In this bulletin:

• Afghan troops battle Taliban for fifth day in west
• Afghanistan complains to Iran over death penalty, refugees
• Top Afghan rebel commander killed
• Canadians, Afghans celebrate Taliban retreat
• Kandahar overwhelmed by influx of refugees
• Photographer witnessed Taliban ambush of Canadians
• Infighting among NATO members snarls Afghan mission, ex-commander says
• NATO general sees potential for failure in Afghanistan
• Let Hillier speak his mind, Liberals urge
• Still much work to do in Afghanistan
• Kandahar deal breakers: The Afghan poll is not a blank cheque
• Muslim extremists rampant in Pakistan's north
• Commentary: US friendship with Pakistan's generals is the problem

Afghan troops battle Taliban for fifth day in west

Fri Nov 2, 2007, By Sharifuddin Sharafiyar

HERAT, Afghanistan, Nov 2 (Reuters) - Afghan forces battled hundreds of Taliban fighters for a fifth day in the west of the country on Friday, as insurgent offensives challenged claims the rebels are ineffective in conventional clashes.

The hardline Islamist Taliban relaunched their insurgency two years ago to topple the pro-Western Afghan government and eject the 50,000 foreign troops, pushing their operations northwards from the mainly Pashtun south where they are strongest.

Western forces say the Taliban's recent greater reliance on suicide and roadside bombs is a result of heavy casualties they and Afghan troops have inflicted on the rebels in conventional fighting and the insurgents' inability to hold ground. But two Taliban offensives raise questions about that assertion.

Afghan forces, backed by NATO-led soldiers, were still battling to dislodge hundreds of Taliban fighters from the district of Gulistan in the western province of Farah on Friday after the rebels overran the area on Monday.

The Taliban have briefly occupied a number of isolated district centres across the centre and south of the country in the last two years, but usually flee the area as soon as Afghan army and foreign troops arrive at the scene.

However, as Afghan and foreign troops fought the insurgents around Gulistan this week, far from fleeing, the rebels gained more ground and captured the neighbouring district of Bakwa on Wednesday.

"Gulistan district is still controlled by the Taliban," Ikramuddin Yawar, the police chief for western Afghanistan, told Reuters. "We want assistance from NATO to support us from the air."

Canadian and Afghan troops in the main southern city of Kandahar said on Thursday they had defeated a Taliban offensive close to the city and forced the rebels to retreat.

But in the west, the chief of a district near Gulistan and Bakwa warned his area would also fall to the rebels unless foreign air power was brought into play.

"The Taliban are fighting Afghan forces in large numbers. We estimate there are about 700 Taliban in the attacking force with 50 4x4 vehicles in Bakwa and Gulistan districts," Maolavi Yahya, the district chief of neighbouring Delaram, told Reuters.

"We request NATO forces to support the Afghan troops from the air. I am warning that if foreign forces do not engage the Taliban from the air, Delaram district will fall into Taliban hands shortly," he said.

Although effective in breaking Taliban assaults, air strikes have also come under fire in Afghanistan for the frequency with which they reportedly cause civilian casualties.

A NATO force spokesman said air strikes have not been launched because the fighting was not intense enough to warrant it.

Taliban spokesman Qari Mohammad Yousuf said the insurgents would occupy the whole of Farah province and would not retreat.

Farah is a large, mostly desert, sparsely populated region bordering Iran to the west and Helmand province to the southeast, where the rebels have held one town since February and are engaged in almost daily battles with mostly British troops.

The police chief of Bakwa said his forces had made a tactical retreat from the district to avoid civilian casualties.

"There is a large number of foreign forces in the area and we are waiting to launch an attack to regain the districts," the police chief, Hashim Khan, said.

As the fighting drags on, frustration is growing among ordinary Afghans that their government and its Western backers have not provided security six years after Afghan and U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban in 2001 for not handing over al Qaeda leaders in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks.

NATO commanders admit they have a limited window in which to defeat the Taliban and provide much-needed development before the Afghan public turns against their presence and public opinion in the West, frustrated by growing casualties, calls for the troops to be withdrawn, handing victory to the insurgents.

Afghanistan complains to Iran over death penalty, refugees

Kabul (AFP) - Afghanistan said Friday it had summoned Iran's representative here to complain about reports of Afghan minors being sentenced to death for drug smuggling and the forced expulsion of refugees.

Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Kabir Farahi also raised concerns at the meeting on Thursday about claims that Afghan nationals were beaten up in Tehran, the foreign ministry said in a statement.

It is not unusual in Iran for drug smugglers of Afghan origin to be executed in border provinces. An unconfirmed report late October cited an Afghan human rights group saying a 17-year-old may have been hanged for smuggling 1.5 kilograms (three pounds) of heroin.

Farahi said "these children are being misused by drug smugglers and their conviction is contrary to human rights, international standards and the very good relations between two countries," according to the statement.

The deputy minister asked the Iranian charge d'affaires, Ghulam Raza Nafar, to take up the issue with his government. He also condemned the forced repatriation of Afghans in border areas, especially those with legal documents.

"At this time Afghanistan does not have the ability to absorb refugee groups. We want the Iranian authorities to revise their decision on this issue," he was quoted as saying.

Iran has expelled around 160,000 unregistered Afghan refugees since April. Farahi also demanded an explanation for an assault on Afghans in Iran.

The ministry said the Iranian official apologised for the incident, which he said arose after the distribution of a video clip taken by mobile phone which showed a woman being abused by what were thought to be Afghans but turned out to be Iranians.

Iran and Afghanistan publicly have good ties but their relationship is dogged by several issues, including the repatriation of refugees and US claims that Taliban insurgents are being supplied with weapons from across the border.

There are about 910,000 registered Afghan refugees in Iran and two million in Pakistan, war-scarred Afghanistan's other neighbour, according to the United Nations.

More than 356,000 registered refugees have returned from Pakistan this year and 6,500 from Iran, it said in a statement Friday.

Top Afghan rebel commander killed

From correspondents in Kabul, November 02, 2007 - SECURITY forces in Afghanistan have killed a top rebel commander and several of his men as they tried to infiltrate from Pakistan, the US-led force announced overnight.

The commander, identified as Abdul Manan, was killed October 28 in the eastern province of Khost after security forces ambushed him and a dozen of his men as they crossed the border, the force said in a statement.

