In this bulletin:

• Taleban forces retake Afghan town
• US to retake abandoned Taleban town
• It's an Afghan issue: Musharraf
• Afghan analysis as general bows out
• Taliban resurgence failure of US, Karzai govt
• Spanish refusal of more Afghan mission troops "snub" to NATO - daily
• Bush Administration Opposes Pakistan Linked - Aid Bill
• US Senate bill supports Pakistan
• U.S. Congressmen Call for More Money, Troops for Afghanistan
• Afghanistan: Country Needs Forward-Looking Mass Media Law
• Private Sector Investment Reaches $ 4.5b In 5 Years
  Loya Jirga a mere political stunt?
• A political curtain-raiser for the Taliban
• The Taliban's flower power
• More than a handful
• After war and repressive Taliban, Afghan art undergoes a revolution

Taleban forces retake Afghan town

BBC News / Friday, 2 February 2007 - Taleban forces in southern Afghanistan have taken control of a town which British troops had pulled out of after a peace deal with local elders.

Some local people said they were leaving the town, Musa Qala in Helmand province, for fear of bombing raids on the Taleban by Nato forces.

US commanders and diplomats had criticised the deal. They said it had not been done with elders but with the Taleban themselves and was not the way to defeat them.

The BBC's Alastair Leithead in Kabul says the loss of Musa Qala to the Taleban is a blow to the strategy of establishing peace deals in Helmand. It comes just days before the British hand over command of Nato forces to an American general.

The Musa Qala peace deal was a controversial change of tactics for British troops in Afghanistan. It saw them pull out of the small Helmand town as part of an agreement with the elders, who said they would keep Taleban fighters out of the town centre and run security with their own auxiliary police unit.

There has been peace for a 142 days, a British spokesman said - but that appears to have come to an end.

The Helmand governor and local people told the BBC that the Taleban had moved in overnight, arrested some of the elders who opposed them and destroyed part of the government compound.

It was this compound that British troops defended from wave after wave of attack in the summer.

US to retake abandoned Taleban town

Michael Evans in Kabul - The Times (UK) February 01, 2007

American forces in Afghanistan are poised to attempt to recapture the town of Musa Qala, which was abandoned by British forces in November after more than two months of heavy fighting against the Taleban General Dan McNeill, who is about to take over as commander of Nato’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, is believed to be ready to order US troops into the town — a key spot in the opium smuggling route in northern Helmand — amid fears that it is now back under Taleban control.

About 30 paratroops from 16 Air Assault Brigade Regiment were ordered to withdraw from Musa Qala in November as part of a deal with tribal elders and the governor of Helmand. The American military were said to be “absolutely furious” at what they saw as a pullout by their principal partners, complaining that it left Musa Qala under Taleban control.

Brigadier Jerry Thomas, who took over as commander of the British Task Force in the province after the withdrawal deal was agreed, denied that the Taleban had been involved in the consultations over the future of Musa Qala. The British insist that the deal could point the way for future security arrangements, giving tribal elders a greater role in keeping the Taleban in check.

But the withdrawal caused a rift between the American and British military. The American view is that northern Helmand has become a no-go zone and needs to be dealt with aggressively. There is now every expectation that General McNeill may try to reverse the deal and put even more troops back into the town to expel the Taleban.

Critics of the so-called British “Platoon House” concept — planting a small unit of soldiers inside the reinforced district centre in Musa Qala and other towns across northern Helmand — said that it was an open invitation to the Taleban, who attacked the sites day and night throughout the summer.

Announcement of the withdrawal deal was delayed for three days, according to a senior defence source, to prevent the Taleban from instantly claiming that they had driven the Paras out. Responding to American criticism of the deal, a senior British officer said: “I know they hated it, but we may well need to do slightly dirty deals to get local communities more involved in their own security.”

In support of the British position, Assadullah Waffa, the Helmand governor, has drawn up a series of protocols, setting out restrictions to keep the Taleban under control. Under the Musa Qala deal, Taleban were banned from living within 5km (3 miles) of the town. Locals have claimed, however, that known Taleban individuals are operating inside the zone.

Yesterday General Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan Defence Minister and a former Mujahidin commander, said: “The [Afghan] Ministry of Defence was not involved in the decision on Musa Qala, but I think it is premature to judge whether it was good as a pilot project. We must see if it works but I think we will need more intelligence to come to a conclusion.”

It's an Afghan issue: Musharraf

Nirupama Subramanian

RAWALPINDI: Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf on Thursday made a passionate defence against accusations that Pakistan had a hand in the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and rejected sole responsibility for stopping it.

At a press conference Gen. Musharraf said he called to clear "misperceptions" about Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, he reiterated that the Taliban was an Afghan problem and needed an indigenous solution, but conceded the fighters were getting help and support from the border areas of Pakistan.

"Whatever is happening here, we understand, and I will never absolve ourselves that nothing is happening here. Some things are happening here and we have to take action and we are taking action, but if anyone blames only Pakistan and tries to make a scapegoat of Pakistan, we don't accept it anymore."

Gen. Musharraf admitted that certain incidents had come to light about border guards turning a "blind eye" to Taliban cross-border activities but justified these omissions as an instinct for self-preservation against a well-armed and well-motivated enemy.

But he rejected as "preposterous" suggestions that sections of the army or the ISI were abetting the Taliban.

The President said it was not just Pakistan's responsibility to stop cross-border activity. "It is the joint responsibility of Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S. forces, NATO, ISAF and we refuse to take complete responsibility of stopping all activities across the border," he said.

