In this bulletin:

• Jordan Hosting World Economic Forum
• 4,000 artifacts confiscated in Denmark returned to Afghan museum
• Afghanistan: RFE/RL Analyst Explores Pakistani-Afghan Tensions
• Afghanistan: U.S. Ambassador To UN Says Global Success Tied To Afghan Progress
• U.S. ambassador praises Canadian effort in Afghanistan at N.B. base
• Why 'legalising' Afghan opium for medicine is a non-starter
• Taleban Create Diversion in Northern Afghanistan
• As Pakistan goes, so goes a war
• The Great Game moves south
• World Bank president - runners and riders
• Pakistan derives export earnings from Afghan carpets

Jordan Hosting World Economic Forum

May 18, 2007  (RFE/RL) -- Jordanian King Abdullah II is hosting more than 700 politicians and business leaders at the World Economic Forum.

Afghanistan' s President Hamid Karzai, Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, and Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni are among those expected to attend the three-day meeting in the Dead Sea resort of Shuneh.

Organizers say the theme of this year's forum is "putting diversity to work" in order to accelerate economic growth and promote regional peace.

Meetings at the forum are expected to include discussions of ways to end the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians.  King Abdullah hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert earlier this week to discuss an Arab peace plan.

A meeting of the G11 group of developing countries is due to be held on the sidelines of the forum on May 19. The G11 brings together Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, Honduras,  Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and El Salvador.

The group says it is dedicated to reducing the debt owed by its member states, alleviating poverty, and raising standards of living. King Abdullah announced the establishment of the G11 last September.

4,000 artifacts confiscated in Denmark returned to Afghan museum
The Associated Press - Thursday, May 17, 2007

KABUL, Afghanistan : About 4,000 artifacts seized by border police in Denmark have been returned to the National Museum of Afghanistan, the Danish prime minister said during a visit to Kabul.

The Afghan archaeological artifacts — including coins dating back to the 1st and 2nd centuries B.C. and figurines of lions and horses — were seized a few years ago by Danish border police and have been returned to the museum in the capital, said Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

It is the "common responsibility for the international community to protect this cultural heritage as well as we can," Rasmussen said at a joint news conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Thursday.

The repatriation of the artifacts comes two months after more than 1,400 were returned from the Afghan museum-in-exile in Switzerland to the National Museum.

The items returned from Denmark include coins that show Afghanistan's former position as "crossroads of the world," said a statement from the Danish Foreign Ministry. Some of the coins have inscriptions in both Greek and the Indian Kharosti language, it said.

During the news conference, Rasmussen presented a lion figurine to Karzai as a symbolic gesture of the hand-over. "Thank you very much! How remarkable!" Karzai said as he received the artifact.

Rasmussen said he hoped the returned treasures would strengthen cultural ties between the two countries and their people.

The National Museum of Afghanistan, founded in 1930, was looted and deliberately vandalized under the Taliban. After restoration and reconstruction, the museum reopened to the public in October 2004.

Afghan officials asked last summer that the objects from Switzerland be returned. International and Afghan authorities deemed Kabul safe enough for them to come back.

That collection — including a piece from a foundation stone said to have been touched by Alexander the Great — was assembled in Switzerland by Afghans who wanted to save their cultural heritage after decades of war.

Afghanistan: RFE/RL Analyst Explores Pakistani-Afghan Tensions

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

May 18, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Government troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan have clashed along their border repeatedly this month -- with more than a dozen people reportedly killed in artillery barrages and gun fire. Correspondent Ron Synovitz asked RFE/RL's Afghanistan analyst, Amin Tarzi, about the roots and ramifications of the crisis.

RFE/RL: What background is essential for those who want to understand the current crisis between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Amin Tarzi: This conflict is not new. After the Taliban government fell (in late 2001), the first instance in which Afghanistan claimed that Pakistanis crossed into Afghanistan was in 2003. And that triggered the burning and attacking of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul. It was the beginning of open hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which has gone cold and warm since then.

RFE/RL: If this is an old conflict between what are supposed to be allies in the U.S.-declared war against terrorism, why is the situation only garnering international attention now?

Tarzi: I think the reason that there is a lot of attention right now is because, in the West and especially in the United States, there is an awareness that two of the allies of the United States in the war on terror are actually going at each other [along their] borders. And secondly, because a U.S. soldier was killed on Pakistani soil allegedly by a member of the Pakistani Frontier Corps, or at least, wearing their uniform.

RFE/RL: Some suggest that the roots of this crisis lie in the 19th-century demarcation of British Colonial India, known as the Durand Line. Afghanistan has never officially recognized the Durand Line as its border with Pakistan. What impact do you think this has in the crisis?

Tarzi: From the Pakistani side, that is the main grievance. When Pakistan was created as a country in August of 1947, Afghanistan was the only country in the world that voted against Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. That vote was later changed. But in my view, the first shot was fired from the Kabul side. Afghanistan has never, including the Taliban regime, recognized that boundary as a legitimate boundary. That gave Pakistan, from day one, a notion that Afghanistan has to be contained -- either by being a very friendly Afghanistan or a very weak Afghanistan -- and that the identity of Afghanistan should be an Islamist identity which Pakistan can control rather than a nationalist identity which would have claim over parts of Pakistan. This has implications in the war on terror. This has implications on Al-Qaeda's presence, the Taliban, the support of Pakistan to the militants in Afghanistan. But the core question is that of the border.

RFE/RL: Does that mean that the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is more concerned about its own foreign policy goals than it is about the U.S.-led war on terrorism?

Tarzi: The reason we are hearing so much about this lately is because the United States, and NATO in particular, are seeing their soldiers being killed by people who are coming from Pakistan. That is obvious. NATO is putting a lot of pressure on Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, to curtail these activities. From Musharraf's perspective, there are two issues. Musharraf cannot control this border. Nobody has ever been able to control this border. And he doesn't want to control it because Pakistan's vital interest is to have an Afghanistan that does not have claims on its territory. Even though, on one hand, Musharraf is fighting alongside the West in this war against international terror organizations, on the other hand, Pakistan's long-term policy is to keep a card against Afghanistan. And that card is the Islamist card, because that's what gives Pakistan leeway. So Pakistan is doing both of them.

RFE/RL: What do you think are the immediate causes of the cross-border clashes between government troops of the two countries in recent weeks?

Tarzi: I believe the latest tensions -- the shootings and the subsequent activities that led to the killing of a U.S. soldier -- were because of [Pakistan's efforts at] fencing. Afghanistan is vehemently against the fencing. Pakistan is now saying, 'Look. We want to fence this border because you say that [militants] are coming [across the border]. We say yes. So we're going to fence it.' But Afghanistan says, 'No, you cannot fence it.' Fencing would mean a de facto demarcation of the border, which Afghanistan doesn't want. So both sides are not working in good faith -- both Kabul and Islamabad.

