In this bulletin:

• Nine killed in Afghan violence: officials
• Afghan bombings signal a deepening conflict
• Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan remains missing
• Berlin plans to double number of police instructors in Afghanistan
• US warns of more terror in Afghanistan
• Afghanistan debate makes soldiers targets: Hillier
• Afghan withdrawal deadline a bad idea, says Manley panel member
• Bridging the gap on Afghan role
• Issues in Afghanistan? Obama's Right, Right-Wing Is So Wrong
• Wanted for empty prison: some convicted Afghan drug barons
• Iran Raises the Heat in Afghanistan
• A call for talks on Pakistan border
• Two Winnable Wars
• Limited options for US in Pakistan
• Bhutto's party endorses autonomy in southwestern Pakistan, release of prisoners
• The ghosts of Pul-e-Charkhi

Nine killed in Afghan violence: officials

Asadabad (AFP) - A mine blast killed seven guards in Afghanistan on Saturday, while two civilians were killed in separate incidents, officials said.

A landmine blew up a vehicle transporting Afghan guards who had been protecting a road construction company in Kunar province, a troubled region on the Pakistani border, governor Fazullah Wahidi told AFP.

He could not say who was responsible for the attack but Taliban militants waging a bloody insurgency against the Kabul government have been blamed for a string of similar incidents.

Meanwhile in the western province of Farah, a suicide bomber with explosives strapped to his body blew himself up near a police vehicle. Regional police spokesman Abdul Mutalib Rad said the bomber was the only person killed.

Police later arrested four men believed to be Taliban who were seen dropping the bomber off from a vehicle, Rad said.

The Taliban are trying to topple President Hamid Karzai's government and force out tens of thousands of international soldiers based in the country.

In other incidents linked to the Taliban insurgency, a civilian truck driver was killed and a truck supplying Western troops was set ablaze in the volatile southern province of Zabul on Saturday, police said.

A Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility. Kunar governor Wahidi also alleged that US troops patrolling in the mountains on Friday had shot and killed a civilian who was collecting wood and injured two others. The US military, which has soldiers in the area, could not confirm the report.

Casualties of civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops have eroded public support for the campaign against the extremist insurgents.

The deepening violence and higher-than-expected casualties among foreign soldiers has also weakened support in many of the roughly 40 countries with troops in Afghanistan, prompting calls for them to leave.

Canada, after threatening to leave next year, announced Thursday it would withdraw in 2011.

Afghan bombings signal a deepening conflict

The Associated Press, 02/23/2008 - KABUL — A ruthless new generation of Afghan insurgents is casting aside Taliban doctrine that opposed killing large numbers of civilians, instead using more powerful explosives and packing bombs with ball-bearings to maximize kills.

Just this week, some 140 people died in two bombings. Afghan security officials say the militants have started using C-4, a powerful explosive not seen before in Afghanistan.

"It's not like Baghdad, but the terrorists are learning lessons from each other," said Abdul Manan Farahi, counterterrorism chief for the Interior Ministry.

The recent bombings are part of a bloody trend in the deepening Afghan conflict. Militants have stepped up attacks, and NATO has boosted its forces and taken the fight to the Taliban. Last year was the deadliest since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, with over 6,500 people killed in militant-related violence, mostly Taliban fighters.

Both sides have caused civilian deaths. According to an Associated Press count based on figures from Afghan and Western officials, militants killed 480 civilians in 2007, while U.S. or NATO action killed 360 civilians — many of them in airstrikes.

The United States and NATO have worked successfully to cut down on civilian deaths since a spate of casualties in June drew stern warnings from President Hamid Karzai and outraged the Afghan public.

At the same time, a surge in suicide attacks in the past two years is increasingly putting Afghan civilians in the line of fire. Only six suicide bombings occurred in Afghanistan in all of 2003 and 2004. Militants ramped up such attacks in late 2005 and they've been rising steadily since, culminating in more than 140 in 2007.

The Afghan government has not formally accused the Taliban of Sunday's attack. But Karzai's spokesman hinted the Taliban were to blame when he said the bombing had "all the hallmarks of previous attacks."

The influence of one Taliban commander — Siraj Haqqani — is growing, the U.S. says. Haqqani, a Taliban-associated militant with close ties to al-Qaida, is accused of masterminding beheadings and suicide bombings reminiscent of the deadliest days of the Iraq war.

"We believe him to be much more brutal and much more interested in attacking and killing civilians. He has no regard for human life, even those of his Afghan compatriots," said Army Lt. Col. David Accetta, spokesman at the U.S. military's main base in Afghanistan, Bagram.

2 Taliban leaders killed Afghan and NATO-led troops killed two regional Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan, commander Mullah Abdul Matin and his associate, Mullah Karim Agha, and an explosion in the same province claimed the life of a British soldier, officials said Thursday.

"The Taliban's networks have suffered another severe setback," said Brig. Gen. Carlos Branco, a spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force.

Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan remains missing

Xinhua / February 23, 2008 - ISLAMABAD -- Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin has gone missing for 13 days but the government believes the missing diplomat is safe and alive, foreign office spokesman said Saturday.

Tariq Azizuddin went missing on February 11 in Khyber tribal agency, one of seven semi-autonomous tribal regions along the Afghan border.

Tariq Azizuddin was traveling to Kabul from Peshawar, capital of North West Frontier Province, by road in his car with a driver and body guard when the local administration lost contact with them.

Foreign Office spokesman Mohammad Sadiq said security forces were actively searching the missing official in the area. Expressing his confidence that the ambassador was safe and alive, Sadiq said all measures would be taken to trace him.

Last week local media reported that local Taliban had claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and said Tariq would be released in exchange for the release of their detained leader Mulla Mansoor Dadullah.

However, the government rejected any such claim and made it clear that no body had contacted them on the abduction nor made any demand.

Berlin plans to double number of police instructors in Afghanistan

Berlin, Feb 23, IRNA - The German government is planning to double its number of police instructors and advisors from 60 to 120, news reports said Saturday.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble wrote in a commentary for Sunday's edition of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper that as part of Berlin's readiness to double the presence of police trainers, the European Union should also be prepared to boost its police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) from 200 to 400.

So far, the EU has failed to equip EUPOL properly, both ministers said. After a "difficult starting phase" the police mission is slowly taking shape, Schaeuble and Steinmeier added. Around 200 European police officers are scheduled to be deployed across Afghanistan by April.

US warns of more terror in Afghanistan

The Age - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates on Sunday tipped more terrorist attacks and bombings and fewer all-out battles as Afghanistan moves into its annual summer campaign season. Mr Gates said on every occasion the Taliban stood and fought, they lost.

But the problem remained there were too few coalition and Afghan government forces to hold territory and maintain security against insurgents to allow economic development. He said the key to long-term success was clearly building up Afghanistan's army and police.

Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon last week announced a 70-strong Australian training team would work with an Afghan army battalion and on Sunday it was announced it also would assist in training Afghan police.

Australia has just over 1,000 troops in Afghanistan, operating in Oruzgan province in what was once the Taliban's heartland. Three Australian soldiers died in action late last year.

Mr Gates, in Canberra for the annual Australia-US Ministerial consultations (AUSMIN), said the nature of the Afghanistan conflict was changing with the Taliban realising they could not defeat NATO forces in conventional battle, even with hundreds of combatants.

"They lose all the time when they do that," he told reporters. "What we are likely to see is more use of terror, killing of school teachers, local officials, things like that, the use of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) to try and sap the will of coalition partners as well as the Afghans and to bring discredit to the Afghan government because of its seeming inability to bring security to the rural areas."

Mr Gates said there had been military success over the last year with the Taliban occupying no territory and winning no engagements.

"The problem is that while we are able to clear the Taliban in certain areas when we have an operation, we don't have enough force to be able to hold some of these areas," he said.

"The way to deal with that long-term is clearly the Afghan National Army and Afghan National police to be able to hold while economic development provides local security. It has to be a partnership between ourselves and the Afghans, with more and more of the effort gradually shifting to the Afghans." Mr Gates said the Australians had made an important contribution in Afghanistan.

"They have the respect of all the people on the front lines in Afghanistan," he said. Mr Rudd said plainly there was a need for better police training in Afghanistan. "We have been reviewing the need for that into the future," he told reporters in Sydney.

"Whatever commitment we make will be modest and within our own resources and won't detract from our capabilities elsewhere. "It is quite plain there are gaps with the Afghan National Police. Together with other countries we will be looking to making sure that those training needs are met on the basis of everyone pitching in. Our own contribution will be modest."

