In this bulletin:

• Karzai refers Spanta's unseating to top court
• Afghan ex-president seeks bigger role for ex-mujahedin
• Kasuri briefs EU ambassadors about Pak-Afghan relations
• Repatriations Spark Debate On Tehran's Aims
• Harper praises unsung heroes of Afghanistan
• Afghan interpreter killed in rocket attack at Cdn base at Ma'sum Ghar
• Calgary man arrested in Afghanistan spoke of jihad, not suicide bombing: imam
• Afghans open controversial interrogation facilities
• Alberta man held in Afghan terror probe
• Afghan envoy welcomes humanitarian aid
• Karzai Says Afghanistan Is 'Not a Narco State'
• U.S. charges suspected Taliban ally in heroin ring
• Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations
• Opium clouds before an Afghan storm
• Afghanistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
• Taliban-destroyed Buddhas may never be restored
• No apology from Taliban

Karzai refers Spanta's unseating to top court

KABUL, May 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): President Hamid Karzai, questioning the unseating of Foreign Minister Dr Rangin Dadfar Spanta by Parliament, has referred the issue to the Supreme Court for interpretation.

The Presidential Palace, in a press release issued Saturday evening, said the apex court would interpret if summoning of the foreign minister to Parliament over an issue not directly related to his job, was in line with the Constitution.

Secondly, the president wants the top court to clarify the constitutional position on twice summoning a minister to Parliament on the same question.

According to the press release, the president urged the court to decide on the invalid ballot in accordance with previous precedents.

Karzai will take action after the Supreme Court answers the queries raised by him. The foreign minister would meanwhile continue to hold his office pending a court verdict, the statement concluded.

Afghan ex-president seeks bigger role for ex-mujahedin

via EUX.TV / May 12, 2007 - Hamburg (dpa) - A former Afghan president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has called in an interview with a German magazine for the former mujahedin to be given a bigger share of power in Afghanistan.

The current government team in Kabul had been created "from abroad" and "has no basis in our own society," he told the magazine, Der Spiegel. Extracts were made public Saturday, two days in advance of Spiegel going on sale.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government already has some representation of mujahedin, a nationalist group who emerged from the 1980s war against Soviet control.

Rabbani, who is now a professor of theology, was president from 1992 till 1996 and again for a few months after the 2001 removal of the Taliban.

He said the nationalists, "who waged a successful war against the Soviet Union and against the Taliban," had been shoved aside.

Rabbani formed a new party in April, the Jabhey Mili or National Front. It includes some members of Karzai's current cabinet, including Vice-President Ahmad Zia Massoud.

Former mujahedin leaders and members of the former communist regime ended their differences to join the party and Rabbani has invited the Taliban into the group.

The ex-president told Der Spiegel he would abolish the presidential system and ensure that provincial governors were popularly elected.

Kasuri briefs EU ambassadors about Pak-Afghan relations

ISLAMABAD, May 11 (APP): European Union's Ambassadors based in Kabul and Islamabad from Germany, EU, Portugal and Holland collectively called on Foreign Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri here at the Foreign Office on Friday.

During the call, Foreign Minister Kasuri briefed the EU Ambassadors on the overall state of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and the positive outcome of the Ankara Summit Meeting.The Foreign Minister also highlighted the political, administrative and socio-economic uplift measures that were taken by the government in the Tribal Areas.The EU Ambassadors agreed with the Foreign Minister on the need for the two sides to refrain from making public statements blaming each other and avoiding megaphone diplomacy' since that would be counter-productive.The Foreign Minister dwelt at some length on the role of Pakistan to counter terrorism and extremism, and in building security in Afghanistan and the importance that Pakistan attaches to a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan.The EU Ambassadors thanked the Foreign Minister for providing them the opportunity to exchange views with him on Pakistan-Afghan relations and other subjects of mutual interest.They commended Pakistan's endeavours to counter terrorism and extremism and for the help it is extending to Afghanistan in the security and reconstruction fields.

Repatriations Spark Debate On Tehran's Aims

RFE/RL 05/10/2007 - Iran's forcible repatriation of tens of thousands of Afghan refugees has raised suspicions that Tehran is trying to destabilize Afghanistan, and prompted complaints from the Afghan Foreign Ministry.

Afghan politicians, media, and even some repatriated refugees say they think the mass evictions since mid-April are an attempt by Tehran to destabilize western Afghanistan.

With tension heightened between Washington and Tehran over Iran's controversial nuclear program, analysts say such fears are understandable.

The discovery of Iranian-made weapons that NATO says were bound for Taliban fighters has fueled further concern.

But while experts on South Asia interviewed by RFE/RL said they thought Tehran would like to prevent the U.S. military from building up a strategic airfield near Afghanistan' s western border with Iran, they expressed doubt the Iranian government was using mass repatriations and weapons smuggling to try to achieve that goal.

Since 2003, the U.S. military has been developing the strategic Shindand airfield near Iran, in the western Afghan province of Herat.

Ian Kemp, an independent defense analyst in London, said the presence of U.S. forces at Shindand is seen by Tehran as a threat because Shindand could serve as a launching point if the United States decided to attack Iran's nuclear facilities from the air.

"The Iranians have a significant military capability," Kemp said. "They are likely to offer far greater resistance [on the ground] than the Iraqi forces did. And with the U.S. and its allies being bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan at the moment, any form of conventional military action on the ground [against Iran] can be ruled out of the question. I think if the United States was to decide upon military action, a combination of missile strikes using sea and air-launched cruise missiles and air strikes would probably be the preferred option."

Making Things Difficult - Peter Lehr, an expert on South Asia at St. Andrews University in Scotland, said the Iranian government might be trying to complicate the situation for U.S. forces in western Afghanistan by sending thousands of Afghan refugees there.

"That's a kind of war by proxy," Lehr said. "If you take a look at other borders between Pakistan and India -- especially the Kashmir problem -- you see that Pakistan is busily exporting many of these former Afghani fighters into Kashmir so that it can raise some troubles there and keep the Indians busy. With the same logic, you can say that Iran is trying to get as much mileage out of the refugee crisis as they can get just to annoy the Americans. That's the way to fight back against the Americans. [Iran] can't come out with [naval war ships]. They can't come out with sophisticated [war planes]. What they can do is things like hostage taking, sending out some agents. What they can do is send a deluge of refugees across the border. That's possible."

Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid said he thinks the repatriation of thousands of Afghan refugees by Tehran could destabilize the Afghan government and cause problems for U.S. forces at Shindand.

"That's a possibility," Rashid said, "but I don't think [Iranian officials] need to do that, because they have long-running relations with many of the commanders and small-time warlords in western Afghanistan -- both Pashtun and non-Pashtun."