The killing could not immediately be confirmed by Afghan officials. The coalition said Manan was a senior commander of insurgent fighters in a faction formed under well-known Soviet resistance commander Jalaluddin Haqqani.

It said the span of his control and influence was similar to that of late Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, killed in May in one of the biggest successes of the campaign against the Taliban and its allies launched in 2001.

"In addition to leading a large contingent of militants, Manan was also responsible for the movement of both insurgent fighters and weapons smuggling across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border," the coalition said.

"His death will seriously hamper the enemy's organisation and operations as there is no known successor."

The coalition helped to topple the Taliban government in late 2001 for harbouring Al-Qaeda leaders after the 9/11 attacks.

Six years later it has about 15,000 soldiers in Afghanistan to round up fighters from the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other radical outfits waging a campaign of violence that is undermining the efforts of the new government to introduce democracy and rebuild the war-shattered nation.

Canadians, Afghans celebrate Taliban retreat

GRAEME SMITH - From Friday's Globe and Mail November 2, 2007

ANA takes lead role in battle that returns control of area north of Kandahar to government with apparent lack of civilian casualties

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — The Canadian military and their Afghan allies congratulated each other, even holding a triumphant tour of the battlefield, just hours after the Taliban retreated from the heart of a key district north of Kandahar city.

Insurgents started falling back from their positions on the north bank of the Arghandab river in the early hours yesterday morning, police officials said. Eager to reassure the villagers fleeing the district, and reduce the public-relations damage caused by the Taliban's bold attack near the city, local authorities organized a well-publicized visit to the front lines.

That's how Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Chamberlain, commander of Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team, found himself taking off his helmet and sitting among Afghan elders for a meeting in the village of Chahar Ghulba, the scene of heavy fighting over the past three days.

The Canadian commander was joined by several politicians, including Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid, who brought a group of Afghan journalists to record the fact that his government was back in control of the district.

"We actually moved forward pretty close to the front lines, closer than we probably would allow a member of our Parliament, but the governor here has a pretty high risk tolerance," Lt.-Col. Chamberlain said, after returning to the city. "It was a very moving sight, because there's a very sincere willingness to lead from the front."

Kandahar police chief Sayed Agha Saqib said on Wednesday that hundreds of Taliban were surrounded by government forces, but he acknowledged yesterday that nearly all of them escaped. The day brought no new casualties and only 11 arrests of suspected Taliban, Chief Saqib said.

Fighting continued as the Taliban left small groups of fighters behind during their withdrawal to the north. A Taliban source said last night that all insurgents had left Arghandab and retreated to havens in nearby Zhari and Shah Wali Kot districts.

Although the Taliban said it was a tactical retreat because villagers had asked them to take their fighting elsewhere, the insurgents admitted that the Canadian and Afghan forces' counteroffensive had been stronger than expected.

"The operation is going very well," said Major Eric Landry, the Canadian chief of planning. "We are very effective against the insurgents, and we have the support of the local population which is very important."

He continued: "They are trying to leave pockets of resistance, but as I say, they are being very ineffective. ... The city is stable. It's not under any threat at the moment."

The response to the insurgents' encroachment involved troops from the Canadian battle group, the provincial reconstruction team, reconnaissance squadron, and the Afghan army mentoring teams, Lt.-Col. Chamberlain said, but the biggest role was played by the Afghan National Army.

Observers say the Canadians were forced to rely on the Afghan army because they didn't have enough troops to take a lead role on the new northern front, but Lt.-Col. Chamberlain said the ANA passed the test admirably.

"A couple months ago, it took a while for the ANA to react to attacks on district centres," Lt.-Col. Chamberlain said.

This time, the ANA arrived on the same day they were requested, the Canadian commander said. "Personally, that's the most promising thing about this," he said.

Afghan and Canadian officials also pointed to an apparent lack of civilian casualties during the fierce battles, suggesting that their forces are growing more disciplined. Civilian deaths have been a major source of anger among villagers, and a reason why recruits join the Taliban. "Those lessons have been learned," Lt.-Col. Chamberlain said.

Still, the attack on Arghandab has forced the Canadians to rethink their strategy for defending Kandahar city. The district served as an important buffer zone between urban neighbourhoods and the rough northern terrain occupied by Taliban. The recent death of Mullah Naqib, a prominent tribal leader, has stripped the district of a legendary warrior who once guarded it.

A tribal shura, or council meeting, is expected in the coming days, as Mr. Naqib's tribe gathers to decide how best to defend itself from future attacks.

Kandahar overwhelmed by influx of refugees

Thousands are heading to the city in an effort to escape the fighting in southern Afghanistan

OMAR EL AKKAD - From Thursday's Globe and Mail November 1, 2007

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — Kandahar is straining under the weight of a massive influx of refugees from within Afghanistan, as thousands of families flee to the province's capital city to escape the fighting that rages throughout much of the southern part of the country.

Last year, Kandahar's refugees and repatriation department assisted about 590 families who fled from within Afghanistan to Kandahar province, according to the department's statistics. This year, it has already assisted about 500 families, only to find another 2,400 asking for help.

"Security is deteriorating," said Agha Nazari, the department's deputy director, attributing the almost fivefold increase entirely to a worsening situation in southern Afghanistan, particularly Kandahar's neighbouring province to the west, Helmand.

"When a few hundred people die in a few days, it brings panic to the people."

Canada has virtually no presence in Helmand province, the opium capital of the world, where mostly British troops operate. But the growing refugee crisis is a prime example of how a worsening situation in other provinces can quickly have a spillover effect into Canada's zone of control, adding to the many problems in Kandahar. According to Mr. Nazari, many refugees in Helmand first went to the provincial authorities there for help - when those authorities were overwhelmed, the refugees fled to Kandahar in droves. "They are coming, and we don't have the capacity to deal with them," he said.

In Kandahar city, where there are no refugee camps, displaced villagers have moved in with friends or family, often taking on odd jobs.

Hafez, a 52-year-old farmer from Panjwai district in Kandahar, fled to the city in 2003 to escape the fighting. Over the next four years, he said, he watched as about 80 per cent of his village did the same.