RFE/RL: Who is likely to benefit most from the Afghan-Pakistan border crisis?

Tarzi: If you are the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and if you see the two sides that you don't like -- Musharraf and the Afghan government, the two best friends of the United States, as they see it -- actually going at each other, they (Taliban and Al-Qaeda) are happy. Unless you bring the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan to an acceptable and normal state-to-state relationship, the terrorists will win at the end of the day. They do not have to love each other. But they have to respect each other as states with defined boundaries. So it has much greater repercussions, not only in the short term with Al-Qaeda, but upon long-term stability.

RFE/RL: Do you think this crisis could deteriorate in the future?

Tarzi: Most of the hardest terrorists in the world are sitting right in that border area. If that border area is not controlled or accepted, they will use that tension and that lack of certainty to their advantage. And unfortunately, so far, neither the United States at a meeting in the White House [in September 2006] nor the Turkish attempt to bring some kind of understanding between Mr. Musharraf and Mr. Karzai has been able to bear fruit. This is one of the biggest problems in the war against terror. The escalation will go on. Afghanistan could bring Pakistan and NATO into direct conflict. Already, one [U.S.] soldier has been killed on Pakistani soil while they were trying to negotiate. If more Pakistanis retaliate and their artillery hits NATO troops, eventually there might be a [NATO] retaliation, which would be disastrous. This is very, very tense. And right now, I think some cool heads need to be working in both Kabul and Islamabad.

RFE/RL: What other factors are contributing to the crisis?

Tarzi: Unfortunately, neither Karzai nor Musharraf is capable or willing to control their own governments. Musharraf, I think, has people in the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) and within the Islamists of the Northwest Frontier Province's government that want this tension to continue. And on the Afghan side, a lot of members of the security forces of Afghanistan are vehemently anti-Pakistani. And they like this tension because it also weakens Karzai. So there is a political game going on inside Afghanistan as well.

RFE/RL: How is this crisis impacting the domestic political situations for Karzai and Musharraf?

Tarzi: I think it is weakening Karzai more than Musharraf. But it is weakening both of them. People in Afghanistan who want to destabilize Karzai are not in cahoots with the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. But it will, because of a weakened Afghanistan, be indirect help to the Islamists. It goes beyond the personalities. And NATO has put all its eggs in the baskets of two individuals -- namely, Karzai and Musharraf. Even if they had the good will -- which they don't have right now, they don't even shake hands -- but even if they had it, I think it's beyond their control right now.

RFE/RL: How are the main peace brokers in this conflict?

Tarzi: The United States and NATO are very aware, and becoming more aware of this problem -- that their two allies who are supposed to work together against international terror are actually fighting against each other. So this is a very, very bad scenario. The U.S. soldier who was killed was killed in a peace mission. They were trying to lessen the tension. So the U.S. is doing that on the ground, military-to-military and person-to-person. Also, the U.S. has supported what is called the "peace jirga" -- which is supposed to bring Afghan and Pakistani tribes together with government people. U.S. President George W. Bush tried to bring Mssrs. Musharraf and Karzai together in the White House last September (2006) -- mainly to lessen the tension. And also just last month, Turkey's President [Ahmet Necdet] Sezer tried to bring them together. So there have been attempts on different platforms and on different levels as high as the U.S. president. So far, unfortunately, they have not yielded the results that everybody wants.

RFE/RL: Is there any way now to repair the damage that the border crisis has had upon relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Tarzi: Even if Mssrs. Karzai and Musharraf come to an agreement personally, I do not think that Karzai controls his own security forces who like to have tension with Pakistan, or that Musharraf fully controls his own intelligence and the Islamists. Because they see their goal as the long-term stability of Pakistan and making sure that Afghanistan does not become too nationalistic and too powerful.

Afghanistan: U.S. Ambassador To UN Says Global Success Tied To Afghan Progress

May 18, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan spoke recently with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad. He talked about the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran, upcoming talks between Iran and the United States, and a number of other issues in that exclusive interview with Radio Free Afghanistan's Zarif Nazar. What follows are excerpts from that May 17 interview.

RFE/RL: Iran and the U.S. are due to hold talks on Iraq. What is your view on that? And to what extent are you hopeful that there will be a positive result?

Zalmay Khalilzad:There have been problems in relations between Iran and the U.S. since several years ago, but several years ago the United Sates started negotiating with Iran over Afghanistan. And when I was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, we used to meet with the Iranian ambassador and talk about Afghan issues and problems with the aim of supporting Afghanistan and encouraging Iran not to take negative steps and be a good neighbor to a [country] that is in transition. When I went to Iraq in 2005, I asked President [George W.] Bush to give me the same permission to speak to Iran over Iraq, and Mr. Bush accepted it. But because of the problems that existed in Iraq, we were not able to have a meeting there, as happened in Afghanistan. Finally a few weeks ago, before I left Iraq, there was a regional meeting; and in the framework of that meeting, there was an opportunity to exchange a few words with the Iranians and talk -- at the table we were sitting -- about issues related to Iraq. Now it has been agreed that before the end of this month, there will be a meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq and the U.S. would speak to Iran about Iraqi issues.

RFE/RL: Iran has deported a large number of refugees -- even people who had permits to work and live in Iran. They've destroyed their documents and sent them back; they treat Afghans very badly. Some [observers] believe that Iran and the U.S. have problems, and Iran sends back Afghan refugees to create problems for the U.S. What is your view on this issue?

Khalilzad: The U.S. government does not want Iran and Afghanistan to have poor relations or to be enemies -- these two countries are neighbors and they have common interests, and we have said that we are not against a good relation between those two countries, and we don't want to include Afghanistan in problems the U.S. has with Iran. Iran and the Taliban had very bad relations, and Iran supported groups that were fighting against the Taliban. But in the end, it was the coming of American forces that had a big role in the change of regime. At that time, the Iranians cooperated, and elements inside Afghanistan that were supported by Iran also cooperated. I think a reasonable view for advancing the region as a whole is not to see a gain in the problems of one's neighbor but rather consider collective progress in one's interest. Unfortunately in the Middle East and Southeast Asia region, old ideas that have created failure in world history still rule. Europe learned its lesson following World War II, and now they know that by cooperating with each other there will be progress for all. Unfortunately, even though Iran in the past opposed the Taliban, they have recently helped the Taliban create problems. And it is possible that regarding the refugees, the aim has been to increase the problems of Afghanistan. We hope that Iran will not repeat its past mistakes, [will] think more positively in its policies regarding Afghanistan, cooperate with the government of Afghanistan, not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs, and not help the Taliban who are killing Afghans -- and instead work for the progress of Afghanistan, work for good ties between the two countries, and be a good neighbor.