Mr Smith said the training would be performed by the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Current there are four AFP officers in Afghanistan in a liaison and counter-narcotics role.

"We are looking at a greater compliment of Australian Federal Police to go to Afghanistan," Mr Smith told the Nine Network. "They'll be part of, if you like, the capacity-building aspects that we are doing in Afghanistan, training the Afghan police."

Afghanistan debate makes soldiers targets: Hillier

Jack Aubry and Meagan Fitzpatrick,  Canwest News Service February 22, 2008

OTTAWA -- Canadian parliamentarians shouldn't drag out the debate on the country's military mission in Afghanistan since troops are currently vulnerable to attacks from the Taliban who wish to influence the decision, Canada's top soldier said Friday in a speech to the Conference of Defence Associations.

Gen. Rick Hillier, the outspoken chief of the defence staff, also raised the possibility Friday that this week's deadly suicide bombing in Afghanistan, which targeted a Canadian convoy, was meant to sway opinions in the Canadian debate.

And he was greeted with lengthy applause from the military crowd when he added: "the least our soldiers could expect" in Afghanistan is that after the pending vote on extending the mission to 2011 is completed, all MPs in Parliament give unanimous support to a motion backing Canadian troops.

But Liberal Leader Stephane Dion said later he was certain MPs in all parties support the troops. He also called the Conservatives' recent suggestions that that those who don't support the extension of the Afghanistan mission to 2011 are supporters of the Taliban, "odious."

He dismissed Gen. Hillier's suggestion that a speedy debate is needed, saying the Taliban are out to kill Canadian soldiers regardless of what Parliament decides on the mission.

NDP MP Dawn Black said Gen. Hillier's speech was inappropriate in several instances.

"It seems incredible to me that Gen. Hillier would make these comments and I think they're quite out of line," said Ms. Black in reaction to his linking suicide attacks to the Canadian debate.

"It's so hypocritical. How can you say that Canadians are in Afghanistan to fight for democratic values, and then try to shut down the democratic debate here at home in Canada?"

She added Gen. Hillier should provide proof of any links with the suicide attacks: "If that's the case, let's hear it, let's see it. This is a mission that's been conducted with so much secrecy and so little information shared with the Canadian public that's his comments are hard to take with credibility."

Speaking to reporters after the speech, Gen. Hillier said he is comfortable with the pace at which the parliamentary debate is proceeding, but he is simply warning that it shouldn't take too long.

"The Taliban will always look at us and try to assess if they can influence things back here. We take many actions to prevent that from occurring but the longer the debate goes on -- if it goes on an extended period of time -- the more difficult it is to do that and I just wanted to raise a cautionary flag, that's all," he said.

In a speech the day before to the same audience, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced a revised motion on extending Canada's mission in Afghanistan beyond the current end date of February 2009 which incorporates many of the changes demanded by the Liberals and calls for Canadian troops to withdraw from Kandahar by the end of 2011. It also includes a pledge to focus the mission on reconstruction, development and training of Afghan security forces.

The Liberals and Conservatives have been edging closer to a consensus on extending the mission, though the NDP and Bloc Quebecois remain firm in their opposition. Debate on the motion is expected to begin Monday.

Gen. Hillier rejected the Liberal party's insistence that the motion to be debated in the House of Commons next week means an end to Canada's combat role in Afghanistan.

He insisted the wording of the motion makes the mission viable militarily because it leaves decision-making to the forces on the ground. "We're been sent to do a job. If we are not micro-managed, we can do it very well." He said the caveats imposed on Canadian Forces in the mid-'90s in Bosnia "put us in a difficult position."

He told the audience battalions of Canadian troops were called "Can'tBats" in the mid-'90s because of the "ridiculous manner" the troops were restrained with no power to act as peacekeepers, forcing them at times to simply watch ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. He said later it left soldiers in Bosnia dismayed and psychologically scarred, affecting their "long-term mental health."

Afghan withdrawal deadline a bad idea, says Manley panel member

OTTAWA - A member of the Manley panel on Canada's role in Afghanistan says the government's proposed 2011 deadline for a military withdrawal is arbitrary and should not necessarily be binding.

Former TV journalist Pamela Wallin says the overall goal has to be a stable Afghanistan, and abandoning the country before that happens wouldn't make sense.

"I don't think any of us think that some arbitrary date is really going to be it," she said Friday.

"It's a process of getting to that stage where the Afghans will be in the lead. That's what they want, and that's what we want, and whether it's Tuesday or Thursday doesn't matter - we just need to get to that goal, which is everybody's goal."

Wallin is the first member of the panel to comment on the political wrangling over extending the mission that has seen the government and the Liberals horse-trading for weeks.

Her comments came after Gen. Rick Hillier, the country's top general, urged politicians to come up with an unambiguous plan for the mission in Afghanistan.

Other members of the Manley panel have been circumspect as the Liberals and Conservatives moved toward a common position on the future of the Afghan mission.

Manley did not return calls Friday. Former ambassador Derek Burner had an assistant issue an anodyne statement: "I'm happy that our report seems to be having a positive impact on parliamentary debate."

The panel report called on the government to put no deadline on the mission.

But Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed with the Liberals on Thursday to set a firm 2011 end date on the mission in the troubled Kandahar region of southern Afghanistan. That was a significant concession for Harper.

He introduced a revised motion on extending the mission beyond next February and also adopted the Liberal demand that the mission focus on training and reconstruction.

The motion adds that the extension is conditional on the Canadian Forces getting helicopters and unmanned surveillance aircraft and on NATO finding a battle group of about 1,000 troops to "rotate" into Kandahar by next February. Those were two of the conditions Manley laid out in his report.

Even if the motion is adopted by Parliament, it is not entirely binding. A change of government or a future parliament could set another timeframe for the mission.

Gen. Ray Henault, the Canadian general who leads the NATO military council, said Friday he's confident the alliance can come up with the reinforcements Canada wants.

The Liberal proposal was clear in spelling out that another NATO country needs to replace Canada in the lead combat role in Kandahar, allowing Canadian troops to focus on reconstruction and training. The new government motion is not so specific and could mean only that NATO must send more troops to reinforce the Canadian contingent.

The Tory motion is expected to pass in March with the support of the Liberals, while the NDP and the Bloc Quebecois are expected to oppose it.

Bloc Leader Gilles Duceppe said Friday that he is standing by his position that Canadian troops must be out of Afghanistan by next February.

Hillier said that once Parliament gets past extending the Afghan mission, he would like to see a rousing vote of support for the soldiers themselves.

He said an "overwhelming" Parliamentary vote of support for the troops would be good for morale and would send a strong message to the Taliban, which is always seeking weakness in its enemies.

Hillier said the troops don't ask for much, "but they do ask, from the point of view of those who would accept the risk and the sacrifice of that mission, that they be given clarity of purpose in what they are asked to do and they get that clarity of purpose as soon as we can possibly give it to them as a country."

"We're going to ask young men and women to put their life on the line, to possibly sacrifice that life for our country, and wouldn't it be a powerful thing if our elected political leaders showed their support for them doing that?" he asked after a speech to a defence conference.

Liberal Leader Stephane Dion said later that even those who may oppose the Afghan mission still support the soldiers. "Everybody supports the troops whatever we think about the mission," he said. troops."

Hillier warned that the Taliban are watching the political debate in Canada for signs of weakness. "Because we are, in the eyes of the Taliban, in a window of extreme vulnerability," he said. "And the longer we go without that clarity, with the issue in doubt, the more the Taliban will target us as a perceived weak link.

"I'm not going to stand here and tell you that the suicide bombings of this past week have been related to the debate back here in Canada. But I also cannot stand here and say that they are not."

Hillier's comments about the Taliban seeking weakness drew the wrath of NDP defence critic Dawn Black, who said he had overstepped himself.

"I think that Gen. Hillier's comments today are really out of line for a Canadian military officer," she said. "It appears to be an attempt to inject some fear and some intimidation into the democratic debate here in Canada."

"He infers that maybe some of this recent horrible violence and suicide attacks are related to debate or discussion that has happened here in Canada . . . good grief."

Dion said he doubts that the debate will provoke the Taliban. "I think the Taliban want to kill our soldiers anyway."

Bridging the gap on Afghan role

Toronto Star editorial - February 23, 2008

Canadian troops patrolled dusty Kandahar yesterday, buying time for President Hamid Karzai's elected government to rebuild the nation after Soviet occupation, civil war, Taliban misrule and terror.

