In this bulletin:

• Thousands gather to support Afghan warlords
• Afghan warlords in amnesty rally
• Afghanistan: Amnesty Bill Places Karzai In Dilemma
• Afghan FM receives his Russian counterpart
• Taliban claim they are rearmed, ready for war
• double spring offensive
• Afghans See Decline Since '05
• World Bank Supports Private Sector Development in Afghanistan
  infrastructure facilities.
• Afghanistan tries to kick opium habit - again
• Opium eradication underway in Taliban heartland to dismay of Afghan farmers
• Alumnus Founds Afghan Movement
• "Taliban would falter without help of Pakistan" - Afghan official
• Editorial from the Afghanistan Times
• Afghan documentaries at New York film festival

Thousands gather to support Afghan warlords

February 23, 2007 - KABUL (AFP) - Around 25,000 supporters of former Afghan warlords, including some senior government figures, have filled a Kabul stadium Friday in a noisy show of support for a controversial proposed war crimes amnesty.

Men from around the country held up posters of leaders of the resistance to the 1980s Soviet occupation and chanted "Long live the mujahedin (holy fighters)" and "God is great."

The stadium, which holds at least 25,000 people, was filled to near capacity and many in the crowd had travelled in from the provinces. Hundreds of police were on hand, but the rally passed off without violence.

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a notorious former anti-Soviet commander and now a parliamentarian, said the bill passed this week ruling out prosecution for war crimes was intended to "bring peace, stability and reconciliation."

Sayyaf is one of a host of commanders implicated in abuses in the 1992-1996 civil war, when mujahedin factions turned on each other after defeating the Soviets. Around 80,000 were killed in Kabul alone.

"Before more food and roads, we need peace and stability," Sayyaf said, referring to internationally-backed efforts to reconstruct the war-torn nation.

Another notorious warlord, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a former defence minister who was appointed to the upper house of parliament, warned the media against "insulting" mujahedin leaders.

The bill has to be approved by President Hamid Karzai to become law, which officials say is unlikely. It runs counter to the constitution and international treaties, and puts Karzai and his weak government in a difficult position, an official said this week on condition of anonymity.

Abibullah, an elderly supporter of ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, also accused of severe abuses, told AFP at the rally: "Human rights groups are saying they should be tried. We came here to condemn this."

"The mujahedin are the ones who brought freedom to us," said Abdul Razaq, 25. "Their wives became widows and their children became orphans. How can anyone say they should be tried?"

"Death to human rights," shouted a female MP who took the podium. "Death to dog washers," shouted a man in the crowd, referring to pro-Western politicians who fill the government and are mocked for having had lowly jobs in exile.

New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) in December called for a truth and reconciliation court to deal with 30 years of war crimes and human rights abuses, including by some who still "hold high office."

It named Sayyaf and Fahim, as well as former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, energy minister Ismail Khan and vice-president Karim Khalili -- all of whom were at the rally.

Analysts have said parliament pushed through the amnesty bill after the HRW statement and the hanging of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

Karzai rejected the report, but in December he formally adopted a plan on reconciliation. The plan included the establishment of a justice and accountability mechanism, which could lead to trials for suspected war criminals.

Afghan warlords in amnesty rally

BBC News / Friday, 23 February 2007 - Around 25,000 people have rallied in the Afghan capital Kabul, calling for a proposed war crimes amnesty for former military commanders to be made law.

The protesters, who gathered in a stadium, included ex-mujahideen and several top government officials. The upper house of parliament has passed the controversial bill but it has yet to be signed by the president.

Tens of thousands of people were killed and tortured during decades of war and unrest in the country.

If the bill were to become law, those who led fighting first as leaders of the anti-Soviet resistance during the 1980s and then during the 1992-1996 civil war would be immune to prosecution for war crimes. International rights groups and the UN have voiced opposition to the proposal, saying justice must be done.

The protesters, waving placards with pictures of political leaders, gathered in the city's Ghazi football stadium, where people were executed and tortured during the Taleban era.

"Whoever is against mujahideen is against Islam and they are the enemies of this country," former fighter Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, now an influential lawmaker, told the crowd of demonstrators.

Mr Sayyaf is one of several commanders linked to human rights violations committed during the country's civil war. The rally was also attended by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, as well as current Vice-President Karim Khalili and Energy Minister Ismail Khan.

Youths later marched through the streets of the city, shouting "Death to the enemies of Afghanistan!" and "Death to America!". More than a million people died during the war between Soviet-backed rulers and the mujahideen opposition.

Tens of thousands were killed during the civil war that followed as mujahideen factions turned on each other and under the hard-line Islamic Taleban regime that subsequently took power.

In the warlord period, some 80,000 civilians died in Kabul alone. Large numbers of others were kidnapped, mutilated or raped.

President Hamid Karzai is known to be opposed to the bill. He has said he will hold consultations before deciding whether to pass the legislation. Some MPs in the lower house, which passed the bill last month, now say they did not understand its implications when they voted for it.

Supporters of the amnesty say it is a move towards reconciliation. They say if it does not happen there will be more war. The United Nations and Afghan's leading rights groups say only victims of war crimes can forgive the perpetrators.

Afghanistan: Amnesty Bill Places Karzai In Dilemma

By Amin Tarzi - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

February 23, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- The Afghan National Assembly's passage of a resolution granting blanket amnesty for human rights violations to all sides in more than two decades of fighting in Afghanistan has presented President Hamid Karzai with a dilemma. The explosive debate over the bill could lead to a constitutional confrontation.

Tens of thousands of Afghans rallied at a Kabul stadium today to show support for the measure -- many of them carrying placards of prominent warlords and former mujahedin -- indicating the highly charged nature of the topic.

The Meshrano Jirga (Council of Elders) passed the controversial "National Stability and Reconciliation" resolution by a 50-16 majority on February 20. That vote came three weeks after the lower house -- the Wolesi Jirga (People's Council) -- approved it on January 31, sparking calls at home and abroad for Afghan President Hamid Karzai to reject it.

The 12-point resolution contains four primary clauses dealing with the amnesty issue. First, it calls on all "opponents who fought each other for different reasons in the last 2 1/2 decades" to forgive each other and consider the Karzai-backed national reconciliation process. Such "opponents" technically include communists, mujahedin, and the Taliban antagonists and their allies. They are then offered immunity from any "legal or judicial" proceedings. Also, those involved in the jihad or resistance to protect Afghanistan's religion or territorial integrity are to be lauded by Afghanistan's "history and people." The draft law goes on to prescribe that such people "should not be subjected to any criticism."

Second, the resolution rejects reporting by the New York-based group Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW has recommended that Afghan authorities hold accountable a number communist and mujahedin figures accused of major human rights abuses since 1979. The draft calls HRW reports "inaccurate" and based "on malicious intentions."

Third, the resolution invites "all parties that are against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" -- without exception -- to join the national reconciliation process by abiding by constitutional and other laws. If they did that, all "opposition parties and armed groups" would be granted the blanket amnesty.