"Some Taliban commanders came to hide in our area," he said. "The foreign forces came to hunt them down. My village is empty now." Like most refugees in and around Kandahar city, Hafez looks forward to the day when he can return home.

"I don't want to live here; my village is very nice," he said, sitting in a workers' section of the housing compound - a littered, mice-infested room. "In my village, I had everything," he said. "I was president in my home, but here I'm a servant."

This week, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees effectively ended its assistance programs near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for the winter, Mr. Nazari said. Traditionally, such programs shut down until about March because refugees don't tend to move during the winter. This means the flood of refugees in Kandahar will likely soon be hunkering down for the next five months.

The Kandahar refugees and repatriation department have already appealed for assistance from the provincial government and humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Program. However, the same worsening security situation is also affecting humanitarian agencies. In 2006, there were five attacks against WFP vehicles. In the first 10 months of this year, there were 30.

Mr. Nazari expects the refugee situation in Kandahar may become even more dire before the year is over - refugees have begun trickling in from Arghandab, north of Kandahar city, fearing that fighting is about to erupt there, he said. If it does, that trickle may turn into a flood.

Afghanistan has one of the largest external refugee populations in the world, mostly residing in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. However, those refugees pose less of a challenge for Afghan repatriation officials because their return home is often voluntary, and once in Afghanistan they tend to settle in all parts of the country. Internal refugees, however, rarely if ever leave home of their own free will, and are mostly confined to the war-torn south.

Photographer witnessed Taliban ambush of Canadians

FINBARR O'REILLY – Reuters November 1, 2007

HOWZ-E-MADAD, AFGHANISTAN — The first Taliban shell struck just as Canadian and Afghan troops retreated across a dusty field in southern Afghanistan.

It exploded about 5 metres from four Canadian soldiers who were training their Afghan National Army counterparts as part of NATO's mission here.

As a photographer embedded with the Canadians, I was caught in the blast and enveloped by a cloud of dust and smoke. We scrambled for cover behind a mud wall shielding us from Taliban positions on the opposite side of the field.

The unit I was with had earlier abandoned a planned dawn ambush of Taliban fighters. It responded quickly to the attack.

Master Corporal Frank Flibotte, left, helps move wounded Sergeant-Major Paul Pilote to safety while another Canadian soldier from the NATO-led coalition provides covering fire after their position was hit by a Taliban shell during an attack in Zhari district of Kandahar province, southern Afghanistan, on Oct. 23, 2007. (Finbarr O'Reilly/Reuters)

I focused on taking pictures of an Afghan army soldier shooting a heavy mounted machine gun from a nearby ditch.

A shell from an 82-millimetre recoilless rifle exploded in front of him and he disappeared in the flash of light. Sand blasted me and the shockwave knocked me over.

I was sure he was dead, or at least wounded. A moment later, he bounded out of the ditch and ran towards me through the smoke, the machine gun blazing from his hip, Rambo-style.

A third shell slammed into the solid mud wall where Canadian Sergeant-Major Paul Pilote was standing, sending the soldier sprawling backwards. Stunned, and with blood spilling from his nose and mouth, Sgt.-Maj. Pilote crawled away from the explosion on hands and knees. I kept taking pictures through the haze.

Under fire, Canadian Master Corporal Frank Flibotte and Major Jean-Sebastien Fortin went to help Sgt.-Maj. Pilote.

The battle was typical of the conflict gripping the border region with Pakistan, where at least 24 clashes between former ruling Taliban and NATO and Afghan forces occurred last month.

Fortin estimated there were between 10 to 15 Taliban attackers, most of them wearing just grubby robes and sandals. Three Taliban were killed, two wounded and three were captured.

Taking pictures during combat is almost a relief. The tension of waiting for “contact” to begin can seem unbearable, then there is mass confusion once things kick-off. Working gives photographers an outlet to channel the fear and subdue the panic.

I have to think about where to be to get the correct angle and show facial expressions that tell the story — what's the light doing, what might happen next, but also, where can I position myself safely?

There's no sure answer to that last one. I moved back from the wall taking shell hits. I was reluctant to leave the cover of a ditch until I realized the Afghan troops had fled and the Canadians were busy with Sgt.-Maj. Pilote on the other side of an open dirt road in the line of fire.

Afraid of being left behind, I scrambled over the wall of a nearby compound and moved through a garden blooming with purple flowers. I was still cut off from the Canadians by the open road and needed to get pictures of them treating Sgt.-Maj. Pilote.

A Canadian armoured RG-31 vehicle raced to fill the space in the firing line, so I ran behind it towards the wounded Sgt.-Maj. Pilote. “Get back behind the RG,” shouted Maj. Fortin.

Sgt.-Maj. Pilote's wounds were not serious and I photographed Cpl. Flibotte and Maj. Fortin helping him to the RG-31 while others gave cover. We retreated to a nearby base, where we heard the sound of heavy fighting as another company came under attack.

“It shows how all the military might in the world can't stand up to 10 ragtag fighters who believe God is on their side,” a fellow journalist said afterwards.

You're always prepared for the worst. But the suddenness, the size and the proximity of the explosions was more intense in Howz-e-Madad than anything I'd experienced previously.

We were lucky. Sgt.-Maj. Pilote suffered minor shrapnel wounds and hearing loss and an Afghan hit in the shoulder is recovering. Under fire, you swear you'll never go out there again. But the soldiers have to do it, and that's who we are here to cover.

Infighting among NATO members snarls Afghan mission, ex-commander says

DOUG SAUNDERS - From Friday's Globe and Mail - November 2, 2007

LONDON — Chaos and competing goals among NATO nations involved in Afghanistan are preventing progress there, according to the British general who commanded the Afghan mission until February.

"The nations contributing to [the NATO mission in Afghanistan], together with the Afghan government, have yet to agree, and to start efficiently implementing, a coherent strategy," Sir David Richards told a conference of leaders yesterday organized by the Canadian government in London.

Gen. Richards was frank about the reason for this deterioration: "General Dan McNeill, the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] commander, has too few troops to conduct the operation in a manner that meets the basic rules of a counterinsurgency campaign."

One senior official experienced with the war said that "we need at least a doubling of ISAF presence - and probably a lot more than that - if we are to achieve the minimum goals of the campaign." There are currently more than 41,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan.