Canadian public opinion, however, is deeply split on that mission. A recent Angus Reid poll found 51 per cent support for maintaining our combat role in Kandahar past 2009, but that still left 41 per cent opposed. Many doubt "success" is possible; some would draw the line at peacekeeping, not fighting; many feel let down by our allies.

Given this split, the 2,500 Canadian troops in Afghanistan deserve clear direction from Ottawa on the nature of their task, how long it will last and how much help we can get from allies. Now, thanks to a bipartisan show of leadership from Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion, building on proposals by John Manley's panel, a healthy consensus is emerging in Parliament on all this. Harper and Dion both deserve credit for finding common ground.

Dion showed the greater political courage, by agreeing to extend our combat-plus-training-plus-aid role in Kandahar though 2011 after initially demanding a pullout by 2009. Compared to Harper, Dion went the further distance. And he had a divided caucus to drag along.

But Harper deserves credit, too, for giving up his preference for an open-ended mission and agreeing to a fixed exit date.

This sets the stage for Parliament's debate this coming week on a fresh Conservative motion to extend the mission. The new motion will honour Canada's pledge to help Afghanistan, rotate our forces out of Kandahar by December 2011, and shift their focus to training the Afghan army and police, providing security, and assisting development. It also requires our allies to provide 1,000 troops. The Liberals may seek clarity on a few fudged issues – the combat/security balance and detainees – but mostly they have what they wanted. What gap remains isn't worth fighting an election over.

Despite this Conservative-Liberal rapprochement, Jack Layton's New Democrats are still pushing for an immediate pullout, and Gilles Duceppe's Bloc Québécois wants one by next February.

The NDP and Bloc stances will appeal to potential Liberal voters who oppose the mission. That might cost Dion and benefit Harper. Still, Dion appears to have chosen principle over partisan calculations.

Canadians are bound to remain conflicted about this war. But the Angus Reid poll found that a solid majority – 59 per cent to 27 per cent – believe the Afghan people are "clearly benefiting" from our presence. A poll of Afghans for the British Broadcasting Corp. confirmed that: Some 70 per cent endorse the presence of foreign troops.

Canadians promised the Afghan people help in mending their broken nation. They want us there. It would be wrong to let them down by withdrawing prematurely.

Issues in Afghanistan? Obama's Right, Right-Wing Is So Wrong

Huffington Post - Posted February 23, 2008

The other night in the debate, Barack Obama passed on a story from an Afghanistan veteran, who detailed the severe issues our troops over there have with shortages in artillery and equipment and force levels. It took no time for the right-wing blogs to spring into action, saying there's no way such issues could happen -- not under President Bush's superb leadership! Senator John Warner got into the act, saying he was shocked -- SHOCKED -- to hear this story, and implied that Obama was peddling a false story that could never have happened, especially not with Senator Warner on the Armed Services committee.

Well, turns out that it is true, and has been true for a long time. ABC verified the story. Not only that, but over at VetVoice.com, story after story from Afghanistan veterans have started to be posted, with similar stories. Keep going to VetVoice.com for more.

Then, in a major story in the New York Times that followed troops in Afghanistan, posted today, a soldier in Afghanistan repeats an identical feeling to what Obama had talked about:

And they felt eclipsed by Iraq. As Sgt. Erick Gallardo put it: "We don't get supplies, assets. We scrounge for everything and live a lot more rugged. But we know the war is here. We got unfinished business."

Indeed, the war IS there. That's where Osama bin Laden is. That's where al Qaeda is growing in strength, plotting more attacks. And this administration, and Senator John McCain, are not taking the threat seriously, at all. In fact, they're coming close to waiving the white flag, by committing the overwhelming majority of our forces and equipment to Iraq, not Afghanistan.

Back to Senator Warner. I find it pretty amusing that he says he never heard of equipment issues in Afghanistan before. We've been trying to tell Senator Warner that it's an issue for a long time now. In fact, in May 2007, we ran an ad featuring Mike Breen, who served in Afghanistan. In the ad, Mike talks about not having the air support that he needed, because the equipment was in Iraq.

We ran this ad in one state and addressed one Senator. You guessed it -- in Virginia. Addressing Senator Warner.

Far be it from me to give advice to the president's supporters, but maybe they ought to stop holding their ears and refusing to listen to the troops. Maybe Senator Warner and the rest of them should start taking troops at their word, and pressuring the president to fix the problem.

Wanted for empty prison: some convicted Afghan drug barons

The Times 02/23/2008 - Jeremy Page in Kabul On the outskirts of Kabul stands probably the nicest prison wing between Warsaw and Tokyo — complete with security cameras, electronic locks, shaded visiting areas and UN-approved levels of natural light.

Built by the United Nations with mostly British money, the “secure wing” of Kabul's Pol-i-Charki prison was designed to hold 96 of the top Afghan drug barons whose business helps to fund a Taleban insurgency.

The idea was that it would be impossible for them to escape.

But 18 months after it opened, the problem is getting anyone inside. British and UN officials have told The Times that the wing, built by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with British funding of £1.1 million, stands empty. The reason, they say, is that it is not yet finished — although it was nearing completion when The Times visited in April 2006 and was declared open later that year.

Antonio Maria Costa, the UNODC chief, said in September 2006: “It has 100 beds. We want these beds to be taken up in the next few months.”

The problem now appears to be that the UN insisted on the highest Western standards without appreciating that the elecricity grid could not provide a stable power supply to heat the place and run the cameras, locks and gates. Christina Oguz, UNODC's Afghanistan representative, said: “It would have been irresponsible to hand over the secure wing of the prison to the Ministry of Justice before it was functional. We very much regret the delay.”

The wing is now due to be handed over on April 1 — complete with its own generators. But even if it is, Afghan authorities have yet to arrest, and let alone convict, any of the “high-value” targets for whom it was built, according to British officials.

“High-value” targets are the ringleaders of the 30 large networks thought to run the drugs trade in Afghanistan, which produces 90 per cent of the world's illegal opium.

The empty prison wing is a telling symbol of the international community's failure to curb Afghanistan's drugs industry, which is expected to earn the Taleban about £50 million this year.

The UNODC predicted this month that Afghanistan's opium production would drop only slightly this year, after a 34 per cent rise last year, and would increase in the insurgency-racked south.

Afghan officials blame the international community for not providing security and economic alternatives — and for wasting money on things such as a world-class prison. General Abdullah Azizi, of the Justice Ministry's prison department, told The Times: “We could make four or five prisons for that money, but it was the UNODC's decision. We don't know why.” He said Afghanistan's 35 prisons were so overcrowded that the ministry rented ten houses to use as jails.

Western officials, however, say a big part of the problem is corruption in the Afghan police, judicial and prison systems, which allows many drug traffickers and Taleban fighters to buy their freedom.

One official said: “It's reached a point where the police, rather than providing security, are seen as a major security threat. People are just paying their way out of jail.”

Mullah Naqibullah, a senior Taleban commander, boasted last month that he had escaped custody for the third time in three years after paying a bribe of $15,000 (£7,600) to Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security. Lower-level Taleban fighters say they have bought their freedom for as little as $1,000 each. Last year, a man sentenced to death for kidnapping an Italian aid worker escaped while being transferred from Pol-i-Charki's old wing to the execution ground.

British officials say the picture is not as bleak as the empty prison suggests. They point to the success of two British-funded outfits — the 1,700-strong Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), which includes investigators, prosecutors and judges.

Last year the CJTF processed 331 cases, convicting 278 people and acquitting 102. Among those convicted were five border police sentenced to 16-18 years each in October for transporting 123kg (270lb) of pure crystal heroin in an official vehicle.

“I don't want to sound victorious but we're starting to get there,” said one counter-narcotics official. “We're seeing more medium-value targets picked up.” “Medium-value” targets are the ringleaders' lieutenants while “low-value” targets are the “mules” who transport the drugs.

The problem, though, is that the few who are convicted are still being housed in Afghanistan's ordinary prisons, whose population has swollen from 600 in 2001 to 10,400 last year. “The older and more crowded the prisons are, obviously the higher the risk of a security breach,” said one official involved in the new wing.

Iran Raises the Heat in Afghanistan

Time Magazine, Friday, Feb. 22, 2008, By BRIAN BENNETT/WASHINGTON

"We haven't chosen these neighbors," joked Afghanistan's ambassador to the U.S., Said Tayeb Jawad, as he shined the red dot of a laser around the edges of a map of his homeland. He was addressing a room full of government analysts, scholars and journalists Wednesday, and when asked about Iran's current influence in Afghanistan, the joking stopped. "Iran has become a more and more hostile power," he said.