RFE/RL: Pakistan is also creating problems for Afghanistan regarding refugees, and recently there have been reports of clashes between [Afghan and Pakistani forces ]. What is your view on that ? Why are the border problems between the two sides continuing?

Khalilzad: The success of Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan; Afghanistan's success is in the interest of the whole world. Afghanistan could become a bridge between Pakistan and Central Asia. Pakistan has benefited from the progress that has been achieved so far in Afghanistan from a commercial and an economic point of view. Pakistan and Afghanistan should enjoy good relations. I know that the Afghan government wants to have good ties [with Pakistan]. The U.S. has tried to have a positive influence, and in the coming weeks we will see what can be done through the United Nations. The problems of Afghanistan will create problems for other countries in the region. What can a poor country facing problems do aside from exporting problems, including [flows of] refugees? Since the Taliban era, Afghanistan's economic situation has improved and commerce between Pakistan and Afghanistan is over $1 billion now, while at the time of the Taliban it was not even $100 million. There are also Pakistan's internal problems, which are one reason for the problems with Afghanistan. Aside from the problems in Afghanistan's relations with Iran and Pakistan, there is a need for Afghanistan for the Afghan people -- the government to improve their situation. Because the more Afghans are united, and the more the government pays attention to the problems of the people -- confronting corruption, treating justly with people -- the fewer problems from foreigners and countries that want to create problems for Afghanistan. Progress inside Afghanistan by the government and other important elements, and also international support is important, and also better ties and cooperation from the neighbors.

RFE/RL: As you know the security situation is deteriorating in Afghanistan and enemies are becoming stronger, has the time come for the U.S and other countries to review their policies in Afghanistan?

Khalilzad: I can say in general terms that the success of Afghanistan is very important to the world, and Afghan failure is global failure. From that perspective, the world is responsible for helping Afghanistan out of its own interest. The success of Afghanistan is important for the region. The most important issue is the internal issue -- progress in the work by the government of Afghanistan and cooperation by people who care for their country. They should not provide the enemies of Afghanistan an opportunity to use the country or Afghans for their own purposes. This is a key issue. Afghans should use the opportunity that exists for them -- the attention and cooperation of the world -- this is a golden opportunity that should be used.

U.S. ambassador praises Canadian effort in Afghanistan at N.B. base
Friday, May 18, 2007

OROMOCTO, N.B. (CP) - U.S. ambassador David Wilkins is praising the contribution Canadian soldiers are making in Afghanistan, saying that real progress is being made in the war against terror.

Wilkins says Oromocto, N. B., is "the hometown of heroes" as he recalls the sacrifice of eight soldiers, most of them from neighbouring Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, who were killed in Afghanistan last month.

Wilkins told students at the Oromocto High School that there's no magic date for an end to the war on terror.

He says the fight will continue as long as there are people in the world who want to harm freedom-loving countries like Canada and the United States.

Many of the students at the Oromocto school have relatives serving in Afghanistan.

Wilkins has visited several Canadian military bases in recent weeks to deliver a message of thanks from the U.S. administration for Canada's efforts in Afghanistan.

Why 'legalising' Afghan opium for medicine is a non-starter

Global Research, May 18, 2007

The idea of 'legalising' Afghanistan's opium crop for medical use was back in the news this weekend. According to the Independent on Sunday, Tony Blair is now 'considering' the plan that has been rejected by the US and also by the Foreign Office. Even though the IOS has hardly covered itself in glory for its recent drugs coverage, this story apparently comes from a prime ministerial spokesperson so there's no reason think its not true. Another report in Pakistan's Daily Times say that apparently NATO are also 'considering' the plan.

Its not surprising they are at least considering it. Afghanistan is as chaotic and war torn as ever: current efforts to deal with the illegal opium trade are clearly failing in dramatic style. Add to this the fact that everyone knows the eradication plans being floated are hopelessly impractical and have zero chance of success, and there may indeed be potential window for more radical solutions to be reviewed. Unfortunately 'consider' is not 'do'. When they do 'consider' it they will find that in its current form the plan is a non-starter. Below is an article which appeared (with a couple of very small edits) in this month's Druglink magazine in which I explain why.

The Senlis Council proposal to license Afghan opium production for medical use has been garnering much publicity and high level support, most recently from the BMA. Could this plan be a 'silver bullet', simultaneously helping to heal Afghanistan and solving the 'global pain crisis'? Sadly not, argues Steve Rolles from the Transform Drug Policy Foundation.

Superficially at least the idea has great appeal. Currently more than half of global opium production is legal and licensed for the medical market (morphine, diamorphine, codeine). This product is not profiting criminals, fueling conflict, or being sold to addicts on street corners. Could we not help Afghanistan on its road to economic and political stability and fill the apparent shortfall in medical opiates for pain control? Unfortunately no – this apparent 'silver bullet' solution faces a raft of practical and political obstacles that render it almost completely unfeasible.

Firstly, the medical opium 'shortage' is an illusory one. Licit opium production currently takes place primarily in Tasmania, Turkey, and India, strictly licensed by the UN drug agencies. The problem is evidently not a lack of opium but rather the under use of current production. The INCB estimated annual global demand for licit opiates (in morphine equivalents) was 400 metric tonnes and that over production since 2000 has led to stocks 'that could cover global demand for two years'. Afghanistan's annual production is 610 tonnes of morphine equivalent (and rising). Flooding an already over-saturated market would potentially cause precisely the supply/demand imbalance the UN control system was designed to prevent. Any first steps would, therefore, have to address under-usage of existing production and the related political, bureaucratic, and licensing issues before any realistic role for licit Afghan production could seriously be entertained.

The second problem is a purely practical one with Afgahanistan's status as a failed state and war zone presenting insurmountable obstacles. Although such an illicit-to-licit transition has been achieved in Turkey and India, this required a high level of infrastructural investment, state intervention and security apparatus, something Afghanistan is entirely lacking in its current chaotic and lawless state. Afghan production would also struggle to compete on the international market, with its unit costs estimated by David Mansfield (1) at almost ten times higher than the highly industrialised output from Australia.

Finally there is the fact that demand for non-medical opiates will not disappear, even if Afghan opium production hypothetically could. A lucrative illicit profit opportunity would remain - a vacuum into which other illicit production would inevitably move - whether in Central Asia or elsewhere. More likely, the demand would be met by increased Afghan production under the same farmers, warlords and profiteers, potentially making the situation worse. The plan has no more hope of getting rid of illicit non-medical production than the decades of failed alternative development and eradication have. The brutal realities of supply and demand economics in a completely unregulated and illegal marketplace will see to that.