Still, regardless of whether Afghan refugees are being used as pawns in a geopolitical struggle, Rashid said he is convinced that Tehran wants to make life more difficult for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

"I have no doubt that Iran has been involved in channeling money and arms to various elements in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, for the last few years," Rashid said. "I think Iran is playing all sides in the Afghan conflict. There are Pashtuns and non-Pahstuns who are being funded by Iran who are active in western Afghanistan. If the Iranians are convinced that the Americans are undermining them through western Afghanistan, then it is very likely that these agents of theirs have been activated."

'Confrontation By Proxy' - British Defense Secretary Des Browne has suggested that Iran might be helping Taliban forces that are fighting NATO troops in Afghanistan.

Browne told the House of Commons Defense Committee in London on May 8 that Iran has "sought confrontation by proxy" with Britain and the United States, as well as other NATO members, in the Middle East. Without elaborating, Browne said there is "some indication" that Iran is doing the same in Afghanistan.

But Lehr said he is suspicious of claims that Iranian agents slipped into Afghanistan alongside the thousands of repatriated refugees in order to instigate recent violence near the Shindand airfield.

Lehr said he also doubts suggestions by U.S. and British officials that the Iranian government has been directly involved in supplying weapons to the Taliban.

"I see a connection to this nuclear issue," Lehr said. "The United States are desperately looking for a casus belli, in my opinion. Of course, it is tempting for [Iran] to instigate even more hatred against the Americans around this very air base. They are deniable effects; if some of these people get caught, well, they can always deny that they are working for the Iranian government. But if you take a look at the context -- at this nuclear issue -- and if you take a look at the fact that the Americans tried to link up a weapons shipment from Iranian territory into Afghanistan with the politics of the Iranian government, then it starts to get a bit smelly."

One of Lehr's areas of expertise is the organized criminal groups that smuggle illegal drugs from Afghanistan to Western markets. He says drug payments made by those groups are much more likely to be the reason that Iranian weapons are being found by NATO soldiers in western Afghanistan.

"If you take a look at the weapons smuggling, well that's been going on for decades," Lehr said. "That is part of this drug route where heroin is shipped from Afghanistan via Iran and other countries and Russia to Europe. The best way of paying for drugs is either, of course, with money -- or with weapons. And there is not even circumstantial evidence that the Iranian state, itself, is involved with that. That is organized-crime groups."

Afghan media and politicians speculate that one reason for Iran's expulsion of refugees probably is to show that it can indirectly pressure the United States by contributing to an economic crisis in Afghanistan.

They said another reason could be the internal economic difficulties now facing Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad' s administration. Sanctions against Iran have contributed to inflation and unemployment there. The expulsion of 1 million Afghan refugees could be seen by Tehran as a way to increase employment opportunities for Iranian citizens.

Harper praises unsung heroes of Afghanistan

CanWest News Service Friday, May 11, 2007

OTTAWA - Prime Minister Stephen Harper gave a boost to a rally in support of Canadian troops on Friday where he told the enthusiastic crowd that there hasn't been enough focus on the "heroes" fighting in Afghanistan.

"There are too many unsung heroes in Afghanistan. Not just Canadians but all of the NATO soldiers who are there, with the United Nations, helping the Afghan people reclaim and rebuild their war-ravaged country," Harper told the large crowd that was dressed in red and waving "Support our troops," signs.

Harper was attending a Red Friday Rally at the legion in Petawawa, Ont. The Red Friday campaign advocates wearing red every Friday to show support for Canadian soldiers and their families.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier and Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor were also at the event in the eastern Ontario town where CFB Petawawa is located. Harper said there is still a long road ahead despite the progress that has been made in Afghanistan.

"You also know that our work has not ended - we cannot just put down our weapons and hope for peace - that we can't set arbitrary deadlines and wish for the best and that we can't let anyone get away with tarnishing the reputation of the Canadian Forces as the most professional, dedicated, disciplined and effective soldiers on this planet," Harper said.

For weeks the opposition has been hammering at the government and calling for O'Connor's resignation because of the confusion over how Canada handles detainees in Afghanistan. The Tories have stood their ground and during sparring in question period have attempted to paint the opposition as unsupportive of the Canadian Forces, an accusation the Liberals fervently deny.

Harper said the debates over detainees have diverted the public's attention away from the positive stories, like the nine CFB Petawawa soldiers who were recently given military awards for their service in Afghanistan.

"They did not get the attention they deserve because their stories were eclipsed by arguments in the House of Commons over the allegations of Taliban prisoners," said the prime minister, donning a red rain jacket.

Harper praised Petawawa for its support of their troops and said he knows how tough it has been for the community to have them fighting in Afghanistan.

"I know that it hasn't been easy. This community has had more losses to mourn than any other base in this country," Harper said, "but you have stood firm in support of our troops because you are so proud of them and you should be."

Following the rally, participants were going to walk through the streets from the legion to the town hall as part of a "military appreciation march."

Afghan interpreter killed in rocket attack at Cdn base at Ma'sum Ghar

Sunday, May 13, 2007

OTTAWA (CP) - An Afghan interpreter working for the Canadian Forces has been killed in a rocket attack in southern Afghanistan. The attack happened this morning at the Canadian forward operating base at Ma'sum Ghar in the Panjwaii district.

Another local Afghan interpreter has been injured in the attack and has been taken to the military hospital in Kandahar. A forces spokesperson in Ottawa says only one rocket was fired and there were no Canadian casualties.

Calgary man arrested in Afghanistan spoke of jihad, not suicide bombing: imam

PAT HEWITT - The Canadian Press - An Alberta imam says he spoke several months ago with a Calgary man he believes is the Canadian detained in Afghanistan and says the man talked about "helping his brothers and sisters in Afghanistan" by fighting the jihad, but didn't mention a suicide bombing.

In a report from Kandahar, CTV Newsnet quoted a written statement from Afghan authorities that alleged the Canadian admitted to planning to carry out a suicide bombing in Kabul. The statement also allegedly claimed the man's brother was the suicide bomber behind a Sept. 30, 2006 attack near the security gate of the Interior Ministry in Kabul that killed 12 people and injured at least 42.

In Ottawa, Foreign Affairs spokesman Rejean Beaulieu said yesterday he could not confirm any Canadian had been involved in the 2006 bombing in Kabul and added he was "not aware of this."

Sheikh Alaa Elsayed said in Toronto yesterday he met with the man six months ago, but he wouldn't name him out of respect for the family and the fact authorities haven't identified him officially.

Elsayed, who is with the Muslim Council of Calgary, said the man's worried father had phoned him and asked for an immediate meeting last November.

"I received a basically frantic phone call regarding his son. And what happened is he said, 'I need your help with my son.'"

Elsayed said when he met with the son, the young man didn't mention anything specific and didn't show irrational behaviour but did mention the word "jihad," which he had read on the Internet.

"He did mention something that 'it's an obligation upon me to defend my brothers and sisters, which pretty much is putting me shoulder to shoulder ... maybe fighting back.' Nothing into the connotation or indication of anything to do with suicide bombing," Elsayed said.

The imam said the man didn't talk about any connections, anybody he had listened to specifically, with whom he was dealing or any network or organization to which he wanted to belong.