Afghanistan is in a tough spot. The country is reliant on the U.S. and NATO for its security and, at the same time, shares its longest land border with Iran. Afghanistan has long pleaded with the U.S. and Iran not to carry out their longstanding strategic rivalry on its soil. And for several years that request has been largely honored. Iran, a long-time supporter of the Northern Alliance, was instrumental in bringing about the fall of the Taliban. Iran has also helped more than any other neighbor with the reconstruction of the country. Since 2002, Tehran has pumped millions of dollars into Afghanistan's western provinces to build roads, electrical grids, schools and health clinics. On top of this, Iranian agents are dumping bags of cash in the laps of tribal leaders in Afghanistan's west, a State Department official tells TIME, "clearly intended to purchase influence and remind them: The Americans may be here for 10 or 20 years, but we will be here forever."

In the past six months, however, Iran's actions have taken a more sinister turn. U.S. and NATO troops have intercepted shipments of Iranian-made arms in Afghanistan, including mortars, plastic explosives and explosively formed penetrators that have been used to deadly effect against armored vehicles in Iraq. U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood said on January 31, "There is no question that elements of insurgency have received weapons from Iran." The discovery of the first caches of Iranian-made weapons in Afghanistan in April, says a State Department official, "sent shock waves through the system." Iran was doing more than just bringing western Afghanistan into its sphere of influence.

Then, as if to remind the government of President Hamid Karzai just how much chaos its big neighbor to the west could create, Iran began deporting over 130,000 Afghan refugees back into Afghanistan, sparking a food and housing shortage just as the harsh winter months set in. After two decades of war, there are over 1 million Afghan refugees currently living in Iran. Afghanistan doesn't have the resources to reintegrate them in large numbers. After Karzai made a direct appeal to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran shut off the spigot. But it is unclear what price Iran might have extracted for its largesse. The repatriation, said the U.S. official, was "clearly designed to send a message to Afghans of displeasure of their relationship with the U.S."

Iran's recent actions have played right into the hands of the hawks in Washington looking to underscore Iran's malevolent intentions in the region. The conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute released a report Tuesday detailing Iran's increasing influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Iran, the report read, "is almost certainly providing some military support for the Taliban in Afghanistan."

All of this leaves Afghanistan caught in the middle. The country needs Iran's help developing its infrastructure in the eastern provinces and has a long-term interest in maintaining friendly relations, but Kabul knows it can't be at the cost of distancing itself from the U.S. and NATO. The last thing Karzai wants is to be forced into making a choice between Iran and the U.S. "Iran has played both a constructive and destructive role in Afghanistan," said ambassador Jawad. By playing it both ways, Iran is trying to back Kabul into a corner. That's not neighborly.

A call for talks on Pakistan border

Election winners say Musharraf's tactics with militants failing

By Kim Barker, Tribune correspondent - February 23, 2008

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan - Since shortly after the Sept. 11 terror attacks in the U.S., Pakistan has relied on its military to confront Islamic militants near the country's border with Afghanistan, pounding their bases with bombs. But in both Pakistan's borderlands and capital, many believe the strategy has backfired, as the militants gained strength and spread their influence.

Calling for a different approach, the leaders of the victorious opposition parties in this week's parliamentary elections have proposed negotiating with the militants. Having embarrassed President Pervez Musharraf, a former army chief, at the polls, they argue that reaching out to the insurgents and understanding them may work better than fighting them.

But many terrorism experts fear such an approach may prove disastrous for the U.S.-Pakistani alliance against terror. Some are concerned that it could interfere with the carefully crafted understanding the U.S. has with Pakistan and that the insurgents may be too ideological to negotiate.

"There's always this talk of negotiated settlement with extremist elements," said Ajai Sahni, executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi and editor of the South Asia Intelligence Review. "They have almost always failed. ... these people see themselves as religious warriors. And this kind of faith-based extremism is one of the most difficult to counter."

U.S. officials will be watching closely as the top two opposition leaders, Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, define their agendas in the American-led war on terror, which has focused on the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan because training camps there have spawned militants who have launched attacks worldwide.

This week, Zardari, head of the Pakistan People's Party, which garnered the most election votes, said he wants to talk to "the men in the mountains" and redefine the country's approach to terrorism.

In the past 18 months, the Musharraf government's truces with militants in tribal areas have failed spectacularly, as militants typically used the truces to regroup, recruit more fighters and stage more complicated attacks, raising questions about how any future negotiations could work.

The New York Times reported Friday that U.S. officials are concerned a new leadership could curtail the U.S. ability to launch secret strikes against alleged terrorists by unmanned aircraft from inside Pakistan. The Times reported that U.S. officials, on a visit last month to Islamabad, reached a quiet understanding with Musharraf to intensify those strikes.

The Bush administration has considered Musharraf an important ally in the war on terror, despite recurring questions in Washington about his commitment. Meanwhile, Musharraf has faced criticism at home that he is fighting the United States' war and relying too much on military power.

"America thinks everything can be done by force," said a senior Pakistani government official and former army officer who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "Force is not going to work here, and it has not worked. When you try something and it doesn't work, then it's time to try something else."

In a poll released this month by the International Republican Institute, 73 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said religious extremism is a serious problem in Pakistan. But only 33 percent supported the army fighting extremists in the North-West Frontier province. Just 9 percent said Pakistan should cooperate with the U.S. in its war on terror.

North-West provincial officials blame the central government for sidelining political representatives in the tribal areas and not investing enough in economic development -- whether schools or roads -- to win over the local people. Often they are caught between the army and militants from their own tribe.

Officials say the militants pay as much as $167 a month to illiterate young men in the tribal areas -- a good wage. And others have joined the militants because they want revenge -- for an army bombing that accidentally killed a relative or for the army raid on a militant mosque in Islamabad last July.

The notion of revenge is central to the code of honor along this Pashtun tribal belt. Before that mosque raid, about 550 army soldiers had been killed in fighting with militants since the beginning of 2002. Since July, the soldier death toll has almost doubled.

Government officials know of cases in which a government judge is the cousin of a Taliban fighter and cases of brothers fighting brothers.

"One cousin is in the Frontier Constabulary and loyal to me. His cousin is unemployed and with the Taliban," said Malik Naveed Khan, the commander of the government's paramilitary force based in Peshawar. "Nothing could be worse than what has happened here. It has totally torn the fabric of this society."

Some believe the election could help in the battle by lending more legitimacy to the government, an issue that many believe has been a problem for Musharraf since he seized power in 1999.

"From a strategic standpoint -- the sheer legitimacy of having a legitimate government takes the wind out of the sails of militants," said a Western military official who spoke on condition of anonymity. But he added that he believed the talk of negotiating with militants was simply "political rhetoric" and that it would be very difficult for the new leaders to alter course.

Most of more than $10 billion the U.S. has given to Pakistan in the past six years went to the Pakistani military, with few checks and balances. The Western military official said as much as half had been wasted and has not gone to improve security in the tribal areas. "God knows where the money went," he said.

The military official doubted the Pakistani army could change direction quickly, even if the political forces here demand it. The new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, has been trying to distance the army from politics and Musharraf.

But the official agreed that both the West and Pakistan have made the same mistakes in the past six years, which has led to the crisis only getting worse.

"It's a failure ... to be able to really form a cohesive strategy, a workable strategy," he said, adding that the West had put its resources "in the wrong places" and now is "really behind the power curve. It's been one misstep after another."

Two Winnable Wars

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Sunday, February 24, 2008, Washington Post

No one can return from the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, as I recently did, without believing that these are wars that can still be won. They are also clearly wars that can still be lost, but visits to the battlefield show that these conflicts are very different from the wars being described in American political campaigns and most of the debates outside the United States.

These conflicts involve far more than combat between the United States and its allies against insurgent movements such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban. Meaningful victory can come only if tactical military victories end in ideological and political victories and in successful governance and development. Dollars are as important as bullets, and so are political accommodation, effective government services and clear demonstrations that there is a future that does not need to be built on Islamist extremism.

The military situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are very different. The United States and its allies are winning virtually every tactical clash in both countries. In Iraq, however, al-Qaeda is clearly losing in every province. It is being reduced to a losing struggle for control of Nineveh and Mosul. There is a very real prospect of coalition forces bringing a reasonable degree of security if decisions such as Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's announcement Friday to extend his militia's cease-fire six months continue over a period of years.