There may well be a place for smaller scale licensing of Afghan opium at some point in the future, certainly for their domestic medical needs and perhaps as part of an amnesty plan or transition program for farmers moving into alternative crops. But the Senlis plan as currently envisaged is a non-starter - 'silver bullet fantasies' as the TransNational Institute describes it (2). Sanho Tree (Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC) described the plan as "a mirror image of prohibition – well-intentioned but ill-conceived, just from the opposite end of the policy spectrum". Whilst undoubtedly useful in stimulating debate on licensing opium production, the proposal is now casting a shadow over more thoughtful and cautious policy work being undertaken by other drug policy NGOs. For organisations like Transform there is a danger that an over hyped but ultimately doomed 'legalisation' plan is potentially undermining a reform movement struggling to promote a more nuanced exploration of realistic models for regulated drug production and supply.

Taleban Create Diversion in Northern Afghanistan

From roadside bombs to suicide attacks, northern regions are seeing the same tactics the Taleban employ in the south.

Institute for War & Peace Reporting - By Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi (ARR No. 253, 17-May-07)

Insurgent attacks are on the rise in northern Afghanistan, in parts of the country not normally associated with Taleban activity.

Some say it is a diversionary tactic designed to draw the international military forces away from the south, where the Taleban have come under pressure in recent weeks. But others caution that there also is a home-grown element to the violence, partly sponsored by local drug barons and partly the product of desperation and poverty.

Security has generally been better in the northern provinces than in the south since the collapse of Taleban regime in 2001, but increased level of attacks are ringing alarm-bells. Since the beginning of spring, which officially starts on March 21, there has been a spate of killings, roadside bombs and suicide attacks.

Assassinations – successful and attempted – have targeted local officials and Afghans and foreigners working for aid groups.

Towards the end of March, a district governor was killed in Qaram Qul in the western Faryab province, and the head of Khan Charbagh district was injured in a separate attack in the same province.

Two bomb attacks targeting the governor of Saripul province, east of Faryab, injured five civilians at the beginning of April.

Also in Saripul, armed men killed an engineer with the German Agro Action aid group in March, and at the end of April, an Afghan truck driver working for the same organisation was shot dead in the Kunduz region in the northeast.

Another attack on an aid group called Rukay left a foreigner and two local staff injured in Mazar-e-Sharif in mid-April.

At the end of the month, a man who officials later said was a Taleban member ran into a group of policemen while attempting to kidnap the son of a local businessman. One police officer was killed and a second was wounded in the firefight that followed.

The regional headquarters of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, in the northeastern province of Badakhshan came under rocket attack four times in March and April. A former Taleban commander in the area, Mullah Abdul Azim, was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the attacks.

Suicide bombings, a relatively new component of Taleban tactics, have also spread to the north. On April 16, one such attack at police headquarters in the north-western city of Kunduz killed nine policemen and injured 30.

It was the most serious attack in Kunduz since the Taleban were encircled and defeated in the city at the end of 2001.

Nazar Muhammad, an eyewitness, told IWPR, "The suicide attacker was a young man, and while the police forces were drilling, he approached them and set off the explosion."

In Takhar, a province west of Badakhshan, there were was a suicide attack and a simultaneous bomb attack outside the regional governor's residence and the police headquarters on April 25. Only the suicide bomber was killed.

In addition, since spring began, at least eight roadside explosive devices have been planted in Mazar-e-Sharif. One damaged an Afghan army vehicle, but another seven were identified in time and defused by ISAF troops.

It is not clear whether some of the shootings were the work of bandits, but other attacks appear to bear the hallmark of Taleban operations. To confuse matters further, Hizb-e-Islami, the insurgent faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, claimed responsibility for various attacks in northern Afghanistan, and a spokesman for the group told the media that more were planned. In March, Hekmatyar said his militia were no longer cooperating with the Taleban and would fight alone.

The governor of Saripul province, Sayed Iqbal Monib, is certain it is the Taleban are behind the wave of attacks.

"Taleban terrorist groups have infiltrated these provinces to destabilise the security situation and attack government institutions,” he told IWPR. “According to the information we have, the Taleban want to carry out suicide and other bomb attacks in the north to create a lack of security, especially in Saripul. We have put our detective and intelligence units to alert to ward off possible attacks."

Police in northern Afghanistan say the rise in attacks is a consequence of a switch in Taleban tactics this year.

When the Taleban pre-announced a major spring offensive in southern provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, the United States-led Coalition and NATO forces responded by beefing up their presence. The Taleban have suffered reverses in recent weeks, and the expected onslaught has not been as fierce as expected.

General Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, the overall commander-in-chief of police in Afghanistan’s nine northern provinces, argues that the Taleban are trying to reduce the pressure on their southern positions by forcing the foreign troops and their Afghan army allies to respond over a more diffuse area.

"By the beginning of spring, the government was concentrating its military operations in the south, so the Taleban sought to turn the government's attention away from the south by organising terrorist and suicide attacks in the north," he said in an interview with IWPR. "The Taleban have therefore used a number of groups to carry out attacks, sending them into the north to hit the security situation".

General Patang said these incomers were being helped by former Taleban living in the north, and by drug barons who had an interest in creating instability to keep the opium crop safe from eradication efforts and the trafficking routes free from control.

"These groups are supported by larger groups based outside Afghanistan, but some former Taleban remnants and drug mafiosi in the north are helping them carry out the attacks," he said. "In assisting the terrorist groups, the mafia wants to play a double game. Helping terrorists means helping themselves, because they want to weaken security so that they can grow poppy and smuggle it out more easily, which becomes impossible when security is good."

Colonel Jon Palsson, commander of the ISAF-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in northern Afghanistan, also made a connection between the Taleban attacks and the drug trade, but offered a different interpretation from Patang’s, suggesting it was the instability created by drugs that allowed the insurgents to move in.

"The security situation in north is incomparable with the delicate security situation in the south, [but] let us not forget that north is not stable, as well," he said. "The expansion of drugs and arms smuggling in the north has paved the way for some terrorist groups to become more active."

Afghan analysts blame what some describe as an incompetent and corrupt police force and other government institutions from allowing the situation to get out of hand. Some warn that the emerging security vacuum could allow the Taleban to recruit among destitute Afghans.

"The police forces have failed to gain the public’s trust, because they are poorly trained. The main reason for this is that high-ranking Afghan generals have hired their relatives to fill all the key posts, and [these individuals] are busily engaged in drug smuggling rather than maintaining security," said one analyst, Qayum Babak. "People are losing confidence in the government day by day – and that paves the way for a lack of security."

Muhammad Nabi Assir, a political analyst also based in Mazar-e-Sharif, sees the resurgence of the Taleban in the north and elsewhere as a failure of good government.