For its part, Pakistan had decided to go ahead with fencing and mining selected areas of the border with Afghanistan despite international opposition to it. As long as no one came up with an alternative to this, no country had the right to criticise Pakistan for resorting to these measures, he said.

Pakistan would fence and mine 35.2 km of its 2,400 km border with Afghanistan in seven separate sections,.

Gen. Musharraf also described Afghan refugee camps in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, as a "safe haven" for the Taliban, and asked the international community to make arrangements to remove them.

He also said his Government knew Mullah Dadullah, a Taliban leader, had been in Pakistan three times, and had tracked him, but he had managed to evade arrest on each occasion.

As there was "total intelligence co-operation" between Pakistan and U.S intelligence agencies, he described the failure to arrest him as a "combined failure".

The President also defended the peace deals with tribals in North Waziristan and South Waziristan, and said though they were only a "partial success" had not ended Al-Qaeda and Taliban activity, Pakistan would not scrap the agreements because it was the only way forward.

Afghan analysis as general bows out

By Alastair Leithead BBC News, Afghanistan

For the last nine months, British forces have been in charge of Nato's mission in Afghanistan, commanded by the charismatic British officer Gen David Richards.

In that time the Taleban have hit back with a bloody insurgency which threatens to undo the progress the country has made with the help of the international community in the five years since the Taleban were overthrown.

Gen Richards took over on 4 May 2006, with 9,000 troops under his command and with an International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) responsible for Kabul, and the relatively peaceful regions of northern and western Afghanistan.

He took Isaf into the lawless south for the first time and assumed command of many of the American forces in the east of the country from the US-led coalition.

On Sunday, he hands over more than 31,000 troops and responsibility for the whole of the country to an American, Gen Dan McNeill.

After following him throughout his nine months, I spoke to three people from very different perspectives to assess Gen Richards' performance as well as giving the general himself a chance to comment on his own performance.

The UN mission emphasises how communication has improved between the military and the international and Afghan actors. It has a positive view of the tenure of Gen Richards.

"He is acknowledged around the shop in Afghanistan as being a great leader, not just for Isaf, but for the international effort to support Afghanistan's transition," says Chris Alexander, the deputy head of the UN mission to Afghanistan.

But, he argues, there are still some serious issues that have not been addressed.

"There is a question of sanctuary and external support, there is a question of weak fragile government institutions as well and there is also the unequal, uneven development in the country which has sometimes fed the insurgency just as the narcotics problem has done also," he says.

The big battle in Kandahar province in early September, called Operation Medusa, is widely seen to have stopped a Taleban attempt to launch an attack to try to take Kandahar city.

"Operation Medusa was the centrepiece, operationally, of Gen Richards' time here, a pivotal moment in the story of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan today," Mr Alexander says.

"It restored confidence in southern Afghanistan that the Afghan government and Isaf had the resolve to stand against this challenge." But Mr Alexander has a stark warning for the months ahead.

"The honeymoon is over. There was euphoria when the Taleban fell and a new government came in and people's expectations were extremely high," he says. "Those high expectations have not been met and there is disappointment with the government, the international community and neighbouring countries."

Afghan Defence Minister Gen Abdul Rahim Wardak talks of a close relationship with Gen Richards but remains unhappy with the short time that commanders are in place.

"Some new officer comes and it takes him some time to know the ground realities and the environment here and once he is fully able then I think he leaves," he says. "This frequent changeover of forces and officers is definitely impacting on everything."

He also criticises the international community for not providing the Afghan National Army (ANA) with better resources much earlier. "The ANA has been armed with 30-year-old weapons all used during the war with the Soviet Union... the result was that it was not an effective force," he says.

He is, of course, a lot happier now that the American government has pledged $8.2bn (£4.16bn, 6.3bn euros) to help fund the Afghan security forces.

Nato's strategy has been to try to bring security and then provide development and help bring in better governance to win the people over. This has involved trying to win hearts and minds.

Ahmed Rashid, a journalist and author of a book on the Taleban, argues the use of air power has killed civilians. He says only bringing in more troops would help.

"The Taleban had calculated that, as Nato and British troops moved into the south, there would be this lull with the handover, so Nato forces were met with this huge and unexpected offensive.

"Richards had to reorganise his whole strategy and his whole philosophy around the fact that the softly-softly approach was clearly not appropriate," he says.

He also believes the communication is not in place to allow development to follow. "Nearly a year after the deployment, there's a complete lack of co-ordination between the big aid agencies," he says.

"There's just this complete disconnect between the military and these aid agencies, and of course, with the private, international non-governmental organisations."

His summary, a common theme among commentators on Afghanistan, is that the source of the problem lies beyond the country's borders. "There's no doubt that the Pakistani military has been very brazenly supporting the Taleban for the last five years.

"It is, in my opinion, totally impossible to defeat the Taleban, or to bring peace to southern Afghanistan, without dealing with the issue of Pakistan. "I think at the moment the Taleban has the psychological ascendancy," he says. "I think there's a widespread belief amongst a majority of Afghans that the Taleban are coming back."

Yet Gen Richards himself is, not surprisingly, brimming with confidence despite the challenges that remain. He points to the victory in Operation Medusa as the most significant moment in his command.

"What I am saying to you is, like the chess player, we are working through the problem. We have neutralised the Taleban militarily. We are now energising the reconstruction and development and improvement of governance."

On Pakistan, he has built a relationship with Gen Musharraf and is more positive than most: "It's whether or not you believe that the government of Pakistan is actually helping us. I believe that they are," he says.