"There was a red flag, but it wasn't a red flag that was a 9-1-1 right away," said Elsayed.

Elsayed said at the end of the two-hour meeting, he asked the man if he was going to do what he wanted anyway, and the man nodded his head and was adamant about his obligation.

The imam said he gave the man an ultimatum and said he would go to the authorities if he didn't relent. “.. because we will not tolerate it, nor do we accept anything for one person to put 65,000 Muslims in Calgary in a tight spot or Canada at large," Elsayed said.

The man appeared to back down, but Elsayed said he may have been trying to buy himself time. The Canadian citizen, reportedly of Pakistani origin, was detained by Afghan police at a Kabul bus station on Tuesday and accused of attending a militant training camp in Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan.

"The last information I received that he did get caught going to Afghanistan but he did not commit anything or do anything. So obviously he is innocent until proven guilty," said Elsayed.

Elsayed also could not confirm the CTV report that the detained man's brother had been a suicide bomber. He said the man and the man's father didn't tell him anything about that.

Afghans open controversial interrogation facilities

via Ottawa Citizen - David Pugliese CanWest News Service May 12, 2007

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - From the outside, the two-storey building looks like any other dilapidated structure in this dust-covered city in southern Afghanistan.

But the facility, a prison and interrogation centre operated by Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, is at the centre of a political firestorm in Ottawa as the Harper government fights off allegations Canadian troops turned detainees over to torturers here.

In an unusual move the NDS, Afghanistan's version of a combined CIA and FBI, allowed CanWest News Service access to insurgent detainees as well as to tour its interrogation facilities. It is the first time journalists have been allowed into the installation.

NDS officers readily admit they opened the doors of their prison to counter allegations in Canada that Afghans in custody of the intelligence agency are routinely abused.

Some Afghans, now in another prison in Kandahar after being linked to the Taliban, say they were tortured at this NDS facility. According to them, they were beaten or hung upside down from metal hooks in the ceiling of one of the cells. Other prisoners have talked about being confined in small cages in the basement.

Human rights groups have also raised concerns about the NDS, whose predecessor was the dreaded KhAD, the secret police created by the Soviets to hunt down anti-Communist forces. KhAD officials earned a brutal reputation for themselves and torture was a common method of dealing with detainees.

The Afghan government says things have changed under the NDS, although some of its officials were members of KhAD.

NDS officers here maintain there is no cause for concern in Canada over the welfare of insurgents taken into custody.

"We don't do anything that is against the law," NDS deputy director Noor Mohammed Balak Karzai said through an interpreter. "We have been trained in our profession. We have much experience."

At the time of the CanWest News Service visit there were less than 20 prisoners being kept in the facility's basement. Some were captured by the NDS, others by NATO forces. All detainees kept in the prison are suspected anti-government insurgents. If the detainees are convicted of a crime they are transferred into another Kandahar prison.

The main holding cell for less dangerous detainees was a large room where eight men sat on mattresses or on the floor. They had food and drink and their feet were shackled.

Another eight prisoners were held in nearby cells behind locked doors. Each of those cells measured about a metre and a half wide by three metres long. Their legs were also chained and some had small mattresses on the ground. A few had the Koran nearby.

Some of the men were subdued, looking constantly down at the ground. Others had a vacant look on their faces. Some laughed as they talked with the guards. There were no visible signs of abuse on their hands, feet or faces. No one complained about poor treatment, but it would be difficult with the nearby presence of the NDS officers.

The cells were relatively clean by Afghan standards. There were no hooks on the walls or in the ceilings. There were no cages. There was fresh food, which appears to have been brought to the prisoners to coincide with the visit by journalists. The NDS officers say the detainees are given the same food as the guards and officers at the facility.

The detainees also have food brought to them by their families when they are allowed to visit once a week.

Col. Abdul Razzaq, another high-ranking NDS officer, maintains the Taliban is using the Canadian news media to discredit the Canadian Forces and the Afghan government with claims of detainee abuse.

"Our enemy uses different tactics," he explained. "They have used suicide bombers. Now the enemy takes the benefit of propaganda."

Razzaq said the NDS is more than open to regular visits by the Canadian military to check on the prisoners. After the detainee issue became high profile in Canada, a group of Canadian military officers made a quick trip to the prison to watch the interrogation process and examine the cells, he noted.

"They observed the situation and they apologized for the (media) broadcasts in Canada," added Col. Mohammed Yassin, another NDS officer on the tour.

Officials from Corrections Canada also visited the facility, according to the NDS officers. They asked that the leg chains be removed from the prisoners but were told that was not possible because of the concern the detainees would escape.

Upstairs, an interrogation was being conducted with an alleged insurgent suspected of being involved in a plan to kidnap a foreigner. His feet were shackled and he looked nervous. An intelligence officer asked him questions and wrote the answers down on a notepad.

The man, who did not give his name, had been in custody for a month and the NDS had applied to hold him longer. "My family knows where I am," explained the prisoner. "I've seen them twice here."

The detainee jokingly claimed the NDS officers were his "friends" and everyone in the room laughed. Razzaq claims it doesn't make sense for the intelligence agency to engage in torture since such actions would ultimately undercut support for the government. "If we ignore the rules of human rights and other international laws, the public will distance itself from the government," said Razzaq. "That would cause an unpeaceful situation."

But asked to further explain the interrogation process, the NDS officers were vague with their answers. They indicated they rely heavily on information already collected on detainees but didn't go into details about how that is obtained. "We use different techniques," explained Razzaq. "We usually take the benefit of the information we've had before. We talk to him. He just confesses."

There is a detailed process on keeping a detainee in custody. If a suspect is injured they are taken to the local hospital for treatment. The NDS officers said they cannot question a suspect until he recovers. Intelligence agents are allowed to hold a suspect for 72 hours, after which they apply to senior legal officials for an extension to keep the person in custody. If the courts convict the detainee they can either be sent to a prison in Kabul or Kandahar.

Some Afghan government officials in Kabul have privately expressed frustration with the reaction in Canada to the detainee issue. They point out the Taliban doesn't hesitate to use torture or kill prisoners outright. The NDS, they argue, are on the front-lines of a guerrilla war with insurgents and are under no illusion what fate awaits them if the Taliban captures them.

"If we are unlucky they would cut off our nose, cut out our eyes, cut off our feet," said Karzai. "If they killed us outright we would be happy."

The NDS officers are particularly angry Canadian troops have been tarnished by the recent allegations. And it is also clear the Karzai government is concerned the ongoing political battle in the House of Commons over the detainee issue could further sour the Canadian public's view of the war, as well as jeopardize foreign aid.

Canada is a major contributor to Afghanistan with both troops and development aid. Razzaq stressed Canadian troops have a reputation for acting properly in regards to handling of prisoners.

"During their operations they don't abuse people," he explained. "We appreciate such an attitude. Other coalition forces do not obey the rules, they don't follow the rules like the Canadians do."

