In this bulletin:

• Karzai denounces Paghman terrorist act
• NATO and Afghan forces kill 65 Taliban - ministry
• US strategic goals in Afghanistan not met: report
• U.S. Notes Limited Progress in Afghan War
• Armed Forces face 'failure' in Afghanistan
• Czechs Buying Dingos, Iveco MLVs for Afghanistan
• Quebec soldier wounded in Afghanistan laid to rest
• Mobile Phone is King
• Civilian proud of Afghan projects
• In Afghanistan, hunt for arms and militants can be a fruitless slog
• What goes wrong in Swat?

Karzai denounces Paghman terrorist act

KABUL, Nov 24 (Pajhwok Afghan News): President Hamid Karzai Saturday condemned the suicide attack in Paghman district, where 10 people including children were killed and 15 others wounded.

The president expressed deep condolences and profound grief over the death of civilians and students in the suicide attack. "Those who commit such wild attacks are scared of the prosperity and reconstruction of Afghanistan"

Karzai said in a statement mailed to Pajhwok Afghan News the people of Afghanistan wanted reconstruction of their country and such attacks could not suppress their ambitions.

He condoled with families of the victims and prayed for speedy recovery of the wounded.

NATO and Afghan forces kill 65 Taliban - ministry

KHOST, Afghanistan, Nov 25 (Reuters) - Afghan and NATO-led forces killed 65 Taliban rebels when they called in air strikes as the insurgents smuggling weapons across the border from Pakistan, the Afghan Interior Ministry said on Sunday.

Afghanistan has seen a steady escalation of violence this year with up to 30 percent more clashes with hardline Islamist Taliban insurgents fighting to overthrow the pro-Western Afghan government and eject 50,000 foreign troops from the country.

Afghan and Western military officials say the Taliban arm and train in Pakistan's restive border region, largely outside the control of the Pakistani government.

The Paktia provincial governor's office said 72 insurgents were killed in Saturday's air strike near the Pakistani border, but a spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said that number was "way too high".

It is not ISAF's policy to release Taliban casualty figures. The group was smuggling weapons on horses and in two saloon cars when Afghan and foreign forces engaged them and called in air support, the Interior Ministry said.

Elsewhere in Paktia province, Afghan and U.S.-led coalition forces killed four insurgents and detained seven others, the Afghan Defence Ministry said in a statement.

And near the provincial capital Gardez, ISAF troops called in an air strike to kill three insurgents after they were spotted planting a roadside bomb, ISAF and the Interior Ministry said.

While Afghan and foreign forces have killed large numbers of insurgents in clashes this year, there has been no let up in Taliban attacks and the rebels have extended their attacks to parts of the country previously considered safe.

NATO commanders admit the conflict cannot be won simply by killing insurgents.

Instead, they say, more Afghan soldiers and police need to be trained to bring security in order for development to be speeded up and undercut Taliban support. (Reporting by Elyas Wahdat; Writing by Hamid Shalizi; Editing by Jerry Norton)

US strategic goals in Afghanistan not met: report

WASHINGTON (AFP) — The White House concluded in a recent secret report that the war effort in Afghanistan has not met strategic goals set this year, The Washington Post reported Sunday.

The newspaper, citing unnamed US officials, said the report was prepared earlier this month by the National Security Council.

Its main conclusion was that while individual military battles against the Taliban have been successful, other areas remain wanting, report said.

"One can point to a lot of indicators that are positive," The Post quoted a senior US intelligence official as saying. "We go out there and achieve our objectives and kill bad guys."

But the extremists, he added, seem to have little trouble finding replacements, according to the paper.

While many foreigners, mostly Pakistani, join the Taliban, several officials said the main source of new recruits remain unhappy Afghans, The Post said.

"There doesn't seem to be a lot of progress being made ... I would think that from (the Taliban) standpoint, things are looking decent," the paper quoted the intelligence official as saying.

U.S. Notes Limited Progress in Afghan War

Strategic Goals Unmet, White House Concludes

By Karen DeYoung, Washington Post Sunday, November 25, 2007

A White House assessment of the war in Afghanistan has concluded that wide-ranging strategic goals that the Bush administration set for 2007 have not been met, even as U.S. and NATO forces have scored significant combat successes against resurgent Taliban fighters, according to U.S. officials.

The evaluation this month by the National Security Council followed an in-depth review in late 2006 that laid out a series of projected improvements for this year, including progress in security, governance and the economy. But the latest assessment concluded that only "the kinetic piece" -- individual battles against Taliban fighters -- has shown substantial progress, while improvements in the other areas continue to lag, a senior administration official said.

This judgment reflects sharp differences between U.S. military and intelligence officials on where the Afghan war is headed. Intelligence analysts acknowledge the battlefield victories, but they highlight the Taliban's unchallenged expansion into new territory, an increase in opium poppy cultivation and the weakness of the government of President Hamid Karzai as signs that the war effort is deteriorating.