Military victory is far more marginal in Afghanistan. NATO and international troops can still win tactically, but the Taliban is sharply expanding its support areas as well as its political and economic influence and control in Afghanistan. It has scored major gains in Pakistan, which is clearly the more important prize for al-Qaeda and has more Pashtuns than Afghanistan. U.S. commanders privately warn that victory cannot be attained without more troops, without all members of NATO and the International Security Assistance Force fully committing their troops to combat, and without a much stronger and consistent effort by the Pakistani army in both the federally administered tribal areas in western Pakistan and the Baluchi area in the south.

What the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have in common is that it will take a major and consistent U.S. effort throughout the next administration at least to win either war. Any American political debate that ignores or denies the fact that these are long wars is dishonest and will ensure defeat. There are good reasons that the briefing slides in U.S. military and aid presentations for both battlefields don't end in 2008 or with some aid compact that expires in 2009. They go well beyond 2012 and often to 2020.

If the next president, Congress and the American people cannot face this reality, we will lose. Years of false promises about the speed with which we can create effective army, police and criminal justice capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot disguise the fact that mature, effective local forces and structures will not be available until 2012 and probably well beyond. This does not mean that U.S. and allied force levels cannot be cut over time, but a serious military and advisory presence will probably be needed for at least that long, and rushed reductions in forces or providing inadequate forces will lead to a collapse at the military level.

The most serious problems, however, are governance and development. Both countries face critical internal divisions and levels of poverty and unemployment that will require patience. These troubles can be worked out, but only over a period of years. Both central governments are corrupt and ineffective, and they cannot bring development and services without years of additional aid at far higher levels than the Bush administration now budgets. Blaming weak governments or trying to rush them into effective action by threatening to leave will undercut them long before they are strong enough to act.

Any American political leader who cannot face these realities, now or in the future, will ensure defeat in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Any Congress that insists on instant victory or success will do the same. We either need long-term commitments, effective long-term resources and strategic patience -- or we do not need enemies. We will defeat ourselves.

The writer holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He recently returned from the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Limited options for US in Pakistan

By M K Bhadrakumar, Asia Times Online / February 23, 2008

The George W Bush administration lost no time reiterating its support of President Pervez Musharraf following the February 18 parliamentary elections. There is bipartisan consensus in Washington that in the given circumstances, the United States has very little leeway other than depending on Musharraf and the Pakistani military.

The leading Republican contender in the US presidential race, Senator John McCain, bluntly rejected the calls for Musharraf's resignation, even calling the Pakistani leader "a legitimately elected president". Top Democrats - Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator John Kerry - as well as the influential Republican figure Senator "Chuck" Hagel, who were in Pakistan as election "observers", also implicitly endorsed Washington's reiteration of Musharraf being a key US ally.

Indeed, there seems to be a bipartisan understanding in Washington that the US finds itself on slippery turf in Pakistan. Any perspective on the US predicament in Pakistan solely in terms of Washington's commitment to the forces of democracy and change will be too simplistic. There are several factors at work that seriously limit the US options in Pakistan.

First, a close assessment of the election results in Pakistan will show that what is available from the February 18 polls is a fractured verdict by the Pakistani people.

A coalition government has become inevitable. This does not augur well for political stability. Coalition politics would be far too sophisticated for Pakistan at this juncture. The requisite political culture of give-and-take needs to develop over time. Besides, PPP and PML-N are both centrist parties, which are vying more or less for the same political space. A political alliance between the two parties - a "grand coalition" - cannot endure for long due to their mutual antipathies rooted in history and their divergent ideologies.

Also, Washington has a sense of uneasiness about the PML-N's plank of "Islamist nationalism". It may not be warranted, but it is there. PML-N seems to be already anticipating an early mid-term poll and likely sees the February 18 election as only a "semi-final". In any case, PML-N's priority will be to consolidate in the heartland province of Punjab, where it is poised to form the government.

As for the PPP leadership, its priorities are different from PML-N's. After some 11 years in political wilderness, the party seniors are naturally eager to grasp the opportunity to form the new government at the federal level as well as in Sindh province. In Sindh, PPP may well have to co-habit with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of migrants from India, which is a strong supporter of Musharraf. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that PPP does not have the stomach for confrontational politics at this juncture.

Tthe assassination of Benazir Bhutto has also created uncertainties within the party. The party is in a sensitive phase of change of leadership, the outcome of which is far from clear. In fact, there are powerful crosscurrents within the party, which are bound to play out in the near future. In sum, PPP is passing through a delicate phase in its history, which puts it somewhat on the defensive and inhibits its sense of adventure even when it is riding a popular wave and has been chosen as Pakistan's ruling party despite heavy odds.

A far more worrisome development for Washington should be the capture of power in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) by the Awami National Party (ANP). Foreign observers are yet to size up the profound implications of an ANP government, which espouses Pashtun nationalism, in the sensitive province bordering Afghanistan. The ANP's electoral success over the Islamic parties is being commonly seen as signifying a rout of the forces of extremism and as the victory of the secularist platform. While this is manifestly so, what cannot be overlooked at the same time is that the ANP also has a long tradition of left-wing politics and consistent opposition to US "imperialism".

Significantly, in the present party line-up, ANP expresses its closest affinity with PML-N - and not PPP to which it ought to be ideologically closer. Without doubt, ANP has opposed the US's support of Israel, the US invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration's intimidation of Iran. It has vehemently criticized Washington's policies allegedly aimed at establishing US hegemony. It has condemned the US forces' operations in the Pashtun regions in southern Afghanistan during the "war on terror". On Wednesday, the ANP leadership reiterated its demand for "peaceful means to end militancy in the [NWFP] province and the adjacent tribal areas".

In practical terms, an ANP government in power in Peshawar will find it impossible to lend support to the sort of military operations that the US would expect the Pakistani military to undertake in the border regions with Afghanistan for ending "militant activities". Interestingly, ANP makes a clear careful distinction between "militancy" and "terrorism".

To be sure, the ANP will point out that the US is pursuing its own national interests in Afghanistan and is expecting Pakistan to kill the Pashtun militants so as to save American lives. The ANP will also demand that Pashtun alienation in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas must be addressed through dialogue and political accommodation as well as through a long-term policy of economic development of the region.

The noisy election has been largely portrayed as a referendum on Musharraf's controversial rule, whereas the specter that is haunting Washington is the widespread opposition to the "war on terror" in Pakistan. This opposition cuts across provinces, ethnic and religious groups or social classes in both rural and urban areas. The US's perceived hostility toward the Muslim people is at the root of this anti-Americanism, and it will not easily fade away.

No elected government in Islamabad can afford to ignore the enormous groundswell of anti-Americanism, however realistic it wants to be about the importance to Pakistan of a close, friendly relationship with the US.

The election results have exploded the myths regarding the "creeping Talibanization" of Pakistan and the "jihadi" threat to the Pakistani state. The propaganda will no longer sell that Pakistan is on the abyss of anarchy. Pakistan does not need Western intervention to save it from becoming a "failed state". Equally, it is very obvious that the transborder movement of the Taliban is only part of the problem. There is a resistance movement active within Afghanistan against foreign military occupation. And the root cause of terrorism within Pakistan is to be traced to the US-led military operations in Afghanistan, which are often pursued with needless arrogance and brute force, and the consequent wave of anger in the tribal areas that the Musharraf regime is serving American interests in the region.

Therefore, a democratically elected government in Pakistan - especially the NWFP provincial government - will be compelled to review the tactics being followed by the Pakistani military in pacifying the tribal areas. It is bound to insist that while terrorism must be countered, militants have to be won over and the use of force must be an exception rather than the rule. The bottom line is that Pakistan will not allow itself to be hustled by Washington into acting in terms of the Bush administration's calendar.

The emphasis will be on befriending the Pakistani tribesmen and on long-term solution. No doubt, an elected government will have difficulty acquiescing with the use of air power and artillery in the tribal areas. There is of course no question of any political party in Pakistan agreeing to US military operations on Pakistani territory.

All in all, if the idea behind a free and fair election in Pakistan was to give a democratic facade to the Musharraf regime and to somehow get the new representative setup led by national parties to provide political underpinning for the pursuit of robust military operations in the tribal areas, that is not what the fractured election result is leading to.

Given this complex scenario, what options would the Bush administration have? The dilemma for the Bush administration is that it is running against the clock in Afghanistan. The war is deteriorating and there is urgent need to stem the tide. The coming 10 months will be a decisive period in determining the fate of the war. The Bush administration is working on a new Afghan strategy to be discussed at the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking place in Bucharest, Romania, in April. Pakistan's role in the war happens to be a critical component of that strategy. The political uncertainties in Pakistan following the elections come at a most awkward time.