Canadian officials, in off-the-record interviews, acknowledged that the nation-building and aid efforts run by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the military efforts led by General Rick Hillier are poorly co-ordinated and that top officials are increasingly at odds with one another.

Gen. Hillier was criticized by officials from the office of Prime Minister Stephen Harper on Wednesday for saying it will be at least a decade before Afghanistan is able to field a military capable of managing its security on its own.

But most officials say privately that, at current troop and funding levels, there is little chance of any lasting progress in the conflict-ridden south of Afghanistan, where Canada's 2,500 soldiers are headquartered.

NATO's former top general, Klaus Naumann, agreed yesterday with Gen. Richards that too few of the troops in Afghanistan are in combat roles. When he was in Afghanistan last year, he said that NATO could at best deploy no more than 5,000 troops to combat roles and had no reserves available with which to escalate military operations.

"NATO nations have to end the lukewarm way they handle these conflicts," he said in an interview after a presentation to the Atlantic Treaty Association, a meeting of academics, diplomats, military officials and policy makers from the 26 NATO member nations taking place this week in Ottawa. He said if Canada withdrew its 2,500 soldiers, it would leave the cohesion of the military alliance in "big jeopardy."

In private conversations, NATO commanders generally agree that the number of troops are inadequate for the task of stabilizing the south enough to bring in effective governance, as is the amount of aid funding, which is less than that devoted to the much smaller nation of Bosnia during the war there in the early 1990s.

Canadian officials say they are alarmed by the lack of progress in building a functioning police force, which was considered a basic step in the reconstruction mission.

"There are more Afghans at work, there are more Afghans at school, there are more Afghan police forces on the streets, there are more Afghan army units working side by side with ours," said Arif Lalani, who has been Canada's ambassador to Kabul for the past six months. "But the biggest challenge, and one we hear about most, is the police. We have a long way to go on police."

There is a feeling among many leaders that coalition partners, especially the United States, led the Afghan people to believe they could expect a level of nation-building that will be impossible to deliver on the current budgets and troop levels. Some officials said that Afghan expectations need to be lowered.

"We have said a lot of things to the Afghan people that we have not delivered on," one senior official said. "You don't make promises you can't deliver on, and I think everyone here knows that we've done that too many times."

Gen. Richards spoke of "the current, rather balkanized situation, in which each nation - understandably - wants to succeed in its province, but sometimes, sadly, at the expense of the operation as a whole."

Senior officials said Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been unable to build an effective government because he has become frustrated by the conflicting agendas of member nations. He reportedly told one senior official, "The international community has to decide what you want me to focus on."

Canadian officials acknowledged that the need to change the approach to Afghanistan, and particularly in the balance between military objectives and social nation-building goals, is urgent.

"I think we need to have a transformation in some of the key files," said Mr. Lalani, the ambassador. "If you look at education and you look at the health sector ... we can build on the success. On other files such as police, governance, corruption, counternarcotics, I think we need actions that are going to transform those files."

Mr. Lalani and his colleagues spoke optimistically of progress being made in Afghan society, and Gen. Richards said that officials now have a better understanding of the Afghan situation. But he added "we have yet to translate that understanding into a coherent, complementary implementation of what are currently many different plans and priorities."

"The perception as well as the reality in the south [where the Canadians and British are fighting], and to a lesser extent in the east, is certainly less good." Gen. Richards said. "Here, the picture is one of slow progress, broken promises, unmet expectations and poor security."

NATO general sees potential for failure in Afghanistan
Thursday, November 01, 2007 - CanWest News Service

LONDON -- One of Britain's most outspoken military officers issued stark warnings about the potential for failure in Afghanistan at a forum hosted by the Canadian high commission Thursday.

Lt.-Gen. David Richards, who commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from May, 2006 to February, 2007, said he remains optimistic that western allies will ultimately stabilize the war-ravaged country and keep it out of Taliban hands.

But Mr. Richards said the military's poppy eradication campaign could backfire, NATO's efforts in the country lack focus, and there aren't nearly enough boots on the ground in Afghanistan's incendiary southern region, where Canadian, U.S., British and Dutch forces are concentrated.

ISAF commander Dan McNeill, the U.S. general who succeeded Richards, "has too few troops to conduct the operation in a manner that meets the basic rules of a counter-insurgency campaign."

While western allies can claim "pretty impressive" success in areas like health care, education and security in Kabul and the northern and western regions, they are having trouble meeting expectations in the south and parts of the east, said Mr. Richards, who is to become commander-in-chief of Britain's land forces in January.

"Here the picture is one of slow progress, broken promises, unmet expectations, and poor security," he said.

While he didn't single out Canada, Mr. Richards also expressed fear that weakening public support for the mission will lessen NATO's resolve to see out the conflict.

"How many of our populations have given up on us because we aren't actively explaining what we're doing?" he asked. "It is very, very important that we collectively raise our game and explain this to our own people."

Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government, which has promised a parliamentary vote on whether to extend the mission beyond its 2009 mandate, has recently increased efforts to enlist public support.

Mr. Richards was one of four panellists who discussed the issue before about 100 academics, parliamentarians, diplomats and media at the Canadian high commission, where diplomats have worked overtime publicizing Canada's critical role in Afghanistan.

He was joined on the panel by Arif Lalani, Canada's new ambassador to Afghanistan, who said significant progress has been made since the Taliban were overthrown, but the "challenges remain very large."

Mr. Richards said independent polls show that roughly 70% of Afghanistan's dominant Pashtun ethnic group want the current government and its western allies to succeed. About 20% are unconditionally hostile to the Islamic fundamentalists and as many as 10% are sympathetic.

"It is this 70% or so that we must convince to stay the course, for fear that they tire of us, and succumb -- I think very reluctantly -- to the much poorer alternative of the Taliban, but one that might at least appear to include a more stable existence." He said virtually all non-Pashtuns oppose the Taliban.

Mr. Richards was also sharply critical of poppy-field eradication efforts that, according to a 2007 article in the respected Foreign Affairs journal, were pushed on the Afghan government as a result of efforts by the U.S. "war on drugs" lobby.

The article said destroying poppy fields simply drives up the price of opium, enriching drug dealers while alienating poppy farmers. The farmers become ripe recruits for the Taliban.

Mr. Richards said the fight against opium production is important because the drug trade funds the Taliban insurgency. But it can only be conducted if farmers are given alternate employment.