The contrasting views echo repeated internal disagreements over the Iraq war: While the military finds success in a virtually unbroken line of tactical achievements, intelligence officials worry about a looming strategic failure.

"There is a key debate going on now between the military -- especially commanders on the ground -- and the intelligence community and some in the State Department about how we are doing," said one Afghanistan expert who has consulted with the National Security Council as it continues to "comb through conflicting reports" about the conflict.

Over the past year, all combat encounters against the Taliban have ended with "a very decisive defeat" for the extremists, Brig. Gen. Robert E. Livingston Jr., commander of the U.S. task force training the Afghan army, told reporters this month. The growing number of suicide bombings against civilians underscores the Taliban's growing desperation, according to Livingston and other U.S. commanders.

But one senior intelligence official, who like others interviewed was not authorized to discuss Afghanistan on the record, said such gains are fleeting. "One can point to a lot of indicators that are positive . . . where we go out there and achieve our objectives and kill bad guys," the official said. But the extremists, he added, seem to have little trouble finding replacements.

Although growing numbers of foreigners -- primarily Pakistanis -- are joining the Taliban ranks, several officials said the primary source of new recruits remains disaffected Afghans fearful of opposing the Taliban and increasingly disillusioned with their own government.

Overall, "there doesn't seem to be a lot of progress being made. . . . I would think that from [the Taliban] standpoint, things are looking decent," the intelligence official said.

Senior White House officials privately express pessimism about Afghanistan. There is anxiety over the current upheaval in neighboring Pakistan, where both the Taliban and al-Qaeda maintain headquarters, logistical support and training camps along the Afghan border. But "in all honesty, I think it is too early to tell right now" whether political turmoil will undermine what U.S. officials already consider lackluster counterinsurgency efforts by Pakistani forces, the senior administration official said.

At the moment, several officials said, their concern is focused far more on the domestic situation in Afghanistan, where increasing numbers are losing faith in Karzai's government in Kabul. According to a survey released last month by the Asia Foundation, 79 percent of Afghans felt that the government does not care what they think, while 69 percent felt that it is not acceptable to publicly criticize the government.

Although 42 percent remained optimistic that things are moving in the right direction -- slightly lower than in a similar survey in 2006 -- most of those who thought otherwise cited insecurity as the biggest problem, followed by poor governance and the economy. Just a year ago, security was cited as the biggest reason for optimism.

U.S. troops number more than 25,000 and make up the largest contingent of the 41,000-member NATO force in Afghanistan. NATO officers say they have eliminated Taliban leaders and fighters in higher numbers than in any previous year. But such claims of success reflect "a very tactical outlook in a game that is strategic," said a former U.S. senior commander in Afghanistan who shares many of the intelligence community's concerns. "I have a lot of respect for [Taliban] strategy," he said. "These guys are not cowardly by any stretch of the imagination."

While U.S. and other NATO forces have maintained a firm hold on major cities, they have been unable to retain territory in the vast rural areas where 75 percent of Afghanistan's population lives, several sources said. Ground hard-won in combat has been abandoned and reoccupied by Taliban forces, which establish dominance over local governmental bodies.

There is widespread agreement among administration officials that the Taliban has suffered heavy losses this year. But the U.S. military has also suffered losses, with deaths already past the 100 mark, compared with 87 over all of last year -- making this the deadliest year for U.S. forces in Afghanistan since the war began. Afghan civilian deaths also reached an all-time high of 5,700 this year, according to an Associated Press tally.

The strategy is "clear, hold and build," said Seth Jones, an Afghanistan expert at the Rand Corp. "You clear the Taliban out, then you hold it for a period of time. You keep forces there, including Afghan forces, then you begin to build, then expand and go into neighboring districts. The problem has been that when you move troops into neighboring districts, you don't have enough to hold what you just cleared."

Although the competence of the Afghan army is improving by all accounts, U.S. military officials acknowledge that the goal of turning captured territory over to Afghan forces has been hampered by training delays and insufficient numbers.

In last year's Operation Medusa, Jones said, Canadian combat troops fought hard for control of the Panjwai district, south of Kandahar. "Four weeks ago," he said, "the levels of Taliban in Panjwai . . . were back up to pre-Operation Medusa."

Experts said the Taliban's control has extended beyond the group's traditional southern territory, with extremists making substantial inroads this year into the western provinces of Farah, Herat and others along the Iranian border even as they regularly challenge eastern-based U.S. forces.

"We're seeing definite expanded strongholds," said a U.S. official who declined to be identified by agency. "That's not going to stop in 2008. . . . If anything, it's gaining momentum."