According to the colonel, the Canadians have a good reputation in the Kandahar area and local residents will sometimes warn the NDS about hidden roadside bombs rigged to target the Canadians. That is something the locals don't do for U.S. soldiers. "If an IED is buried in the way of American forces, they don't say anything," said Razzaq. "The public doesn't have a good attitude or opinion toward them."

Alberta man held in Afghan terror probe

Suspect getting help from embassy in Kabul
National Post, with files from CanWest News Service - urday, May 12, 2007

An Alberta man arrested in Kabul and under investigation for possible ties to terrorism could face trial in Afghanistan depending on the outcome of the police probe, Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada said yesterday.

Sohail Qureshi, 24, who graduated with a degree in computer science from the University of Calgary last year, was taken into custody in the Afghan capital this week because of suspicions he had attended militant training camps in Pakistan.

In Halifax, Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay said the man was getting help from the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. "At this point in time, for privacy reasons, we're not at liberty to say a lot about this case, but it is somewhat unusual."

A Canadian citizen of Pakistani heritage, Mr. Qureshi left the country three months ago and did not return as planned in April. Omar Samad, Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada, cautioned that his government was still trying to confirm the identity of the man.

"It seems that he may have left Canada prior to going to Pakistan and is of South Asian origin, who may have immigrated from another country to Canada," the ambassador said.

Throughout the 1990s, thousands of foreigners made their way to Afghanistan to train at the network of paramilitary and terrorist camps run by Osama bin Laden and affiliated anti-western terrorists.

Since the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, the camps have shifted across the border to the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan and to Kashmir. Several Canadians are believed to have trained there in recent years.

Mr. Samad said the investigation was still in the early stages, but that if police forward the case to the attorney general for prosecution, the man will be given a defence lawyer. Afghanistan has already assured the Canadian Embassy in Kabul it will have full consular rights to visit the man, he said.

Afghan envoy welcomes humanitarian aid

OTTAWA, May 12 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Afghan Ambassador Omar Samad has welcomed more than $1.5 million medicines and supplies donated to his country by Health Partners International of Canada (HPIC).

The ambassador participated in a ceremony held in Mississauga, Ontario, where the medical supplies shipment to Afghanistan was announced .Samad thanked donors and financial supporters of the shipment.

According to a press release issued from the embassy, Samad said: Your generosity will touch the lives of thousands of Afghans who are, in most cases, deprived of quality medical supplies including medicines.

He lauded 13 Canadian health-care companies and the Bridgeway Foundation for donating the medicines and providing financial support to deliver the shipment to CURE International Hospital in Kabul.

]he shipment includes anti-infectives, vitamins, diabetes treatment and anti-virals. At a press conference, HPIC President John Kelsall highlighted the significance of the program for Afghans.

Mrs. Carol Peterson, representing the Bridgeway Foundation, explained the humanitarian motivation for participation in the Afghan medical project.
The Embassy has been working with HPIC, a non-governmental organization, since 2004 to provide health-care assistance to Afghanistan. In 2004, HPIC shipped more than $2 million worth of medicines to the country.

In February, HPIC announced a multi-million dollar diversified programme to help the public health sector in Afghanistan.

Karzai  Says Afghanistan Is 'Not a Narco State'

PRESS RELEASE -  Washington, D.C., May 11, 2007 - Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai in an exclusive television interview told the Voice of America (VOA) that Afghanistan is "not a narco-state."

"It is not a narco-state, but it does produce a lot of poppies. There is a difference between being a mafia-dominated, state-run economy - that you can call a narco-state," said Karzai. "A state that fights narcotics, a state that suffers the consequences of that fight, a state that has gone through 30 years of extreme desperation and displacement of its population, will have problems."

Karzai said that better security has led to better government institutions and better performance of the civil services and the police, and that better trade, education, and reconstruction have helped to decrease the reliance on growing poppies.

In the wide ranging interview, President Karzai talked about a number of important topics including his recent trip to Turkey and the security situation in Herat.

VOA TV's in-depth profile covering their day-long visit at the Palace with President Karzai will air on May 19. The profile will discuss his plan for drug eradication; how he is dealing with civilian deaths in Afghanistan; his perspective of being a Muslim; his excellent working relationship with Washington; how he began his career in politics; his love of poetry, especially Tennyson; and what it means to be a father for the first time.

VOA's Afghan Service broadcasts TV Ashna in Dari and Pashto to Afghanistan where it is heard from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily on National Afghan TV and by satellite on Asiasat Channel 24 and on IOR for Europe on Channel 409. The Service's Radio Ashna also broadcasts 12 hours of Dari and Pashto programming daily on radio.

U.S. charges suspected Taliban ally in heroin ring

May 11, 2007 - NEW YORK (Reuters) - An Afghan man and suspected Taliban ally appeared in U.S. federal court in Manhattan on Friday to face charges of trafficking $25 million worth of heroin, prosecutors said.

Mohammad Essa was first arrested in Afghanistan in December 2006 and extradited in April, when he pleaded not guilty. The U.S. Attorney's Office and Drug Enforcement Administration announced his detention on Friday after he appeared at a pre-trial hearing.

"He maintains his innocence to the charges," Essa's lawyer Michael Hueston said after the hearing.

Prosecutors allege Essa was a partner in heroin trafficking organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan headed by Baz Mohammad, who was extradited to the United States in 2005.

Mohammad pleaded guilty in July 2006 of conspiring to import $25 million worth of heroin and could face a prison term of 15 to 20 years.

The organization provided financial support to Afghanistan's former Taliban rulers in exchange for their protection of opium crops, heroin laboratories and drug trafficking routes, Essa's indictment said.

Between 1990 and 2005, the organization transported hundreds of kilograms of heroin out of Afghanistan and Pakistan and controlled opium fields in Afghanistan, using laboratories to process the opium to heroin, the indictment said.

Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations

By Hayder Mili, Jacob Townsend - Global Terrorism Analysis (USA)
Volume 5, Issue 9 (May 10, 2007)

the opium economy in Afghanistan is a key component of the counter-insurgency campaign, yet remains one of the most difficult issues to tackle. It is a critical problem facing international efforts to create a functional government in Kabul that can prosecute counter-terrorism on its own territory. A successful counter-narcotics intervention would have the added benefit of undermining an important terrorist funding source in arenas as diverse as Chechnya, Xinjiang and Central Asia. While coalition and Afghan officials regularly acknowledge the power that the narco-economy has over their ambitions, it has proven exceptionally challenging to turn this into a national strategy that incorporates counter-narcotics into counter-insurgency and provides the resources for its execution.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), opium production had a boom year in 2006, rising to 6,100 metric tons. This marked a 49% increase over 2005, yielding an estimated $755 million to farmers on the basis of a slightly decreased farm-gate price of $125 per kilogram of dry opium. With the national government’s revenues at less than $350 million for 2006, the opium economy is a formidable financial power base beyond the state’s control. Good weather conditions are expected in 2007, suggesting another huge harvest.