Fourth, the resolution appears to attempt to circumvent Afghanistan's international obligations. It says that following the establishment of the Afghan National Assembly in 2005, "all laws and international principles should be compared with constitutional and other" Afghan legislation to avoid local norms being superseded (eds: set aside) by Afghanistan's international obligations. Those obligations include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The clause also stipulates that laws approved by the National Assembly should be respected by the government of Afghanistan -- perhaps a subtle hint to Karzai not to oppose the current bill.

The sweeping resolution not only grants blanket amnesty from prosecution -- or even criticism -- to all parties and individuals involved in gross human rights violations; it also extends a similar reprieve to the current groups who are terrorizing parts of Afghanistan.

Nowhere in the resolution is there any mention of human rights, the suffering of the Afghan people, or any public aspirations of justice -- even if merely symbolic. The bill grants full pardons to those who murdered, raped, and maimed their countrymen -- and then goes on to laud them as heroes.

Karzai faces a thorny dilemma over the resolution. On the face of it, he must approve it -- thus making it part of his country's laws -- or reject it -- inviting opposition from powerful elements within and outside his own government.

The Afghan Constitution (Article 94) says a bill becomes law after approval by both houses of the National Assembly and endorsement by the president "unless the Constitution states otherwise." If the president rejects a bill approved by the National Assembly, he "can send the document back with justifiable reasons [for his objection] to the Wolesi Jirga" within 15 days. The lower house (Wolesi Jirga) can override presidential objections with a two-thirds majority vote. But if the president takes no action on a bill for 15 days, the document becomes law.

The New York-based International Central for Transitional Justice noted in a press release on February 3 that Karzai has endorsed the recommendations of a 2004 report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission that urged the prosecution and removal of "war criminals from positions of power."

HRW, whose work is attacked in the new resolution, said in a brief on December 12 that the Karzai administration signed on to a 2005 "Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice." The group added that the plan pledged five "key actions" to implement and complete a transitional justice process by 2009. They include publicly commemorating public suffering through three decades of war, vetting the civil service to exclude serious human rights abusers, documenting past events to establish accountability, promoting reconciliation and national unity, and establishing a mechanism for justice and accountability.

After the Wolesi Jirga approved the amnesty bill, presidential spokesman Mohammad Karim Rahimi told reporters on February 6 that Karzai had sent the document to legal experts for review. Rahimi did not say how Karzai planned to act on the bill, but he said that Afghan and Islamic law dictate that no one has the right or authority to forgive a criminal, apart from the victim or others harmed by the crime. Rahimi went on to "assure [the public] that the president will not take any action against the constitution." He added that the "government will never surrender to pressure in implementation of the constitution," Pajhwak News Agency reported.

Karzai now has less than two weeks to influence the fate of a resolution that appears to run counter to the wishes of the Afghan public and the country's international obligations.

Karzai can choose to reject the bill based on constitutional grounds -- which his experts can arguably find in Article 7 and in Article 6, which obliges the state to create a society "based on social justice, protection of human dignity, [and the] protection of human rights." HRW Asia researcher Sam Zarifi has noted that international law prohibits the extension of national amnesties to genocide or war crimes.

Basing a rejection argument on Afghan law, experts could conceivably turn to Islamic jurisprudence -- under which neither the state nor its organs has the right to forgive the perpetrator of a crime like murder.

Karzai's rejection of the bill would surely alienate some in his immediate circle, including powerful members of both houses of the National Assembly. And in the end, the Wolesi Jirga might muster enough votes to overturn his veto, further eroding the president's public standing.

Former warring parties have tried to flex their muscles -- including through today's rally by tens of thousands of supporters of the controversial bill.

The "amnesty" bill and the ensuing presidential quandary are ultimately a result of expediency measures -- endorsed by Karzai himself -- that allowed individuals accused of gross rights violations to escape accountability and even assume positions of power.

The bill is based on just one of the five key points of the Action Plan that Karzai's administration endorsed -- namely the "promotion of reconciliation and national unity."

Karzai might do well to remind the resolution's backers of the other four key points of that plan -- and fulfill his 2005 pledge to implement them.

Some would argue that as the head of a Muslim state, Karzai's first responsibility is to uphold justice. That suggests that the temporary loss of support among a few powerful individuals might be outweighed by the gains of defending the rights of victims of past violence and the broader public.

Karzai must be wondering whether such an approach could turn the amnesty dilemma into a presidential panacea.

Afghan FM receives his Russian counterpart

Posted On Foreign Affairs Ministry site: Feb 23, 2007

Afghan foreign minister, Dr. Spanta met the visiting Russian foreign minister, HE Sergei Lavrov . In their lengthy discussion, the two foreign ministers exchanged views on a number of issues. Referring to Afghanistan foreign policy principles (multilateral, cooperative and confident foreign policy) Dr. Spanta stated that based on these principles, Afghanistan is keen to expand its bilateral relations with Russia on all mutually beneficial areas. He invited Russia, in particular Russian private sector to assume more role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. By thanking Russia’s active support for Afghanistan since the collapse of the Taliban regime, including Russia’s support for the presence of the international community in Afghanistan, Afghan foreign minister expressed his wish to see Russia’s continuous support. He drew attention of his Russian counterpart to the utility of pursuing coordinated policy in addressing Afghanistan and region’s challenges such as terrorism, illicit drug. In this context he mentioned joint NATO-Russian-Afghanistan cooperation as an important framework to combat illicit drug.    

On his part the Russian foreign minister reiterated his country’s support for the Afghan government and its readiness to increase its contribution to the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan.   The two ministers also exchanged views on pressing regional and international developments, including Iran’s nuclear dossier. The two ministers expressed their wish to see a negotiated solution to this crisis.

Possible areas of cooperation between the two ministries was another issue that was discussed. At the end of the meeting, the two foreign ministers took part in a joint press conference, which was followed by releasing a joint press declaration.

Taliban claim they are rearmed, ready for war

Reuters - 02/25/2007 - SPIN BOLDAK - Rearmed with new guns the Taliban on Friday vowed this would be the deadliest year for foreign soldiers in Afghanistan since the Islamists were toppled in 2001.

"This year will prove to be the bloodiest for the foreign troops. It is not just a threat, we will prove it," senior commander Mullah Dadullah told Reuters by satellite phone.

"The Taliban's war preparations are going on in caves and in mountains. Our 6,000 fighters are ready for attacks on foreign troops after the change in weather and as it becomes warmer."

His comments came as Britain approved a plan to send a wave of extra troops to Afghanistan to repel an expected spring offensive by the Taliban, British government sources said.

Taliban leaders say they expect to be able to field 10,000 soldiers after the bloodiest year since the Taliban?s ouster in 2001, with a big increase in suicide fighters after conventional pitched battles brought heavy losses for the rebels.

With winter snows melting, fighting has already picked up dramatically in recent weeks.

Dadullah said the extra weapons the Taliban were being supplied?he did not say from where?included the ability to bring down the NATO and U.S. helicopters crucial to their operations in this rugged, mountainous country.