Northern Afghanistan, ethnically separate from the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, is still considered relatively peaceful, although officials regard a Nov. 6 suicide bombing in northern Baghlan province that killed more than 8o people -- most of them children -- as an ominous sign. Though U.S. intelligence officials initially questioned the Taliban's denial of responsibility, they now believe the bomb was the work of Hezb-e-Islami, a Taliban ally, even as suspicion has grown in Afghanistan that most of the deaths were caused by Afghan police officers responding to the explosion.

The former senior U.S. commander said suicide attacks are a "hugely effective tactic" that has been imported from Iraq to Afghanistan, terrorizing the population and convincing Afghans that the coalition cannot protect them. "The idea that [suicide bombs] are a sign of desperation, that's ludicrous," he said.

In Washington, Afghanistan policy has often seemed to be on the back burner since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Republican presidential candidates rarely discuss it, while Democrats generally bring it up to criticize the administration, saying officials are paying too much attention to Iraq at the expense of a "forgotten" war.

President Bush seldom mentions Afghanistan. In White House remarks last month asking Congress for an additional $200 billion for both wars, he noted that "our troops, NATO allies and Afghan forces are making gains against the Taliban," then offered an extensive recounting of progress in Iraq.

To the extent that the administration has publicly described problems in Afghanistan, it has focused on the reluctance of NATO members to send more troops and the restrictions placed by some on the missions they can undertake. "In Afghanistan, a handful of allies are paying the price and bearing the burdens" for the rest of the 26-nation group, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said at a NATO meeting last month. "The failure to meet commitments puts the Afghan mission -- and with it, the credibility of NATO -- at real risk."

Gates has acknowledged that U.S. Marine commanders have appealed to him to speed their departure from Iraq for deployment in Afghanistan to address more pressing challenges there. The Special Operations Command has also been lobbying for a more active role along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Several experts believe that the United States can no longer afford to leave the Pakistani military to clean up its side of the border. "Unless we resolve the safe-haven issue, this is not going to succeed," said Henry A. Crumpton, a CIA veteran who led the agency's successful 2001 Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. "It's getting worse."

But others said the problem is not Pakistan or a lack of military or financial resources in Afghanistan. It is the absence, they say, of a strategic plan that melds the U.S. military effort with a comprehensive blueprint for development and governance throughout the country.

"There are plenty of dollars and a hell of a lot more troops there, by a factor of two, from when I was there," the former commander said. The question, he said, is "who owns the overarching campaign for Afghanistan, and what is it?"

Armed Forces face 'failure' in Afghanistan

By Sean Rayment and Jasper Copping

The Telegraph, November 25, 2007 - British troops are facing "operational failure" in Afghanistan due to years of chronic Government under-funding, according to former heads of the armed forces.

The lives of hundreds of soldiers could be lost unless the Government starts to fund the military properly, they argue.

General Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, who served as the Chief of the Defence Staff in 2001, said: "Operational and tactical failure in Afghanistan is now not impossible to believe."

Their warning follows one of the most damaging weeks for the Government since Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair in June.

The Prime Minister and his Defence Secretary were accused of failing the services in one of the most extraordinary political events of recent times when five lords attacked the Government's defence-spending policy.

Gen Lord Guthrie, who launched a blistering attack on Gordon Brown during the defence debate in the House of Lords last week, told The Sunday Telegraph: "The Prime Minister could be presiding over damaging one of the really great institutions of our state.

"It [the military] is about to break if he is not careful. By this I mean no one will want to join the Armed Forces and the operational consequence of this is a failure in Afghanistan. It could well mean that the Taliban actually win a battle and kill a lot of our soldiers. Operational and tactical failure is now impossible to believe."

Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, who served as the Chief of the Defence Staff at the start of the Iraq war, echoed his fears, saying that the persistent under-funding was "bound to have operational consequences".

The former head of the Royal Navy, Admiral Sir Jock Slater, also warned that the military could fail in Afghanistan if it was not properly supported.

Liam Fox, the shadow secretary of state for defence, who has just returned from visiting troops in Afghanistan, said: "There is no doubt that frontline shortages, particularly in battlefield helicopters, will put us at a significant disadvantage despite the heroic efforts of our forces. Responsibility for this has to lie with the Government."

Defence sources claim that relations between the Government and the military are at an all-time low with both sides being deeply mistrustful of each other.

Although Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, said he welcomed the debate, he was said to be at first stunned then furious that he was given no prior warning of the intensity and the personal nature of the attacks.

Mr Brown, who returns from the Commonwealth leaders' summit in Uganda tomorrow, attempted unsuccessfully to quell the growing dispute by insisting that he had nothing but praise for the Armed Forces and pledged to match their professionalism "with the resources they need".

The Lords debate followed revelations in last week's Sunday Telegraph that a report written for the head of the Army said that British troops felt "devalued, angry and suffering from Iraq fatigue".

