In this bulletin:

• Official: Afghan teacher beheaded for allegedly spying for US in Pakistan border area
• Taliban launch violent purge
• Beckett in Afghan president talks
• Afghanistan and UK Launch their Joint Action Plan
• Spy chief pushes for action in Pakistan
• Pakistan's Musharraf on Thin Ice
• Prodi Defends Italy’s Involvement in Afghanistan
• Canada urged to stop complaints about Afghan burden
• Afghanistan: The Taliban's Attention-Seeking Attack
• Former Afghan interior minister says government must win hearts and minds
• Talks with Taleban still the best prospect
• Allies return their focus to Afghanistan again
• Ruined poppy farmers join ranks with the Taleban
• Protecting Afghanistan's vital power source

Official: Afghan teacher beheaded for allegedly spying for US in Pakistan border area

The Associated Press - Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan: Suspected Islamic militants captured and beheaded a schoolteacher in Pakistan's wild Afghan border area for allegedly spying for the United States, an official said Wednesday.

The man's body was found early Tuesday in a large sack dumped by a road near Jandola, a town in the South Waziristan tribal district, the local security official said. He asked not to be identified due to the sensitive nature of his job.

The area is a stronghold for pro-Taliban militants suspected of harboring al-Qaida remnants in remote tribal regions along a porous, poorly-defined section of border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Scores of people have been killed in the border zone in recent years due to suspicions that they collaborated with Pakistani authorities or spied for Washington. Pakistan's government is a key ally in the U.S.-led international campaign against terrorism.

A note found with the beheaded man's body identified him as "Akhtar Usman, the one who spied for America," the official said. He said the forehead of the man's severed head was inscribed with the word for "hypocrite" in Urdu, Pakistan's main language.

Usman, in his 30s, was a teacher at an Islamic school in nearby North Waziristan and was known to have spoken out against militants in the area, the official said.

Taliban launch violent purge

Insurgents blame paid informants for increasingly accurate NATO strikes

GRAEME SMITH - From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — Taliban fighters say they have executed dozens of suspected informants, as they hunt for the spies who helped NATO target several of their leaders in recent weeks.

Air strikes in the past three months have killed at least three major Taliban commanders in southern Afghanistan, and the insurgents say they're facing an increasingly active infiltration campaign by Western agents.

In a videotaped interview from a hideout in Sangin district of Helmand province, a Taliban commander was asked to explain NATO's recent success at finding the movement's leadership.

"This year they put many spies in our groups, give them lots of money, so they find our bosses," said the young commander, who said he joined the insurgency four years ago. He covered his face, sitting cross-legged in what appeared to be a storehouse for weapons: Kalashnikovs, belt-fed machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

"We have arrested about 60 or 70 spies, and we killed many of them," he told the Globe and Mail researcher who conducted the interview. Other insurgents in Sangin said the executions, mostly by hanging, have reached such a frantic pace that 17 suspected spies were killed in the previous week alone.

One suspect was paraded in front of the camera with his arms tightly bound behind his back and a blindfold covering most of his face. The Taliban accused him of trading information about the insurgents for the equivalent of $3,800. The man denied the allegations. His captors said his fate would be decided by a Taliban shura, or council of elders.

Details of the Taliban's purge are hard to verify, because the insurgents are notorious for spreading false information about their inner workings, and NATO does not discuss its covert operations.

But villagers across Helmand province say they've noticed the result of the insurgents' concern about spies, as bodies of the condemned have been hung from trees.

Muslim custom requires a quick burial after death, but the Taliban told the families of the executed men to leave them hanging for up to three days, as a warning to others who might work for the foreign troops.

Although patrolled by NATO troops, Taliban insurgents control much of Helmand province and operate unchecked in wide swaths of the territory.

One of the latest stories circulating among Taliban fighters in the province describes an elaborate counter-intelligence effort by the insurgents. As the story goes, Mullah Hanan, a commander of perhaps 100 Taliban near the town of Gereshk, was feeling increasingly worried about his safety.

One night in January, he grew suspicious that a spy might have infiltrated his band of fighters, so he decided to sleep in a compound some distance from the main group. He picked five trusted bodyguards to keep watch, and each of them were assigned shifts.

One man requested the final shift before daybreak, and in the predawn hours he sneaked away from his slumbering leader and used a satellite phone to mark his co-ordinates. Then he apparently made a phone call; shortly afterward, air strikes destroyed the mud house where Mr. Hanan was sleeping, along with the compound where most of his fighters spent the night.

According to the version of the tale repeated among the insurgents of Sangin, the treacherous bodyguard returned to Mr. Hanan's ruined compound two or three weeks later. He started chatting with a group of farm labourers nearby, probing for information about whether the Taliban commander had died in the fiery attack. They watched him continue along toward the charred blast site, and one labourer quietly followed him as he stood in the shade of a tree-lined irrigation canal near the ruins. The labourer overheard him speaking on a phone, telling somebody: "Mullah Hanan is dead, I'm looking at his destroyed home."

The Taliban always try to emphasize their popularity. And in their telling of this story, the farmers were outraged by the bodyguard's betrayal, so they tackled him and handed him over to the insurgents.

He was wearing a bulletproof vest under his traditional kameez (a long shirt) and carrying a satellite phone. With a promise of forgiveness from the insurgents, the bodyguard quickly named his intelligence handler, a landowner who ran a large poppy farm.

Like his subordinate, the landowner told the Taliban he would give them all his contacts if they would spare his life. They instructed him to visit a mosque and swear on a Koran that he would stop working against the insurgents. Then they told him to summon his contacts for a meeting that evening, and after a flurry of phone calls his sources had gathered at one of their regular safe houses.

The Taliban said they surrounded the house and captured them all. Despite the Taliban promises, none were spared. A shura was swiftly convened to condemn them all, and their bodies were displayed in several parts of the province, including Gereshk, Sangin and Musa Qala.

Before he was executed, the Taliban said, the bodyguard confessed to receiving $100,000 (U.S.) for the death of Mullah Hanan, and a $25,000 bonus for the foot soldiers killed in the same operation. The insurgents never found the money.

Beckett in Afghan president talks – BBC

UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett has met Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai for talks. They began just hours after a suicide bomb went off at the country's main US military base as it hosted the US Vice-President, Dick Cheney.

This is Mrs Beckett's first visit to Afghanistan, which will soon be the main UK theatre of operations overseas. She is meeting key figures from the Afghan government, NATO and the NATO-led security force ISAF.