The rebels said they shot down a twin-rotor Chinook helicopter earlier this month in southern Afghanistan that killed eight U.S. soldiers and wounded 14. The U.S. said the pilot reported engine failure.

The insurgents have claimed several foreign chopper downings, but only one has been confirmed since the 2001 war. That was in 2005 when 17 soldiers died when their craft was hit as it came in to land during combat operations.

NATO, the United States and the Taliban are promising spring offensives in what they and analysts regard a crunch year in a country still in crisis more than five years after the Taliban?s fall.

More than 4,000 people, a quarter of them civilians, died in fighting last year.

But on Friday, more than 30,000 people rallied in a Taliban execution ground to support an all-embracing amnesty for war criminals, including members of parliament and government officials.

Parliament insists amnesty for those guilty in almost 30 years of war is essential for peace and reconciliation. Local and international rights groups say punishment is essential for peace and to allow the country to move on.

double spring offensive

The Economist - 02/23/2007 - After a dreadful year in Afghanistan, a newly confident NATO is preparing itself to take on the Taliban. Success will be difficult, but not impossible

KABUL, KAJAKI AND KANDAHAR - THE Kajaki dam, with its turquoise lake lost in the rocky wilderness of southern Afghanistan, is an unusually scenic setting for battle. On the heights above, British marines at the sharp end of NATO's war against the Taliban routinely come under fire from guns and rockets. But over the past two months the Taliban have been pushed back by NATO's firepower and their continued pot-shots are, for the moment, little more than harassment.

On a recent evening a single round from a Soviet-era anti-aircraft gun, fired from six kilometres (just under four miles) away, provoked a full pyrotechnic response: dozens of mortar rounds, bursts of red tracers from a 50-calibre machinegun, illumination flares, the flaming rush of a Javelin missile and the juddering explosion of a 1,000kg guided bomb dropped from a Harrier jet. An American B-1B bomber was on hand to follow up; an Apache helicopter provided surveillance.

After the show was over, the Royal Marines reported two Taliban sentries killed and others fleeing. An expensive operation for the end result, perhaps. When the fighting is on the ground, it is more treacherous and does claim marine lives. The wadis and labyrinthine Afghan compounds, with their metre-thick walls, provide excellent cover. The Taliban are good shots, conceal themselves well and evacuate their casualties efficiently.

Even so, the Royal Marines at Kajaki are now fighting on highly favourable tactical terms. The flight of Afghans from surrounding villages reduces the risk of killing civilians. The marines choose when and where to attack. They hold the high ground, they have high-powered observation equipment and mastery of the air. "We see them three kilometres away. They cannot see us 200 metres away," says one officer. "It's unfair sometimes"

The problem is the wider strategy. The Taliban have a seemingly inexhaustible supply of recruits, enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan and almost certainly have greater staying power than the foreign troops. The marines do not have the numbers to hold more than the immediate area around the Kajaki dam. From their dominant hilltops-called Athens, Normandy and Sparrow Hawk-all they survey with their high-tech gadgetry is Taliban country. So the marines now perform a strange dance: they raid Taliban hideouts (as in the picture above), they withdraw-and then they watch the enemy return.

Just for now, this is good enough for NATO. After a dreadful year of violence in 2006, when security in the south appeared to collapse, the alliance has rediscovered a sense of confidence and believes it has regained the initiative. At the very least, say officers, NATO will not again be caught by surprise when, as expected, the Taliban step up the fight in the spring.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO-led coalition of 37 countries, strolled almost casually into the heart of Taliban country as it deployed for the first time in the south and east of Afghanistan last summer. It was ill prepared for the ensuing fight that cost the lives of some 3,700 Afghans and 191 soldiers from ISAF and the separate American-led coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom.

John Reid, who was Britain's defence secretary at the time, carelessly said he would be happy if British forces completed their mission "without a shot being fired". Instead, the first contingent to deploy in Helmand fired nearly half a million rounds of ammunition and 11,500 mortar rounds and artillery shells as paratroopers found themselves parcelled out and besieged in towns across the province.

Last September in the neighbouring province of Kandahar, a brigade-sized force, led by the Canadians but cobbled together from disparate elements, only narrowly managed to evict an estimated 1,000 Taliban fighters from the Panjwayi valley from where they had threatened Kandahar city. In Kabul, the country's capital, repeated Iraq-style suicide-bombings sapped the confidence of the government and its international supporters. The ring road connecting the main cities, the symbol of reconstruction, became perilous.

All this has changed, at least temporarily. The level of violence has decreased sharply and the ring road is safer. There have been no bombings in Kabul for months, and reconstruction teams are again active in the south. But whether this is real progress, or the result of the Taliban taking their habitual winter break, will become clear only after the snows melt. "The blood of the oppressed people and the mujahideen will bear its fruit very soon," promised a letter from Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, in December. Taliban commanders boast that they have 10,000 fighters, plus a swarm of thousands of suicide-bombers, ready to go into action.

Everything going their way
Nevertheless, NATO is feeling bullish. Along with Afghanistan's own forces, it is preparing "Operation Nowrouz" (new year), a spring offensive to disrupt the Taliban's spring offensive. Fighting has continued through the winter, but it has usually been at NATO's initiative. In Helmand the British have been raiding deep into Taliban areas. The Canadians have been clearing out more of the Panjwayi valley, claiming success in finding and killing key Taliban leaders and thus allowing civilians to start returning. Despite the war of words between Afghanistan and Pakistan, intelligence co-operation is improving, with the creation of a joint NATO-Afghan-Pakistan intelligence cell in Kabul.

Above all, the alliance has been energised by America's intensified commitment. On top of the surge of five brigades into Iraq, George Bush announced on February 15th that an extra brigade would be deployed in Afghanistan. He is also requesting an additional $11.8 billion in military and civilian aid over two years, mostly to pay for the expansion and training of the Afghan army and police.

Britain is beefing up its forces in the south with an extra battalion in April; additional special forces are also expected. A fresh battalion is due from Poland. Bits and bobs are being offered by other allies: six reconnaissance jets from Germany, more surveillance drones and a transport plane from Italy, military trainers from Spain and so on. But these commitments emphasise the split in the alliance. "Those with their hands in the mangle of the fighting in the south have no choice but to reinforce," says one senior NATO officer. "The rest are trying to stay out of it."

A recent report by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank, blamed the growth of the insurgency on "the desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace". Even with the extra resources, NATO will still be stretched thin. Afghanistan is bigger than Iraq, both in terms of size and population. But the number of security forces, whether foreign troops or local soldiers, is less than a third of those available in Iraq.

The country has seen real achievements since the fall of the Taliban, not least the growth in education and health care (admittedly more in quantity than quality) and the return of more than 3m refugees. The north and west are relatively stable. The population of Kabul has expanded eight-fold, and streets ravaged by war are bustling with street markets. People in the capital still express their strong support for the presence of international forces.