General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the Army, also admitted in the report that the military covenant was "out of kilter" and that more needed to be done to improve standards of pay, accommodation and medical care.

"Troops are having to deploy without having had the equipment and training to properly prepare," said Admiral Boyce yesterday. "You have people leaving because of low morale and no Army infantry battalion is fully manned. That is bound to have operational consequences. The unintended consequence of all this could be some kind of operational failure."

Sir Jock added: "We have poor support, poor training and an equipment programme looking shaky. If you don't fund properly, the initial result is that people begin to complain and then people begin to lose. You only have to look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that if troops are not properly supported … then one day things will go extremely, badly wrong, militarily."

Admiral Sir Henry Leach, who served as head of the Royal Navy in the Falklands War, said: "Our people in Afghanistan have to be absolutely impeccably equipped. The consequence otherwise will be an endless campaign with a steady rate of casualties."

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, said: "Recruitment remains robust and we are taking action. The recently announced Command Paper is tackling a number of areas for our brave personnel."

Czechs Buying Dingos, Iveco MLVs for Afghanistan

Defence Industry Daily, 11.25.07 - Czech Republic soldiers will soon be deploying a Provincial Reconstruction Team as part of NATO's ISAF missionto Afghanistan's southern Logar province, along the very dangerous Pakistani border. The USA has offered to lend them more than 20 up-armored Hummers for the duration, but the dangerous regions of southern Afghanistan also demand blast resistant vehicles for the tip of the spear. Hence the government's purchase of KMW's Dingo 2s (currently in service with German forces to the north) and Iveco's MLV (known as "Panther CLV" to the British, and also bought by Norway and Spain for use in Afghanistan).

The Prague Daily Monitor reports that Czech military intelligence service (VZ) director Ondrej Palenik on Tuesday signed a CKr 135 million ($7.5 million) contract with the MPI Group on Nov 20/07 for 4 Dingo-2 vehicles, to be delivered by the end of February 2008. The VZ reportedly solicited 6-8 companies, before narrowing down to 2 finalists under an urgent selection procedure. The newspaper adds that the defense ministry is also preparing a draft contract on the CKr 100 million ($5.6 million) purchase of 4 Iveco MLVs, which are to be used by the Czech military police's special unit operating in the southern Afghan province of Helmand.

These 8 blast-resistant vehicles will meet only the most urgent need, however, and a public tendering process will be launched for "tens of light APCs" that will join the 199 wheeled Pandur II APCs and T-72M4 CZ tanks in the modernized Czech military.

Quebec soldier wounded in Afghanistan laid to rest

ROXTON POND, Que. - A military honour guard lined the steps to the church Saturday where loved ones laid to rest a young Quebec soldier who took his life after being wounded in Afghanistan.

Hundreds of mourners followed the procession through the main street of Frederic Couture's home town of Roxton Pond, a quiet community surrounded by maple trees approximately 90 kilometres southeast of Montreal.

Couture, a soldier with the Royal 22nd Regiment based in Valcartier, Que., was 21 last Dec. 16 when he was out on patrol with a contingent of Canadian and Afghan soldiers in the dangerous Panjwaii district of Afghanistan.

It was the first day of Operation Falcon's Summit, and the soldiers were headed out to a nearby village to determine what kind of help residents would need to get through the winter.

At least a half-dozen others passed by before the young Quebecer's foot came down on a landmine buried in the desert sand. His left foot was amputated and he was at home recuperating when he died.

Couture put on a brave face in media interviews in the months following the December 2006 explosion but he took his own life earlier this month.

The coroner is investigating his death. At the family's request, The Canadian Press did not attend his funeral service Saturday.

A friend said Couture wanted to return to the army. Couture's death has put a focus on the issue of post-traumatic stress for soldiers returning from Afghanistan.

A recent military survey of returned soldiers found that nearly 400 of 2,700 who had served in Kandahar may have come home with mental health problems.

The survey found problems ranging from post-traumatic stress disorder to suicidal tendencies, although high-risk drinking was the predominant issue for soldiers who responded to the survey.

Military officials said they have programs available for soldiers and their families.

Mobile Phone is King

Kelly Cryderman, CanWest News Service - Published: Sunday, November 25, 2007

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- In a country where roads are often impassable, travel is fraught with danger, and recent history recalls many Afghans taking the long road to Pakistan just to make a call, the mobile phone is king.

Afghanistan's cellphone networks may be new and terribly unreliable, but they're spreading like wildfire across the country, aiding everyone from female entrepreneurs, to criminal gangs operating in the desert, to regular Afghans who previously couldn't call their relatives.

"It is due to this public call office that I am supporting my family," said Kandahar City resident Qudratullah, 24, who operates a tiny kiosk called a PCO where the many Afghans who can't afford cellphones can pay to make calls.