Unsurprisingly, taking all factors into account, the Bush administration has concluded that Musharraf is a "known factor" and it is prudent to depend on him to lead Pakistan through the difficult period ahead. This approach has serious limitations insofar as in the medium and long term it is only a democratically elected government that can effectively counter militancy and terrorism. But, then, the Bush administration simply does not have the luxury of taking a long-term perspective.

A failure in Afghanistan would be a severe setback to NATO's aspirations to emerge as a global political organization. It will impact on the US's trans-Atlantic leadership role. Those who clamor for the Bush administration to review its decision to back Musharraf overlook the great urgency of the situation.

Washington's first preference is a coalition between PPP and PML-N working with Musharraf. But that may be too much to hope for. At a minimum, the US would convince PPP leader Asif Zardari to work with Musharraf, which seems to be within the realms of possibility, while American diplomats keep working patiently on the PML-N leadership to show flexibility and pragmatism vis-a-vis Musharraf. In fact, there is an interesting pattern whereby Washington backs Musharraf while American diplomats in Pakistan cast their net wider. A short-term policy of expediency going hand in hand with a radically different longer-term approach - by no means an easy task to achieve in diplomacy.

As for Musharraf, he would also see this equation as both posing an onerous challenge and a welcome opportunity. As he told The Wall Street Journal in an interview on Wednesday, "whatever government there is, I'm pretty sure they will continue to fight terrorism and extremism. Why would any government change its priorities? I think the policy will remain consistent."

But the political parties' reticence about the "war on terror" also provides wriggle room for the Pakistani military in resisting unreasonable US pressure. Thus, Musharraf added in his interview, "I don't think relationships between nations are tied to individuals. There are mutual, national interests that lead to personal relationships. It's not the other way around. It's the mutual interests in the region, especially the fight against terrorism, that has led to our strategic relationship. Now it is broad-based, and long term. So it's an issue-based relationship, which has led to a personal relationship with President [Bush], and I cherish the relationship."

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

Bhutto's party endorses autonomy in southwestern Pakistan, release of prisoners

The Associated Press, 02/24/2008

ISLAMABAD - Benazir Bhutto's party called Sunday for an end to military operations against insurgents in Baluchistan and the release of all political prisoners in the southwestern province where the Afghan government believes the Taliban leadership may be hiding.

The Pakistan People's Party, which will lead the new government after winning last week's elections, issued the call following a meeting between its top leaders and party officials from Baluchistan, where militants have been fighting for self-rule and a greater share of royalties from the area's natural gas fields.

In a statement, the party apologized to the people of Baluchistan for "the atrocities and injustices committed against them" by government forces and called for the release of all political prisoners including Akhtar Mengal, a former provincial chief minister who was arrested in a government crackdown in September 2006.

The statement also called for "maximum provincial autonomy" for Baluchistan and Pakistan's three other provinces.

The two biggest opposition parties — including Bhutto's group — together captured at least 154 of the 268 contested seats in the National Assembly and have begun talks on forming a new coalition government.

President Pervez Musharraf's ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Q, won only 40 seats. The Election Commission has yet to declare winners of six seats.

U.S. officials have been concerned that the overwhelming rejection by the Pakistani voters of Musharraf's political allies could undermine the U.S.-led war against terrorism, especially against al-Qaida and Taliban fighters who have sought refuge in Baluchistan and other areas that border Afghanistan.

The U.S.-backed Afghan government believes the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, is hiding in the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta — a charge Pakistani officials deny.

Before the balloting, opposition groups had been calling for a change in strategy for combating Islamic extremism, shifting from military operations to dialogue with militants, some of whom have close ties to al-Qaida and the Taliban, which have been battling U.S.-led coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Late Saturday, suspected Islamic militants attacked a government checkpoint near Peshawar, killing two paramilitary soldiers and one policeman, according to Zulfikar Khan, a local police official.

The Bush administration has considered the unpopular Musharraf among its closest allies in the war against terrorism, and U.S. officials have been encouraging the winners of last Monday's election to work with the president rather than undertake steps to remove him.

The country's outgoing ruling party promised Saturday to support the winners in combating Islamic extremism and said it was prepared to play a "positive, constructive role" in the interest of national stability.

During a press conference Sunday, a leading Islamist politician called on Musharraf to resign, saying "the people have given their verdict" and rejected the president's policies in the Monday ballot.

"If he has any respect for democracy, any realization of public opinion, Musharraf should resign or we will ask the people to demand that he step down," Qazi Hussain Ahmad, head of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, told reporters.

He also said his party strongly condemns "the naked American interference" in efforts to form a new government — a reference to U.S. statements urging the winners to work with Musharraf.

Ahmad's party boycotted the recent election, saying any vote under Musharraf would be flawed.

The ghosts of Pul-e-Charkhi

The Sunday Times, 02/24/2008

Since the Taliban were ousted, 86 mass graves have been uncovered in Afghanistan — their occupants the victims of torture and murder. Fariba Nawa went in search of her uncle — a professor who dared to teach We were in territory off limits to civilians. The Afghan army Jeep suddenly braked after a 20-minute ride through unpaved roads on the outskirts of Kabul. The ministry-of-defence spokesman started to point into a shallow ditch. I braced myself. Mina Wali, an Afghan-American woman who had also journeyed from the United States, anxiously exited the vehicle. I wasn’t brave enough to go first; I wanted to see her reaction before I looked where he was pointing.

We were at one of Afghanistan’s newly uncovered mass graves in search of skeletons from nearly 30 years ago, dumped there when I was just six years old. Wali’s father and my paternal uncle were two of the tens of thousands imprisoned by Afghan authorities during the communist regime – 1978 to 1992 – who were never seen again. We called them gomshoda, or the disappeared. Since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001, 86 mass graves have been dug up, though the authorities seem to know little about who was buried in them. Most have been discovered unintentionally, as a result of workers digging to erect new buildings as part of the extensive reconstruction of the country.

Wali and I had chosen to begin our search at a grave near the notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison, where many of these prisoners were taken – a desert outpost used for target-shooting by the Afghan military. Human bones had begun to surface as workers dug on the site. But as nobody was willing to start the process of identifying the bodies, the digging had stopped.

There were two human bones inside the ditch, probably from the thigh and back Strewn next to them were lapis-coloured pieces of fabric and a pair of black, close-toed plastic shoes. Poor Afghan men wore this type of shoe. The wind had blown empty plastic water bottles on top of the ditch near mounds of fresh dirt.

Wali crouched near the ditch and sobbed. I held back my tears. Stories I had heard over the past 29 years about how the disappeared were executed and some buried alive in this desert raced through my mind. I was standing on ghosts who held on to secrets of torture and atrocities. We sensed our relatives were among them. I had met Wali while reporting on Afghan-Americans who had returned to Afghanistan to do good – she had built a school – and we discovered both of us had family who had been missing from the communist era. Now, here we were.

My quest was to find out what had happened to my uncle – his death has scarred my family – and to come face to face with the man who sealed his fate. It proved to be an uncomfortable but revelatory journey.

I had warm memories of my uncle, Fazel Ahmed Ahrary. He was balding, always reading something or playing with his daughter, Ariya, his favourite. Sometime in spring 1979, a couple of months after the mujaheddin uprising in Herat, I remember my father telling us his brother had been imprisoned. It was the first time I saw my father weep. He knew his brother wasn’t coming back. But Fazel Ahmed’s wife and children refused to believe it. They searched for him for the next three years and then emigrated to the US, with no answers but still hoping he was alive. Last year I told Aunt Roufa, who lives in Hawaii, of my interest in continuing their search and she was enthusiastic: perhaps individuals who had information but had been too scared to talk in the past would be willing to open up now.

The key to unlocking those secrets of the past was held by Assadullah Sarwary, the head of the Afghan secret police in 1978 and 1979, the time at which most people disappeared. There are no reliable statistics, but from nearly every large family in the Afghan diaspora, from Britain to the US, at least one member was jailed during that period. On documents that list names of prisoners who didn’t come back, it is Sarwary’s signature. Today he is the only representative of the communist regime in prison in Kabul on charges of mass murder. Many of his colleagues are either dead, in the West, or rising to the ranks again in today’s western-backed Afghan government. An Afghan court sentenced him to death in February 2006, but human-rights groups and the United Nations objected to the trial, calling it unfair. He has pleaded not guilty and appealed against the sentence. He’s waiting for the Afghan Supreme Court to grant him a military trial because he was in the air force.