He is realistic though, predicting that there will be an upsurge of Taleban violence this spring. "I have no doubt about that, but I am confident that just like they really, really tried last summer and failed, that we are on top of them," he says. "I already have a plan for our spring campaign which will continue to disrupt their efforts.

"It's been a huge privilege and I think what we have done, when there was much scepticism about Nato and Isaf last year, is prove that Nato is actually a great going concern and can do what it has been asked to do."

Taliban resurgence failure of US, Karzai govt

NEW YORK: The resurgence of civil war is due to failure of the United States, Karzai government and the international community to take advantage of the lull in the conflict that followed collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001.

It is also because of their failure to strengthen the capacity of the new Afghan government to project its authority and provide public services, including security, to the population beyond Kabul, James Dobbins, who served as the first US envoy to Afghanistan following the 9-11 attacks, said the other day.

Analyzing the resurgence of the Taliban, Dobbins said in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington: "The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the US put together in late 2001 to stabilise and reconstruct."

Observing in the aftermath of the fall of Taliban, the US and global community had a "golden occasion" to help Afghans build an effective government, he said: "We failed to seize this opportunity. During those early years, US and international assistance was minimal."

Responding to the question from the House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, Dobbins said:

"The more American money and manpower is committed to Afghanistan, the more important it becomes to address the principal source of the ongoing civil war, which remains, as it has for most of the past 20 years, largely external, and in present circumstances, largely in Pakistan."

Dobbins said the Pakistani government be persuaded to abandon its relationship with extremist elements within its society, halt its support for terrorism, provide its youth an educational alternative to fundamentalist madressas, extend effective governance into its border provinces, and curtail their use by insurgent movements.

He told the Congressmen that the conflict in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front in the war on terror, which neither in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. "Al-Qaeda, after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taliban is operating out of Pakistan, as are several other insurgent and terrorist groups seeking to expel international forces from Afghanistan," he alleged.

Dobbins argued that the US should intensify efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir, as this, he said, was the root cause of radicalisation in Pakistani society and governments use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

"Second, our assistance programmes need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan," he said.

"Third, we need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimise the current frontier. And finally, the US should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections," Dobbins concluded.

Spanish refusal of more Afghan mission troops "snub" to NATO - daily

Text of unattributed report: "Another snub to the allies, this time in Afghanistan", published by Spanish newspaper La Razon website on 1 February

The allies will not be able to count on a new Spanish force on another international mission. After the hurried withdrawal from Iraq, the prime minister has decided to clash with NATO over Afghanistan, the other battleground - an increasingly active and dangerous one - in the war against international terrorism.

The increase in the detachment in this country to tackle the growing threat of the Taleban with more and better guarantees is one of the topics at the heart of the coming NATO summit to be held in Seville on 8 and 9 February. The allies, in their calculations, were counting on our country taking over from the British in heading up the mission, as it is the only country out of those with troops stationed there that has not shouldered any responsibility, bearing in mind, furthermore, the fact that it should already have done so a year ago.

Defence Minister Jose Antonio Alonso confirmed this week, during his visit to the Spanish contingent, that an increase in the number of troops would be a decision to be taken along with all of the allies, leaving the door open to the possibility that Spain would accept this commitment. The prime minister's disavowal of [the comments by] his minister a few hours later is not just humiliating for Alonso, and disappointing for the military commanders who were staking on reinforcements, but damages our battered image with the allies.

Decisions like this undermine Spain's international reputation and lower its standing. So, it will be no surprise if NATO relieves of responsibility a country which has not earned it and looks at the possibility of withdrawing most of its headquarters from Spain. A country that is serious shoulders its responsibilities and does not run away from problems.

Bush Administration Opposes Pakistan Linked - Aid Bill

By REUTERS Published: February 1, 2007 - ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - The U.S. administration is opposed to provisions of a bill now in the hands of Congress which would link military aid for Pakistan to its efforts to tackle the Taliban, the U.S. embassy said.

Concern has mounted over Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, from where the Islamist militants last year orchestrated the bloodiest violence in neighboring Afghanistan since 2001.

Pakistan says it is doing all it can to stop militants infiltrating Afghanistan, but the U.S. military says cross-border attacks in Afghan border areas increased sharply last year. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are major U.S. allies in the war on terrorism.

The U.S. bill, known as H.R. 1, calls for an end to U.S. military assistance to Pakistan if it fails to stop the Taliban operating from its territory.

Some newspapers in Pakistan have likened the bill to the so-called Pressler Amendment to the 1985 U.S. foreign aid bill, under which Washington blocked the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan because of its nuclear program.

The bill has already been endorsed by the House of Representatives and will be sent to the Senate for consideration. The U.S. embassy in Islamabad said linking aid to tackling the Taliban would be counter-productive to fostering a closer relationship with Pakistan, which was one of the bill's goals.

``While the U.S. administration supports the underlying intent of H.R. 1, the U.S. administration has serious concerns with several of the bill's provisions and does not support it in its current form,'' the embassy said in a statement late on Wednesday.

The United States and Pakistan were not only allies in the war on terrorism but also partners engaged in building a broad, long-term strategic relationship, it said.

Pakistan had continued to demonstrate its commitment to cooperation with U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, it said.

Pakistan, which has been battling militants on its side of the border, acknowledges that some insurgents are crossing into Afghanistan but says the insurgency there is essentially an Afghan problem.

New U.S. House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi, under whom the bill was introduced, visited Pakistan last week and met President Pervez Musharraf. The government did not say whether the bill was discussed but Musharraf said Pakistan's resolve to fight extremism and terrorism was unshakeable.