"I want to be a teacher or a businessman," said Qudratullah, who is able to pay for classes that would put him in Grade 10 in Canada and who, like many Afghans, has only one name.

Across the courtyard from Qudratullah's wooden shack is foodstuff shopkeeper Mohammed Anwer Zarif, who said just a few years ago he had to travel to Kabul, Herat or Pakistan to place his product orders.

Now, he can just call his suppliers when he needs a new shipment. "Then quickly they send the stuff," Zarif said.

The telecommunications industry was close to non-existent before the Taliban were overthrown in 2001. But there's room for tremendous growth now: Few land lines exist in Afghanistan, and just four million of its 32 million inhabitants are mobile subscribers.

"It's right at the heart of our investment promotion," said Omar Zakhilwal, president and CEO of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, which licenses and promotes businesses across the country.

Civilian proud of Afghan projects

Waukesha contractor has been helping build jails and court systems

By SCOTT WILLIAMS, journalsentinel , Posted: Nov. 25, 2007

Waukesha - From his vantage point, Bob Gibson has seen the best and worst of Afghanistan.

As a private contractor for the U.S. government in the war-torn nation, the Waukesha consultant has witnessed the courage of people determined to rebuild their homeland.

But he also has watched some of his own colleagues pay the ultimate price in the war.

"There's danger everywhere," he said by telephone from the Afghan capital of Kabul. "It is a part of our world. And that's why we're here."

Gibson, a criminal justice consultant, is leading a team employed by contractor PAE Group to implement jail and police systems for the government that was elected after the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban regime.

Since arriving in July 2005, Gibson has observed what he describes as significant progress, in the face of continuing violence.

"We have a long way to go," he said. "But we've come a long way as well."

Gibson's group has garnered high praise from the U.S. government and others for its work building facilities and assembling new criminal justice procedures and systems.

"We're very, very proud," said Wendy Owen, spokeswoman for giant defense contractor Lockheed Martin Corp.

Lockheed Martin acquired PAE Group last year in the midst of the Afghan contract, which is with the U.S. State Department.

Although it is a non-military contract, Gibson and his team of civilians have frequently gotten caught in the crossfire of ongoing fighting.

On June 28 of this year, a suicide car bomber near Kabul targeted a vehicle that was carrying several members of the criminal justice group to a nearby prison.

Killed in the attack was Santa Garcia Ramirez, 33, of Arizona, along with an unidentified security guard from the nation of Nepal. Five others were wounded, including three Americans who have either returned to work or soon will.

The U.S. government has released few details of the incident, although it issued a statement mourning the loss of Ramirez.

Gibson, 52, said he makes frequent trips to the same prison and easily could have been hurt in the suicide attack.

"I will never send my people to any place I won't go," he said, adding that violence in Afghanistan has worsened since he arrived 2 ½ years ago.

"That's all the more reason to stay," he added.

The dangerous mission has been difficult for Gibson's wife, Marty, who said she frantically follows news media reports of each car bombing and other attack.

She recalled having mixed emotions about this summer's fatal attack when she learned that her husband was unhurt but that others had been killed.

"I can't be overjoyed," she said, "because these other people are gone."

Redirected from one group concentrating on courts to another focused on police and jails, Gibson now oversees a staff of 125 people, including 38 Americans.

For about a year, the Waukesha consultant found himself working alongside another Milwaukee-area resident.

Michael Tobin, an employee of the City of Milwaukee, served with the U.S. Army as a legal adviser to the U.S.-led coalition during 2005 and 2006. A former adviser to Milwaukee's police chief, Tobin recently was appointed executive director of the city's Fire and Police Commission.

He recalled working closely with Gibson in Afghanistan - escaping gunfire together once - in circumstances that he said were challenging and fast-changing.

"Bob was very successful working in that type of environment," Tobin said. "He's an adventurous person."

As he nears the completion of his third year in Afghanistan, Gibson said he soon must decide whether to sign on for a fourth year.

Although he enjoys the work immensely, he is reluctant to subject his wife and other family members to another year of danger and uncertainty. Even if he steps aside, however, he hopes the U.S. government continues its rebuilding efforts.

"Afghanistan is a place we cannot back down from," he said.

In Afghanistan, hunt for arms and militants can be a fruitless slog

By C. J. Chivers, Saturday, November 24, 2007

ESPANDI, Afghanistan: First Lieutenant Aaron Childers stood before a doorway inside a mud-walled compound while an Afghan and American patrol searched behind him. Paratroopers swept metal detectors over the dusty ground, looking for buried weapons and ammunition. A middle-aged woman, one of the compound's residents, faced the lieutenant, speaking emphatically and waving her arms. A young woman beside her hid her face beneath a shawl. The lieutenant's Afghan interpreter also hid his face, concealing his identity.