But the Afghan government remains weak, and this is as much of a problem as the strength of the Taliban. In a society wrecked by wars, poverty and illiteracy, the government lacks the human resources to run the country. In recent years it has been able to spend barely half its budget. Afghans are disillusioned by the lack of jobs and the spread of corruption, whether petty or high level. After the Taliban's collapse large parts of the country came under the control of unsavoury warlords, often linchpins of the booming opium trade. The source of nine-tenths of the world's heroin, Afghanistan is just one step away from becoming a narco-state.

When NATO belatedly expanded its remit to the turbulent south and east, the foreign soldiers were often seen as the protectors of rapacious local officials?and a threat to small poppy farmers. The Taliban seized the moment to escalate their attacks. That the alliance held its nerve is something, but success is far from assured.

"In the short term we will not remove the threat of the Taliban, but we will contain it," says David Richards, the British general who has just completed his tour as ISAF's commander. The betting is that the Taliban will not attempt another conventional battle but will intensify ambushes and suicide-bombings. Had he had more troops last year, says the general, he could have stopped the main body of Taliban escaping the Panjwayi valley. And with more boots on the ground, he would have been less reliant on air power, with its inevitable risk of big civilian casualties.

The Afghan army is being expanded rapidly, but desertion rates are high and the quality is often poor. "When they come under fire they scatter. It's like herding cats," says a British sergeant helping to "mentor" the Afghan army in Kandahar. The few decent Afghan army units are badly overworked. The police are in even worse shape, regarded by most Afghans as little better than robbers in uniform. The government and its backers are now scraping together a third force, the "auxiliary police" recruited locally and trained for just two weeks before being deployed.

Building the state is plainly key to winning the war. General Richards sums up the need as reconstruction, development, governance and relations with Pakistan, all wrapped up in a cloak of growing security. His central point is that there must be "synergistic" progress in all dimensions.


He has been a highly political commander, taking on the job of speaking to Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, "soldier to soldier". He claims the effort is paying off, but in the process he has irritated the Afghan government. He has also been instrumental in organising an ?action group? of Afghan, ISAF, UN and other senior officials to turn government decisions into reality. The group deals with security, intelligence, strategic communications and development. The general wanted to add a fifth pillar, governance, but was overruled by President Hamid Karzai.

America's new counter-insurgency doctrine espouses similar ideas about the need for "unity of effort" in military and civilian activity. But relations between America and Britain in Afghanistan have been tetchy. Some of General Richards's departing staff are nervous that ISAF's new American commander, General Dan McNeill, will be too "kinetic". Rightly or wrongly, the new man is known by some as "Bomber McNeill".

Finger in the dam
The problems that beset Afghanistan are encapsulated at Kajaki. The workers at the hydro-electric power station inhabit a surreal grey zone, sleeping with the Taliban in the villages at night and working alongside the British at the dam by day. There is an unspoken understanding by both sides to keep the plant operating; the government wants power for the cities, while the Taliban charge villagers for electricity.

First built by the Soviet Union in 1953, and upgraded by the Americans in 1975, the power station that provides most of southern Afghanistan's electricity gradually fell into disrepair. The transmission lines were blown up in 1980 by anti-Soviet mujahideen, then fixed by the Taliban government in 1996. The windows were blown out by American bombing in 2001. An American-financed project to refurbish the power station and upgrade the transmission lines is a development priority but work stopped last May when the area became too insecure. Restarting the work means reopening about 70km of road through the Taliban-controlled Sangin valley?and protecting some 100km of new transmission lines.

At Kajaki the Royal Marines are training local army recruits. Some of the hilltops around the dam are held by private militia hired by American contractors. These friendly Afghan forces complain of being low on ammunition, water and fuel (though some commanders seem to have no shortage of boys with painted nails for company). But all the fighting in Kajaki is done by the marines, who dare not tell their Afghan allies of their plans for fear of being betrayed to the Taliban.

In the view of one senior ISAF officer, ?there is not a hope in hell that we can secure the road with the limited resources we have.? Indeed, the job could tie down all of the reinforcements currently planned for southern Afghanistan. The only answer, in his view, is to ?engage? the population in the district to pacify the area. The offer of construction and security jobs should prove a useful enticement. ISAF officials like to display diagrams of how they intend to drive a wedge between the ?irreconcilable? Taliban based largely in Pakistan and the more moderate local elements. It looks neat in the briefing rooms but in practice is a messy, ambiguous business fraught with moral dilemmas.

A bargain to stop the fighting at Musa Qala, near Kajaki, has been particularly controversial. After months of fighting that cost the lives of six soldiers last year, British forces agreed to withdraw from the town in return for the deployment of an auxiliary police force and a promise by local elders to keep the Taliban outside a 5km radius from the town centre. The British saw it as a pioneering deal that got their forces out of static positions, gave government officials access to the town and empowered local elders. But some senior American officials denounced it as surrender to the Taliban.

In any event, the Musa Qala deal collapsed last month when the Taliban, accusing local elders of collaborating with a NATO airstrike that narrowly missed a militant leader, stormed back into town and bulldozed part of the local police station. NATO says it got its man, Mullah Abdul-Ghafour, in a later bombing attack, but the Taliban still hold the town. Some argue that the deal was worthless because it could not be enforced; the British still say it was a success because the Taliban's behaviour angered much of the local population. The question, however, is whether displeasure at the Taliban is enough to overcome fear of the Taliban.

Matters have not been helped by the political upheaval in Helmand, which has seen three governors in a year. The current man, Asadullah Wafa, has only just started trying to assert his authority, beginning with the partial eradication of poppy crops in the province. Poverty, warlordism and rebels have made Helmand the great opium den of the world. Poppy cultivation jumped up by nearly 60% across Afghanistan last year, mostly due to increases in the southern provinces. Helmand alone accounted for over 40% of production.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime expects a further rise in the south this year, but a "significant decrease" in the more stable north and centre. NATO believes that the Taliban are intimately bound up with the opium trade in the south, and that drugs money finances the insurgency. The debate is whether the government should first tackle the insurgents or the poppy growers, and whether eradication should take place before or after alternatives are in place.

What alternatives? Without security, electricity, reliable transport and access to markets, poppy farming is still the best bet. It is a crop that requires little water, does not need refrigeration and acts as a family's store of wealth: a hectare of poppy is nine times more profitable than wheat.

Ashraf Ghani, a former Afghan finance minister, argues that the real answer is not to find alternative crops but to modernise the economy. He advocates, for instance, giving preferential trade terms for textiles from Afghanistan. "Cotton will not compete with poppy," he says, "but T-shirts will." Others have proposed the idea of licensing poppy production to make pharmaceutical opiates.

The Taliban keep their poppies
NATO officials worry that antagonising farmers with forced eradication will only strengthen the insurgency. The Afghan government has so far resisted American pressure for aerial spraying, preferring to rely on tractors. It claims to be targeting "the greedy rather than the needy" (for instance destroying poppy fields allegedly owned by a former police chief). No compensation will be offered. But uprooting is often a haphazard affair, usually affecting those who cannot bribe the eradication teams to pass over their plots. Given that there can be little or no eradication in Taliban areas, those who live under government control feel unfairly penalised.