Mrs Beckett's visit come after it was announced earlier this week that the UK will commit an additional 1,400 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the total British deployment to 7,700.

Most are to be deployed in southern Afghanistan where the Royal Marines are already engaging Taleban insurgents daily. The foreign secretary arrived shortly after the departure of US Vice-President Cheney, whose own Afghan visit to Bagram Air base was overshadowed by a suicide bomb.

Both Mrs Beckett and Mr Cheney came to Kabul from Pakistan, which Washington believes should do more to prevent Taleban and al-Qaeda activity within its borders.

Afghanistan and UK Launch their Joint Action Plan

Posted On MoFA site: Feb 28, 2007

On the occasion of the official visit of the UK Foreign Secretary to Afghanistan the text of the Joint Action Plan between the two countries was released to the public. 

  AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP - ACTION PLAN 2006-07 

A.      Introduction

 This document sets out the mutual commitments of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the United Kingdom for the period of  2006 & 2007 in relation to activities underpinning the Joint Declaration of Enduring Relationship between the UK and Afghanistan signed in London on the 19th July 2005. 

B.     Political and Economic

  Nation Building Activities 1.      Both Governments reiterate their full commitment to the Afghanistan Compact and will continue to work towards fulfilling their respective obligations under the Compact.

 2.      Afghanistan and the UK will hold regular meetings between heads of state and at the Ministerial level, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and the UK’s Foreign Secretary to exchange views on issues of mutual interest and concern.

  3.      Both Governments will continue to support efforts in making the Joint Co-ordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) the leading body for monitoring the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (IANDS). 

4.      Both Governments will continue to encourage the donor community to disburse their assistance more strategically and efficiently, in particular according to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.    Rule of Law

 5.      The UK will assist in the achievement of an improved Rule of Law (RoL) environment throughout Afghanistan by working with the Afghan Government, UN, the European Union, and the international community to implement the commitments within the Afghanistan Compact to establish a sound legal framework, functioning justice institutions and anti-corruption measures at the national, regional and provincial levels. 

  Economic Growth & Regional Co-operation  

6.      As outlined in Section E, the UK will work with the Afghan Government to strengthen the institutional and legal environment to help attract private and foreign investment. 

Development of the Afghanistan National Assembly

  7.      The UK will continue to support capacity building initiatives for the Afghan Parliament, specifically UNDP’s SEAL Programme. As part of this support, the UK has funded a one-week training course for 10 Parliamentary staffers in the UK and will also take opportunities to engage with Afghan MPs both in Kabul and by way of visits to the UK.

 8.      The UK will consider sponsoring two visits (one on Counter Narcotics and the other focusing on Women Issues) of Afghan MPs to the UK in 2007.   

Robust and Sustainable Institutions

            9.      Through technical assistance, the UK will support capacity building initiatives in:

 (i)                  The Ministry of Finance to strengthen its budget process and revenue mobilisation capacity; 

(ii)                The Ministry of Commerce to develop and implement a strong private sector development policy;  (iii)               Counter-Narcotics institutions at central and provincial levels to implement the Government’s Counter-Narcotics policy; (iv)              The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH) and the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development to improve the national integrated rural development planning and implementation; (v)                The Centre of Government Institutions to build the capacity of all staff and to clarify formally the roles, responsibilities, rules, relationships and reporting lines of (and between), institutions and post holders; (vi)              The Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support its ongoing reform process and also its objective to become the focal point for strengthening regional cooperation as is stipulated in the IANDS.

 10.  To develop more effective Provincial and District administrations and Provincial Councils, the UK will look for ways to work with other donors in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan. This includes providing UK officials and development advisers in Helmand and in ISAF HQ.  

Merit Based Civil Service

 11.  The UK will continue its support to public administration reform processes through supporting the co-ordination of donor-funded technical assistance to better meet the Afghan Government’s needs, and also to improve the capacity, efficiency and sustainability of ministries and other public institutions. The Afghan Government will continue to implement and enforce a merit-based recruitment process to the civil service. The Afghan Government, with support from the UK and other donors, will accelerate Public Administration Reform at national and sub-national levels.  

C.     Security

   12.  The UK will support Afghanistan Security Forces to assume more responsibility in confronting the security challenges and expanding the writ of the Afghan Government throughout the country.  

 13.  The UK will continue to support the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The UK will work towards strengthening the work of the UK-lead Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gar, Helmand province, where its 4300 strong ISAF contingent is deployed.

 14.  The UK will support strengthening Afghanistan’s relationship with NATO. The UK has supported Afghanistan entering into a long term strategic relationship with NATO. 

  15.  Afghanistan and the UK will cooperate in creating a responsible, accountable and effective security force for Afghanistan through the ongoing efforts of Security Sector Reform (SSR). The UK will provide institutional development and capacity building expertise. The UK will offer political and practical support for the disbandment of illegal armed groups; Afghan National Army (ANA) development and Command and Control; and Afghan National Police (ANP) Command and Control and capacity building.  The UK will continue to fund implementing agencies responsible for demining and the destruction of illegal small arms.

 16.  Afghanistan and the UK will develop close operational links between the ANA and the UK Armed Forces deployed in Afghanistan, focusing on improving the operational effectiveness of the ANA. The UK will provide Embedded Training Teams (Operational and Mentor Liaison Teams) to work with the ANA as part of the UK deployment to the South. The UK will continue to provide training support to the ANA, including training to Non-Commissioned Officers, provision of opportunities for ANA Officers at RMAS Sandhurst, and provision of junior officer training through a new Officer Candidate School in Kabul.

   17.  The UK will help to build counter-terrorist capacity within the Afghan security services.

 18.  The UK will assist in the development of Afghanistan’s intelligence capability and the fusion of intelligence through supporting the establishment and development of intelligence cooperation and sharing mechanisms.   

D.     Counter-narcotics

 19.  The UK will act as partner nation in the field of counter-narcotics by continuing to coordinate and lobby for increased international assistance in support of the four national priorities identified in the Afghan Government’s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). 

 20.  Specific UK support and Afghan Government commitments are highlighted under the eight pillars in the NDCS. 

E.     Development

 21.  The UK will support the Afghan Government in preparing its IANDS and final National Development Strategy (ANDS), and promote the ANDS as the key policy document for progress in Afghanistan across all sectors.