"She says there is no Talibs," the interpreter told the lieutenant. "They have no Talibs here."

"Tell her we are going to be very respectful with the search, and the ANP are going to be with us," Childers said, using the acronym for the Afghan National Police. "If anything comes up missing while we are searching, please let us know."

Childers is a platoon commander with the 82nd Airborne Division, engaged in the long, slow counterinsurgency campaign that the Afghan government and the United States hope will marginalize the Taliban and make Afghanistan capable of self rule.

On this day, the platoon's mission was to cordon off part of the village and capture Mullah Shabir, a low-level Taliban commander, and to search for caches of rockets or mortar rounds. In recent months, many had been fired from the village toward the command post of the platoon's parent unit, the Second Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry. The paratroopers also hope to teach Afghanistan's indigenous security forces, still an inconsistent lot, to work effectively and with each other. Of the 58 people in the patrol, 12 were Afghan soldiers, 5 were Afghan police officers and 7 were agents of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's intelligence service.

Under American tutelage, Afghanistan's army and intelligence service have shown signs of improvement in recent years, American officers say. The police remain troubled by incompetence, corruption and sloth. The Americans watched the officers closely, aware that they might steal. After the police did a cursory walk through the compound, the paratroopers conducted a more determined search. Staff Sergeant Matthew Allen, the leader of the platoon's second squad, moved through a dim stable, illuminating his way with a flashlight attached to his M-4 rifle. The air smelled of urine and dung.

He picked a path through the manure and searched stacks of firewood. Finding nothing, he returned to the courtyard and pulled off the black mask he had worn on the long walk here through the frigid November night. He inhaled the clean air, and watched the paratroopers pacing on the compound's roof, absorbing the rays of the rising sun. The first search was over. No sign of Mullah Shabir. Allen's eyes twinkled with mischief.

"Funny thing is, I don't think we've ever found the Taliban," he said to the platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class David Banks.

"They seem to do a good job of finding us," Banks answered.

In its eight months in Afghanistan, Second Platoon has been ambushed several times, and in about 10 firefights. "You'll be driving down the road, and be like, 'Was that an RPG that just flew by?' " Allen said, referring to a rocket-propelled grenade. The Second Battalion occupies small firebases and outposts in Ghazni and Wardak Provinces, a region of mountains, high desert and steep-sided valleys between Kabul and Kandahar.

The area, the size of Maryland, is split by Highway 1, Afghanistan's principal road. It contains a patchwork of villages, some friendly to the paratroopers, some apparently neutral, others heavily populated with insurgents and criminals who attack American and Afghan units and prey on passing traffic. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy McAteer, the battalion's commander, said in an interview that the groups operating against the battalion showed signs of tactical coordination, using spotters with cellphones to tell the Taliban and bandits the direction of American patrols, or alerting them to trucks carrying valuable merchandise on the roads.

The paratroopers often move on foot at night, hoping to evade the spotters. On this patrol, they had approached Espandi after a two-hour walk in the blackness, stopping outside the village and sending teams to block escape routes. Then the Afghans and Allen's squad moved toward compounds where they had been told Mullah Shabir had been seen. A dog had been barking madly as the platoon approached.Now the paratroopers moved to a second compound. They found nothing there, too.

Outside a third compound, Private Joseph Wheeler spotted a small metallic cone in the dirt. It was the fuse to a 107-millimeter rocket, the sort that had been launched at the battalion command post. Had it been dropped before dawn, as insurgents spirited their weapons away ahead of the platoon's advance? Or it had been sitting in the open for weeks? It was impossible to tell. Inside the compound, an old man was patting a fresh layer of mud against a wall. He was Hajji Tahir, the father of Shir Agha, a fighter for the Taliban.

"We'd like to ask you a few questions about your son," Childers said. "We're not going to hurt you in any way. You don't need to be afraid."
Hajji Tahir said he was not afraid.

"Do you know where your son is?" the lieutenant asked.

"No," the man answered.

"When was the last time you saw your son?"

"Some men came and took him and he joined them," he said. "I am old and I am alone. My son does not help me.

"I have not seen my son," he added. "But if I see him I will arrest him."

Childers was polite but unconvinced. "We don't want his son to get killed in the fighting," he said to the interpreter. "Can you ask him to call us when he sees his son?"

Hajji Tahir agreed. Then he said he would make chai, or tea, for the platoon. He excused himself and walked away. Captain Benjamin Klimkowski had accompanied Childers' patrol, to help supervise the Afghans. He was also trying to assess the village.

"You buy it?" he asked Childers.

"I don't know," the lieutenant said.

Allen had paced near the conversation with Hajji Tahir while his squad searched the yard. He cradled a rifle. The hand grip of a 12-gauge shotgun jutted from his backpack.