Any national counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan must begin with a preface noting the geographical variations of the country. In 2006, the southern province of Helmand accounted for 46% of Afghanistan’s opium production. To the east of Helmand, Kandahar produced eight percent. In other words, the majority of Afghanistan’s opium economy is built on production in two southern provinces. Of the remainder, 25% is produced in the northern belt close to the borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with lighter concentrations in the eastern and western provinces. Based on the UNODC’s observations of recent opium planting, southern pre-eminence is likely to intensify further in 2007 [1]. The distribution of production correlates strongly with areas of ongoing insurgency/terrorism and coalition fatalities. Using NATO’s divisions of Afghanistan, Regional Command South, which includes Helmand and Kandahar provinces, is where 62% of the country’s opium is produced and where the coalition has suffered close to two-thirds of its combat deaths [2]. Basically, people are dying where poppies are thriving.

The difference between the relatively calm north and west and the militarized south and east should be reflected in approaches to counter-narcotics. Opium is undoubtedly a governance problem across the country. In the south and east, however, it is also strongly related to the Kabul government’s most immediate existential threat—the Taliban-led insurgency—as well as to the funding of 139 suicide attacks in 2006 [3].

Farmers and Fighters -Out of Afghanistan’s total opium production, 21% is trafficked northward through Central Asia. Around 31% travels directly to Iran, which has suffered considerable human and financial costs in responding to both the direct drug traffic and the substantial opiate shipments arriving via Pakistan. The remaining majority of opiates leave Afghanistan across its 2,430 kilometer border with Pakistan. Harsh terrain, corruption and insecurity make it difficult or impossible to interdict opiate flows in most places.

In practice, it is challenging to differentiate between criminality, farmers’ economic needs, insurgency fundraising and state complicity. Separating these factors conceptually, however, helps to formulate effective counter-insurgency tactics, highlighting the interactions between the drug trade and the Taliban. According to officials from the United Nations who interviewed Afghan law enforcement and coalition agencies in 2007, a symbiosis between the opiate trade and the Taliban continues, to the extent that some Taliban units simultaneously organize drug production and insurgent activities. In some regions, there has been a methodical process of fighting for territory while establishing relationships with opium cultivators that vary from symbiotic to despotic. Insecurity reinforces these relationships and this in turn makes the territory easier to penetrate by insurgents.

The feedback loops are evident in southern labor markets. A survey by the Senlis Council, a drug policy advisory forum, suggested that $200-600 per month was offered to work for the Taliban [4]. Law enforcement officials corroborated this in their report stating that the Taliban successfully recruits young locals to fight for $20 a day. These are not hardcore, dedicated and ideological fighters—they are unemployed men, some of whom are accustomed to a mercenary life. Although generally inferior to coalition troops and seemingly deployed in many circumstances as cannon fodder, they can be effective in ambushes and arranging Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Taliban commanders have also used these “tier two” fighters to assist opium harvesting. Harvest time raises the stakes for insurgents in terms of maintaining territorial control. Traditional migrations for seasonal employment supply itinerant laborers who can be employed simultaneously as harvesters and protectors of opium. The Taliban can then take credit for providing local security and ensuring control of opium production.

With the government and coalition unwelcome and subject to active (ambush) and passive (IED) attacks, areas of intense opium cultivation are the most difficult in which to demonstrate any reconstruction and development benefits. Alternative employment for mercenaries and alternative livelihoods for farmer-fighters cannot be delivered and those who might be attracted to such alternatives fear Taliban retribution. For example, the Pajhwok News Agency reported on October 30, 2005 that farmers in the Khan Nishin District in Helmand province were being forced by the Taliban to cultivate poppies under threat of death.

Addicted to Poppy-Dollars - Law enforcement officers and UNODC officials interviewed by the authors in April 2007 believe that the “Taliban are completely dependent on the narco-economy for their financing.” Where the Taliban are able to enforce it—mostly in the south and some eastern districts—they are said to levy a 40% tax on opium cultivation and trafficking. A low estimate of the amount that the Taliban earn from the opium economy is $10 million, but considering the tradition of imposing tithes on cultivation and activities further up the value chain, the total is likely to be at least $20 million [5]. There are also regular reports of cooperation between political insurgents and profit-driven criminal groups. One example is their collusion to throw small farmers off their land or to indenture them under debts and threats in order to maintain opium production. More detailed information provided to the authors describes arrangements whereby drug traffickers provide money, vehicles and subsistence to Taliban units in return for protection [6].

The synergy between politically-motivated warfare and economic logic is starkly visible and should drive the integration of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategies. Of course, not all violence is linked to transnational jihadis. Across Afghanistan, profit-driven criminality is more pervasive than sympathy for or cooperation with insurgents, even if both benefit from and contribute to general lawlessness. When it comes to the Taliban, however, the centrality of the opium economy in their funding model is both a strength and a weakness. Reducing their financial power would undermine an important component of their recruitment model. It suggests a potential for turning the vicious circle of insecurity and economic stagnation into a virtuous one of coalition military superiority and job creation.

Dimensions of Counter-Narcotics - The failure to reduce opium cultivation in the early post-invasion years has directly augmented the Taliban’s military strength. They have harvested the opium into weapons. The opiate trade and terrorism activity currently overlap to such an extent that some law enforcement actions fall under counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism simultaneously. So far, despite the millions spent and the various schemes that the coalition has attempted, opium production has increased, maintaining its importance as a source of terrorist funding domestically and internationally. As one Afghan diplomat lamented, “it makes no sense why the donors are blind to what they can see” [7]. An integrated approach to counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics is required, taking account of the problem’s three major dimensions.

First, proselytizing insurgent groups are treading a fine theological line in financing themselves through drug trafficking. Some drug barons linked with al-Qaeda, such as Badruddoza Chowdhury Momen, have argued that “it is a noble…responsibility to spoil Western society with drugs” (Asian Tribune, May 19, 2006). This line of thought has a long tradition: in 1981, heroin trafficker and mujahideen leader Nasim Akhunzada published a fatwa stating that “poppy has to be cultivated to finance holy war against Soviet troops and their puppets in Kabul” (Eastern Review, January 1989). The difficulty is that most Muslim communities are intolerant of drug use, and to claim that flooding the West with narcotics is a form of jihad glosses over the millions of Muslims addicted to heroin and the associated HIV/AIDS infections. Furthermore, despite the apparently clear religious prohibition on the consumption of intoxicants, the issue appears divisive in the insurgency—as in Chechnya, Algeria and Somalia—because some Taliban are drug users themselves (Dawn, March 21, 2006).

These contradictions should be exploited in approaches to counter-narcotics operations. Ironically, it was the Taliban who in 2001 produced a successful opium clampdown, justified by religion. The same leaders are now protecting poppy growers from eradication. More than a third of the farmers surveyed by the UNODC who had never planted poppies responded that religion guided their decision. Fear of eradication was a negligible concern [8]. Insurgent justifications depend on potential supporters agreeing that the ends of jihad justify the inherently sinful means. Taliban spokesman Mohammad Hanif summarized the difficult argument for his organization last year when he opposed the cultivation of opium, but was “happy with any means of combating Western societies,” including the production of heroin (RFE/RL, May 11, 2006).