Neither the drugs trade nor the insurgency can be controlled so long as the border remains uncontrolled. The Taliban still enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, whether with the Pakistani government's approval (as Mr Karzai claims) or despite efforts to stop them (as Mr Musharraf insists). In the south-east, the Americans are reinforcing their presence on the border with Pakistan. But in the Canadian and British sectors, the frontier is unguarded. Despite NATO's planned reinforcements, there is unlikely to be more than a thin presence of special forces to watch over this part of the border.

Indeed, Helmand's governor gave warning on February 11th that 700 Taliban fighters had crossed over from Pakistan and were heading for the Kajaki dam. Up on Athens, Normandy and Sparrow Hawk, the Royal Marines like to soak up the sun during lulls in the fighting. But as spring advances, this area may soon become too hot for comfort.

Afghans See Decline Since '05

The Washington Post 02/24/2007 By Griff Witte
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Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated markedly since 2005, with rising violence, government corruption and misguided U.S. efforts contributing to growing unease among the population, according to a report released yesterday based in part on 1,000 interviews with ordinary Afghans.

Although there were bright spots -- a better overall economy and more rights for women -- the report's authors found diminishing security as the Taliban steps up its attacks, a discredited justice system and a severe lack of basic services such as electricity. The report, produced by the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies and funded in part by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development, also found that Afghans tend to be more negative in their outlook than official statistics or media accounts would suggest.

"Public fear and frustration are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, Afghans are beginning to disengage from national governing processes and lose confidence in their leadership," according to the report. "Dramatic changes are required in the coming weeks, or 2007 will become the breaking point."

That statement echoed remarks made earlier this month by the departing U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, who told a congressional panel that "a point could be reached at which the government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people, and the goal of establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could be lost forever."

A year ago, U.S. officials were speaking much more optimistically about Afghanistan. But an especially violent summer, fed by an increasingly aggressive insurgency, has convinced many policymakers that Afghanistan is at a precarious moment more than five years after a U.S.-led military campaign knocked the Taliban from power. Last week, President Bush pledged $11.8 billion in aid for Afghanistan over the next two years and said U.S. forces would be increased by 3,200 to 27,000, the highest level of the war.

Among the report's recommendations are to shift the focus away from eradicating poppy fields and toward interdiction, to give local communities more control over aid money, and to abandon major military sweeps that inflict damage on civilians in favor of rapid-response forces that can protect Afghans in emergencies. "NATO and the United States' 'big army' military operations and emphasis on foot soldier 'kills' are doing more damage than good," the report said.

Lt. Col. Todd Vician, a Pentagon spokesman, said he could not comment on the report's recommendations because he had not seen them, but he said part of the reason the United States is committing more troops to Afghanistan is to improve response times. Britain said yesterday it would also be sending additional troops.

World Bank Supports Private Sector Development in Afghanistan
infrastructure facilities.

The Private Sector Development (PSD) Support Project aims to provide land
services and facilities including electricity, water and telecommunications;
and build capacity of government agencies to develop and implement PSD-related
programs. It will also help improve capacity of the government and its agencies
to promote Afghanistan as an investment destination and provide investment
facilitation services.


Private sector development is one of the priority areas for the Afghanistan
The government recognizes that the private sector will offer the employment
opportunities for the Afghan people that the state can no longer provide, and
will also provide the tax revenues that will help funding health, education and
other services.

Md. Reazul Islam, World Bank Senior Private Sector Development Specialist and
Project Team Leader said that while there is considerable private
of private sector development is to expand formal entrepreneurial activity and
induce a shift from an informal environment to a formal contract-based private

This project will complement work of other donors and help Afghanistan address
the most important limitations to private investment, especially land
constraints and power supply, though industrial park development. By helping to
address these constraints the project will attract private investment in a
variety of sectors, especially light manufacturing, food products and carpets.

The project will fund the construction of an industrial park in Hissar-e-Shahi
near Jalalabad. This industrial park will help stimulate the local economy,
generate employment, and raise much needed tax revenues. The project will also
fund capacity building in Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) and the
Ministry of Commerce and Industries.

The project has been developed in collaboration with other donors, including
International Development (USAID).

This project will be implemented over four years under the overall leadership
of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA).

Afghanistan tries to kick opium habit - again

The Associated Press - 02/25/2007
Cultivation rose 59 percent in 2006; goal is to destroy before harvest

DOBUNDI - Anguish creased the weathered face of the opium farmer as a U.S.-trained eradication team swept through his farm fields in this southern Afghan village.

With helicopters buzzing overhead, dozens of tractors plowed up Sadullah Khan's sprouting poppy plants, which in two months time would have yielded the sticky resin used to make heroin - and earned him, by Afghan standards, a generous income.

After failing miserably to curb opium production last year, the Afghan government has launched a renewed eradication drive, particularly here in Helmand province - which accounted for more than 40 percent of the 2006's record yield of 6,725 tons. The U.S. government estimates the opium trade generates $3 billion a year in illicit economic activity.

There is some armed resistance to the campaign in Helmand, where drug gangs and Taliban militants form a powerful nexus against President Hamid Karzai's unpopular government. Still, counter-narcotics officials expect better results this year ? if not a resounding success.

That's cold comfort to Khan, a 55-year old father of nine, who owns 25 acres of land planted with poppies.

"When they are eradicating my poppy, it's just like they are destroying my home," he said, watching the heavily armed Afghan teams at work - supported by a handful of U.S. contractors, who rode in pairs through the rolling poppy fields on all-terrain vehicles.

There are fears the program could increase support for Taliban insurgents, but Karzai is under growing international pressure to crack down on Afghan drug production - which accounts for more than 90 percent of global supply.

Bush's public reminder
Last week, President Bush called poppy cultivation a threat to Afghanistan's fragile democracy. Bush said he had told Karzai "to gain the confidence of his people, and the confidence of the world, he's got to do something about it, with our help."

The year 2006 saw an alarming 59 percent rise in opium cultivation to 407,700 acres, deepening fears that Afghanistan is rapidly becoming a narco-state.

A Western counter-narcotics official said it was too early for an accurate prediction of this year's crop, but he noted some positive signs.

Cultivation will likely drop significantly in the north and northeast while increasing slightly in some areas of the south, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The government, he said, has launched eradication "earlier and with more determination" than last year and has warned officials they would be fired if they didn't take action.

Lt. Gen. Mohammed Daoud Daoud, the deputy interior minister for counter-narcotics, said 8,900 acres of poppy fields have been destroyed nationwide in the past month. The target is to destroy almost 14 times that figure "a total of 123,550 acres" before the harvest, which runs from April to July, from the south to the colder north.

The Western official doubted that target will be reached. But he said he hoped that 15 to 20 percent of the planted fields will be eradicated to demonstrate the "business risk" to poppy growers. Last year, only about 8 percent of planted fields were destroyed.