"At the moment this appears not to be the case," he said. "Eradication conducted in isolation from other relevant factors risks turning an insurgency into an insurrection."

He urged NATO members to support efforts to create a single, powerful co-ordinator in Afghanistan because some countries focus on their own designated region, "sometimes sadly at the expense of the operation as a whole."

He concluded: "The nations contributing to ISAF, together with the Afghan government, have yet to agree and to start sufficiently implementing a coherent strategy."

Let Hillier speak his mind, Liberals urge

BRIAN LAGHI - From Friday's Globe and Mail, November 2, 2007

Opposition slams government for reportedly rebuking top general over his remarks about Afghan army and Kandahar conflict

The opposition Liberals accused the Conservatives yesterday of trying to muzzle Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier after senior government officials said they had admonished him for speaking out recently on the Afghanistan mission.

"The Prime Minister has now taken steps to stop the Chief of the Defence Staff from providing Canadians with honest answers about our combat mission in Afghanistan," Liberal MP Lucienne Robillard said in Question Period. "If the Prime Minister were more willing to be truthful about the mission, this would not be an issue, but Canadians need the true opinion of the Chief of the Defence Staff more than ever."

Ms. Robillard was commenting on a Globe and Mail report that Gen. Hillier was told to refrain from stepping into the political realm after he told reporters last week that the Afghan army will need at least a decade before it is capable of managing the security of their country. He also called on European countries to increase their role in the Kandahar region of southern Afghanistan, where Canadian soldiers are based. The comments were seen by some as undermining the government's Speech from the Throne, which said Afghans will be able to defend their sovereignty by 2011.

A senior official said Gen. Hillier had been told that his role was not to construe himself as the chief spokesman for the mission. "He needs to do his job and leave the politics to those who are assigned to that task and who have the elected mandate behind him," the official said.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay said the Prime Minister's Office has not given Gen. Hillier direction regarding his public comments. "Mr. Hillier had the possibility to speak with the media and troops on the ground in Afghanistan," he said. "That's clear."

Gen. Hillier's office has also denied that he has been told to stop commenting on political issues, adding that he doesn't do so in any case.

His comments last week reportedly earned the ire of the PMO. Gen. Hillier was appointed three years ago to highlight the military and the need for its rebuilding. However, some in government believe he has strayed too far into politics.

He is extremely popular with the army and with Canadians who support the mission and, by extension, many Tory supporters. The current mission ends in 2009, although the government has appointed a blue-ribbon panel to give it advice on how to proceed subsequent to that date.

Still much work to do in Afghanistan

November 02, 2007 - Allan WoodsOTTAWA BUREAU

OTTAWA–With an insurgency on the rise and an increased perception of insecurity among locals, the international community should not "pretend" that stable progress is being made in Afghanistan, a top European diplomat said yesterday.

Francesc Vendrell, the European Union's special representative for Afghanistan, said an increasing number of Afghans fear for their safety, the Taliban is more active than at any time since 2001 and there are strong links between the Taliban, organized crime and government officials.

"Why are we at this point?" he asked at an Ottawa conference. "I don't think we should try and pretend that everything is all right."

Vendrell was one of a number of speakers yesterday discussing the successes and drawbacks that coalition forces are having bringing peace and security to the country.

Jonathan Parish, a senior NATO policy adviser, said: "As long as the Taliban can take sanctuary across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area ... the task for NATO members, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan, will remain difficult if not impossible.

"That is why encouraging a more effective contribution from Pakistan is important."

All agreed that one of the bright spots in international efforts to rehabilitate Afghanistan was the training of the Afghan National Army. The force stands just shy of 40,000 troops but is rapidly expanding.

A recent spat between Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Gen. Rick Hillier, the chief of the defence staff, focused on just how long it would take for Canada to train the Afghan army. The Conservative throne speech last month asserted it was "achievable" by 2011, allowing for a Canadian withdrawal from the country after that. Hillier later said that it would take about 10 years. He was quickly forced to clarify his comments.

Both Parish, a Briton, and Vendrell, a Spaniard, gave a cautious endorsement of the 2011 target date for the Afghan army.

"I'm less worried about whether we will meet the date than whether we will meet the actual substance of the agreement we arrived at in London (where the Afghanistan Compact was signed)," Vendrell said.

Parish said that 49 NATO training teams are currently working with the ANA and that number is set to jump to 70 by this time next year. One major outstanding problem is the Afghan police, said Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, head of the Canadian army.

He noted the Afghan army has evolved into a "thoroughly professional, hard-hitting and well-respected institution ... The same cannot be said for the auxiliary police forces."

But even that is changing, he said. On a trip to Afghanistan about 10 days ago, Leslie said, he spent an evening with an Afghan police patrol in Kandahar's Panjwaii district. It was uneventful, he said. "Three to four months ago that certainly would have been fatal."

Kandahar deal breakers: The Afghan poll is not a blank cheque

TAYLOR OWEN AND DAVID EAVES - Special to Globe and Mail Update

November 2, 2007 - The results of the poll of Afghans by Environics on behalf of The Globe and Mail, the CBC and La Presse were surprising to many. Afghans are broadly content with their government, happy that Canada is in Afghanistan, and believe the work being done is beneficial and effective. Canadians should be proud. We are making a difference.

What is potentially worrying, however, is the fervour with which the poll was greeted in Canada by some of the mission's supporters. While a useful reminder of why we are in Afghanistan, this poll is not a blank cheque for any and all future engagement.

Future actions, by us or our allies, could alter the political conditions in Afghanistan, negatively shifting indigenous public opinion. Consequently, this poll should reaffirm the necessity of debating how we engage, and under what conditions we walk away. Two looming scenarios could derail the mission.

Consider, for instance, the spraying of poppy crops. This winter, under the leadership of the former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, the Americans plan to spray opium fields with pesticides. Needless to say, the spraying will have little to no impact on the global availability of illegal opiates.

But the impact on Afghanistan will be dramatic. Opium is critical to the Afghan economy. Kill the poppies and you impoverish the farmers, their families and the communities they support. This will undermine Afghan support for the NATO mission and destabilize the Karzai government.