22.  UK support will include:

 (i)                  Advice and support to the ANDS working group on statistics and the development of a monitoring framework, so credible baselines can be set and progress tracked;

 (ii)                Technical expertise on issues by respective sector(including counter-narcotics, security and governance) during the consultation period of the IANDS, and during the preparation of the full ANDS;

 (iii)               Supporting the Afghan Government in the use of the IANDS/ANDS for better donor coordination and harmonisation. 

23.  The UK will extend its commitment to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to £200 million over three years (2005/6 – 2007/8). The UK will invest at least 50% of its 2007/8 development budget through the ARTF. The UK will continue to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance on tax administration and customs, and to the Ministry of Commerce on private sector development.  The UK will provide assistance to the Ministry of finance in terms of tax, customs, and  budget reforms in 2006 as part of its ongoing technical assistance .

F.      Education, media and culture

  24.  The UK will focus to improve and expand English language instruction through providing direct teaching methods, Teacher training, and consultancy services for the Ministry of Education on Curricula and school textbook materials advancement. The UK will support the English Unit of Kabul University through the provision of training and resources for the improvement of English language instruction across Kabul University. The UK will work to establish a Teachers’ internet based network to provide the educational institutions with teaching materials and also to provide internet access for students. These facilities will build the capacity of Afghan students in term of their study in both Pashto and Dari language through access to our language learning website at Go4.  

25.  The UK will support Islamic and vocational educations through the provision of consultancy services on the curriculum, educational material, establishment of basic relations between Afghanistan and UK institutions, and the provision of educational resources and access to internet. The UK recognises the significant importance of a sound rural development policy and practice and therefore will provide technical assistance and financial assistance to the Afghanistan Institute for Rural Development, through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, to establish and enhance training and research capacity in the field of rural development within Afghanistan. 

26.  The UK will provide access to Chevening scholarships to enable promising Afghan students to study at British universities. 

27.  The British Council will provide access to distance learning qualifications through the expansion of its examination services.  

28.  The UK recognises the importance of cultural excellence and will support work to expand the capacity of cultural institutions in Afghanistan. The UK will encourage the British Museum to extend its curatorial training programme to Afghanistan. The UK will support the return to Afghanistan of cultural objects illegally taken from the country and seized in the UK by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.  

Spy chief pushes for action in Pakistan

By KATHERINE SHRADER, Associated Press Writer Wed Feb 28

More must be done to go after al-Qaida, which is trying to establish
training camps and other operations in some of Pakistan's most ungoverned territory, the new U.S. spy chief said Tuesday.

"It's something we're very worried about and very concerned about," Mike McConnell told the Senate Armed Services Committee in a hearing on global threats.

McConnell said the U.S. believes al-Qaida's top two leaders — Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri — are hiding in the rugged frontiers
of northwestern Pakistan and are attempting to establish an operational base there. He noted that al-Qaida's camps are in an area that has never been governed by any state or outside power.

McConnell's push for action along the Afghan-Pakistani border echoed concerns raised by Vice President Dick Cheney during a face-to-face meeting Monday with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Cheney was accompanied by Deputy CIA Director Stephen Kappes — a sign that intelligence played a strong role in the case made to Musharraf.

Musharraf has insisted his forces have already "done the maximum" possible against extremists in their territory, and he said other allies also shoulder responsibility in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

But U.S. officials have grown increasingly concerned about intelligence suggesting the Taliban and al-Qaida plan a spring offensive against allied forces in neighboring Afghanistan.

They are also worried about the autonomy of al-Qaida and Taliban operatives in Pakistan after the government signed a peace deal with the tribal leaders of the region, North Waziristan, in September.

In that agreement, tribal elders promised to respect the supremacy of the Pakistani government and curtail attacks in Afghanistan. In return, Musharraf gave back some of the tribes' weapons, released some prisoners and withdrew from posts inside North Waziristan.

At Tuesday's hearing, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said the tribes have not abided by most of the agreement's terms. And McConnell said U.S. intelligence believes al-Qaida's training and related capabilities increased as a result of the deal.

Lawmakers were skeptical, too. "Long-term prospects for eliminating the Taliban threat appear dim so long as the sanctuary remains in Pakistan, and there are no encouraging signs that Pakistan is eliminating it," said Senate Armed
Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (news, bio, voting record), D-Mich.

In his first month as national intelligence director, McConnell said he's been briefed about al-Qaida's efforts to reconstitute itself in Pakistan's northwest frontier. He said the group does not have the thousands of fighters, training in multiple camps, as they did in Afghanistan before the 2001 U.S.-led invasion. "That's gone," he said.

But McConnell said U.S. intelligence believes al-Qaida still has volunteers committed to carrying out "heinous attacks" akin to Sept. 11, 2001. And while three-quarters of al-Qaida's leaders have been taken out, they have been replaced by equally committed jihadists.

The upside: McConnell said the new generation doesn't have as much experience.
Pressuring al-Qaida is not without its risks for Musharraf, who faces an election this fall. McConnell acknowledged that efforts to pursue the terror group must be balanced with the desire to keep Musharraf — a moderate and a U.S. ally — in ch arge of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal.

The testimony from Maples and McConnell was part of the Senate panel's annual review of global threats, including the latest assessments on Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Touching on those hot spots, they said:

_Iraqi troops are taking the lead in securing parts of their country, but much work remains to improve the number and quality of those forces. "They are better today than they were a year ago, but they are still not where we need them to be," McConnell said.

Maples said two of the three brigades promised by Iraq have moved into Baghdad as part of the new security plan, but he acknowledged that those units have only 43 percent to 82 percent of their intended troops, according to ranges he has seen.

_On Iran, McConnell said that the regime could develop a nuclear weapon early in the next decade, but it will more likely take the country's scientists until 2015. But it's not clear whether the country will have a delivery system at the same time.

_Maples said the United States is seeing North Korea take initial steps to comply with the Feb. 13 agreement on its nuclear program, including inspection of its plutonium-producing Yongbyon nuclear facility. But there are other steps to which the U.S. will have to pay close attention, he said.

McConnell's top adviser on North Korea, Joseph DeTrani, said the U.S. continues to insist that North Korea declare all of its nuclear programs. But he backtracked a bit from a previous U.S. view of analysts, who had "high confidence" that North Korea was buying material for a uranium production program. Now, he said, the U.S. believes the program exists "at the midconfidence level."

Pakistan's Musharraf on Thin Ice

SPIEGEL Germany February 27, 2007 By Matthias Gebauer in Peshawar, Pakistan

US Vice President Dick Cheney's recent visit to Pakistan was far from a gesture of friendship. The United States are putting massive pressure on Pakistan to finally take action against the Taliban active on the country's border. But can Musharraf afford it?