"Despite all the donations given to Afghanistan, the government has been unable to root out the Taleban in five years, and they have grown stronger and stronger," he said. "Unemployment and the lack of a proper judicial system have forced many people to join the Taleban. If you are poor, or if you have been abused by a warlord, you have no form of redress, and you will join the Taleban as a form of retaliation."

Assir believes that a surge in Taleban recruitment is giving the insurgents the capacity to move northwards. He warns that the north of Afghanistan could become as unstable as the south unless the government alters its strategy – for instance by changing the way appointments are made in the security forces, and making the courts work.

General Patang argues that it is unfair to blame the security forces for the revival in Taleban activity in the north.

“The increase in enemy attacks does not mean the police are weak,” he said. “We are doing our best – it is the enemy who is seeking to harm the security situation, and we are trying to stop him. We will seek out terrorist camps in the north and root them out quickly as possible."

The general added that the interior ministry was about to launch “extensive reforms” which would improve the police beyond recognition.

On the streets of northern towns, people are less optimistic. "What does it mean if the government cannot establish security - why then are they ruling over us?" asked Hamidullah, a street trader in Kunduz.

“After that suicide attack [on the police HQ], I am fearful even of my customers. Everyone, wherever they are – in their car or in a hotel – lives in expectation of being attacked. It’s unbelievable."

Like many people, Hamidullah was angry that the heavy military presence was proving ineffective.

"I am surprised at all these heavily armed uniformed soldiers – what are they doing? Are they asleep? Look around: there are these local and foreign soldiers everywhere,” he said. “The whole world has arrived here to bring security, but they can’t even stop a few talebs [students] from the madrassahs, so what exactly are they doing here?"

Poverty alone may not be driving the Taleban resurgence, but it may provide them with willing footsoldiers.

At a demonstration by unemployed schoolteachers in Mazar-e-Sharif in mid-April, the mood of desperation was obvious. One protester who did not want to be named told IWPR he was quite prepared to join the Taleban.

"If the government can’t employ us, I will have to join any group that will pay me so that I can bring in food for my children. If your children are hungry, you will blow yourself up in a suicide attack rather than hear them crying for food," he said.

The wave of attacks in the north has affected reconstructive work in the region as well. Staff working for non-government organisations, NGOs, told IWPR they were now worried by the security situation.

One NGO head, who did not want to be named, said that in the wake of murders of aid workers, “NGO staff do not dare go out to the villages because they think the same will happen to them as to those engineers who were killed."

He added, "If the situation continues like this, it is possible that many projects will come to a halt or that at most, projects will be active only in the cities."

Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi is an IWPR staff reporter in Mazar-e-Sharif.

As Pakistan goes, so goes a war

The Christian Science Monitor / May 18, 2007 - Opinion 

After 9/11, the US had little choice but to rely on Pakistan to free Afghanistan of Al Qaeda and the Taliban – and to try to keep it that way. But since March, Pakistan's ruler has lost popular support. Gen. Pervez Musharraf looks less reliable as an ally in the war on Islamic terrorists.

Washington now faces a difficult decision. Middle-class protests against Mr. Musharraf have risen in recent months, triggered by his ouster of the Supreme Court's chief justice. Violent incidents, such as 42 demonstrators killed in Karachi last weekend, have raised alarm at home and abroad. Support by the military may be fading.

Despite his success in boosting the economy and helping to capture or kill key leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the man who took power in a 1999 coup could be headed for a dangerous downfall.

Unless, of course, the US and other Western powers help arrange a peaceful transition to a less-polarizing figure and to a better form of democracy than Musharraf has tried to manufacture in Pakistan.

For too many years, the Bush administration has shown too much interest in Musharraf as a short-term strategic partner in a hot war and not enough on whether he could deliver a stable democracy that could maintain a long-term struggle against radical Islamists. And the US has largely agreed with him – and many Pakistanis – that the country's history of inept civilian rule demands some sort of strong military hand in government.

Musharraf took power on that popular assumption. But his recent missteps in trying to continue to act as both the top political and military leader indicate the limits of keeping civilian rule at bay too long. Civil liberties erode. Power becomes its own end. It may be time for him to cut a deal for a transition – although to exactly to what or to whom is unknown. Eight years in power is enough for any ruler, especially for one who wants to live in his country once out of power.

Musharraf seems determined to push ahead with elections in October that would likely reelect him as president. But his action against the chief justice and other moves are seen as stepping on the Constitution. Lawyers are leading a middle-class revolt that resonates within the military rank and file.

Pushing for democracy in Islamic countries was a key political weapon in President Bush's war on terror. Iraq is fumbling toward democracy while the US has little hope now that Iraq's key neighbors – Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria – will become democracies with an Islamic base, as Turkey or Indonesia are, anytime soon.

The US can't afford to keep backing Musharraf if more Pakistanis turn against him. It might lose the willingness of 160 million Pakistanis in the fight against the Taliban or Al Qaeda. But finding an able and popular civilian leader to replace Musharraf remains difficult.

Getting out of this box will be a test for US diplomacy in coming weeks and months. Top leaders of Pakistan's political opposition will need to bend as much as Musharraf and many of the top brass.

Both camps need to find a transitional figure who can bridge their differences. They must see Pakistan in its larger role as a pivotal state in a global struggle against terrorism. Such states are better off with a stable democracy.

The Great Game moves south

By Zorawar Daulet Singh - Asia Times Online / May 18, 2007

Over the past year, the northwestern frontiers of the South Asian subcontinent have emerged as a vital theater for geopolitical competition renascent of earlier eras. This episode includes the three great powers of the contemporary system - the United States, Russia and China, the latter two exploiting their vital positions in the Eurasian geopolitical landscape.

The patterns of the game cannot be discerned without a critical evaluation of the foreign-policy interests of the three protagonists and other regional powers in the region. What follows is a reflection of how the game has now decisively moved south and thereby likely to influence the "look West" policies of New Delhi and Islamabad.

In the winter of 2001, Afghanistan became the target of a spectacular air and ground assault by the United States, laying the foundations for a gradual strategy whose rationale was beyond just the annihilation of al-Qaeda. In February 2002, then secretary of state Colin Powell told Congress that the US "will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind that we could not have dreamed of before".

Now fast-forward to spring 2005, and the US has established an array of military bases in the heart of Central Asia, poised to crush the historic Russian hold over the region.

By the summer of 2005, it had became apparent to Moscow that the US was hardly planning a limited military deployment and what in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, appeared to be a legitimate response to terror networks was now expanding into a more traditional realpolitik strategy. Counterbalancing was inevitable.

The turning point came in July 2005, when the Russian Foreign Ministry classified US forces as "non-regional", and declared that such a military presence in the region must be rolled back. Similar calls to set a timetable for the withdrawal of US bases in Central Asia were voiced by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Moscow's and Beijing's (more discreet) intentions were henceforth made explicit.