US Senate bill supports Pakistan

Daily Times 2 Feb 07 - By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: A bill moved in the US Senate towards the implementation of the recommendations of the report of the 9/11 Commission recommends to the president to provide $3 billion in assistance to Pakistan for the next five years.

The bill containing what is termed “sense of Congress” says “the government of the United States should provide assistance to Pakistan’s failing basic education system and to emphasise development and the government of the United States should strongly urge the government of Pakistan to close Taliban-linked schools known as madrassas, close terrorist training camps and prevent Taliban forces from operating across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan”.

The bill asks the secretary of state to report not later than 90 days after the bill becomes law to “submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on efforts by the government of Pakistan to take the actions described” above.

The bill contains no conditionality, as does its House of Representatives counterpart proposed by Frank Pallone, a congressman with an established record of being critical of Pakistan and highly supportive of India. He is also a member of the India Caucus. However, the two versions will be eventually reconciled between the two chambers and a compromise worked out. The Bush administration has expressed unstinting support for Pakistan and will lobby hard to eliminate or water down any provisions that tie up the president’s hands or force Pakistan to take actions that it considers unnecessary or uncalled for.

U.S. Congressmen Call for More Money, Troops for Afghanistan

By KRIS OSBORN – DefenceNews.com

Calling Afghanistan the “forgotten war,” members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee and a team of experts called for more troops, more money and more NATO participation.

“The U.S. brings the T-bone steaks, others bring the plastic forks,” Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., the committee’s ranking member, said at a Jan. 30 committee hearing. “There are a lot of NATO nations with major assets who are not moving up in the Afghan program.”

Karl Inderfurth, who served as assistant secretary of state for Afghanistan from 1997-2001, suggested that Defense Secretary Robert Gates bring the topic up with his NATO counterparts at a planned Feb. 8-9 meeting in Seville.

“We do not have enough people on the ground to occupy territory for rebuilding,” Inderfurth said.

NATO has 21,000 troops in Afghanistan, including 11,000 U.S. troops, witnesses told lawmakers. There are also 10,000 more U.S. troops in the country who are not under NATO command.

Committee chairman Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., praised the Pentagon’s recent decision to keep the 3rd Brigade of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan four months longer than planned, but said more troop increases were needed.

“I am encouraged by reports of supplemental assistance for Afghanistan to be proposed in the administration’s budget package,” said Skelton.

Afghanistan’s problems include corruption, opium trade, insufficient security, violence and difficulty policing the Afghan-Pakistan border, panelists and committee members said.

Suggestions included more funding and troops, helping Afghan farmers replace opium crops with orchards and other farm products, greater training of the Afghan security forces and better security along the border.

James Dobbins with Rand National Security Research Division suggested working with the Pakistani government to control the semi-autonomous northwestern tribal areas, long a suspected haven for insurgent and al-Qaida members.

“Pakistan is not a problem susceptible to a military solution. Therefore, other sources of influence will need to be used,” said Dobbins. Panelists praised the British and Canadian forces in Afghanistan and suggested France, Germany, Italy and Spain contribute more.

Panelist Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said domestic politics mean little hope for a bigger German force, but added that “the French have significant power-projection ability with a history of actually fighting.”

A congressional delegation returned from Iraq and Afghanistan a few days ago. Skelton, and Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, and others met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and several provincial chiefs.

Afghanistan: Country Needs Forward-Looking Mass Media Law

By Amin Tarzi Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

February 2, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- The prospects for advancement and freedom in Afghanistan's media sector are perhaps closer now than at any other time in the country's history. The difference is even more marked if one compares the situation to that under the Taliban regime.

Since the demise of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the dissemination of information has gotten steadily easier and its purveyors more professional. But signs have recently emerged of efforts within both the executive branch and the legislature, the National Assembly, to curtail the activities of the media under the pretexts of national security or religion and culture.

Much discussion is emanating from the National Assembly's Wolesi Jirga (People's Council), which is due to review the Mass Media Law that President Hamid Karzai decreed shortly before the legislature came into existence in 2005.

Constitutional Context - In January 2004, a Constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) approved a new constitution for Afghanistan. It declares that "freedom of expression is inviolable...[and] every Afghan has the right to express his thought through speech, writing, or illustration or other means, by observing the provisions" of the constitution. The same article (Article 34) further gives every Afghan the "right to print or publish topics without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law." The constitution also stipulates that directives related to the media "will be regulated by the law."

Freedom of expression is further strengthened by Article 7, which obliges the state to "abide" by international conventions to which Afghanistan is a signatory, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

But the freedoms enshrined in Afghanistan's Islamic constitution are also guided by Article 3, which stipulates that "in Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."

The 2004 constitution calls for the mass media to be governed through legislation. Consecutive administrations -- first the Interim Authority in February 2002 and then the Transitional Administration in March 2004 -- approved temporary media guidelines before President Karzai decreed a new media law just days before the Afghan National Assembly was inaugurated in December 2005.

The draft media law already contains problematic clauses, and there are indications that the Wolesi Jirga could try to make the law more restrictive.

Viewed in that light -- assuming that the executive branch believes in freedom of the media and that the judiciary is not bent on curtailing freedoms to make political statements -- the current law already looks like a positive first step, allowing Afghanistan to become a democratic state.

Wolesi Jirga And Media Law - The Wolesi Jirga is essentially reviewing the 2005 media law in order to change it from a presidential decree to a law. Within the lower house, matters related to the media fall under the Wolesi Jirga's Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission.