If you believe Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, there was nothing unusual to report this Monday. US Vice President Dick Cheney had just arrived in Islamabad for an unannounced visit on his way to Afghanistan and was having lunch with Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf.

Perfectly normal security precautions, a press spokeswoman said in reply to questions as to why the visit has been kept secret. A "normal visit between partners."

But even the few photographs made available from the visit suggest that the speedy stopover by President George W. Bush's right-hand man was not the friendly bonding session the spokeswoman would have one believe. Cheney barely managed an awkward smile when he shook the hand of his host for the camera.

He left Pakistan after just a few hours -- without giving a public statement or even holding a press conference with Musharraf. "Visits between friends look a bit different," one Western diplomat commented. It is likely, he added, that Cheney's had stopped in Pakistan to admonish US-ally Musharraf.

The visit is the clearest indication of just how tense relations between Washington and Islamabad have become. Even as Pakistan remains nominally a strategic partner in the ongoing struggle against the Taliban and al-Qaida, such an explicit hand-slapping -- administered in part publicly but also in anonymously circulated allegations -- is rare.

The accusation is that Pakistan is not doing enough to fight terror groups in the border region near Afghanistan -- and that Islamabad may even be partially responsible for the Taliban comeback. With the Taliban spring offensive imminent, it seems US patience has run out.

Still, the official account of the visit sounded relatively harmless. "Cheney expressed US apprehensions of regrouping of al-Qaida in the tribal areas and called for concerted efforts in countering the threat," Musharraf's office said.

The statement also referred to Cheney expressing "serious US concerns on the intelligence being picked up of an impending Taliban and al-Qaida 'spring offensive' against allied forces in Afghanistan."

Musharraf, on the other hand, was reported to have insisted his forces had already "done the maximum" to combat extremists active on Pakistan's territory.

Threats behind closed doors - Once behind closed doors, though, Cheney didn't mince words. With CIA Deputy Director Steve Kappes by his side, Cheney threatened them US Congress, with its Democratic majority, could deny Pakistan its promised aid of $785 million if Musharraf didn't finally take action
against the Taliban.

Congress only recently voted to reconsider aid to Pakistan on an annual basis. Only if Pakistan made good on its promises to fight terror, the message went, would money be forthcoming.

Cheney's visit comes after weeks of similar trips by US officials to Islamabad in recent weeks. But now the tone seems to be shifting and becoming more acrimonious. An unnamed member of the Bush administration was quoted by the New York Times as saying that the administration is tired of listening to Musharraf's promises.

"He's made a number of assurances over the past few months, but the bottom line is that what they are doing now is not working," one senior administration official told the Times. "The message we're sending to him now is that the only thing that matters is results."

But it's not just the Taliban giving the United States a headache. Several Western intelligence agencies suspect that al-Qaida militants are also grouping in the border region and using the territory -- which is only loosely controlled by Pakistan's military -- for training.

US President George W. Bush recently characterized the region as "wilder than the Wild West." Analysts told the Times it has once again become a "hub of militant activity."

So far, solid evidence to suggest the terror network is active in the region remains thin. Those arrested in London last year on suspicion of planning to attack a number of passenger jets are said to have had connections to the border region.

Several Pakistani terrorists who killed a US diplomat with a car bomb in Karachi in March, 2006 are also said to have had contacts to al-Qaida leaders from the North Waziristan border region.

According to the New York Times, intelligence services have even identified an al-Qaida training camp. What has been known for years is that the Taliban use the area as a safe retreat after military operations -- and that the Pakistani troops controlling the border are doing little to prevent it.

"Absurd, biased and unsubstantial" - Pakistan, not surprisingly, denies these allegations. President Musharraf's spokesperson called them "absurd, biased and
insubstantial" in a conversation with SPIEGEL ONLINE. Pakistan's military is doing everything to "recognize and eliminate" Taliban structures, General Shaukat Sultan insisted.

He pointed out the military has stationed 80,000 soldiers along the border, whereas only few soldiers are to be seen on the Afghan side of the border. "We've done our part; now the Afghans should do theirs," the general demanded.

It's not dissimilar from the message the Pakistani has for years tried to disseminate. "We always say the same thing," Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz admits. And then he cites the same numbers given by military officials -- 80,000 soldiers on the border, more than 1,000 manned posts.

But mostly politicians emphasize the military has already suffered 700 casualties in its struggle against the Taliban. "We've suffered more than other states, because of Afghanistan," the Prime Minister says, sounding almost proud.

But it was precisely the high number of casualties that forced Pervez Musharraf's government to go soft on the Taliban last year. A messenger from Islamabad signed a ceasefire with a number of militant groups active in the region -- groups known to openly support the Taliban.

After the peace deal, Pakistan's troops retreated to their headquarters, venturing forth only rarely to attack Taliban positions or camps. The Taliban have been operating in the region "virtually undisturbed" ever since, according to Western intelligence analysts.

The peace deal -- really a ceasefire that was effectively forced on Pakistan -- symbolizes President Musharraf's dilemma. He knows from experience that every military offensive against the Taliban or other militant groups active in the border region will lead immediately to attacks on him or military facilities.

Moreover, his own political survival is based in large part on support from radicals, say observers. Any action taken against the radicals is potentially dearly expensive.

But the US, it seems, is tired of excuses. They're said to have issued a clear threat in the past weeks that if push comes to shove, they will clear up the border region themselves. Such US-led attacks, which have occurred only rarely in the past, would break Musharraf's back politically.

US intervention would be just what both fundamentalist Muslims and more moderate parties in Pakistan are waiting for to be able to attack Musharraf.

From Musharraf's point of view, much turns on when and how the United States make good on their threats. About $300 million of the US financial aid provided to Pakistan goes to the country's powerful military, which also secures the President's own power. No one has a stake in endangering Musharraf's political authority.

As dissatisfied as Washington may be with his efforts to combat the Taliban and al-Qaida, what a new Pakistani government would look like in the event of Musharraf being overthrown is simply too unpredictable. And so a solution to the conflict seems difficult to achieve. But one thing is certain: Musharraf is facing a difficult year.