The first manifestation of Russian resurgence in Central Asia came with a defensive alliance with Uzbekistan, militarily the most important of the five Central Asian republics, in November 2005, thus making it Russia's largest strategic bridgehead in Central Asia. Shortly after, most of the other Central Asian states followed suit and made a strategic choice to re-establish contacts with an invigorated Kremlin. Recently, there are indications that Washington's last remaining airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, itself a few kilometers away from Russia's expanding Kant airbase, may be asked to exit altogether.

Suffice it so say, with the specter of US-sponsored "color revolutions" having receded, and the drive to augment a permanent US military presence north of Afghanistan not only checked but dramatically rolled back, there was a change of tactics in Washington.

In February 2006, the State Department reorganized its South Asia Division and included the five Central Asian states in its jurisdiction. The formal strategy was articulated in speeches by assistant secretary of state Richard Boucher in the spring of 2006. In what was termed the "Greater Central Asia" strategy, Washington would henceforth refocus its diplomatic attention to steer the region southward, dangling the energy issue to open Central Asian hydrocarbons to energy-deficit South Asia, and promising to provide India and Pakistan a channel for influence into Central Asia.

This tactical retreat into South Asia was predicated on the stabilization of Afghanistan, which given its location would be the pivotal link in connecting South and Central Asia. Naturally, the seminal "de-hyphenation" of US engagement with India and Pakistan whereby it achieved the historically unattainable - stable relations with both states - and arguably the enduring success of the post-September 11 US diplomacy in South Asia made such a strategy conceivable in the first place.

Anticipating that the SCO too was vying for South Asia's attention, the US timing and motive were clear - introducing another option for India and Pakistan to participate in the affairs of Central Asia, and thus nip any regional realignment in the bud.

In essence, the new US strategy is based on "multilateralism", with the US playing the role of a midwife between Central and South Asia, of which Afghanistan is the core. Yet transformation of Afghanistan from its historic buffer status toward that of a "bridge" has not been shared as an overwhelming goal by other regional actors, especially since the corollary of an open-ended US military-strategic presence in Afghanistan would impinge on the security interests of all the surrounding actors - Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan. India may be the only exception.

The extensive Russian pipeline infrastructure that transports Central Asian gas exclusively via Russia into Europe ensures that the area is integrated into the wider Russian energy strategy, and any instability or reorientation in Central Asia will directly impinge on Gazprom's export strategy.

A number of hydrocarbon deals since early 2000, and reaffirmed more recently between Moscow and the Central Asian republics, implies that even if the US does accomplish the formidable objective of creating a vibrant Afghanistan, regional surplus reserves are simply insufficient to meet South Asian demand, thus making a pipeline financially infeasible.

For instance, Russia is projected to purchase 85% of Turkmenistan's gas exports (50 billion cubic meters, or bcm) in 2008. The remainder is to be pumped into northern Iran. A Russian-Turkmen agreement valid until 2028 implies that there is little gas available for other markets. Thus the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline is truly a pipe dream.

As for Kazakhstan, the other hydrocarbon oasis, the most recent statement by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev after a meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin last week underscores the robust strategic pull of Moscow: "Kazakhstan is completely committed to transporting most, if not all, of its oil (and gas) across Russian territory." (In 2006, Kazakhstan exported 80% - 42 million tons - of its total oil exports via Russian pipelines.)

This was followed by a landmark trilateral pipeline deal in Turkmenbashi, under which 20-30bcm of gas annually would flow from Turkmenistan along the Caspian Sea shore via Kazakhstan into the Russian pipeline network beginning 2012. Finally, according to a joint declaration, which included Uzbek President Islom Karimov, the Soviet-era Central Asia-Center pipeline network is expected to be upgraded.

There are indications now that Russia and Afghanistan are reviving contacts, first signaled in February when Moscow reopened its embassy in Kabul. Russia's decision to settle Afghanistan's Soviet-era debt issue, possibly in lieu of the participation of Russian companies in Afghan reconstruction, is significant.

In March, Moscow through the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization held extensive meetings with Kabul and offered military-technical and civilian cooperation, and according to Moscow the Afghan government has itself requested that Russia renew deliveries of arms and equipment, which were discontinued in 2005.

There is perhaps an inverse linkage between the export of Iranian gas to South Asia and the pace of physical connectivity between Central and South Asia. And given that Central Asian hydrocarbons are destined to flow primarily northward (and a portion eastward), Iranian hydrocarbons have become a significant and natural choice for South Asian markets.

Gazprom's recent reiteration of seeking to participate in the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline alters the entire dimension of the project and frees it from the political baggage associated with Western financial options. Two recent developments are worth noting on the future prospects of the IPI project.

First, Gazprom expressed the possibility of extending the pipeline into China, which implies a convergence of interests among all regional actors. Second, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's recent visit to Pakistan, the first by a Russian premier in 38 years, is also instructive, especially since his delegation included officials from Gazprom.

Iran's links with Central Asia too have renewed recently. A defense agreement between Iran and Tajikistan early this month, presumably with Russian acquiescence, underscores future patterns of collaboration between Central Asia and Iran, both having substantial bilateral relations with Russia. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon also called for Iran's full membership in the SCO. Kyrgyzstan too has expressed interest in intensifying bilateral relations with Iran.

India's traditional policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan was based on the geostrategic logic of denying Pakistan its "strategic depth" and thereby dividing the military attention of Islamabad from exclusively focusing on the Indo-Pakistani border. In the nuclear dimension, such a policy based on a conventional "pincer movement" loses much of its viability.

India-Pakistan relations hold the key to any inter-regional geo-economic collaboration, including the IPI project. And nothing short of an India-Pakistan entente would enable transnational integration to occur, even one that circumvents Afghanistan. While the rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad is proceeding apace, and there is immense geostrategic logic for an entente today, we are yet to witness the political stability and will on both sides unequivocally to bury the hatchet.

India-Pakistan relations, then, assume a significance beyond simply a bilateral dimension. Indeed, arguably none of the major powers - the US, Russia, China - would be averse to an enduring India-Pakistan rapprochement, given the primacy of geo-economic interests of all actors.

Similarly, for India to elevate its peripheral influence in Central Asia toward a more multifaceted engagement would be augmented by a partnership with Pakistan. Indeed, Russia would not be averse to South Asian nations taking a proactive stance in Central Asian affairs, and indeed may even encourage the filling of any vacuum by its strategic partners.

Can US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan? At what cost?

Without this piece of real estate, any notions of linking Central with South Asia are absurd. Importantly, the complex US-Pakistan collaboration and Pakistan's pivotal role in augmenting current US-NATO operations provide it with sufficient leverage that it is unlikely to be abandoned any time soon by the United States, despite the recent political flux in Pakistani politics.