Opium eradication is a promising counter-terrorism strategy if it can be executed without damaging the livelihood of the average opium farmer. For every leaflet and exhortation from the insurgents justifying opium, the Afghan government should be there to highlight the Taliban’s hypocrisy and advertise the damage done to other Muslims.

Second, development programs that offset farmers’ loss of income also need to provide some benefit to the pool of unemployed workers from which the Taliban recruit. Intervening in the opium economy means re-arranging a number of markets, including those for labor. At least, the under- or unemployed should not be left worse off, although, of course, the better outcome is a self-sustaining development trajectory.

Compensation to farmers is probably necessary. Options for delivering compensation are complicated by the tendency of some farmers to receive loans from traders and insurgents in anticipation of opium delivery, creating a debt burden that requires alleviation. A plan to pay at the end of the planting season is likely to be resisted more strongly. However, payment at the start of the season raises the risks of cheating and also the costs of monitoring since some crops may need to be checked twice. The United Kingdom’s payments for not planting in 2002 and 2003 were unsuccessful as farmers (and politicians) pocketed funds and still produced opium. UN officials report that micro-credit programs have often been considered as an alternative to direct subsidies. Essentially, donors would take over the position that money-lenders currently occupy, with lower interest rates and a prohibition on using funds for opium cultivation.

Whatever the offsetting option chosen, the amount pumped into rural economies would need to equal that generated by opium production minus the value of producing licit crops and adhering to socio-religious rules. An eradication program supported by compensation and religious justification would trap the legitimacy of insurgents in a pincer maneuver. President Karzai’s 2004 suggestion for a “jihad on drugs” showed the right intent, but the argument needs to be heard at the micro-level through anti-drug proselytizing by local religious leaders (AFP, March 7, 2004). With the precedent of the Taliban’s 2001 ban on opium cultivation and a strong effort by the Afghan government—with the help of foreign funds—to buffer the loss of income, incitements to rebellion will be weakened.

Finally, the geographical concentration of the insurgency indicates that counter-narcotics tactics need to vary with location. For example, eradication is difficult and possibly counter-productive in Helmand and Kandahar. Less than 10% of Helmand’s poppy cultivation was eradicated in 2006, a figure subject to question in light of frequent reports that bribes are successful in avoiding eradication, particularly where government control is weak. Where security is already poor, teams of eradicators are likely to increase support for local insurgents, who by responding violently can demonstrate that they are protecting communities’ interests. During counter-insurgency campaigns, policies of attraction are at least as important as those of attrition. This holds true for an integrated counter-narcotics component. In the north and west, there are relatively good prospects for reducing and holding down opium production through a comprehensive approach. Where Kabul and the coalition can exert a degree of effective governance, they can gain trust and promote credible programs. An additional angle that could be considered is a safe biological agent to eradicate and suppress poppy cultivation.

As of November 2006, Afghanistan’s Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund had approved only two projects across the south [9]. Where territorial control is hotly disputed or in the hands of the Taliban, the best counter-narcotics policy is benign neglect toward cultivators and attempting to interdict traffickers. Priority districts for implementing comprehensive programs should be those that have a relatively strong coalition/government presence and adjoin to insecure or Taliban-controlled opium-producing areas. Where successful, these demonstrate to others nearby the intent and benefit of government efforts. Perhaps the best way to spread this news is to take participants from one district into adjacent non-compliant or less secure districts to share their experience.

A three-year commitment that integrates secured eradication and economic offsets is a promising alternative to the medium-term uncertainty of facing off against insurgents without attacking their local sources of funding. The current consensus that a decades-long project is required to turn farmers away from opium needs to be challenged by a strategy that views continuing production as a paramount security problem. The economic implications of opium eradication are huge for Afghanistan, but if the country can be secured then the development challenges of the national economy are no greater (or smaller) than those in other destitute states around the world. The difference is that Afghanistan will have removed the primary additional burden it faces: violent terrorist/insurgency activities funded by illicit narcotics.

1. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, Kabul: February 2007.
2. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, October 2006. For information on coalition combat deaths, see http://icasualties.org/oef.
3. Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, January 2007.
4. Senlis Afghanistan, Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies, London: MF Publishing, February 2007.
5. Unofficial comments by international staff working in the region, April 2007.
6. Unofficial comments by international staff working in the region, September 2006.
7. Author interview, March 2007.
8. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, October 2006.

Opium clouds before an Afghan storm

Asia Times 05/10/2007 - By Philip Smucker

LASHKAR GAH - Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Taliban have promised the world major military offensives in southern Afghanistan. The NATO-led alliance is sending thousands of soldiers into the fray to preempt the Taliban Ghazwatul Badr uprising that has been announced with a centurion call for thousands of fighters and suicide bombers to ready their ammunition belts.

Yet although Afghanistan is well into its balmy spring, the battlefield in southern Afghanistan has entered a twilight zone of cloak-and-dagger assassinations with only limited clashes.

The poppy harvest is only now ending, and growing doubts about Afghanistan's future have infested the parched valleys and high mountains passes. The Taliban have not gone on a blazing warpath, and that makes everyone a little more nervous.

In the latest political development, the upper chamber of the Afghan Parliament (Meshrano Jirga, or House of Elders) voted this week to begin dialogue with Taliban fighters to persuade them to accept the Afghan government.

A draft law says a distinction should be made among Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. It also seeks an end to military operations by foreign forces unless they come under attack or have first consulted the Afghan National Army.

The bill still has to be passed by the Wolesi Jirga (People's Assembly), the lower house of Parliament, and signed by President Hamid Karzai before becoming law. Similar approaches to the Taliban have failed in the past. The move follows a law providing an amnesty from war crimes committed over nearly three decades of civil war.

Meanwhile, as the time-bomb ticks toward more fighting, the rag-tag Afghan insurgency is fast morphing into a 21st-century guerrilla movement.

Born out of the ashes of civil war and the US Central Intelligence Agency's unrefined efforts to stimulate a jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the Taliban are significantly changed from their days in power across Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001.

More than anything, the once-xenophobic, home-grown movement is now a part of a global jihad. Operatives inside and outside the country mix and match battlefield tactics and information strategy to fit the moment.

Announcing the Taliban's "full contacts" with the larger struggle in Iraq last year, one of the Taliban's senior field commanders, Mullah Dadullah, stated, "We are united against the infidel - we are in the same trench." Dadullah later announced that he had sent some of his own foot soldiers to fight in Iraq.

Leading analysts of global terrorism believe that the Afghan "exchanges" are value-added capabilities in the realm of both "hearts and minds" and fighting skills.