Virtually all of that commission's proposed modifications of the existing media law are of a restrictive nature.

The current media law has no preamble, but Article 1 states: "This law has been enacted in accordance with Article 34 of the Constitution and in pursuance of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to ensure the right to freedom of thought and expression and [to] organize the activities of mass media in the country." In Article 2, the law commits Afghanistan to observing the "principles of expression of mass media enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, taking into consideration the injunctions of Islam." The proposed amendments by the Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission revoke Article 1, replacing it with a nine-part preamble that begins: "The Mass Media Law (MML) is within the guidelines of the Noble Koran. The MML shall obey Islam's principles for Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic and its religion is the sacred [religion] of Islam." The last sentence is based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Afghan Constitution.

The proposed preamble further emphasizes the role of religion by recalling Article 3 of the constitution, which stipulates that "no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."

In a seemingly redundant statement, the proposed preamble then states that the MML should be in accordance with the Afghan Constitution and the "international covenants" that the country has signed.

While the 2005 media law was intended to cover all mass media, the proposed amended law states that the media law "is the first legislative step related to Radio and Television and supporting independent media in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan...but it does not cover all related matters." It adds that other areas -- such as electronic commerce, intellectual property (copyright), and "access to information held by the public authorities" require "separate laws to be construed in harmony with the [media law]."

The proposed Article 11 would call for the formation of a High Council of Media to "keep track" of income and expenditure of mass media, ensuring that they are "overt and transparent." The Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission's recommendation on the composition of the High Council of Media is still in flux, but so far the names include members of the Wolesi Jirga, a representative of the Ministry of Justice, a mullah from the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, and the head of the Journalism Faculty at Kabul University. There are no recommendations for the inclusion of members of civil society; nor is there any suggestion to include a representative of the media industry itself. If Afghanistan's media sector is to develop in a democratic direction -- while respecting the country's constitution -- media professionals and media lawyers should be included on the High Council of Media.

The Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission's proposed Article 33, on the "Dissemination of Prohibited Material" -- which in the original MML included four categories: "matters contrary to Islam or insulting to other religions," "insulting or accusative matters concerning individuals," matters contrary to the Afghan Constitution or Afghan criminal codes, and the exposure of the identities of victims of violence -- is modified to include four additional restrictions: "material jeopardizing stability, national security and territorial integrity of Afghanistan," "material providing false information which might disrupt public opinion," "publicity and promotion of any other religion other than Islam," and "material which might damage physical well-being, psychological and moral security of people, especially children and the youth."

Most of these restrictions -- including those listed in the original media law -- contravene provisions of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, given the supremacy of Afghanistan's religious beliefs over other laws -- as clearly stated in that country's constitution -- an argument can be made that restrictions in the media law should either be limited to constitutional limitation or, if listed separately, clarified further to prevent abuse in the future. As listed in the media law -- particularly in the additional restriction proposed by the Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission -- there are also vague terms such as "insult" and clauses open to interpretation, such as "information which might disrupt public opinion," that beg clarification or deletion from the law.

There are also proposals for the creation of "independent" commissions to oversee complaints against Afghanistan's state-owned radio and television stations and against the official news agency (Bakhtar). But ensuring the independence of these commissions arguably demands that they not be included in the media law. Their creation and funding belongs in the arena of open and public debate within the National Assembly, and commission members deserve to be allowed to vote on their commissions' internal hierarchies.

Forward-Looking Law - Afghanistan has taken strides forward in the past four-plus years in the realm of media freedom. The current challenge is to avoid basking under slogans touting what has been achieved -- and instead to enact laws and regulations that protect the safeguards enshrined in the Afghan Constitution. At the same time, there is an obligation to list clearly the constitutional restrictions on the media.

To demonstrate real progress, the media law that the Wolesi Jirga's Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission proposes should do more than simply protect existing freedoms and create space for a professional and self-regulating media. It should also protect basic media freedoms against unwarranted encroachment (eds: intrusion) by any future executive.

The Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission -- and in fact all of their colleagues in the lower house -- are faced with a historic responsibility.

They can increase the country's vulnerability to the arbitrary exercise of power. Or they can pave the way toward a more inclusive, tolerant, and democratic society that is mindful of the country's religious and cultural values -- which are fully protected within the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's constitution.

Private Sector Investment Reaches $ 4.5b In 5 Years

Date : Feb 01, 2007 - Bakhtar

 The national exchequer has received $ 4.5 billion in the form of foreign as well as local investment over the previous five years.According to officials, the three telecommunication companies, including the Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), Roshan and Areeba are on top of investment list, whose total investment amounts to $800 million.Omar Zakhelwal, president of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), said, besides the telecommunication sector, the industrial sector attracted more than 600 million US dollars.He said the Coca Cola Company invested 25 million US dollar and the Crystal and Aria mineral water spent $ 20 millions and $ 14 millions respectively.

In the construction sector, he said, over three billion US dollars had been invested. Of this amount, the Kabul Serena and Safi Landmark Hotel are on top with $ 37 million and $ 15 million investment respectively. He said the Afghan Investment Company had spent $ 300 million to reconstruct the cement companies in the northern province of Baghlan and Jabal Saraj district of Parwan.

Another entrepreneur in the name of Safi Brothers had invested $ 50 million to erect a cement plant in the western province of Herat. Karim Khwaja, chief of the Roshan telecommunication company, said the company had more than one million customers across the country.He said Roshan had paid more than $ 65 million in taxes to the government during the previous three years. Sher Khosti, spokesman for the AWCC, said the company had about one million customers in 92 cities and 20 provinces.