"You know, right now he's gone to another house to tell his son to run," he said, then flashed a grin and joked, "His son was making the chai."
Hajji Tahir returned with tea.

At the next compound, which contained a house surrounded by a withered vineyard, a woman approached the paratroopers after the Afghan police walked through. She said that after the Afghan officers had left she found that she was missing 500 Pakistani rupees, worth about $8, from the box where she kept her money. News of her accusation spread through the patrol; Afghan Army soldiers appeared disgusted. One chambered a round in his Kalashnikov rifle and strutted menacingly toward the police officers; another leveled his rocket-propelled grenade launcher at them.

Childers intervened, and herded the police officers back inside the compound. They stood against the wall.

"This can't happen," Childers said. "We can't have the police stealing from the people."

He made an offer: return the money and continue on the patrol, or face a search and a report to their supervisor. The police officers said they did not take the money. They looked less humiliated than insolent and bored. The patrol was held up for about 30 minutes while Allen led the police officers around a corner and searched them. He found nothing; the lieutenant had 500 rupees given to the woman at his own expense. Then he jotted down each of the officers' names, to put in a report later.
The police rejoined the patrol.

"This wasn't in my job description," Childers said.

"Tell me about it," Banks said.
Allen's squad moved off to search an orchard at the other side of the village.

The other paratroopers and the Afghans gathered at a fortress-like compound with towers at its corners. Staff Sergeant Frankie Manglona, the leader of the platoon's third squad, had brought his paratroopers there ahead of the sunrise. They had taken positions in two towers and watched over the patrol throughout the morning. Now the sun was hot. As Allen's squad searched among the spindly trees, Manglona scanned the area through the scope of his M-14 rifle.

Children clustered under the tower, looking up. They grinned and pointed. "The people are really friendly," Manglona said. He peered through the scope to see if anyone was creeping up on Allen's squad. "I don't trust them, honestly," he said. He rolled up a sleeve, exposing a black bracelet. It had been engraved with a name: Sergeant Dustin J. Perrot. He had been killed on June 21 by a roadside bomb. "He was a real good guy," he said, watching the exposed members of his platoon. Allen's paratroopers had found machine-gun ammunition and the wrapper of an RPG in the orchard, apparently discarded during a firefight another unit had had in the village earlier in the month. Now they were walking toward Manglona. They entered the tower, exchanged cigarettes and drained canteens.

Uneventful patrols defy ready measurement. Mullah Shabir had not been found. The Taliban's local leader could be watching calmly from a window, under the village's protection, or he could be far away. The patrol's ambition was shifting from hunting for him to seeking intelligence and potential allies. But which of the villagers were potential allies? Which were foes? Were most of them simply pragmatic — saying whatever they needed to say to men who stood before them with guns? No one knew. The patrol found its way to the village's bazaar, where a group of small shops were clustered around a mosque. The American officers began to interview shopkeepers and elderly men.

"We are here today in Espandi to make it safer," Childers said.
A man with a white beard nodded after the sentence was translated. "Thank you," he said.

"There are reports of people bringing rockets and weapons here," the lieutenant said.

"We don't know about this," the old man answered.

"We heard they come from outside the village and fire them and leave," the lieutenant said.

"If we hear of anyone bringing rockets and weapons here, we will capture them and bring them to you," the old man said.

The elderly men and the lieutenant settled into a conversation; the old men said the village could use another well. The lieutenant said he would see if could arrange to have one dug. He thanked the group and stood up and gave a signal to the patrol.

The paratroopers stood and filed away down the alleys, their patrol nearly at an end. In all, they would spend 12 hours walking this day, at an elevation above 7,000 feet. A short while later they slipped out of the village and into the barren flatlands, where old habits of the infantry took over and they dispersed into a wide formation and began the long walk home in the fading light.

What goes wrong in Swat?

The Post, Pakistan, Shahzada Alamgir Swati Sunday, November 25, 2007

One wonders what is going on in Swat. Obviously all is not well. All that is appearing in newspaper columns indicates our lack of understanding. We are unable to perceive what is actually going on there. Is it only the issue of demanding Shariah implementation? Is it the government’s denial of budging on the demands of the militants? Should the government resort to such an extreme action if it is just a political or religious issue?

In fact, most of the people but also the well-informed media men are not aware that it is neither an issue of Shariah implementation, nor is it sense of deprivation, etc. Shariah was the demand of Sufi Muhammad of Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) about three decades ago. At that time there were neither Taliban nor al Qaeda. He was not receiving backing or funding from any foreign country. This indigenous movement led to an agreement with the then provincial government of Aftab Sherpao. However, the courts’ name was changed such as Ilaqa Qazi’s adalat, etc, which are still working. During the Taliban move, Sufi Muhammad went to Afghanistan along with 500 minor students. Later in a fierce fight, all his students were killed. He fled back to Pakistan and went into hiding. This put him in a great dilemma as parents and relatives of those innocent students were outraged. Sufi was left with no option but to stage-manage his surrender to the authorities in order to save himself from being killed by the locals.