Helping Taliban recruit?
The campaign, supported mainly by the U.S. and Britain, carries a political and military risk for the government and its Western allies. It could generate more recruits for the Taliban, the militia that is threatening a spring offensive against NATO forces.

There have been five attacks in the past two weeks against the eradication campaign in Helmand, Farah and Nangarhar provinces, Daoud said. In the worst incident, a roadside bomb in Helmand's Nad Ali district killed two police officers and wounded three serving as guards for the eradication team.

To mitigate the risk of a backlash by farmers, authorities say they are targeting areas where there's little reason not to grow crops like wheat and vegetables _ rather than dry, remote fields where farmers may feel forced to cultivate opium because they lack good irrigation or market access.

Most eradication efforts are led by provincial governors who pay their teams with U.S. money. But there's also a well-equipped, 550-man national eradication force under the Ministry of Interior, which is advised by the U.S. security contractor Dyncorp.

This force has deployed to areas with increased poppy cultivation ? in Nad Ali, for example, where vast poppy fields are irrigated by canals fed by the Helmand River.

This week, angry farmers in Dobundi village watched as uniformed men on tractors plowed up foot-tall poppy plants. Counter-narcotics officials say the farmers should have time to replant with legal crops.

In other villages, farmers have flooded fields to obstruct the tractors. Dobundi's farmers put up no resistance, but they complained bitterly, alleging security forces targeted them because the area is less dangerous than elsewhere in Helmand.

"If the Taliban were in Nad Ali, the government couldn't come here," said one farmer, Darath Khan.

He said Karzai's government had failed to bring security or development, despite the foreign aid that has poured into Afghanistan over the past five years.

Sadullah Khan spoke for many farmers when he described his dilemma. "I know it's not good to cultivate poppy but we don't have any other option," he said. "If we can't cultivate it, we can't feed our families."

He said his poppy crop earns him four times what a crop of wheat would. If Sadullah Khan were allowed to harvest his poppies, his 25 acres would likely yield about 815 pounds of opium, which would fetch about $37,000 at market, the counter-narcotics official said.

Still, Sadullah Khan owns a relatively large farm in one of the best-irrigated and fertile regions in the country. By planting wheat he could, by his estimate, earn roughly $9,250 ? a good income in rural Afghanistan.

Opium eradication underway in Taliban heartland to dismay of Afghan farmers

The Associated Press - Friday, February 23, 2007 - DOBUNDI, Afghanistan: Anguish creased the weathered face of Sadullah Khan as a U.S.-trained opium eradication team swept through his farm fields in this southern Afghan village.

With helicopters buzzing overhead, dozens of tractors plowed up the sprouting poppy plants that in two months time would yield the opium resin used to make heroin.

After a miserable failure last year, the Afghan government has launched a renewed drive to nip poppy cultivation in the bud, particularly in Helmand province — which accounted for more than 40 percent of the 2006's record-breaking yield of 6,100 metric tons (6,725 tons).

Despite some armed resistance to the campaign in a region where drug gangs and Taliban militants form a powerful nexus against President Hamid Karzai's unpopular government, counternarcotics officials expect better results this year if not a resounding success.

That's cold comfort to Sadullah Khan, a 55-year old father of nine, who owns 10 hectares (25 acres) of land that was planted with poppy.

"When they are eradicating my poppy, it's just like they are destroying my home," he said, watching the heavily armed Afghan teams at work — supported by a handful of U.S. contractors, who rode in pairs through the rolling poppy fields on all-terrain vehicles.

Despite concerns that eradication in the south could boost grassroots support for a resurgent Taliban, Karzai is under growing international pressure to crackdown on Afghan drug production that accounts for more than 90 percent of global supply.

Last week, U.S. President George W. Bush called poppy cultivation a threat to Afghanistan's fragile democracy and said he had told Karzai that "to gain the confidence of his people, and the confidence of the world, he's got to do something about it, with our help."

2006 saw an alarming 59 percent rise in opium cultivation to 165,000 hectares (407,700 acres), deepening fears that Afghanistan is rapidly becoming a narco-state.

A Western counternarcotics official said it was too early to give an accurate prediction of this year's crop, but noted some positive signs.

Cultivation will likely drop significantly in the north and northeast while increasing slightly in some areas of the south, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. He said the government has launched eradication "earlier and with more determination" than last year and warned officials they would be sacked if they didn't take action.

Lt. Gen. Mohammed Daoud Daoud, the deputy interior minister for counter-narcotics, said 3,600 hectares (8,900 acres) of poppy fields have been destroyed nationwide in the past month. The target is to destroy 50,000 hectares (123,550 acres) before the harvest which runs from April to July, from the south to the colder north.

The Western official doubted that target would be reached but hoped that 15-20 percent of the planted fields would be eradicated to demonstrate the "business risk" to farmers of growing poppy. Last year, only about 8 percent of planted fields were destroyed.

But the campaign, supported principally by the United States and Britain, also entails a risk for the government and its Western allies, because it could generate more recruits for the hardline militia that is threatening a bloody spring offensive against NATO forces.

Daoud reported five violent incidents in the past two weeks against the eradication campaign in Helmand, Farah and Nangarhar provinces. In the worst incident, a roadside bomb killed two police and wounded three who were protecting eradicators in Nad Ali.

To mitigate the risk of a backlash by farmers, authorities say they are targeting areas where there's little reason not to grow legal crops like wheat and vegetables — rather than dry, remote fields where farmers may be more compelled to cultivate opium because they lack good irrigation or market access.

Most of the eradication is led by provincial governors who receive U.S. funding to raise teams for the job, but there's also a well-equipped, 550-man national eradication force under the Ministry of Interior, which is mentored by the U.S. security contractor Dyncorp that once supplied Karzai's bodyguards.

The force has deployed to where authorities see a worrying increase in cultivation — in Nad Ali, where vast expanses of poppy fields are irrigated by canals fed from the Helmand River.

Earlier this week, angry farmers in Dobundi village looked on at the uniformed men on tractors as they plowed up their poppy plants — which were about a foot (30 centimeters) tall and yet to flower. Counternarcotics officials say they should have time to replant their fields with legal crops.

Farmers put up no resistance. In other villages, they have deliberately flooded fields to obstruct the tractors.

But Dobundi's farmers complained bitterly, alleging that security forces were targeting their district because it was less dangerous than other parts of Helmand that are under virtual Taliban control.

"If the Taliban were in Nad Ali, the government couldn't come here," farmer Darath Khan, 45, said.

He stopped short of declaring support for the militants, but complained Karzai's government had failed to bring security or development despite the major injection of foreign aid to Afghanistan in the past five years.

"I know it's not good to cultivate poppy but we don't have any other option. If we can't cultivate it, we can't feed our families," said Sadullah Khan, adding that he'd earn only about a quarter as much from growing wheat as he does from opium.

But given his large landholding in one of the best-irrigated and fertile regions in the country, that would still be a reasonable income for rural Afghanistan, where drought and terrible poverty are rife.