He said they had paid $ 35 million in taxes to the government during 2006.According to officials of the third telecommunication company, Areeba, it had over 200,000 customers in 13 provinces. 

Loya Jirga a mere political stunt?

PakTribune, Pakistan 02/01/2007

Though, both Pakistan and Afghanistan have constituted their respective Loya Jirga commissions, analysts are skeptical if the event would actually take place, specially after Pakistan announced to mine and fence certain parts of its 2,400-km border with Afghanistan to control ?cross-border infiltration?.

The recent hard-hitting statement of Afghan intelligence officials claiming that Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omer is hiding in Quetta and is being patronized by Pakistan?s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has further diminished the chances of holding the jirgas. Even if it happens, analysts believe, the US-sponsored move is unlikely to yield the desired results.

The heads of both commissions are not being considered more than mere "showpieces" by independent experts. Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao, and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, who head Pakistan and Afghanistan?s Loya Jirga commissions, respectively, have no personal or party influence in the tribal areas. Other two members of Pakistan?s Loya Jirga commission are Federal Minister for Culture Ghazi Ghulam Jamal and Federal Minister for Frontier Affairs Sardar Yar Mohammed Rind, who, too, are considered elpless in this regard.

"Temporary and fake ideas like Loya Jirga will not work because the main issue is occupation," Dr. Shamim Akhtar, former chairman of the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, says. "Until and unless, the occupation forces leave Afghanistan, the problem cannot be resolved," he opined. "At best, the Loya Jirga is unlikely to be anything more than a public relations stunt to legitimize the current regime and the US bombing campaign that led up to it," said Akhtar.

"Clearly, the risk is in the Loya Jirga appearing to be under foreign control, regardless of who is actually in control." During a meeting last year in Washington, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed to convene a meeting of Afghan elders residing across the joint borders. "There is an agreement on the basic concept," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Tasnim Aslam told a briefing earlier this week.

"The effort is to use this traditional institution to establish peace in Afghanistan," she said. Pakistan favors limiting attendance to leaders of the ethnic Pushtun tribes that inhabit both sides of the rugged border, while Afghanistan wants all of its ethnic groups to be represented at the talks. Karzai has written letters to Pakistani opposition leaders Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Qazi Hussein Ahmed as well as Awami Nation Party chief Asfandyar Wali in the North-West Frontier Province to woo generally Pushtuns and particularly Taliban to participate in the process.

Fazlur Rehman and Qazi Hussein have told the Afghan leader that in the presence of allied troops in the country, they can?t help him. Wali, for his part, has promised to help him.

A Loya Jirga usually brings together tribal or regional leaders, political, military and religious figures. There are no time limits in a Loya Jirga and it continues until decisions are reached.

Decisions, which are made by consensus, have invariably been accepted by all sections of the Afghan people. However, in this case, analysts are skeptical about the success of the idea as the two major forces in Afghanistan?Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar?have refused to participate in the process, dubbing it a " political stunt" at the behest of America.

Dr Akhtar said a few Afghans might be excited about a process that has been wrongly touted as a turning point towards peace and democracy.

"Whether America and the West accept that or not, the reality is that Taliban and Hikmatyar are the representatives of the majority of Afghanistan," he maintained.

"They are fighting the foreign aggression, and it makes no difference whether the US and its allies term it terrorism. It does not change the ground reality," the expert added.

"Hizb-e-Islami will support the holding of Loya Jirga only if the occupation forces leave our country," Hikmatyar, who is reportedly leading the armed attacks on foreign troops in southeastern Afghanistan, said in a statement issued to newspapers last week.

Hikmatyar, a leading figure of US-backed Afghan Jihad in 1980s, enjoys an ostensible support in Kunar, Nooristan, Naghman, Paktika, Paktia, and Gerdez provinces.

"We will stay away, and try our level best to foil ideas like this (Loya Jirga), which are aimed at strengthening US occupation through its puppets like Karzai," Qari Yousuf, a Taliban spokesman, told newsmen by satellite telephone from an unknown location.

He asserted that Taliban leader Mullah Omer and his followers would not participate in the US-sponsored Loya Jirga.

Dr Tariq Rehman, a senior expert on Afghan affairs, said the outcome of the proposed Loya Jirga could be a more devastating disappointment for those Afghans who were optimistic about it. "Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual country. While the Pushtuns are the largest ethnic group, the minorities, taken together, form an overall majority," he noted.

"A major weakness of the incumbent regime is its predominantly Uzbek and Tajik character for majority Pushtuns. And if the Pushtuns, who are being represented by Taliban and Hikmatyar, do not participate in Loya Jirga, there will be no use of it," Dr Rehman said.

Dr Akhtar, however, insisted that it was not only the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami who were creating trouble for NATO troops in Afghanistan.

"This is absolutely wrong. I agree that Taliban and Hikmatyar are part of the ongoing anti-occupation struggle, but an overwhelming majority of Pushtuns is supporting this war militarily and economically," he said. "America should not forget the fact that traditionally and historically, Afghans have never accepted any kind of occupation or occupation forces."

The success of the Loya Jirga also hinges on the assumption that the numerous well-armed warlords will simply melt away and allow a transparent and democratic process to occur. Another potential obstacle is the increasing influence of drug mafia in the present setup.

According to anti-narcotics officials of Pakistan and Afghanistan, various warlords, who have been supporting the Karzai government, are involved in drug trade, which has again become the backbone of Afghan economy.