The fact that so many linked to the past regime are still in power and that the country is enmeshed in a new war doesn’t bode well for justice. People are still afraid to talk. “There’s a culture of fear. People from each era are still in power, which prevents civilians from coming forward with proof against past criminals. People don’t trust the system,” said Rahimullah Rameh, a lawyer who investigates war crimes for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

My uncle was my father’s younger brother – there were five brothers and three sisters – and came from a family of intellectuals and writers from the city of Herat. But Fazel Ahmed was the star. He won a scholarship to study pharmacy in France and then became the head of the pharmacy faculty at Kabul University. He was known among the family as a bookworm, quiet, honest and warm. His marriage was arranged to a cousin, Roufa Ahrary, a poet and teacher, and they had four sons and a daughter. In 1978, when Soviet-backed Afghan revolutionaries staged a coup against President Daud Khan, my uncle was at the height of his career and uninvolved in politics.

But Afghanistan rapidly destabilised after the coup as the American-backed mujaheddin began a fierce guerrilla war against the communists. Kabul University was the hub of political activity, with daily demonstrations against capitalism and imperialism and seminars discussing Marx, Lenin and Mao. But there were tensions among the Afghan communists. There were three communist parties: Khalq, the party in power; Parcham, a more elitist, intellectual party backed by the Soviets; and the Maoists, supported by China, who were outlawed but met in secret. The Khalq party did not accept the other two and imprisoned their more influential members. Punishment of the Maoists was more severe, usually execution, while some in Parcham were spared because of Soviet support. The Khalq formed a strong secret police called Agsa, which Sarwary ran, similar to the East German Stasi.

Students and professors disappeared by the hundreds from the university. My uncle, who was not a member of any party, was demoted from his job as the head of the faculty.

Before visiting that dreadful graveside, I had begun my quest at Kabul University, at the faculty of pharmacy where his students and the classmates who studied with him in France are now professors. Fazel Ahmed’s younger sister Nafisa Masomi and two of my cousins went with me. There, one of his colleagues, Qamaruddin Saifi, and two of his students, Nasim Siddiqi and Hassan Frotan, agreed to talk.

My uncle was a different personality at the university – vivacious and vocal. He stayed behind the scenes politically, but attended various leftist meetings and discussed political crises with his colleagues. The problem was that some of his closest contacts were Maoists, and they were on the government’s hit list. Saifi said the head of the faculty at that time was in the Khalq party, and informed him and several others to stop interacting with Maoists. Saifi listened, but apparently Fazel Ahmed continued talking to these Maoist friends. This could have been the reason he was jailed: guilt by association.

Siddiqi stayed quiet for most of the meeting with us, but said that he kept his mouth shut then and he was even scared to talk now. Frotan, a handsome man in a suit, said he was the last person in the department to see my uncle. Frotan noticed the infamous government black car with tinted windows outside their faculty – the Russian-made vehicle took prisoners who didn’t return. Then he saw Fazel Ahmed, wearing his sheepskin hat and a black suit, walking down with a bureaucrat. “He gave his briefcase to somebody and told them to give it to his wife and our eyes met. I was standing downstairs, too afraid to say anything, as he was being escorted down by another man. The colour in his face was gone. He knew where he was going. He went without any resistance,” Frotan recalled.

Fazel Ahmed Ahrary disappeared at 43 and was never seen again. “We asked the head of the faculty after the regime changed [nine months on] what happened to our professor,” Frotan said. “He knew because he was in the Khalq party, but he wasn’t a killer. He said sadly, ‘Mr Ahrary died under torture. He never made it out of the interrogation room.’ We didn’t ask any more questions.”

I made Frotan repeat “died under torture” a few times before I could digest it. The others in the room tried to share happier memories of my uncle, but I had the answer and I wasn’t going to let it go. Where can I find this head of the faculty? What kind of torture? Who did it? I threw these questions at Frotan and he stared back blankly and shook his head. All he could give was the name of the head of the faculty: Hossain Hilali.

It was the same name that Saifi and Murad Ali Roshandel, another colleague who lives in Germany but has returned to teach in the pharmacy faculty in Kabul, had mentioned earlier in a separate interview. Roshandel said Hilali had warned him to stay away from the Maoists, and that Hilali had seen Roshandel’s and my uncle’s names on a list of professors who were to be arrested. But from the 12 professors at the faculty, my uncle was the only one who was arrested and disappeared. I had to find Hilali if he was alive.

My companion, Wali, had endured a longer and more painful search than I was experiencing.

She was also keen I meet Sarwary and confront the man she believed had ordered the execution of her father. Now 47, she is from my Afghan diaspora community in the San Francisco Bay area, the largest population of Afghans in the United States. She’s here to find her father, Shah Wali, nicknamed “Pilot”, or his remains.

He was a high-profile air-force pilot in charge of Bagram air base, where western troops are now stationed. One night in 1978, in front of his family, authorities showed up at their holiday home in Jalalabad and took him in his pyjamas. Wali was 17 and newly engaged. Her mother was crying and Wali was shaking as he was being taken, but he told them to be brave. That was the last time Wali saw her father.

In her Kabul home, Wali brought out her photo albums. The first photograph was of her father, a striking man with a moustache and smiling eyes. Wali is the mother of three grown children, but she reverts to childlike innocence when she speaks about her dad. He was her hero and as the only daughter, she was his princess.

Two months after the famous pilot was jailed, he sent his family a letter asking for cigarettes and medicine. For the next year, Wali wore black and talked to influential members of the government to release her father.

The same day that Wali and I visited the mass grave, we went to Pul-e-Charkhi. I shivered when I saw the structure inside – four-storey, grey triangular buildings with small, barred windows and stone walls riddled with bullets. It holds 4,000 inmates, including criminals and political prisoners, and despite laws against torture now, authorities still do it, according to inmates. On October 7, 2007, 15 people were killed by a firing squad, the first executions announced during the current president Hamid Karzai’s leadership.

Wali held up her father’s photograph to all the guards in the hope that one might remember him from 29 years ago. The guards who were present at that time seemed uncomfortable, but one of them said that at night they heard moans from the back yards of the prison, which they believed were the restless spirits of the past.

There had been an amnesty in 1979. Families lined up at Pul-e-Charkhi to see who made it out alive after two years of arrests. Wali stood behind the prison door from 8am until 8pm while inmates were driven out in buses and freed. “It was like a zoo,” she said. But her father was not among them. Instead she saw her maternal uncle Ehsan Pattan, the former King Zahir Shah’s royal pilot, who had also been jailed. He told his niece her father was no longer in the prison. Wali left Afghanistan shortly after that. Later, Pattan escaped into exile, but his experiences in Pul-e-Charkhi have turned the 70-year-old into a temperamental and distressed man. He was the last to see Wali’s father, but he has not disclosed details of their time together in prison with Wali yet. “I didn’t want her to suffer.”

The communists took him prisoner on charges of plotting a royal counter-coup, which he denied. Before he was taken to Pul-e-Charkhi, he was holed up with 1,000 men at the ministry of defence for five days. There he watched soldiers throw five men into a well alive and pile dirt on top of them. Pattan says Sarwary, who used to be his student in flight school, came in with a friend, now a member of the Afghan parliament, and called the names of 15 members of the Afghan royal family. Then Pattan heard numerous shots fired in the parking lot of the ministry. All 15 were reported dead, he said.

Eighteen buses carried the prisoners from the ministry to Pul-e-Charkhi, where Pattan spent two years. After two months in a cell, Pattan said in an unaffected tone, Sarwary interrogated and tortured him inside the prison. Wires were clipped to his toes and electric shocks zapped through his body. “He asked how I was planning to bring the king back, what were my plans with Shah Wali [Wali’s father]. He hit me and broke my ribs and two of my teeth.”

After a year, Shah Wali was brought to Pattan’s cell, where they spent three nights, and the brothers-in-law swapped stories. Shah Wali had also been tortured. Pattan said that on the third night, Said Mohammad Gulabzoy, a key Khalq member, called 12 inmates, including Shah Wali, to be taken to the desert target range, the killing fields. “He looked at me and said, ‘Don’t forget your God.’”

Pattan thinks he was saved because he wasn’t important enough to kill. Shah Wali was more powerful and high-ranking. Pattan said he had gone from a celebrated pilot to a security guard in the US, but he has put the past behind him. Yet he would like to see justice against Sarwary. “They should try him again fairly and then execute him in front of the victims’ families.”

But how to reach Sarwary? I spread the word to friends who were connected to the Afghan government that I wanted to interview him. I was told it would be impossible because he was on death row and those inmates were not allowed to be interviewed. But connections can override most rules in Afghanistan. A friend introduced me to a man who knew Sarwary and would be able to get me inside his cell. He took me to the prosecutor handling Sarwary’s case and got permission for the interview.