If it was used to grow opium, his 10 hectares (25 acres) would likely yield about 370 kilograms (815 pounds), which would fetch about US$37,000 at market, the counternarcotics official said.

That's a fraction of the vast profits reaped by criminal networks that process the opium into heroin and smuggle to the Middle East and Europe, but still a huge sum in Helmand, although most of it would likely be spent by the farmer in paying off local officials and warlords, the counternarcotics official said.

Alumnus Founds Afghan Movement

By David Krone - Hoya Staff Writer Friday, February 23, 2007

During his years on the Hilltop, Hamed Rahim Wardak (COL ’97) spent much of his time studying ways to reform his native country, Afghanistan. Ten years later, Wardak may have just found a way.

Wardak has established a reform movement called “Fedayeen-e-Sul,” an anti-Taliban bloc that seeks to build a democracy in the country currently occupied by U.S. military forces.

Wardak, a Rhodes scholar, conceived the movement, whose name translated from Dari-Persian means “Sacrificers for Peace,” while traveling throughout Afghanistan and speaking with local tribal elders, according to a report last week on http://www.dailyindia.com. He said the movement will seek democratic reforms and liberal economic policies, such as free markets and low taxes, while portraying al Qaeda and the Taliban as “un-Islamic.”

Wardak could not be reached for comment for this report. “The more I deal with elders, I realize the potential for democracy in this country is great,” Wardak said, according to the Feb. 13 report. “The type of ideals that we have, they also share; they just express it in different ways.” Wardak added that his movement aims to be “pan-ethnic, reformist and democratic.”

Wardak transferred to Georgetown as a sophomore in the fall of 1994 after studying at the University of Maryland. His father, current Afghan Defense Minister Abdurrahim Wardak, immigrated with the rest of his family to the United States during the Taliban regime, said Anne Sullivan, senior associate dean of Georgetown College.

A government major with a concentration in political theory, Hamed Rahim Wardak wrote his senior thesis under the mentorship of John Voll, associate director for the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and government professor Jeane Kirkpatrick.

Voll recalled Wardak’s curiosity and passion for Afghanistan. “He was hard-working and personable,” Voll said. “He was always well-informed and enjoyable to talk to about contemporary issues on Afghan politics and history.”

Wardak wrote his senior thesis about the way the relationship between the Afghan government in Kabul and lower levels of administration affected control of the country.

“Between his senior thesis and his brilliant research, he left Georgetown with a good conceptual framework in political development,” Voll said.

Voll said that in leading Fedayeen-e-Sul, Wardak is in a good position to help Afghan citizens break out of the current cycle of violence. His strongest asset, according to Voll, is his ability to deal with the competing interests of cosmopolitan city dwellers and rural village farmers.

Zahid Bukhari, a director of the Alwaleed center, said many Afghans view the United States as a foreign power trying to impose an illegitimate government — a view that could cause problems for Wardak, since some may associate him with the United States.

“The Afghan people are looking for freedom, so in that sense, Wardak’s message is fine,” Bukhari said. “The bone of contention will be whether Wardak is truly representative of the people over there or representative of the end of the government.”

Wardak said in the report on dailyindia.com that he hopes to redefine Islamic names and symbols, replacing their radical associations with what he sees as their original, correct meanings.

Emal Stanizai (GRD ’07), an Afghan resident, said he is unsure whether the political climate in Afghanistan is suitable for reform movements such as Fedayeen-e-Sul.

“Bringing significant changes in such a short period of time, despite challenges that currently exist, is a difficult task, but it is happening now, though slowly,” Stanizai said. “There is a large number of political parties [and] movements; every [one] of them pursue their own or others’ political agenda,” Stanizai said. “Movements such as Wardak’s, as far as their intentions are good, can make [a] difference, but not to the extent one can anticipate.”

Shireen Hunter, director of the Carnegie Project on Reformist Islam at the Alwaleed center, said she was also skeptical of how effective Wardak’s new movement will be, although she said she views it as a good start toward an Afghan democratic movement.

“There is a Persian proverb known by [Afghans] that goes like this: ‘One flower does not make spring,’” Hunter said. “But spring begins with one flower. It will take a lot more efforts like this to be successful, but hopefully, by sowing the seed and allowing it to take root, there will eventually be success.”

"Taliban would falter without help of Pakistan" - Afghan official

The Record (Waterloo, Canada) - 02/23/2007

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan would be dead overnight if Pakistan were forced to stop supporting them, says a senior Afghanistan government official.

Jawed Ludin, in a wide-ranging interview with The Record, said the focus of NATO troops on capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and his Taliban supporters in Afghanistan left untouched the wellspring of Islamic extremism in Central Asia.

"The root and the sources of terrorist indoctrination, terrorist support, terrorist mobilization, terrorist financing, terrorist training and terrorist launching -- all of this happens to be based in Pakistan," Ludin said.

"This is, in my view, the main and the biggest reason for why we have a larger, fiercer and more deadly threat in Afghanistan today than we had five years ago."

Ludin, the former chief of staff to Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai, and before that Karzai's director of communications, is visiting family in Waterloo before taking up his latest post -- Afghanistan's ambassador to Scandinavia, based in Oslo, Norway.

More than five years since the Taliban was ousted from power in the poverty-stricken country the 2,500 Canadian troops there find themselves battling a tenacious insurgency.

There are about 40,000 troops from 38 countries in Afghanistan, forming what's called the International Stabilization Security Assistance Force.

"The whole world is here to fight terrorism, why is it they (Taliban fighters) can come in great numbers from across the border and attack us, and Pakistan gets away with impunity?" Ludin said.

About 49 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat have been killed in Afghanistan since 2002, and today Ludin is scheduled to meet with some Canadian soldiers who recently returned from tours of duty in Afghanistan. Every Canadian soldier who has served in Afghanistan is viewed as a hero by the overwhelming majority of the people there, Ludin said.

His comments come at a time when the Canadian public is deeply divided about fighting in that country. About 60 per cent of Canadians are opposed to having Canadian troops there. "Afghanistan is grateful obviously to have Canada on its side," Ludin said.

The bombings in Madrid and London, as well as the attacks of 9/11, are all linked to terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ludin said. "It would obviously be easier and more comfortable for all Canadians and their soldiers to be back in Canada, but life is not always about easy choices. The difficult choice is the right choice, and that's to be there," Ludin said.

The Italian prime minister recently saw his government fall over his support for keeping Italian troops in Afghanistan. The issue is widely viewed as a political Achilles heel for Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Ludin is a boyish-looking 34. He was born in Kabul in 1973, and was there when the former Soviet Union invaded in 1979.

While the Mujahedeen waged a guerrilla war against the Soviets the streets and people of Kabul were left largely untouched. The war came to Kabul after the Soviets left the country, and the once-proud city was destroyed. "It had become a hell," Ludin said.

He fled to England, eventually earning a master's degree in political studies from the University of London. He is fluent in the two major languages of Afghanistan, Pashtun and Dari, as well as English.