Prodi Defends Italy’s Involvement in Afghanistan

February 27, 2007 - By voanews - Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi defended his government’s foreign policy on Tuesday, including its troop commitment in Afghanistan. In a wide-ranging speech to the upper house of parliament, Prodi tried to convince senators of the need for his government to survive. Sabina Castelfranco reports from Rome

Less than a week after Prime Minister Prodi submitted his resignation, he addressed the upper house of parliament, stressing the need for the parties of his center-left coalition to respect the government’s common action.

The prime minister resigned last Wednesday after suffering an embarrassing defeat over foreign policy in the Senate, which included the government’s plan to keep Italian troops in Afghanistan. He was asked to remain in office and form a new government.

In his Tuesday evening address, Mr. Prodi defended Italy’s foreign policy and Rome’s troop commitment in Afghanistan, where 1,800 Italian troops are deployed. “The goal of Italy’s presence in Afghanistan,” he said, “is to consolidate the young democratic institutions in the country. Our soldiers in Afghanistan, like on all our missions, he added, bring a culture of dialogue and help, not of clashes.”

Mr. Prodi also said Italy is committed to maintain a channel of dialogue open with Iran. “It is true,” he said, “that the choices made by Tehran have created a very difficult situation with the international community, but we must do everything that is possible to avoid this from turning into a military confrontation.”

On the Middle East, Mr. Prodi said the Italian government would continue to make every effort to ensure that Israel and the Palestinians will live as two people in two states, capable of coexisting in peace and security side by side.

The prime minister also stressed that his government has sought to raise its profile in Europe while maintaining good relations with Washington.On the domestic front, Mr. Prodi pledged a reform of the electoral system, which has been blamed for contributing to political instability by giving too much influence to small parties. He also promised to help families and increase job security.

A vote of confidence in the government led by Mr. Prodi will be held in the senate late Wednesday. Center-left party leaders have said they are confident they will win this time after all coalition parties renewed their commitment to the government. All parties have signed a 12-point plan that the prime minister said would be “non-negotiable” and would serve as the government’s platform.

If Mr. Prodi wins the Senate vote, he will submit his government to a vote in the lower house, where he has comfortable majority. If he loses the confidence vote, the government will have to resign, sparking a political crisis that might lead to the formation of a broad-coalition government or to early elections.

Canada urged to stop complaints about Afghan burden

CanWest News Service - Wednesday, February 28, 2007

OTTAWA - Canadians should lose the notion their troops are the only ones bearing the brunt of violence in Afghanistan, say two of Canada's biggest players on the international stage.

The two diplomats delivered that message directly to politicians in Ottawa on Tuesday from the NDP, who have called for a troop withdrawal, and the Liberals, who want Canada to serve notice to NATO that it will end its Afghanistan combat operations in 2009.

"The idea that Canada is in the south alone is simply wrong. The idea that other countries are not contributing or increasing their contribution does not reflect the reality," NATO spokesman James Appathurai told the Commons defence committee, one of four public forums where he appeared Tuesday in Ottawa.

Appathurai credited Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor and Gen. Rick Hillier, chief of the defence staff, for raising Canada's clout in NATO by calling on allies to commit more troops to Afghanistan, with fewer restrictions that would prevent them from front-line fighting in southern Afghanistan, where 2,500 Canadian Forces troops are based.

But Appathurai's remarks suggested Canada should stop complaining about whether some of its allies are pulling their weight because the number of troops in the south has mushroomed to 12,000 from 1,000 in the last 18 months.

"Canada is not bearing the burden alone when it comes to casualties," he added. "Over a dozen NATO countries have lost troops in significant numbers. I can tell you we have the flag down in front of NATO headquarters on a regular basis ... These sacrifices are being made by everybody and in all zones, in the north, the west, and the capital and the east and the south."

That remarkirritated NDPdefence critic Dawn Black. "I also have some trouble listening to you talk about the casualties other countries have suffered," she told Appathurai.

Chris Alexander, the UN's deputy special envoy to Afghanistan and Canada's first ambassador to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, challenged MPs to abandon suggestions that NATO countries should withdraw their troops.

The billions of dollars spent in the last five years assisting Afghanistan would "go up in smoke," while the very existence of NATO and the UN would be threatened if the West withdrew, he said.

"And most tragically, none of us around this table would be able to explain to the families of the 44 Canadians who have lost their lives in Afghanistan what the purpose of that sacrifice was," Alexander told the committee. Since 2002, 44 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat have been killed in Afghanistan.

While neither Appathurai nor Alexander wanted to make specific recommendations on how long Canadian troops should stay in Afghanistan nor offered direct criticism of the NDP's calls for withdrawal, both stressed there would be a role for Canadian soldiers long after February 2009, the extent of Canada's current commitment.

Alexander drew parallels with the reconstruction of the Balkans, which is in its second decade. "If we are rushing for the exit, if we are trying to cut things short, if we are flagging in our commitment to achieving the objectives ... we will be giving comfort to the enemy of this transition and we will, quite frankly, be undermining the achievements and the efforts that are underway today," Alexander told the committee.

Later, Appathurai said the issue of "why" NATO is in Afghanistan is simply not up for debate. "There is no controversy in any serious discussion," he told a luncheon audience of diplomats, military and non-governmental organizations. "Anyone who calls that into question is not being serious."

Alexander said while Afghanistan remains desperately poor, its gross national product and annual per capita income have doubled in the last five years. The extension of health care to 85 per cent of the population and the fact that more than five million children were back in school were indicators of progress.

He said Canada's infusion of $200 million of extra aid spending represented "principled engagement and investment" that would set the bar higher for other countries.

Alexander made clear he was not sugar-coating the challenges that lie ahead, both in defeating the renewed insurgency and rebuilding a shattered country. "Until then, peace is still an elusive goal in Afghanistan."

Afghanistan: The Taliban's Attention-Seeking Attack

Strafor - February 27, 2007

Summary - A suicide bomber detonated outside the U.S. military base at Bagram, Afghanistan, on Feb. 27, killing at least three people and injuring a score. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney was visiting the base at the time, but was not in the vicinity of the blast. Rather than a serious attempt to kill the vice president, the attack likely was intended to deepen the perception about a growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan -- and about NATO's inability to deal with the insurgents.

Analysis - A suicide bomber detonated at the front gate of the U.S. military base at Bagram, Afghanistan, on Feb. 27 during a surprise visit by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. Cheney was in his room and not in the vicinity of the blast, which the U.S. military said killed three people, including an American soldier. Rather than a serious attempt to kill the vice president, the attack likely was intended to deepen the existing perception about the growing Taliban threat in Afghanistan -- and about NATO's inability to deal with the insurgents.