The transformation of the Taliban provides a study in how a local insurgency has re-emerged as a force for al-Qaeda's global interests. Western diplomats and Afghan experts monitoring the Taliban contend that it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between the international and the local aspects of the insurgency.

"The Taliban [movement] is now a part of an internationalized jihad," said Waheed Mujda, an Afghan writer who served as a deputy minister in the Taliban's government between 1997 and 2001 and later wrote a tell-all book about the movement.

"The largest contributing factor to this internationalization has been the US attack on Iraq and a growing sense that Muslims across the Islamic world are fighting the same aggressor, the US and its allies. The Taliban's war has now moved outside the boundaries of Afghanistan and is part of a global struggle."

Videos from training camps inside Afghanistan and also in Pakistan suggest that al-Qaeda's trusted Arabs have resumed their venerated roles as military trainers for the Taliban. But apart from numerous cameo appearances in joint al-Qaeda-Taliban training videos, these senior al-Qaeda figures remain almost invisible on the battlefield, according to Afghan security and intelligence officials.

Afghan and other Islamic militants travel clandestinely among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq and also "wave" to one another over the Internet. In one recent video, Abu Laith al-Libbi, a senior Libyan trainer for the Taliban in Afghanistan, sends a message of encouragement to Iraqi insurgents from a training base in Kunar province. His work in Afghanistan and his close affiliation with al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq suggest strong cross-pollination between anti-American insurgencies in the two countries.

Taliban tactics, which as late as last spring involved wild frontal attacks with hundreds of fighters on US and allied positions, have further morphed to fit al-Qaeda's vision of a successful jihad: spelling a notable and new preference for suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices, and assassinations of key figures, with a stress on "NATO collaborators".

The Taliban's re-emergence as a formidable foe in the sphere of public opinion and on the battlefield in Afghanistan has paralleled al-Qaeda's own equally stunning revival in Pakistan. The symbiosis has been years in the making. A nascent al-Qaeda capitalized on the Taliban's own success in the late 1990s when the religious zealots seized control of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden's organization used the Taliban's own power base to launch his vision of a global jihad, which included dozens of training camps that served jihadis from around the world.

The Taliban have made some unexpected strides on the public relations front. Analysts put this down to the militant religious movement's ability to capitalize on the failures of the Karzai regime.

"The Taliban's comeback is one of the greatest examples I can think of [of] a ruling regime snatching defeat from the jaws of victory," said Saad Mohseni, an Australian-Afghan journalist and the owner of Afghanistan's largest private media conglomerate. "The Taliban [are] engaged in more of a rescue mission than anything else. They are admired for providing security."

But other analysts believe the Taliban should be given far more credit for their own real successes in the sphere of Afghan public opinion. A movement that once mangled its own media operations is now regularly featured in the independent Afghan media for its press statements and military gains - so much so that officials from the government of US-backed Karzai now threaten to muzzle the free press in their own country for being - in part - too sympathetic toward "the enemy".

The Taliban's military chief and local media star, Dadullah, who personally oversees the same kinds of showmanship beheadings of foreigners and locals made infamous by al-Qaeda in Iraq's dead leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, puts on a tough, defiant face that is admired by some and despised by others.

Taliban leaders frame their actions and arguments against what they say is a far more brutal US-led "global war on terror". The Taliban, mimicking al-Qaeda's own websites and video-production wing, Al-Sahab, now produce daily news pieces covering events in Afghanistan and the Muslim world and slick videotapes that depict the lives of young militants in religious schools and in al-Qaeda-led training camps inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan.

Despite the Taliban's growing "globalization", the Afghan-centric nature of the fight in the trenches remains very much the same. Afghan security officials working in the Taliban's operational heartland say they rarely catch foreign militants dead or alive in the insurgency's ranks. That is because the actual foot soldiers fighting in Afghanistan are almost all still Afghans or Pakistani Pashtuns (ethnic brethren divided by the British Raj-imposed Durand Line).

Even suicide bombers, once a rarity and carefully selected from outside the region, are increasingly originating in South Asia, say senior Afghan intelligence officials.

NATO planners, particularly the British in Helmand, are aware of the Taliban's machinations. Dealing with them is another trick entirely. Helmand province is now a nexus for both Taliban and NATO operations. A drive past poppy fields on freshly paved roads is a race to dodge NATO-Taliban firefights as well as avoid kidnappings that have left journalists and drivers beheaded in recent weeks.

Unarmed Taliban fighters can be seen in the fields assisting villagers as they scrape oozing opium paste from the buds of poppy flowers. The estimated US$3 billion opium and heroin trade is heavily taxed, say residents. Government eradicators, who appear to have surrendered to the inevitability of this year's predicted bumper crop, demanded stiff fees for not destroying the crop several weeks ago. In addition, Afghan landowners with poppy fields just outside the ancient city of Lashkar Gah say they are paying a zakat, or religious tax, to Taliban insurgents, which is used to support the movement and buy arms.

So in addition to massive support from al-Qaeda's strengthened base across the border in Pakistan, including financial ties inside leading Sunni states bordering the Persian Gulf, al-Qaeda is financially sound on the ground in Afghanistan.

Cracking the nexus of drugs and terror amounts to fighting two wars at once. "The Taliban's Tier 2 members, mostly farmers and villagers, [are] usually doing it for the money," said Lieutenant-Colonel Charlie Mayo, the NATO spokesman in Helmand province. "We don't really want to fight Tier 2 - if we don't have to. If we are able to push the Tier 1 out, we can provide breathing space for economic development without Taliban intimidation."

But distinguishing the hardened ideologues from mere poppy farmers with Kalashnikovs is easier said than done. Helmand's provincial police chief, Nabi Jan Mulla Kheal, said he now favors the US government's own efforts to persuade NATO allies to allow Taliban-controlled poppy fields to be eradicated by chemicals sprayed from the air. But other Afghan officials as well as locals in the capital, Lashkar Gah, say aerial spraying would only drive more poor Afghans into the waiting arms of the Taliban.

Philip Smucker is a commentator and journalist based in South Asia and the Middle East. He is the author of Al-Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail (2004).

Afghanistan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

US News - By Kevin Whitelaw Posted 5/10/07

With all the bad news coming out of Iraq, the U.S. effort in Afghanistan is not looking all that bad these days. For one thing, the U.S. troop presence there is surprisingly popular. More than 80 percent of Afghans want American troops to stay in their country, according to recent State Department polls. The economy is surprisingly healthy and reconstruction projects are moving ahead in parts of the country. The situation obviously is far from rosy: The Afghan government remains alarmingly weak, the Taliban is gaining ground, and suicide bombings have risen sharply.