Perhaps most important, the U.S. spraying campaign undermines the agreed-on division of labour within the NATO alliance. Under the Afghan compact, Britain was given responsibility for counternarcotics. Unilateral spraying by the U.S. violates this agreement. Such actions call into question the terms under which the alliance agreed to function, and on which Canada agreed to sustain its presence in Afghanistan.

In short, a policy in which we have had no input, and we are not executing, will make Afghanistan more dangerous to our soldiers and less conducive to achieving a lasting peace.

A second possible deal breaker is also on the horizon. After the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the Americans are likely to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. The purpose, strategy and tactics of this surge will have dramatic implications on the nature and potential success of our mission.

This influx of American troops could secure the troublesome Pakistani border and enhance the security environment for reconstruction and development. Alternatively, this force, hardened in Iraq, could engage in the most counterproductive forms of counterinsurgency, driving support to the Taliban. In short, a sea change in the composition of American forces could alter the nature of the mission into one that is unacceptable to Canada.

Neither the opium problem nor the insurgency can be solved with magic bullets. The appropriate policies are complex and long term. There are, however, things we should clearly not do.

In order for us to effectively react to, or ideally influence, these scenarios, it is not enough to be clear on our strategy and objectives. Canada must also outline to its allies the policies that so harm our actions that they negate our involvement.

This is not an empty threat. As Canadians already know, no one is willing to take over our role. Either our work in Kandahar is valuable to NATO, in which case we have influence, or it's inconsequential, and we should be reconsidering our involvement. If the former, then we possess political leverage with which to shape the mission. What's more, it is an aberration of responsibility to deploy our troops in the field but allow others to determine the course and strategy of the mission.

The Afghan poll gave us reasons to stay in Kandahar and to be proud of our role, but it is not a blank cheque. We must use our hard-won influence to negotiate with our allies on the terms and implementation of the mission. Poppy spraying and widespread use of aggressive counterinsurgency tactics should be deal breakers. Our military has won Canada real influence in Afghanistan; will our diplomats use it to ensure the mission's success?

Taylor Owen is a doctoral student at Oxford. David Eaves is a frequent speaker, consultant and writer on public policy and negotiation.

Muslim extremists rampant in Pakistan's north

KATHY GANNON - Associated Press November 1, 2007 - SWAT, Pakistan — Muslim extremists are expanding their control of northern Pakistan, challenging the U.S.-backed government of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and adding to the lands where terrorists allied with Osama bin Laden find refuge.

Once restricted to pockets in the mountains along the Afghanistan border, radical mullahs now control vast areas of the north. They moved in the past few months beyond the tribal regions and into northern Pakistan cities and the Swat Valley.

The increased influence of the Islamic radicals was highlighted this week by intense fighting between local gunmen and government troops. The government said about 180 people have been killed, mostly militants, in violence including bombings, abductions and shootouts.

“I can tell you there is money coming from al-Qaeda and if al-Qaeda did not lead these things we couldn't fight,” said Abdul Samad, a stocky militant from Afghanistan's eastern Nangarhar province who serves as a liaison between Taliban groups on both sides of the border. Even during the fighting, radicals have made themselves available to speak with visiting journalists.

The growing instability in northwest Pakistan has shaken Gen. Musharraf's authority at a time when he's also being upstaged by the return of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto — a jubilant homecoming shattered by a terrorist bombing that killed more than 140 people.

Taliban and al-Qaeda were pushed back after the U.S. and its Afghan allies toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. Today, residents say Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks have rejoined the ranks of the local radicals, mostly Pashtuns, the same ethnic group as the Taliban across the border in Afghanistan.

“The Pakistanis, and by extension the United States, have almost no control of events” in the northern, ethnically Pashtun regions, said Milt Bearden, a former CIA station chief in Pakistan.

“I don't think anyone in Washington really gets it,” he said. “Losing Swat is shocking.”

Pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Fazlullah has set up a virtual mini-state in Swat, a province of 6,500 square kilometres. He uses an FM radio station to help spread fundamentalist Islam in an area once known to tourists as the “Switzerland of Asia” for its stunning, snow-covered mountains.

Militias following Mr. Fazlullah's teachings, identified by their shoulder-length hair and camouflage vests over traditional shalwar kameez clothing, have bombed girls schools and blown up video and CD shops. They drilled holes into the face of a 6-metre- tall stone Buddha, obliterating the features of the 1,300-year-old sculpture.

Sher Mohammed, a lawyer in Swat and a human rights activist, said the enforcers — including Afghans and Arabs — “are roaming freely, checking barber shops in the small villages.”

“They come out at midnight. They are not local people,” he said.

Mr. Samad, the militant organizer, says he travelled in recent weeks to North Waziristan and recruited scores of militants to reinforce Mr. Fazlullah's followers in Swat Valley.

“It's not just in Swat or in Waziristan or in Bajaur. We are getting stronger everywhere in the area,” he said. Recent suicide bombings are direct evidence of al-Qaeda's influx, he said.

Mr. Fazlullah, who draws tens of thousands to his rallies, has launched a broad campaign against Western influence. He uses his outlawed FM radio station to preach jihad against America and Gen. Musharraf and teach his strict interpretation of Islam.

Mr. Fazlullah has called for a ban on polio vaccinations because he said it was a ploy by the West to sterilize Muslim babies. He demands women wear the all-encompassing burka and frowns on barbers who give haircuts in styles deemed un-Islamic.

This month, Pakistani authorities sent about 2,500 extra police and troops into Swat district to challenge Mr. Fazlullah's followers. A group of tribal elders and clerics has been holding talks with Mr. Fazlullah's aides about ending the bloodshed.

Still, many Pakistanis fear the government has waited too long to confront militant clerics like Mr. Fazlullah.

“For three years no one did anything. Two years ago you could have arrested Mr. Fazlullah with two police constables. Today you need a division,” Mr. Mohammed said.

A police official, who asked for anonymity fearing reprisals from militants and from his superiors, said sympathizers within the government, police and intelligence service have allowed Mr. Fazlullah to gain stature in the region.

A confidential memo circulated to Pakistan's National Security Council in July and made public soon afterward warned that radicals from the border region were exerting wide influence.

It spoke of a “nexus” between radical clerics behind the bloody siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which resulted in more than 100 deaths, and the clerics in northwest Pakistan. Besides Mr. Fazlullah, those include Baitullah Mehsud, who allegedly threatened to meet Ms. Bhutto's return to Pakistan with suicide attacks.