A fragile government in Afghanistan suits them (drug smugglers). They feel very comfortable in a situation like this, security analysts believe.

Therefore, they think, the drug mafia would try its level best to subvert any process aimed at establishing a strong government.

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) has recently warned that the US-led troops and the West-backed Karzai government have been collaborating with bloodstained hands, appointing war criminals and human rights abusers to complete their ?mission?.

Such perpetrators now enjoy a massive presence in the government and the parliament, and they still misuse power, according to the international human rights watchdog.

The Mujahiddin, who fought against the Soviets and are now advocating an end to the US presence in Afghanistan, also stand as an obstacle in the success of the Loya Jirga.

The Mujahiddin, including former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and pro- Iran Ismail Khan, want least US influence through a proposed "government of consensus" in Afghanistan. Ikram Sehgal, a senior defence and security analyst close to the US and Pakistani establishments, believes the Loya Jirga would not yield the desired results as 90 per cent of Taliban militants reside in refugee camps in Pakistan.

"They have been operating from refugee camps set up in Pakistan. You just dismantle these camps, the problems would be resolved automatically," he told Paktribune.

"Another desperately-needed step is to present smuggling through Afghan Transit Trade, which has been providing financial and military resources to militants, particularly tribals," Sehgal said.

"If Pakistan grants transit trade status to its tribal region, then it would provide abundant economic opportunities to local poor people who generally fall prey to the warlords or the foreign militants just because of poverty and lack of economic opportunities," he maintained.

"These are the major steps which must be taken forthwith, otherwise ideas like the so-called Loya Jirga will be nothing but a waste of time."

Dr Akhtar suggested that the US should withdraw from Afghanistan under the UN cover and a UN peace force, comprising troops from non-aliened countries, be deployed with a mandate to protect national installations and hold free and fair elections.

"This is very much possible as the idea has already been implemented in Namibia, where the UN peace force had been detailed to establish and maintain law and order."

He disagreed with the contention that the US supported the Loya Jirga idea because it wanted a respectable way out from Afghanistan.

"America does not want to leave from Afghanistan due to its economic and strategic interest," he said. "By floating and implementing ideas like Loya Jirga, it wants to legitimize its as well as the hand-picked Afghan government?s presence," he maintained.

A political curtain-raiser for the Taliban

Asia Times 02/02/2007 By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - The Olsi Jirga, the Afghan lower house of parliament, has granted immunity to all Afghans involved in the country's 25 years of conflict, despite calls by human-rights groups for war-crimes trials.

The decision will cover fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar and former prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who now heads his own militant group. The decision is just another dent in the US-led "war on terror" campaign at a time when the Taliban-led spring uprising is imminent and the Taliban show no desire to initiate dialogue for peace.

As the temperature has risen in Kabul to 1 degree Celsius - from minus-13 only two weeks ago - reconciliatory efforts on the part of Kabul have gained momentum.

The purpose of the initiative is to split opinion within the Taliban-led resistance, which has increasingly drawn in warlords across the country. From the tone of President Hamid Karzai's statements, though, it is clear that he does not intend to go as far as power-sharing; he talks of dialogue with "an enemy who is after our annihilation and is shedding our blood".

The amnesty decision, nevertheless, is significant. The overwhelming majority in the Olsi Jirga is former mujahideen, including Speaker Younus Qanooni and Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf. The single largest group is Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami, besides a sizable presence of former Taliban, including diehards such as Mullah Abdul Salam Rocketi, whose "defection" from the Taliban was made under considerable duress.

In early 2006, politicians in Kabul would have learned of the jump in support for the Taliban and their planned spring offensive for that year, which many believed would be successful. As a result, politicians drew up a political blueprint premised on the Taliban capturing Kabul and other key cities. In effect, they were acting as the Taliban's political wing. The latest act of granting immunity can be viewed as a continuation of this, and it sends a very strong message to all segments of Afghan society.

Spring sprung
The Taliban's plan for a mass uprising has now become an issue of honor, and this year it is many times better prepared than last year.

It is estimated that last year the Taliban were able to draw from a pool of about 40,000 foot soldiers, many of them secure in the Pakistani tribal areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan. This year, the number of fighters has risen by many thousand, many of whom have already been launched from Pakistan into the Gramsir district of Helmand province across the border.

Thousands of others are ready to go from Pakistan's Bajaur agency into Kunar, Nooristan and then up the northeastern valley of Tagab to besiege Kabul.

In addition, there is a strong presence of Taliban in the Afghan provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Ghazni - possibly as many as 100,000. The Taliban have also regrouped in the western provinces of Faryab, Herat, Ghor and Baghdais, where they have sizable forces.

Within the next few weeks, Mullah Omar is expected to make major decisions on the appointment of new commanders and also make changes in command structures.

The roadmap for 2006, which centered on the fall of Kandahar and mobilization of Taliban forces to Kabul, is also likely to be altered, possibly allowing for an assault on an eastern city. This happened in 1991 when Khost was the first city to fall to the Taliban, followed by Jalalabad and finally Kabul in 1996.

Nonetheless, whether the Taliban move first on the east or the southwest, Kabul is clearly reading the signs, and preparing for the possibility of the Taliban entering Kabul.

The Taliban's flower power

By Syed Saleem Shahzad Asia Times Online / February 1, 2007

KABUL - Western officials involved in counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan estimate that this year the country will produce its biggest poppy crop in history.