In an effort to build momentum in Afghanistan, the Bush administration has dispatched some additional American soldiers and is proposing a major boost in aid (although the request has been stalled with the fight over Iraq war funding). The extra help will be very welcome. When the White House was preparing its request for supplemental war funding last fall, it asked the State Department to calculate how much the United States has spent training and equipping the Afghan police and military and on reconstruction aid. Foggy Bottom reported that nearly $13 billion had been spent over five years. President Bush and his aides wondered if the State Department had miscalculatedbecause they thought the number would be significantly higher. The White House asked State to double-check its calculations, but the number was correct (today, the figure has grown to over $15 billion). The episode helped persuade Bush to ask for nearly $12 billion in additional reconstruction and security aid for the next 18 months.

A look at what's going right, and what's not, these days:

The Good - Afghanistan's economy might have started from a very low point, but it has been, by some measures, the fastest growing economy in South Asia, averaging a growth rate of nearly 14 percent since 2002. Inflation has remained relatively low and foreign companies are beginning to return. In the health sector, a recent household survey by Johns Hopkins University found that infant mortality is declining—some 40,000 fewer infants are dying each year than during Taliban rule. Nearly a third of pregnant women now receive some form of medical care, up from 5 percent before 2001.

Reconstruction is uneven, but projects do not have the same degree of security constraints as do their counterparts in Iraq. On many projects in Iraq, as much as 80 cents of each dollar spent on reconstruction goes toward overhead and security. In Afghanistan's most dangerous province, that figure is 28 cents. Elsewhere in the country, reconstruction aid dollars can go even further. U.S. officials are also encouraged by the high level of support for the U.S. presence, which has remained steady for several years. "It reflects the view that they're fine as long as the Americans are here," says one U.S. official. "But they do not feel the Americans will be here long enough to correct all the problems."

The Bad - U.S. military operations in Afghanistan continue to draw protests amid accusations of their causing civilian casualties. In the latest incident on Wednesday, Afghan officials claimed that U.S. airstrikes targeting Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan killed at least 21 civilians. U.S. officials could not confirm the account, but the uproar comes one day after the U.S. apologized for a previous incident and paid compensation to the families of 19 people who were killed by U.S. fire after a suicide bombing in March. The upper house of Afghan's parliament passed a bill Tuesday calling on the U.S. military and NATO to coordinate all offensive actions with the Afghan government.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government also remains very weak, and he still cannot exert much control in vast stretches of Afghanistan. "The penetration of the Afghan government throughout the country has been slow," says one U.S. official. In many areas, Taliban elements have moved in to fill the gaps. Opium cultivation has reached record levels and Afghanistan now accounts for more than 90 percent of the world's supply. U.S. officials have been focusing their counterdrug operations on a few provinces, leaving some of the biggest production areas for later.

The Ugly - The Taliban is in the midst of perhaps its strongest spring offensive since U.S. forces ousted the regime in late 2001. A recent United Nations report described an "insurgency emboldened by their strategic successes, rather than disheartened by their tactical failures." Even worse, the report found that the Taliban's leadership structures "remained intact."Insurgent violence in January was more than double the levels of a year ago. Suicide bombings rose throughout 2006 as well. Coalition deaths are also running higher-51 soldiers in the first four months of this year versus 36 in the same 2006 period.

Chaos in the tribal areas of Pakistan is only fueling the Taliban's resurgence. Overhead imagery from several months ago of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan illustrates how severe the problem is. U.S. spy cameras picked up images of a long column of more than 100 people being led across the border into Afghanistan. The men, clad in rags and wearing plastic bags on their feet instead of shoes, were being led by a small group of crack Taliban fighters. In an effort to avoid detection, the double-file column of men was stretched out over nearly a mile. U.S. officials believe these were a new batch of recruits for the Taliban. "It was clear that this was the fodder for the suicide bombs," says one U.S. official.

Taliban-destroyed Buddhas may never be restored

May 11, 2007 By Peter Bergen

BAMIYAN, Afghanistan (CNN) -- At the foot of cliffs in central Afghanistan, about 5,000 fragments of what were once among the world's great artistic and religious treasures, the Buddhas of Bamiyan, sit in rudimentary shelters.

Their destruction by the Taliban in March 2001 was an act of cultural vandalism on a spectacular scale. The two tallest standing Buddhas in the world -- which had stood as silent sentinels over the snow-capped valley of Bamiyan for more than 1,500 years -- were reduced to mere rubble.

Wire mesh now covers the cliffs to prevent them from deteriorating further, while archaeologists and restoration experts have cataloged the fragments that remain of the giant statues.

The recovered pieces -- many the size of large boulders, others as tiny as pebbles -- are stored in the shelters while the archeological team decides whether to proceed with restoring the statues.

And that's just it: More than three years after UNESCO, the United Nations' main cultural agency, declared Bamiyan to be a World Heritage site, no one knows if the statues can ever be saved.

"No decision has yet been made about whether the Buddhas can be restored," said Abdul Abbasy, who heads Afghanistan's ministry responsible for the country's monuments and cultural heritage.

Carved out of sandstone cliffs, the larger male Buddha once towered 170 feet above the valley, as high as a 15-story building, while the smaller female Buddha stood around 10 stories tall.

The statues had survived the ravages of Mongolian conqueror and warrior Genghis Khan, centuries of wars and the natural wear and tear of the elements. But in 2001, despite protests from around the world, including from Muslim nations, the Taliban used explosives and tank fire to destroy Afghanistan's most famous tourist attraction.

The Taliban ordered their destruction as part of its campaign to destroy pre-Islamic artifacts considered an assault on Islam.

Today, some see the influence of al Qaeda behind the destruction of the Buddhas, which came in the months before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Al Qaeda had brought its extremist Wahabbist version of Islam to Afghanistan while the Taliban were in power, critics say.

The governor of Bamiyan, Dr. Habiba Sarabi, the only female governor in the country, told CNN, "It was al Qaeda or some other foreign power."

No apology from Taliban

A sense of the enormity of restoring the Bamiyan Buddhas can be gained by visiting Kabul Museum, in the Afghan capital, which once housed one of the world's greatest collections of Buddhist art.

In the weeks before the Taliban destroyed the giant Buddhas, they also entered the Kabul Museum wielding sledgehammers. They smashed 2,500 priceless artifacts stored there.

"It was a sad action," said museum director Omar Khan Masoudi, who has worked at the museum for almost three decades.

Asked if the Taliban had ever apologized for their actions, he smiled slightly and said, "No."

In 2003, with the support of the governments of France, Britain, Italy and Japan, work was begun not only restoring the destroyed artifacts, but also rebuilding the museum, which had been destroyed in Afghanistan's civil war during the mid-1990s.

Where once the roof was open to the sky, the museum is now almost completely rebuilt.

In the museum restoration room, technicians wearing white overalls working from old photos have been painstakingly restoring around 300 of the destroyed artifacts in the past five years. At that rate, it will take another four decades to restore the rest.

The slow progress at the Kabul Museum suggests that the restoration of the giant Buddhas will take many, many years -- if it is even possible.

Back at the cliffs overlooking Bamiyan, a gaping hole remains where the Buddhas once stood. Like so much in Afghanistan, a country destroyed by decades of war, restoring the country's cultural heritage is a task that will likely take decades .

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]