Cheney's visit to Afghanistan, like his visits to Iraq, was announced with little notice for security reasons. Cheney arrived in Afghanistan on Feb. 26 after a similar short-notice visit to Islamabad to confer with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf -- and to chide him for not doing enough to help secure Afghanistan.

Despite the short notice, Cheney's visit to Afghanistan was no secret. After his visit to Islamabad, it was easy to assume that Afghanistan would be his next stop. Furthermore, bad weather delayed Cheney's departure overnight, giving the attackers time to rush an already-planned attack into action. In this case, the timing of a planned attack could have been stepped up, or the bomber simply retasked from another target in order to coincide with Cheney's presence in Afghanistan.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, and pinpointed Cheney as the target. However, while traveling overseas, VIPs such as Cheney are surrounded by concentric rings of heavy security. Their visits are preceded by intensive intelligence-collecting by the U.S. Secret Service and other intelligence agencies. This is especially true for visits to places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Bagram, as a major logistics point for U.S. and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan, is heavily defended. Although the Taliban claimed Cheney was the target, the likelihood of a single suicide bomber on foot being able to get anywhere near the U.S. vice president is extremely remote.

For the Taliban, the attack was a win-win situation. If they had been able to cause significant damage, or get anywhere close to Cheney (extremely unlikely), the attack would have been a major success for them. As it stands, even the minimal impact of the operation works in their favor. (Some reports are putting the death toll as high as 19). Suicide bombings no longer are rare occurrences in Afghanistan, and this one would have gotten little attention had Cheney not been at the base. With Cheney present, however, it allows the Taliban to appear as a threat that NATO is unable to effectively handle.

The media impact of this attack, then, far outweighs the psychological or military impact to Cheney or U.S. troops. From the Taliban perspective, for only the cost of a suicide bomber they have achieved much by disrupting Cheney's visit, even if only slightly.

Former Afghan interior minister says government must win hearts and
minds

Pajhwok Afghan News website, Kabul, in English - 27 Feb 2007

Former Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali has said that getting control of a chunk of land does not mean that the insurgents have got the power to overthrow the government.

In a reference to the ongoing insurgency and the threat posed by the Taleban to the peace and security of the country, Jalali said the war cannot be won unless the insurgents win the hearts and minds of the people.

At the same time, he said: "The government cannot fail by losing control of a few districts, but it could lose if it fails to maintain its legitimacy and win the hearts and minds of the people."

In an exclusive interview with Pajhwok Afghan News, Jalali observed although the insurgents were not yet capable to overthrow the Afghan government, they felt they were winning by not losing. On the other hand, the counter-insurgency operations can lose by not winning.

Asked about the government's previous two years achievements, Jalali said no-one, including the Afghan government, people and the international community was satisfied with the progress made with regard to peace and development in the past couple of years.

The international community and the government missed the opportunity of bringing stability to the country that existed in the first three years after the ouster of the Taleban. Those years, he believed, offered the best window of opportunity for peace and reconstruction as the 'enemy' was disintegrated and the people were supporting the government and the international force; however, the opportunity was squandered.

The Unites States' shift in attention and resources to Iraq came at a time when the global jihadis refocused their attention on a weak Afghan state, he added.

About the factors responsible for the renewed attention to the situation in Afghanistan, Jalali pointed to several aspects. Deterioration of security in Iraq, domestic politics in the US, influence of critics of Iraq war, who balance their opposition to that war with a call for more assistance to Afghanistan and the danger of further instability in Afghanistan are all reasons for the new focus. "I wish this happened sooner which would have cost less."

Regarding the roots of the insurgency, he said the Taleban-led insurgency was not rooted in a popular ideology. The people of Afghanistan rejected the leadership, the ideology and the political vision of the Taleban and other militant groups long ago. The new Taleban-led insurgents are an assortment of ideologically motivated by Afghan and foreign militants, disillusioned tribal communities, foreign intelligence operatives, drug traffickers, opportunist
militia commanders, disenchanted and unemployed youth, and self-interested spoilers. It is more of a political alliance of convenience than an ideological front.

To a question about Pak-Afghan relationship, the ex-interior minister said Pakistan had significantly contributed to fighting Al-Qa'idah militants on its territory. However, it had done little to contain the Taleban. He was also sceptical about the peace deal between the Pakistani government and the pro-Taleban militants in the South and North Waziristan.

On the border-fencing and mining issue, Jalali said Taleban would continue to pose a danger to peace and stability of Afghanistan unless their infrastructure in Pakistan, including their command and control system, financial sources, logistics and training facilities are disrupted.

About the reconciliation draft bill and reservations expressed by the rights organizations and international community, he said it was "an extremely complex process" in a post-conflict society and requires a conducive political environment. He urged the need for truth and reconciliation with direct participation of victims to heal their wounds and pains and to re-integrate the citizens into a peaceful life in the society.

Asked to comment on reports about the Taleban and their training camps in Pakistan, he said removal of sources of insurgency in the area required a regional approach involving not only Afghanistan and Pakistan but all actors engaged in the region, including the United States, the European Union, NATO and other countries in the neighbourhood. The new approach should address several issues to include the legitimate concerns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the development of the least educated and not urbanized tribal areas on both sides of the Durand line, the promotion of democratic changes in
Pakistan, enhancing governance capacity in Afghanistan, and finally integration of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the state administration.

About lasting stability and peace in Afghanistan, he said the key to resolving current problems in Afghanistan was "doing" what was not "done". This includes a regional approach to ending the insurgency, creating effective governance capable of establishing the rule of law, providing human security and public services and fostering economic development that can replace the illicit drug
trade with legal economic activities.

About the stay of US troops in Afghanistan, he said it depended on building of national security capacity and ending the threat of transnational terrorism and cross-border insurgency in Afghanistan. In this connection, he referred to the Strategic Partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the United States which provides for continued US political, economic and military cooperation with
Afghanistan.

About his return to Afghanistan and role in politics, the former minister said he would come back to his country when he felt the country needed him.

Ali Ahmad Jalali was Afghanistan interior minister from January 2003 to September 2005. He had served with the Voice of America for more than 20 years. He is one of the few Afghans living in US, who is frequently consulted by the Bush Administration and invited by Congress for consultations and testimonies on issues related to Afghanistan. Jalali is presently a Distinguished Professor at Near East South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies of National Defence
University.

Talks with Taleban still the best prospect

The Times, UK 02/27/2007 By Bronwen Maddox

Margaret Beckett is surely right to leave open the prospect of one day talking to the Taleban.