In his absence, Sufi’s son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, known as ‘Molvi Polio’ and ‘Mullah Radio’, took control of his father-in-law’s madrassa. The military operation in North and South Waziristan resulted in the expulsion of a number of foreigners including Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who sneaked into Swat Valley and chose Maulana Fazlullah’s area as their hideout. Molvi Polio’s background gives us some dubious accounts of his past life, but as locals talk about, he was expelled from a madrassa near Rawalpindi on a charge of unnatural offence. He remained involved in criminal activities and emerged as a gang leader who used to collect bhatta using a den inside a Dir cave. Locals’ resentment was evident from the fact that they stayed away from sending their children to his madrassa when suddenly he took over the charge after Sufi Muhammad’s ‘disappearance’.

Wealth started pouring in along with mysterious movement of unknown faces. Brand new high powered four-wheel vehicles started roaring around. Fazlullah got bodyguards and started moving on a black stallion with a double-edged sword in his hands. Some locals also got attracted towards him, thanks to his generosity and hospitality. As things unfolded, it came to the fore that al Qaeda and Taliban-connected foreigners, most of them Tajiks and Uzbeks, were the source of stuffing his kitty. This is, however, a myth as from where had those men of al Qaeda and Taliban who were supposed to be on the run got money? Those whom we call men of al Qaeda are not supposed to be in the age group between 20 to 30 but 50 to 65. They must be of Osama or al-Zawahiri’s age. They are the people who, in their 30s, joined jihad against Russia in the early 1980s and later joined the Taliban in Afghanistan. They never went back, even when the tide turned against them after 9/11. But the people we see around Fazlullah, none of them happens to be in the 50s or 60s. They are all youth and battle-worthy mercenaries. I am sure al Qaeda and Takfiris mostly consist of people from the Middle East and Arabian Africa.

Let us find out who are the men around Fazlullah in Swat and Baitullah Mahsuod in Waziristan. According to AFP, Reuters, AP, Asia Times, Newsweek, The Washington Post and The New York Times reports, these Chechens, Uzbeks and Tajiks are criminalswanted by their respective governments. Many of them sought refuge in Afghanistan after President Islam Karimov launched a crackdown against them. Many of them took part in the Chechens’ war against Russia and the bloodshed unleashed by Putin’s army led them to seek refuge in areas along the Pak-Afghan border. These people’s presence in Swat is no more a mystery. The question is how they got heavy weapons, money and men? The question is why they chose Swat and other areas? It was understood that Pakistan Army’s 90,000 troops are deployed at the porous Pak-Afghan border; a few miles of it has also been fenced. NATO forces are vigilant on the other side of the border. When locals in Waziristan, sensing that those foreigners had nothing to do with Islam and were exploiting their hospitality, they took arms against them, killed many of them and forced others to flee. Why they chose Swat as their next hideout is not difficult to answer, but here we will have to see who actually happens to be the mastermind of all that has happened and what is going to happen.

It is everybody’s guess that there is someone working from behind the scenes who does not want this unrest to end. The unrest is engineered to go out of proportion, sending a strong message to the world that the strategic assets of Pakistan can go into extremists’ hands. Therefore, think-tanks are suggesting to the US administration to shift this arsenal to California lest there is no time left. The game plan is different from what is being seen on the surface. An Indian think-tank’s website www.saag.org has claimed that New Delhi has its ground assets placed in Swat Valley and Pakistan army commanders’ conversation is being recorded and passed on to Fazlullah and his men. Pakistan’s Director General Military Operations had mentioned the hand of enemy countries and the Peshawar Corps Commander endorsed the fact that Fazlullah’s men are using highly sophisticated equipment. That is why the government saw a technical difficulty in jamming more than 100 radio channels through which the ‘Mullah Radio’ delivers secret messages and jihad or Shariah sermons. Peaceful citizens of Swat and surrounding areas are terrified. Fazlullah and his followers are threatening them against moving to safe places and using them as human shields. Ancient archaeological sites, which date back to the Buddhist era, are under threat of extinction. It is time to stop their advance, extirpate them from their roots and clean the Valley of their influence, once and for all. But at the same time there is need to introduce social reforms, development plans and transformation into the mainstream of society. This has to be taken as an opportunity to knock out the unwanted and pave the way for a permanent solution. The government will have to solve problems, it will have to remove the sense of deprivation and injustice and restore the confidence of locals who are peace-loving and equally patriotic.

The writer, a resident of Swat, is an academic, author of a number of books on history and archaeology

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]