“When I was following the Red Mosque, one thing was very clear — that they had strong sympathizers within the establishment and within the military,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading independent Pakistani defence analyst. Mr. Rizvi said Pakistan's powerful armed forces remain ambivalent about religious extremists, whom the military supported during the Afghan war with the Soviets in the 1980s.

Pakistan's military has often used extremists as proxies in the violent secessionist battle against India for control of Kashmir, he said.

“The government is perturbed because of their activities in Pakistan,” he said, but doesn't object when they fight Western-backed leaders in Afghanistan or Indian troops in Kashmir.

Commentary: US friendship with Pakistan's generals is the problem

United Press International, Asia - Hong Kong,China
Commentary: U.S. friendship with Pakistan's generals is the problem
TORONTO, Oct. 30 HARI SUD

That former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto survived the
recent attempt on her life is a miracle. But 140 of her supporters
were not so lucky on Oct. 18. Her survival saved the newly minted
U.S. policy on Pakistan.

Bhutto and the current military dictator may still share power.
The truth of the matter is that former and serving Pakistani generals
are too friendly with the United States. Blinded by their friendship,
Washington continues to play to their interests. The present mayhem
would not have happened had the United States discouraged General
Pervez Musharraf from seizing power in 1999.

Supporting Pakistani generals of many hues has been U.S. policy
right from the 1950s when General Ayub Khan seized power. Later when
General Yahya Khan ousted Ayub Khan in 1967, Washington supported
Yahya Khan, resulting in the break-up of Pakistan in 1970. The United
States continued its excessive association with generals when
Bhutto's father was ousted and hanged by another military dictator,
General Zia Ul Haq. The latter was a favorite of U.S. President
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s because he allowed Pakistan to become a
base for the covert U.S. war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
He received massive military aid for his support.

The present general, Pervez Musharraf, has been a U.S. favorite
for the last eight years because he has again traded military aid for
his support of the U.S. War on Terror in Afghanistan. Washington paid
no attention to the fact that this general in unpopular. His eight
years in office have been marred with violence, and on his watch al-
Qaida and the Taliban have re-established themselves in Pakistani
border regions.

Among the friendly Pakistani military generals and a few civilian
leaders there is a group of popular serving and former military men,
especially in the dreaded Inter Service Intelligence, who regard
themselves as the saviors of Islam. They oppose secularism and do not
wish Bhutto back. Apparently the United States forgot about this
group, which publicly and privately opposes any U.S. involvement in
Pakistani affairs, let alone allowing Bhutto to rule them. The elite
Mohajir and political grouping of the Punjabi establishment also
support this powerful group.

Currently, the United States is trying to balance two opposing
ideologies by having the two sides share power -- the friendly
generals, who wish to stay in power, with a popularly elected prime
minister. In this way, democracy is restored and also their man stays
in power. There is one caveat, that is, the forgotten bunch of ISI
men. They, together with the local al-Qaida and Taliban elements, are
hell-bent upon torpedoing this arrangement. In fact, they came very
close to their objective on Oct. 18.

It is a pity that the people of Karachi, who were only offering a
hearty welcome to Bhutto, became the victims. Emboldened, the
saboteurs will not stop. They will try and try again, until they kill
either the secular general or Bhutto.

If this happens, where does it leave U.S. policy? In my opinion
it will head toward oblivion. U.S. policy will not be the same if
either Musharraf or Bhutto loses his or her job and life violently.

The United States will have to look for new options if the
present formula of power sharing does not see the light of the day.
Martial law may be re-imposed by Musharraf (if he survives) or his
chosen deputy. Bhutto, if she is still around, may flee the country
to save her life. Democracy will be dead for a long time. The people
of Pakistan may ultimately suffer.

The United States still has many cards in its hands, which it
could play to control the situation. But it cannot play any of them
as long as Pakistan is to be used for the War on Terror. Pakistan's
role as a major source of intelligence -- though at times dubious --
on the Taliban and al-Qaida, cannot be understated. Information
received so far is what kept the so-called 2007 Taliban spring
offensive on NATO forces in Afghanistan in check. It has not helped
to nab al-Qaida head Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, however.

What should Washington do in the event of the failure of its
power-sharing proposal?

It will have to go slow on its military and economic assistance
to Pakistan. If possible all the critical components of military
hardware supplied to Pakistan should be kept within U.S. reach, to be
taken away in case the situation worsens. This the United States did
very successfully in Iran in 1979 after the fall of the Shah. The
United States took away all the critical components of F-15 fighter
jets, making them useless for a long time.

Also, it should reduce economic assistance and development aid.
Right now Pakistan's GDP has a healthy 7 percent growth. This could
drop to 3 percent if half of U.S. cash grants were withdrawn.
Pakistan would be hard pressed and would not protest, since the
remaining aid would still be keeping the army and civilian life
afloat.

There is no easy way to control the free-roaming ISI vagabonds in
Pakistan. They are the main source of secret support to al-Qaida and
the Taliban. They are also the key elements identified by Bhutto as
the chief culprits of the Oct 18 attack on her. Nothing can be done
about them, but they should be kept in U.S. gun sights. Washington
should do everything in its power to prevent the ISI and jihadis from
getting closer to the nuclear button, especially the technically
competent ISI.

All the nuclear weapons in Pakistan should be made un-
operational. Washington would have to make the friendly generals
understand that control of the nuclear button is the ultimate goal of
all the jihadi elements. If this were made unavailable it would
diminish the jihadi zeal for power. Right now Musharraf and his men
claim that the nuclear weapons are very safe. If the safeguards are
not strong enough, however, the United States, India and Israel could
all become the targets of jihadi wrath.

Finally, the United States has to stop cajoling the generals. It
was a huge mistake to listen to Musharraf's explanation when he
grabbed power in 1999. He should have been thoroughly discouraged and
forced out of power, threatened with the loss of military and
economic aid.

Washington must very clearly state that the critical components
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are to be within U.S. gun sights at all
times. If all hell breaks loose and anybody attempts to remove them
without U.S. concurrence, then US B-2 bombers should destroy them
forever.