But as she said yesterday on her visit to Afghanistan, right now those prospects look dim. There is no other possible position on a day when a suicide bomber, claimed by the Taleban as one of theirs, tried to kill Dick Cheney, the US Vice-President, at Bagram airbase near Kabul. ?We wanted to target Cheney,? Mullah Hayat Khan, Taleban spokesman, told Reuters news agency by phone from an undisclosed location.

The Foreign Secretary said that talks with the former Taleban or sympathisers who were no longer active may be possible in the future. That could be a different matter, but I certainly don?t envisage some form or process of dialogue at present,? she said.

Nothing about this policy can stay clear cut. In the end, it will probably be necessary to deal with the Taleban or their sympathisers (if a distinction can really be made), as the Afghan and Pakistani governments are already doing. Cheney?s sudden trip to Pakistan was prompted by US alarm that al-Qaeda terrorists were returning to the wild borderland with Afghanistan, although not with anything like the numbers or freedom of movement that they enjoyed when Afghanistan was almost entirely run by the Taleban.

He told President Musharraf that if Pakistan did not clamp down on fighters crossing the border into Afghanistan, then the US may be forced to cut off some aid.

President Bush has already proposed giving Pakistan $785 million (£400 million) next year, including $300 million for its military. This threat comes after four months of rising US exasperation, since Musharraf struck controversial deals with some of the tribal leaders on the Pakistani side of the border. If they halted the transit of foreign fighters? (al-Qaeda and Afghan Taleban) then Musharraf would withdraw Pakistan?s army from their territory. US and British
officials agree that the hasn?t worked.

There is little sign of a crackdown, and suspicion that the recent surge in attacks on Nato forces in Afghanistan is a sign that the Taleban have been released from pressure on the eastern front.

Musharraf has told the US and Britain than he has done more than is popularly supposed, and that his forces have suffered some 700 fatalities since they began more two years ago to close the border dividing the Waziristan tribal area from Afghanistan. For this reason alone he had to do the deals.

Up to a point. His army is under such strain partly because of the separate tribal unrest in Baluchistan, a patch of trouble Musharraf ought to settle quickly and through political means, answering their grievances about their share of local gas revenues.

The more profound motive for the deals is that Pakistan is losing confidence in the Nato strategy for southern Afghanistan. For a start, the definition of Taleban is much fuzzier than Nato officials imply. Al-Qaeda fighters, often Arabs, and not part of the local Pashtun communities, are certainly identifiable. And it is possible to identify Taleban leaders, organising attacks on Nato forces, as those forces and the Afghan Army have done.

But it is less clear whether the label ?Taleban? should be slapped on those who fight with them, whether out of fear or belief, and communities supporting them.

The Afghan Government and Nato will have to persuade as many of these people as possible to change sides. Beckett is right to leave open the chance to talk to them in the future. The deal Musharraf struck with his tribal leaders was a bad one, but the principle was not outrageous.

Allies return their focus to Afghanistan again

By James Travers - Toronto Star Ottawa (Feb 27, 2007)

For mostly the wrong reasons, Afghanistan is again the talk of two villages. In the tiny one on Parliament Hill, Stephen Harper is committing more aid and Stephane Dion, with an equally sharp eye on the coming election, is promising to bring the troops home in 2009. In the bigger global village, the United States and Britain are rediscovering the War on Terror's front.

All that chatter is a warning. Progress in Afghanistan's relatively stable north isn't mirrored in the wobbly south where generals now warn the situation is precarious.

It's not just that the Taliban is regrouping for a spring replay of the last offensive that put Canadian casualties in the headlines. While in Washington the intelligence community that waved red flags before 9/11 is again sniffing trouble in the easterly wind.

Those currents converge along Afghanistan's disputed border with Pakistan. Protected by overarching regional and international preoccupations, the Taliban and its malignant parasite al-Qaeda are free to raid and plot. Countering those threats is suddenly an allied priority.

As Canadian soldiers again brace for the worst, the not-so-new Tory government is throwing more money at the hearts-and-minds campaign there hoping both voters and the antiwar NDP here will support the tactical shift toward reconstruction. Meanwhile the United States and Britain are refocusing their attention from the lost and peripheral Iraq cause to the central one in Afghanistan that might still be won.

Since governments prefer root-canal surgery to candour, no one is confirming the obvious. Stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan on the cheap isn't working and the job is now more problematic than on the day when the United States wandered off to topple Saddam Hussein.

Students of current history will recall that the Bush administration justified that gross miscalculation by fancifully connecting Iraq's secular despot with Islam's sectarian fanatics. They will remember, too, that Harper saw merit in a reckless invasion that more savvy foreign policy analysts warned would create a power vacuum and a civil war.

Pointing to past misjudgment is more than churlish hindsight. It's also a useful reminder that, like all of us, politicians suffer from human frailty as well as the compulsion to arrange selected facts in the most favourable order.

That puts the onus on voters to subject government explanations to microscopic scrutiny when lives are at risk. On one level, applying that examination to yesterday's announcement isn't particularly scary for the PM.

Bitter experience proves it will take many more millions and many more troops to rescue Afghanistan. By adding $200 million to Canada's $1 billion 10-year commitment, Harper is making a significant contribution to reconstruction, while the United States and Britain are now making the commitment to security so urgently needed immediately after the Taliban's was driven from Kabul and power.

But two nagging questions remain: Is this renewed effort too little, too late and is this Afghanistan strategy in Canada's best interest?

The wait for the first answer will be short. NATO commanders are now making it unusually clear that Kandahar is now at the tipping point. In a place where decisions are life-and-death, ordinary people must now choose between local insurgents apparently willing to fight forever and foreigners who say they will stay as long as it takes.

As this month's Senate report found, geography and history tilt to the Taliban. Worse still, there are legitimate doubts about the effectiveness of the Afghanistan model.

It's awkward to admit but in important ways this mission is at least as much about us as it is about them. Canada's Afghanistan fixation is a post-9/11 phenomenon driven by everything from Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor's disturbing appetite for "retribution" to Ottawa's eagerness to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Washington.

Neither is as widely appealing as the notions that we are there to free Afghan men and, particularly, women, or that Canada's security rises as the Taliban and al-Qaeda fall. Those arguments were front and centre again yesterday as the government offered a generally optimistic "progress" report, but optimism isn't about to dispel lingering skepticism about the effort to morph a tribal country with an opium economy into a model market democracy.