Anatol Lieven of the New America Foundation was perhaps a rare exception in Western commentary when he recently argued against the pattern of exclusively focusing on Afghanistan at the expense of wider US regional interests. He noted that "defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan is indeed a secondary issue. Of far greater long-term importance is the survival of Pakistan as a state, and its development as a successful modern society and economy."

Such reasoning may well be instructive for future patterns in US policy, since it is perhaps unlikely that the US would pursue a tactical annihilation of the Taliban if that came at the strategic cost of radically destabilizing Pakistan. This dilemma is nonetheless exacerbated by increasing evidence of Pakistan's resurgent leverage in Afghan affairs, primarily through the elements of the so-called "moderate Taliban".

Until the US abandons, in the words of Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, the "unrealistic goal of rapid centralization in a still-feudal society that has never been centralized" will Afghanistan settle toward a modicum of normalization. The Pashtun-based Taliban are gradually being viewed by tribal Afghans as a relatively stabilizing force, after indiscriminate use of air power has further alienated these groups.

"Success" for the US in Afghanistan would then appear to stem logically from reconciling the contradictions of the surge in Pashtun nationalism as it is manifested through the resurgence of the Taliban with the overt US reliance on remnants of the Northern Alliance. Reconciling these ethnic groups with the US-friendly Northern Alliance through a grand coalition in Kabul is perhaps the only feasible path to stability in Afghanistan.

Thus the game for all practical purposes has shifted south from its erstwhile imperial theater into Afghanistan, and perhaps into Pakistan. And it is China that is the major competitor with the US for influence. To discern Chinese interests in Pakistan in a post-post-Cold War age and in the context of accelerating Sino-Indian rapprochement requires an evaluation of China's "southwest corridor to the sea" strategy.

The decision by Beijing to enhance the development of its western regions, especially Xinjiang, is the starting point. But there is a multidimensional rationale. China's rapidly growing geo-economic links - energy, trade, investment - with East Africa, West Asia, and the Persian Gulf suggest a strategic need to gain secure uninterrupted access to these regions.

The vulnerability of Chinese energy and vital raw-materials imports in Indian Ocean sea lanes is well recognized. Thus a land route totransport West Asian hydrocarbons through Pakistan into China eliminates the possibility of naval interdiction and enhances Beijing's energy security.

In addition, a 1,500km corridor would also enable direct transport of East African commodities vital for industrialization of Xinjiang, situated 3,500km from China's east coast. The linkage is two-way. The economic rejuvenation of western China would then imply an outlet for Chinese exports into imports-dependent Pakistan and wealthy markets in the Persian Gulf.

China's assistance to Pakistan to establish and modernize its transportation infrastructure from Kashgar through the Trans-Karakoram Highway to the deepsea port at Gwadar is the initial manifestation of an envisaged geo-economic trail, perhaps no less dramatic than the historical silk routes across Central Asia.

With Pakistan offering to provide China "a window to the sea", the envisaged US-sponsored opening of Afghanistan holds little interest for China, which is able to pursue a shorter route to the Arabian Sea.

The United States today is facing an uphill task in shaping regional politics, as all the relevant actors are reluctant to accept the US role of a geopolitical arbitrator. The once intricately poised US advance northward in the aftermath of September 11 has become a defensive tactical retreat to steer Afghanistan toward an uncertain fate.

Remarks in February by Evan A Feigenbaum, US deputy assistant secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, perhaps reflect best America's belated acknowledgement of geopolitical reverses in the north:

- We reject the notion, once again so fashionable, that Central Asia is merely an arena for outside powers to compete for influence. Central Asians are not the objects of our struggles with others. They are the very focus of our policy. And if Central Asians themselves are the focus of our policy, then we have every incentive to help them tap economic opportunity in every direction on the compass: west, east, north, and south. In short, our policy is not "anti" anyone. Nor is it focused in any single geographic direction to the exclusion of any other.

A far cry indeed from the late 1990s and early 2000s, when pipeline blueprints were drafted solely on exclusive US-led plans for evacuation of Central Asian hydrocarbons. Feigenbaum went on:

- We are not talking about severing the region from other long-standing ties. And how could we, anyway? An existing - and extensive - network of pipelines, power lines, railroads and highways to Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States countries provides the current backbone of Central Asian trade and commerce.

Putin's latest Central Asian tour is perhaps the final nail in the coffin. Well, that "Great Game" is indeed over! In the US geostrategic calculus, South Asia has evolved from a possible bridgehead into a vital theater for geopolitical influence in its own right.

The emerging trend to watch out for is how the now-transformed "defensive" strategic posture of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan will shape out. Given its substantial investment in blood and money, the US is likely to try to consolidate its leverage over South Asia, and especially over Pakistan, and hope to retain a long-term strategic foothold to ensure that a countervailing presence to growing Chinese influence in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular is preserved.

Zorawar Daulet Singh, who holds a master's degree in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, is an international-relations and strategic-affairs analyst based in New Delhi.

World Bank president - runners and riders
Guardian Unlimited 05/18/2007 By Graeme Wearden

Tony Blair may have emerged as a surprise choice to replace Paul Wolfowitz as president of the World Bank, but the former finance ministers of Afghanistan and Nigeria are both seen as more credible candidates.

Ashraf Ghani, chairman of Kabul University, is a likely option if president George Bush decides to break with tradition and appoint a non-American. A former World Bank economist, Ghani left in 2001 to help rebuild the Afghan economy after the war of 2001 began.

It was reported last month that he headed the White House's list of candidates to replace Wolfowitz. Bookmakers Ladbrokes today installed him as the 4/5 favourite.

Another non-US candidate - and the only woman currently tipped as a Wolfowitz successor - is Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Another former World Bank staffer, she has served as both Nigeria's finance minister and foreign minister.

Okonjo-Iweala told Reuters today that she had not been approached about the job.

"It is an institution that is very worthy and I really believe in the institution. It needs a lot of healing," she said.

But a large obstacle stands between both candidates and the prestigious post ? the US government has indicated that it wants to replace its former deputy secretary of defence with another American.

Robert Zoellick, former deputy secretary of state, has been named as one credible option, as has Robert Kimmitt, current deputy secretary at the US Treasury.

Respected economist Joe Stiglitz has claimed that Tony Blair is in consideration for the top job at the Bank.

"He is one of the people that is clearly being discussed," Stiglitz said , adding that he would prefer to see a candidate with more experience in economics and development.

Ladbrokes, though, does not appear to see Mr Blair as a likely choice, offering odds on his appointment of 25-1 .