He helped the United Nations organize the Bonn conference of November 2001 that laid out the democratic framework for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. He returned to Afghanistan to work for the president's office in May 2003.

"There is a large consensus internationally that it is vital for this country to become secure and stable again in order for the world to be safe from the threat of terrorism," Ludin said.

NDP Leader Jack Layton, and other MPs have called for a major change of direction in Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Those critics want Canadian troops to focus more on development work, rather than fighting.

But Ludin said both are needed at the same time. "It's through development that you will ensure the long-term sustainability of this effort."

"You have to defeat the enemy of stability in Afghanistan in order to be able to help Afghanistan recover and develop economically," Ludin said.

The roots of terrorism in Afghanistan were planted in the 1980s. Money from Saudi Arabia was used by Pakistan's intelligence agencies to set up religious schools (Madrassas) where young recruits were indoctrinated into extremist Islam.

The Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan, but the Madrassas remained. The Taliban came out of these schools. Talib means religious student. Ludin said Pakistan and Afghanistan never accepted the border between the two countries when Pakistan was created in 1947.

And now Pakistani intelligence uses Islamic extremism to undermine any nationalist tendencies in the provinces that border Afghanistan. The Muslim radicals running the Madrassas, the Taliban and Pakistani intelligence agency known as ISI form what Ludin calls an evil triangle. "This triangle is the evil triangle that has to be dismantled if the world is ever going to be safe from terrorism" Ludin said.

Editorial from the Afghanistan Times

Posted on Afghanyat by: "Khaleeq Ahmad" khaleeqahm@yahoo.com - Feb 22, 2007

Pooping the gossip –makers’ Party - Editorial By Afghanistan Times
14 February 2007 - On the eve of President Hamid Karzai’s visit to London, the chatterati in Kabul have been all agog about a recent British news report claiming that the Presidents former chief of staff, Jawed Ludin, was obliged to leave his position as he was not playing ball and did not go along with the establishment view that Britain was conspiring with Pakistan to lop off southern Afghanistan and hand it over to Pakistan.

Extraordinary as the assertion is, what is most noteworthy about it is its timing, not its contents. With Mr. Karzai due to arrive in London on an official visit on Wednesday, some journalistic fun can presumably be had from seeking to place him in a spot with the publication of a seemingly embarrassing report that distracts from the larger issues that are at stake in the fight for democracy in Afghanistan by concentrating on minor matters, though even these are not anchored in context situated appropriately in fact.

But it is naïve to think that either Whitehall or the Presidential Palace here is all set to be diverted from the official agenda, which obviously grapples with some of the more critical issues of our day. Britain has voluntarily put boots on the ground in Afghanistan and backed this up with financial commitment. This country cannot but be mindful of this, and is duly appreciative of UK’s contribution. Indeed, there is a full-fledged partnership on between Kabul and London and no impartial observer can fail to see this.

However, this does not mean there must be congruence of approach in all circumstances. In facts, it is the hallmark of a serious relationship that such differences are narrowed or removed through mutual discussion.

It is no secret that western officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have been critical of Britain’s “go it alone policies” in the war theatre in Afghanistan, as the well-known British newspaper Daily Telegraph reported in early January. However, unease among Britain’s western allies with its policy came to be articulated right after the so-called Musa Qala peace deal that the British forces entered into with extremists in that minor towin in Helmand, long before the Daily Telegraph story appeared. That deal has now come apart, with the Taliban overrunning Musa Qala, the pact notwithstanding. Nevertheless, Britain wanted more such deals, if the Daily Telegraph is to be believed, “but the US and some Nato allies rejected the idea”.

Thinking in official circles in Afghanistan could not remain insulated from the dominant Nato thinking and was duly critical of the British approach as this seemed to be more mindful of Pakistan’s assertions on the question of cross-border infiltration of terrorists into Afghanistan than of the reality of the ground. Many thought that this was the case because Islamabad kept London happy by being helpful on tracking Islamist terrorists of Pakistan origin (and these make up nearly all the active extremist agents in Britain), and using that leverage to keep the British quiet in the Afghan context. This view was shared by the media as well as several of Britain’s allies.

But the Ludin issue had nothing to do with any of this, as gossip purveyors might believe; nor for that matter the out-of-line behavior of a senior member of the British diplomatic staff in Kabul. When the diplomat in question turned boorish at the President’s office in the latter part of December, it was Ludin who virtually ordered him out, we understand on high authority.

Incidentally, the diplomat was getting hot under the collar on an internal Afghan matter – the decision to change the governor of Helmand, and not on any question of security policy that might politically involve Pakistan, as some have been led to imagine. Thus, the basic assumption of the party-circuit is off the mark here.

And poor Mr Ludin, he has been sought to be painted as a possible British mole! The former chief of staff need have no fears for his reputation. As he prepared to leave the office for personal reasons after a long stint in Kabul, this paper knows for certain that he even declined ministerial nomination, and desired to be posted as the ambassador of Norway, a position he obtained without any fuss. A spy would hardly be treated with such dignity.

During his official talks in London, the President would certainly be discussing all ramifications of the security situation, including the counter-narcotics campaign to obtain a common understanding of how to deal with the terrorist threat in the coming weeks and months. It would be perfectly in keeping with established norms if the Afghan delegation also informed the foreign office that its diplomats needed to have a better grasp of protocol.

Afghan documentaries at New York film festival

NEW YORK: Three Afghan documentaries, including one on women and another on Kabul, are scheduled to be screened at the 2007 New York Arab and South Asian Film Festival in Big Apple, the organisers said here.

The documentary "Afghan Women: A History of Struggle" by director and producer Kathleen Foster would be presented during the 10-day festival in New York commenced today (Friday).

Organisers of the mega event said they had collected special feature on Afghanistan, including discussions on the issues of Afghanistan after the screening of those documentaries and films.

The 65-minute film in Persian, Pashto and English subtitles documents the development of the Afghan Women’s Rights Bill that was drafted, signed and presented to President Hamid Karzai by women leaders across the country.

To hit the global stage with the film festival, the documentary was created by Afghan women, who participated in the third annual conference of "Women for Afghan Women" in 2003 in Kandahar.

The second documentary on Kabul, capital of Afghanistan, explores the soul of a city devastated by nearly three decades of war. Jointly directed by David Edwards, Maliha Zulfacar and Gregory Whitmore, the 104-minute film follows city residents in the course of their daily lives and listens to their stories of the past and their hopes for the future.

From neighbourhoods leveled by rockets, traditional mud brick homes next to modern glass towers, gleaming SUVs caught in traffic jams with rebuilt taxis, Kabul Transit is about the spirit, as much as it is about the problems of the city.

Directed by Meena Nanji, the 82-minute documentary "View from Grain of Sand" was shot over the last three years in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A doctor, a teacher and a social worker tells how their lives were violently affected by wars of international making and three different regimes in Afghanistan.

One of the significant features of the 10-day festival is said to be the screening of "War Diaries", which will introduce the American public to unseen daily experience of the people of Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]