son), they were able to preserve the treasures.

"During the civil war these people knew about the transfer of these pieces and never gave any information to anybody," says a modest Massoudi. "In this case we keep this like a separate memory during the war, especially during the civil war and even during the Taliban? At that time I remember most of the Afghan and foreign journalists asking about these treasures. 'Where is it? Is it looted or is it here? Is it safe or not?'"

It wasn't until 2003, more than a year after the overthrow of the Taliban, that the Afghan government confirmed the existence of the treasures and restoration work began. Less than one-quarter of the museum's original collection survived. Afghanistan is still deemed too unstable for the art to go home, and the museum itself remains badly damaged. So currently this traveling exhibit is the only way Afghans can see the museum's collection. Curators hope the exhibit will go home in the not too distant future, but for now, it will continue making its rounds abroad: it was in Paris and Turin before Amsterdam, and after Washington will travel to New York, San Franciso and Houston. The exhibit's catalogue, though, has been translated into the Afghan languages Dari and Pashtu and will be distributed to every school in the country. Deputy Minister Sultan has no doubts about the future of his country's art. "If they were able to save it at that time," he says with a smile, thinking back, "I promise you we can save it for as long as we are alive."

Private security firms flooding Afghanistan

IWPR, 01/08/2008 Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi - KABUL - If there is one thing Afghanistan has no shortage of, it’s heavily armed men ready to go work for the large number of private security firms that have sprung up across the country offering protection to private firms, organizations or individuals.

And the continued level of violence throughout the country has created a ready market for their services.

But according to the Afghan government, many of these firms, often unlicensed and unregulated, are guilty of some of the very crimes their clients hired them to protect them from, including armed robbery, kidnapping and murder.

“Over the past few months we have conducted a review and have concluded that many of the armed robberies and murders have been carried out by members of these firms,” said Zmarai Bashiri, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry. “The illegal use and sale of weapons is also common among these companies.”

According to Bashiri, there are currently 60 private security companies in the country, employing between 18,000 and 25,000 men. The majority of these companies are based in Kabul.

The ministry has already shut down 10 private security firms and has conducted raids on several more in recent days.

Many of these firms appear to be run by former militia commanders who ran roughshod over the country during the 1990s. Despite numerous disarmament programs, many of these commanders retain large caches of weapons along with loyal followers.

Now they are morphing into highly profitable security companies. Mohammad Nasir, a resident of Pul-e-Khumri in Baghlan province, said that a former regional strongman is now “masquerading” as the head of a security firm.

“The commander has gathered all of his men and given them new uniforms,” Nasir said. “They may be guarding (non-government organizations), but the commander still uses them to demonstrate his power. People still see him as a commander; he is still armed, and he can do anything he wants.”

These security companies are actually increasing the level of insecurity in the area, he said.

“When people on the street see this company’s weapons and special vehicles, they feel frightened,” Nasir said. “They do not have good memories of these commanders during the time when they ruled the streets.”

In fact, many Afghans can’t tell the difference between members of these private firms and members of the Afghan army or NATO-led troops who operate in the country.

“Afghans do not know who the security companies are and what they are doing in their country,” said Susanne Schmeidl, co-author of a study on private security companies for Swisspeace, a research organization.

“Many Afghans are not able to distinguish the private security sector from the international armed forces, or from their own Afghan National Police and Afghan army, and general confusion prevails.”

The Interior Ministry’s Bashiri concedes that such security firms are spreading chaos and making the security situation in the country worse. “They have proved a headache for us,” he said. “We will close them all.”

That may be easier said than done, however, in part because of the high demand for such protective services. Many international organizations do not feel comfortable operating in the country without armed protection.

“The police cannot ensure the security of the government, the cities, or the highways, let alone the thousands of NGOs operating in Afghanistan,” said an official from a Chinese company building roads in Faryab province who asked that his name not be used. “We have no guarantee that anyone will be able to protect us if the government shuts down our security firm.”

The firms also argue that they are providing a vital service. Amir Mohammad, an official with RONCO, a U.S.-based company that conducts de-mining operations in Afghanistan as well as providing security services, says his company is legitimately operating in Afghanistan and opposes the interior ministry’s plan to shut down other companies.

“This is a mistake by the Interior Ministry,” he said. “Thousands of people are employed by these firms, and they could end up on the street. Foreign companies cannot rely on the Afghan (state) security agencies, so if the private firms are closed, no foreigner will invest in Afghanistan.”

Bashiri insists that the country’s police will provide security cover once the private security firms are closed.

“We will provide our own forces to ensure security when the firms are shut down,” he said. “Charity organizations and business entities will be safe and they won’t have any complaints.”

But Mohammad Fareed Hakimi, a political affairs analyst in northern Afghanistan, points to the deteriorating situation across the country, and said he doubts that the Interior Ministry is up to the task of managing the situation.

“The government has closed these companies, but how can it fill the gap?” he said. “They cannot increase the number of police to what is required. If the Interior Ministry now has to guard banks and NGOs, the security gap will get even bigger.”

X Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi is a reporter in Afghanistan who writes for The Institute for War & Peace Reporting, a nonprofit organization in London that trains journalists in areas of conflict. Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune Information Service.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]