No compelling argument can yet be made that the three D's of defence, development and diplomacy is making a successful transition from public relations sloganeering to successful strategy. Pumping even more millions into a sea of corruption is self-evidently risky. And its mostly wishful thinking that war over there makes anyone safer here while there's reason to fear that infidel boots on Muslim soil may stimulate the opposite.

Aligned against those negatives is this positive: The Afghanistan project is now facing an acid test and the more thoughtfully its discussed the greater the hope of moving past flag-waving to creative responses.

Ruined poppy farmers join ranks with the Taleban

The Times (UK) / February 27, 2007 - Tim Albone in Panjwayi and Claire Billet in Nad Ali

The tractor roared through the field, the plough tearing through the valuable poppy crop as the farmer looked on. A helicopter searched for insurgents and armed police stood watch, their uniforms replaced by robes and turbans to make them less conspicuous.

“The people are unhappy with this eradication campaign; if it goes on they will all join the Taleban,” Dilbar, a poppy farmer in Helmand province, told The Times.

The prospect of such a surge in Taleban numbers is bad news for the 5,000 British troops based in Helmand and 1,400 more heading there after the announcement by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary. The fiercest fighting since the Taleban were overthrown in 2001 came last year, with more than 4,000 people killed, and intelligence reports predict a new offensive this spring.

Poppy eradication is a double-edged sword. Afghanistan provides nine out of every ten grams of heroin sold on the streets of Britain, and officials are determined to stamp out poppy growth. Yet a successful campaign would leave many unemployed as potential recruits for the Taleban.

Afghans, ever the pragmatists, have devised their own solution. “We leave some fields without destroying the poppy so everyone is happy . . . otherwise they will go and support the Taleban,” said Aminullah, 21, a policeman with the eradication force in Helmand.

Although 90 per cent of Helmand’s arable land is turned over to poppy growth, only 550 hectares (1,400 acres) were destroyed in the first week of the campaign. With three months left until harvest the police know that they are fighting a losing battle.

Farmers take huge risks to grow poppy as the market price is 20 times that of wheat. But without aid they have little choice and when the crop is destroyed they are crippled by debt, often having borrowed heavily from landlords to plant the crop. Landlords make no concessions for eradicated crops and the farmers are still expected to pay off their loans.

Smugglers who take the drug out of Afghanistan are also rewarded handsomely for their trade. Very few, if any, smugglers or landlords have been punished, and in southern Afghanistan operate virtually beyond the law. “It will be impossible for us to eradicate the entire poppy. We will need months and months and the poppy will be ready for harvest in only three,” Aminullah said.

In Babaji, a village of mudwalled houses and winding dirt tracks five miles (8km) from Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, eradication was meant to be in full swing.

“We are growing poppy because we don’t have any other options,” said Abdullah, a poppy farmer, as tractors ploughed part of his field. Over sweet green tea Abdullah, 35, had persuaded a member of the local shura, or council, to leave some crops. The shura member then spoke to the eradication agents and Abdullah’s most valuable crops were saved.

In the district of Panjwayi, in neighbouring Kandahar province, where Nato troops fought the largest antiTaleban battle last September, the agents are reluctant to leave poppy fields untouched.

In the village of Haji Habib police apologised to farmers as the tractors destroyed fields of poppy. “We started here because the village is a Taleban village,” Bismallah Jan, 35 a policeman, said. “But we still feel bad we are destroying their livelihoods.”

Protecting Afghanistan's vital power source

By Alastair Leithead - BBC News, Kabul Tuesday, 27 February 2007

A union flag beats and cracks in the strong wind which races across the ridge, the air cold but the sun beating down on the British troops stationed high up on the outpost.

Mortar tubes are surrounded by sandbags and stacks of bombs wait in line on the observation post high over Helmand province. Ankle-high string, decorated with small white bunting, distinguishes safe paths from minefields.

In the 1980s the Russian army held this ridge in Kajaki and as well as the mines, they also left behind a rusted field gun - a reminder of a different war, with a different army, fighting over the same piece of land.

The British forces had to fight hand-to-hand with the Taleban to win the beautiful view and the military advantage that comes with it. On one side, where the mortars and guns are pointed, is the valley, flat and surprisingly green, the Taleban frontline just 3kms (two miles) or 4kms away.

And the other panoramic view is filled by a huge lake spreading out into the mountains - well-defined fingers of land that mark the shore are what is left of the hillsides flooded when the reservoir was built.

A 90-metre terraced dam pinches one end, and the glistening Helmand River snakes its way south to irrigate the prime agricultural land where the opium poppies are grown.

But the row of small and delicate pylons gives away why UK forces are here - this is not about water, it is about electricity - and the power to actually make a difference to Afghan people.

Two roaring jets of water plunge out of the hillside into the narrow gorge at the base of the dam. A large concrete building perches on the edge of the tunnels, the overhead cables sharply heading up the cliff face and onto the ridge.

A plaque bearing the American eagle says it was built in 1975 - the hydro-electric power station was donated at a time when Cold War nations were pouring money into Afghanistan to buy support at the crossroads of Asia. And working hard to keep it running is a determined man with a long beard, who has been here since the year after the turbines started turning.

Engineer Sayeed Rasul pointed to the huge gap between the two round power generators: "Turbine one needs repairs and turbine three is working well and when turbine two arrives we will be able to generate much more power," he said.

"We have only one power station in southern Afghanistan and that is Kajaki power station. "When we have all three turbines working it will be a very big help for us and Afghanistan and our people." It is estimated that almost two million more Afghans will get electricity when the project is complete.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Chinese and American companies are doing the work, which involves new and bigger power transmission cables across Helmand and to Kandahar.

The British troops under Nato and Afghan forces are protecting it. A road will have to be built to bring the turbine to its new home - thousands of jobs will be created in the local area over the two or three years of the project, but it cannot start until the area is secure.

And that is a major drawback for a development which is everything this international mission is supposed to be about. Since the British forces secured the ridge that is exactly what they have been trying to do.

The Taleban have been pushed back a few kilometres - the Royal Marines now have bases in areas that were once insurgent-held territory. This week, caves in a hill used recently as firing positions were dynamited to stop them being used again and the fight has moved into the villages out in the valley.

But it is guerrilla warfare and the developers are not even here at the moment as it is deemed too dangerous for them to stay, let alone work on the power station. The Taleban know how significant the project's success would be - jobs for locals, electricity for southern Afghanistan.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]