The United States has cajoled and loved all the Pakistani
generals for a long time. But current events point in the direction
of upcoming mayhem in Pakistan in spite of all U.S. efforts. It is
time now to stop power brokering in Pakistan. Better still, it is
time to stop being friendly to the generals. It is time to cut
military and economic aid.

(Hari Sud is a retired vice president of C-I-L Inc., a former
investment strategies analyst and international relations manager. A
graduate of Punjab University and the University of Missouri, he has
lived in Canada for the past 34 years.

Commentary: Murder Inc.

United Press International, Asia - Hong Kong,China - WASHINGTON, Oct. 25
ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE UPI Editor at Large

No sooner did Benazir Bhutto narrowly escape a two-man suicide
bombing attack than she faced the next death threat of many more to
come. Like paparazzi chasing down a celebrity, would-be assassins
will be dogging her every step as she leads her Pakistan People's
Party in the coming election campaign to reclaim Pakistan's prime
ministership, from which she was deposed in 1990 and again in 1996.

Five days after 140 people were killed and some 400 wounded in
Bhutto's brush with martyrdom, she received a two-page handwritten
letter in Urdu from a "friend of al-Qaida" that threatened to
eliminate her "by any means."

Frighteningly long lists of plots are being hatched by a wide
variety of extremist organizations and groups. And there is no
shortage of killers and volunteers for suicide bombings, martyrs
anxious to die for a new global caliphate. Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf himself has been the target of nine assassination attempts,
two by suicide bombers. Conspiracy is Pakistan's middle name.

Government sleuths reassembled body parts to get a lead on the
would-be assassins. Released to the media were ghoulish photos of the
severed head of what the police were certain was one of the
perpetrators. Pakistani intelligence from a northern tribal territory
reported another 30 suicide bombers had been assigned to "high-value
political targets."

Radical groups pollute Pakistan's political scene. Since Sept.
11, 2001, when Musharraf, under U.S. pressure, dumped his Taliban
proteges, extremist groups, once encouraged by the all-powerful Inter-
Services Intelligence agency for the "liberation" of Indian Kashmir,
were ordered to shut down. Many of them had offices in the major
cities that were closed only to reopen with a different name a block
or two away.

The most ominous warning of all for Bhutto came from the federal
railways minister, Sheik Rashid Ahmad. He accused her of "raising the
flag of imperialism (i.e., Bush administration support), which means
she "will have to face suicide attacks. We have already conveyed to
her that the ground realities have changed (since she was last in her
country eight years ago)."

This perennial Cabinet minister ran a jihadi training camp in the
1980s. He also served in the previous military government under
President Zia ul-Haq. As Musharraf's information minister, he was
known as a champion spin doctor who affects an always-in-the-know
image. This time he inadvertently validated Bhutto's claim that some
elements in Musharraf's government collude with militant radicals
assigned to sabotage her political comeback.

Ahmad is a close friend of retired Gen. Hamid Gul, a former ISI
chief who acts as strategic adviser to the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
coalition of six politico-religious extremist parties that governs
two of Pakistan's four provinces (Baluchistan and the Northwest
Frontier province). Gul hates the United States -- and anything
Washington favors -- with a passion. He assisted the creation of the
Taliban in the early 1990s and to this day believes the Sept. 11 al-
Qaida attacks were a plot engineered by Israel's Mossad, the CIA and
the U.S. Air Force. ("How come no fighters were scrambled to take on
the planes you say were hijacked?" he asked this reporter.)

From al-Qaida and Taliban sanctuaries in the tribal areas on the
Afghan border to Karachi, a teeming port city of 15 million some 600
miles away, there are tens of thousands of fanatics who would love to
see Bhutto dead. To lengthen the odds, the government banned
political rallies and street demonstrations. But she will still have
television, now accessible to 60 percent of the country. The
privately owned ARY television network has 12 24/7 channels for news
and commentary and for everything from food to fashion. ARY Chief
Executive Officer Salman Iqbal was in Washington and New York this
month to recruit "intellectual talent" for a new a "think tank"
channel, directed by Ammar Turabi. It will focus on counter-
terrorism, human rights and distance learning.

Despite the newly acquired accoutrements of modernity, a large
part of Pakistan is still stuck in the past. More than half its 160
million people are illiterate. And aligned against Bhutto's return to
power are renegade ISI cadres; the nationwide MMA coalition of
extremists throughout the country; supporters of the late military
dictator ul-Haq, who seized power from Bhutto's father, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, and then ordered him executed by hanging (Zia himself died in
a mysterious plane crash in 1988 and Benazir became prime minister in
a restored civilian government); and the countless flat-Earth clerics
and their followers who regard a female leader as an abomination.

Yet Bhutto's popularity in this deeply divided society remains
high. And her Pakistan People's Party is the country's largest,
backed and funded by a burgeoning middle class in a country with an
annual growth rate of 7 percent. Her power-sharing deal with
Musharraf called for corruption charges against her to be dropped as
she returned from self-imposed exile in London and Dubai, in exchange
for which Musharraf would doff his general's uniform after the
Supreme Court certifies his election to another five-year term. He
seized power in a bloodless military coup eight years ago.

Several hundred lame-duck lawmakers from four provincial
assemblies, the federal Assembly and the Senate re-elected him
recently; all opposition parties boycotted the balloting.

Assuming all goes according to plan -- always a big "if" in
Pakistan -- the big question will be who will wield the most clout on
defense and internal security matters? Bhutto believes the seven
troubled tribal areas on the Afghan border, now under the sway of al-
Qaida, the Taliban and assorted jihadis from Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, can be brought to heel by introducing political parties
and election campaigning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Today only the MMA is authorized to recruit and propagandize in
the FATA. The MMA is pro-Taliban and its leaders are self-avowed
admirers of Osama bin Laden, the world's most wanted terrorist.
Pakistan's mainstream political parties are not welcome in North and
South Waziristan where the Taliban and al-Qaida rule and where
Pakistani troops are loath to fight.

Pakistani intelligence reported from the northern tribal
territories another 30 suicide bombers had been assigned to terminate
high-value political targets. Bhutto is now the target with the
highest value. The late ul-Haq once said his greatest mistake was not
killing Bhutto the daughter as he had ordered the execution of her
father. Benazir's assassination would relegate Pakistan to a "failing
nuclear state."

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]