When I saw him, I felt a surge of anger. But I held back and told myself I had to hear his side of the story. He said the only reason he agreed to see me was because of our mutual acquaintance.

Sarwary’s conditions in jail are a lot more pleasant than those of inmates of the communist times. He’s not in Pul-e-Charkhi but in a temporary cell in police headquarters in the centre of Kabul, where prisoners awaiting trials and sentencing are held. His room mirrored an average Afghan bedroom, with a bed, red mat, a TV, Thermoses of tea and plates of cookies and candies – except there were bars on the window. He wore traditional Afghan garb, loose trousers and a long tunic, and a turquoise ring. His neatly trimmed beard is the same colour as his salt-and- pepper hair. Papers and books were stacked near his bedside. At 66, Sarwary has spent a total of 17 years in prison. His adult life is a cycle of coups and incarcerations in various Soviet-backed regimes, in which he befriended powerful leaders and then became their enemy.

He greeted me with normal Afghan customs of hospitality, offered tea and began his soliloquy as if he had shared his biography numerous times. Animated at times and subdued at others, he never lost his air of confidence, the absolute conviction that he’s innocent. Sarwary was last captured by the mujaheddin in 1992, and the mujaheddin leader Ahmad Shah Massoud kept him in his private prison until he was handed over to Karzai’s administration.

Sarwary spent several years in the Soviet Union training to be a pilot and intelligence officer. He became enraptured with communism. “I had never seen that kind of order and organisation. They were civilised and we were backward.”

When he returned to Afghanistan, he was responsible for 100 planes and 1,500 officers, but that didn’t last long. He teamed up with King Zahir Shah’s cousin Mohammad Daud Khan to overthrow the monarchy in 1973. But while Daud Khan became president, he threw Sarwary in prison for eight months for insubordination. While Daud was pro-Soviet, Sarwary believed he didn’t go far enough in implementing socialism.

Sarwary came from what he claims was a landowning family in Ghazni province, and he was angry with the injustice to the landless poor. He studied Marx and Lenin and believed in communism, but says Afghans can never truly be communists. “We can’t separate ourselves from nationalism, so none of us were really communists.”

His role in the 1978 coup was instrumental – he was friends with Nur Mohammad Taraki, the first communist president, and with Hafizullah Amin, a key member of Khalq who later became prime minister and then president. As head of the secret police, Sarwary claimed he simply arrested people – 1,100 – and those who accuse him of torture and murder are lying. His agency used phone-tapping and informants to capture “enemies”. “I didn’t have the power to kill or order killings. All the evidence against me is false.”

I looked him in the eye and asked him what had happened to those who disappeared. He said Amin, who was assassinated in 1979, was responsible for most of the killings – and the rest of those in power who would know are also dead.

“Did you know Fazel Ahmed Ahrary?” I asked. He paused for a minute and shook his head. I told Sarwary he was my uncle and had disappeared. Do you know where those who disappeared are buried?

“I don’t know anything. If I killed anyone, slaughter me,” he answered angrily, motioning a knife cutting his throat. I knew then that I would not get any information I needed from him. Our meeting ended cordially, with him agreeing to be photographed on my mobile phone. Cameras were not allowed inside the prison, but nobody searched me.

Sarwary’s most faithful ally is Gulabzoy, who was minister of telecommunications when he was chief of Agsa. But while Sarwary anticipates life or death, Gulabzoy makes big decisions in the lower house of the parliament. He visits Sarwary every week and attests that his friend is wrongly accused. “He’s honest, patriotic and gullible – those are his weaknesses,” Gulabzoy said, on the lawn of his two-storey house in Kabul. Most witnesses against Sarwary say Gulabzoy was guilty of the same crimes, but he played his cards better politically.

After 13 years in prison, Sarwary was given the right to a trial in late 2005, and video tapes from the day of the sentencing in Kabul show a mob in the courtroom anxiously waiting to hear the judge read the death penalty. Sarwary had no defence lawyer and sat there calmly as he was sentenced to death. Representatives from human-rights groups, including the UN, attended part of the trial and said international standards of due process and fairness were ignored.

There’s no law against war crimes in Afghanistan, and some legal experts believe it would be better to try Sarwary in the Hague, because Afghanistan’s judicial system is not ready for such cases. Three other Afghans have been indicted for war crimes outside the country – one man from the mujaheddin era in Britain, and two from the communist times in Holland.

Meanwhile, the culture ministry has set up a commission to try to decide what to do with the mass graves. A UN official told me it’s best if families do not get their hopes up that the remains will be identified. According to the ministry of defence, there are no Afghan forensic experts who can do the job and it’s too expensive.

But for Wali and me, the efforts of the commission are not enough. Wali wants to unite all the victims’ families to build a memorial, similar to the Vietnam wall, commemorating those who disappeared, and some relatives are writing books and documenting their stories in hopes of finding closure. I continue my search – for Hossain Hilali, the former director of the faculty of pharmacy, and for others who might have a clue as to what happened to my uncle. Hilali might be in Munich, but numerous internet searches and calls to Afghans there turned up nothing.

The answers I found raised even more questions, and the selective memories of those who were there at the time were too subjective to point to any reliable truth. The trail leading to my uncle has gone cold, but no matter in which direction it leads, the ending is death.

Now I had to share what I knew with those closest to him. My father took the news in his stride when I went back to California to tell him. At 77, his memory is going, but he remembers every detail I told him about my journey and he retells it to all of our guests in an attempt to grasp its reality. I kept delaying the call to Aunt Roufa, my uncle’s wife, and when I did call, I avoided the subject for an hour until finally she asked. With many disclaimers that

it could be false, I told her that he may have died under torture.

“I never heard this before. I feel his pain. I think he didn’t have any tolerance for suffering. None of us in the family do,” she said, grappling for an explanation.

I suggested having a memorial service for him, to give him a peaceful rest, but she said no. “I prefer that he has disappeared and not to know. I don’t want to see a body. I don’t know what I would do if I found out he’s dead for sure.”

When I hung up the phone, I burst into tears finally, not because my uncle was dead, but because I had opened up old wounds. I knew that at the other end, in her apartment in Honolulu, Aunt Roufa was alone and in pain.

Afghan police convicted of rape

Canwest News Service Saturday, February 23, 2008

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- Three Afghan National Police officers were sent to prison Saturday after being found guilty of gang raping a 12-year-old boy and his father.

The sentences were delivered immediately after a brief trial, held inside a packed Afghan military courtroom in Kandahar city. An Afghan judge heard shocking evidence from the two victims.

The father, a 46-year-old labourer named Noor Mohammad, explained in court that the police officers had burst into his guest room in Kandahar city a month ago and accused him of stealing 20,000 Afghanis, or about $400.

They took him and his son to a police check post in Dand, a few kilometres west of the city, and confined them in two separate rooms.
 
Mr. Mohammad testified that Asadullah, 30, the checkpoint commander, beat him with a pistol, forced him into manual and oral sex, removed his trousers and then raped him. He said he could hear his son crying in the next room. He tried to escape the room but couldn't, he said.

"I told [the assailants] to kill me, but they didn't," Mr. Mohammad testified. "If they had killed me, I would have forgiven them at judgment day."  
He wept as he gave his testimony.

His son then described his ordeal. He said that three police officers pinned him down and took turns raping him. The checkpoint commander then entered the room and raped him, he said.

Afterwards, the officers threatened to kill him if he or his father reported them to authorities. The boy said he promised the police officers they would tell no one about the rapes.

The boy and his father were released. They walked back to Kandahar city and straight into police headquarters, court was told.

According to an Afghan military prosecutor, several police officers rushed to the checkpoint in Dand and confronted three of the four rapists, including the commander. The fourth officer involved escaped, the prosecutor told the judge.

The others were disarmed and arrested. All three come from northern Afghanistan. They arrived in court Saturday wearing red prison outfits. They were not represented by counsel and testified in their own defence.

The commander denied in court that he had raped Mr. Muhammad and his son, and claimed the father was trying to "blackmail" him.

A second officer also denied the assaults. But a third officer, Abdul Samad, 22, confessed to having raped the boy. After hearing from each of the accused, the judge left the courtroom.

He returned ten minutes later and sitting at a small desk, he delivered his guilty verdicts. After telling the three officers that they could attempt an appeal, the judge sentenced each one to ten years in prison.

Approximately 250 police officers attended the trial. Three American soldiers were also present; they sat in the front row of the spectators' gallery. Observers say it is the first trial of its kind in Kandahar since the Taliban were removed from power in 2001.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]