Ashraf Ghani (4/5 favourite at Ladbrokes)

Born in Kabul, he returned to Afghanistan after the US-led invasion in 2001. As finance minister he overhauled the country's treasury, brought in a new currency and attracted $28bn in aid from the international community.

He is chancellor of Kabul University. He joined the World Bank in 1991, and managed large-scale development programmes in China, India and Russia.

Previously tipped as a future secretary general of the United Nations, there have been suggestions that Mr Ghani might be too volatile and impatient. One acquaintance told the Financial Times last year that "given that he blows up at even his closest friends, I can't see him as the world's leading peace-maker."

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (5/2)

She has been credited with playing a key role in fighting corruption and pushing economic reform in Nigeria during her three-year stint as finance minister. She also attempted to crack down on the "419" scam, in which fraudsters send emails, letters and faxes offering a share of a ficticious fortune.

She studied at Harvard, and has a PhD in regional economics and development from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

In June 2006 she became Nigeria's foreign minister, resigning three months later. Before becoming finance minister in 2003, she was vice-president and corporate secretary of the World Bank.

Robert Zoellick (7/2)

As number two to Condoleezza Rice at the State Department, Robert Zoellick was seen as a counterpoint to more hardline voices such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. But he quit in June 2006 after sixteen months as deputy secretary of state, and is currently on the board of Goldman Sachs.

In February 2001 he began a four-year stint as US trade representative, negotiating the entry of China and Taiwan into the World Trade Organisation.

Zoellick attracted headlines last year after posing in China cuddling a panda cub, in an attempt to illustrate the warm relations between China and the US.

Robert Kimmitt (5-1)

The current deputy Treasury secretary has been seen as a potential safe pair of hands for the Bank. He served in Vietnam, where he was awarded three Bronze Star Medals, the Purple Heart, the Air Medal, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.

He has plenty of political experience, serving as ambassador to Germany between 1991 and 1993, and under secretary of state for political affairs from 1989 to 1991.

Kimmitt's boss, Henry Paulson, has also been suggested as a candidate but the Treasury secretary is not thought to be interested.

Stanley Fischer 14/1

Current governor of the bank of Israel, he was vice president, development economics and chief economist at the World Bank between 1988 and 1990. From 1994 to 2001 he was first deputy managing director at the International Monetary Fund. Very well-regarded as an economist, but his links to the Clinton administration may harm his chances.

Senator Richard Luger (14/1)

Indiana's representative in the US Senate, he is the ranking minority member on the foreign relations committee.

John Bolton (16/1)

Forced to resign as America's ambassador to the United Nations after failing to assuage concerns over his brusque style and criticisms of the UN.

Tony Blair (25/1)

Like Wolfowitz, he is working out his notice. Blair has said he hopes to promote peace in the Middle East and inter-faith dialogue after he finally vacates Downing Street on June 27.

Donald Rumsfeld (100/1)

The two-time secretary of defense and architect of the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan is available, having resigned last November after the Republican party lost control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. However, he may not be seen as an ideal choice to unite a divided World Bank and counter criticism that US should cede control of the selection process for its presidency.

Pakistan derives export earnings from Afghan carpets

Reported by Zabeehullah Ihsas - Translated & edited by S. Mudassir Ali Shah 

MAZAR-I-SHARIF, May 16 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Pakistan earns $130 million annually from exports of a wide variety of world-famous carpets handmade in Afghanistan, say Balkh-based weavers and merchants.

Ever since the mass refugee exodus into the neighbouring country in the wake of the 1978 Soviet invasion, they claim, Pakistan has been purchasing in bulk Afghan carpets and exporting them abroad under its own brand name.

Muhammad Qul, deputy president of the Balkh Carpet Export Association, reckons of the six million craftsmen associated with the countrys major industry, four million come from northern provinces that account for 70 percent of Afghanistans total annual production - three million square metres of rugs.

On a yearly basis, I sell Pakistan 120,000 square metres of carpets - infused with Afghanistans history - that are later sent to offshore markets as a Pakistani product, points out Haji Qandeel, who owns the countrys largest manufacturing facility spread over 15 acres of land in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Given the ubiquitous insecurity in Afghanistan, the carpet magnate argues, foreign buyers tend to err on the side of caution and eschew coming to the Central Asian country. As a consequence, he continues, foreigners wrap up multimillion transactions with Pakistanis.

One square metre of rug exported directly from Afghanistan costs 22 dollars while we pay a mere seven dollars for the same quantity sold abroad via Pakistan, explains the leading industrialist, who urges the Karzai government to open a bank to facilitate Afghan entrepreneurs.

An office-bearer of the Balkh Carpet Export Association, Najib confirms the neighbouring country reaped windfall profits from such business deals. He is optimistic the Afghan government can earn millions of dollars in foreign exchange by helping manufacturers gain access to the international market, where prices of Afghan carpets are going through the roof.

But Abdul Wakeel of the International Chamber of Commerce insists they are doing their bit to provide rug traders with all possible inducements - notably the transportation facility. He grumbles the Finance Ministry is not cooperating with the Chamber in addressing businessmens concerns, primarily impediments created by the customs staff.

For his part, provincial customs collector Muhammad Shireen Aaqa avers exports and imports have been exempted from road tolls in compliance with a decree issued by President Hamid Karzai. The allegations leveled against the customs department are malicious and unfounded, he maintains.

During the Dr Najibullah government, Muhammad Qul recalls, weekly carpet shipments to Europe from Mazar-i-Sharif alone stood at 12,000 square metres. The level has nosedived, nevertheless, thanks to decades of strife and widespread corruption. This last year, the International Chamber of Commerce could export just 7,000 square metres of carpets to Germany.

Going by credible statistics, an average carpet, produced at the cost of 3,800 afghanis, sells for Rs4,500 in the domestic market and $90 across the border in Pakistan. Significantly, the Pakistani dealer pockets $60 apiece from its overseas transaction.

If reintegrated into the global market, Afghanistan can indubitably export its way out of poverty with handmade carpets of the highest quality. Made from natural fibers, the high-value carpets have vastly different designs, motifs, colours and sizes.

Additionally, entrepreneurs suggest, expatriate weavers and industrialists should be encouraged to return from Pakistan, which derives substantial export earnings from their expertise and investments.

For tapping into this big revenue-generating source, Afghanistan needs to expand traditional hand-knit carpet production from remote villages to city centres. Proper transportation to collect and deliver the products to market locations plus sustained availability of raw materials that could cut costs and boost production capacity are urgently needed to realise the full potential of the industry.

Afghanistans braided rugs with oval, round and oblong shapes and fitted carpets with medallion patterns and delicate broken borderlines are in great demand the world over. But regrettably enough, the lions share of incomes from the artistically-woven rugs and bags end up in pockets of outsiders.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]