Nevertheless, Taliban-dominated Helmand province, which contributes a major chunk in poppy cultivation, houses drug-processing labs and serves as a main route for trafficking and transportation, will be largely spared anti-narcotics operations.

In Helmand, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will be preoccupied with an expected major Taliban offensive come spring, rather than with drug-eradication programs.

The United Nations estimates that Afghanistan's opium production jumped by nearly 50% in 2006 to a record 6,100 tonnes to supply more than 90% of the world's heroin. About a third of the country's economy was based on opium last year. Of the 164,700 hectares of poppies that were cultivated in 2006, 70,000 hectares were in Helmand province, according to UN figures.

Sitting in a heated room of the British task force's base in Helmand near the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, a British anti-narcotics officer spread a map detailing just what a drug heaven Helmand is.

"Undoubtedly, Afghanistan will produce its best bumper poppy crop ever this year, but there is no shortcut to control this monster," said the official, who asked not to be named.

"At least, it will take three to five years for any significant reduction, given that development projects are launched and the people are provided alternative means of earning a livelihood and if the security situation is improved."

The official added that one cannot expect any improvement in the poppy situation when security is such a problem and counter-narcotics teams cannot operate freely. "You need to understand that in Thailand it took 30 years to make counter-narcotics operations successful," said the official.

The official said he believed that spraying is not an option as it can make people and animals ill.

His position was endorsed last week by President Hamid Karzai, who, despite months of US pressure, decided against using herbicides - in this case glyphosate - to spray heroin-producing poppies. A spokesman for the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics said that this year the government will rely on "traditional techniques" such as sending people into fields to trample or plow opium poppies before they are harvested.

"Eradication is only possible by forcing people to eliminate the poppy and grow other crops," the British official said. "We don't offer any compensation for poppy elimination. In 2002, people were offered money to eliminate poppy, and it played havoc. All the money went into people's pockets and they did not eliminate poppy cultivation."

Afghanistan has for many years been the world's hub of poppy cultivation and the narcotics trade. When the US Central Intelligence Agency supported the mujahideen resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s, it turned a blind eye to - or even actively aided - drug money flowing into the resistance's coffers.

Drug kingpins were born, often from Pakistani Pashtun areas, and their money helped shape the dynamics of Pakistan's social, religious and political fabric - some were said to have become members of Parliament.

When the Taliban came to power in 1996, they clamped down on poppy cultivation, at least in the early years before they were ousted by the US-led invasion in 2001. But now it is business as never before.

"Five kilograms of heroin is sold for US$90 in Helmand province, and the district of Sangeen is the main hub of narcotic-processing labs," the British official said. He estimated that there are no fewer than 150 such laboratories in the area. About 10 tonnes of opium produces approximately a tonne of heroin.

"The finished produce of the Sangeen laboratories is sold on the British market for anywhere between $120 and $160 per gram," the official said.

I put it to the official that the Taliban are not directly involved in the drug business, other than receiving "contributions" for providing protection to the growers and processors. The Taliban's business is fighting occupation forces, I suggested.

"I don't agree with you. It is correct that the Taliban don't like poppy cultivation and the narcotics trade in principle, but it is impossible that narcotics could be traded without their consent, and we are even aware of some big names among the Taliban directly overseeing narcotics trade operations," the official said.

The official was lost for a while in his own thoughts, and then spoke. "The international buyers sit at the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan [Gardi Jungle near Pakistan's Balochistan province] and send local buyers to Lashkar Gah. A full-blown mafia operation runs this business, which includes the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army and the local administration. Their connivance goes all the way to assisting the local buyers to get the consignment of heroin to the Gramsir district.

"From Gramsir, the Taliban's area starts and a new cartel then transports the consignment up to the Pak-Afghan border. From there they use many deserted coastal points in Balochistan to ship the consignments to the UAE, Europe and other international destinations. Nevertheless, from the Gramsir district nothing can pass through without the consent and connivance of the Taliban ... it is impossible," the official said.

"Some marijuana is smuggled into Iran and some of the heroin is also marketed in Pakistan," the official added.

More than a handful

Helmand is the Taliban's most strategic province, where it raises resources and exerts widespread influence over the population. The province also serves as access to western Afghanistan's Tajik belt and to Pakistan's lawless border areas to the south.

Within the province, Gramsir district is perhaps the only region in which British troops actively pursue targets (beside Gresikh, where there is limited patrolling and occasional operations). Operations in Gramsir are based on sketchy information-gathering that leads to air strikes.

Similarly, British forces do not know how to choke the drug routes, especially as from Lashkar Gah to Gramsir a cartel allegedly headed by the Taliban includes local police and army personnel.

The Afghan Eradication Force led by US and British forces simply does not have any idea how to tackle this unlikely joint venture between the Taliban and Afghan security forces and the local administration.

And critically, in Sangeen district, where most of the processing labs are located, the Taliban and the ISAF have agreed to a ceasefire, in effect allowing the Taliban to go about their business - whether military or otherwise - unimpeded.

Asadullah Wafa, the governor of Helmand, has been entrusted by the British to establish tribal councils to build bridges between the Taliban and his local Kabul-backed administration. Money will also be funneled into numerous reconstruction projects.

For Sangeen district, the governor has only recently started negotiations with tribal elders and clerics to form councils. Until these are in place - and it could take months - the ceasefire between the Taliban and foreign forces will stand.

Yet the Taliban's planned mass uprising for spring is only a few months away, as is another lucrative bumper poppy crop that would provide the money to keep the uprising going for a long time.

After war and repressive Taliban, Afghan art undergoes a revolution

Assocaited Press 1 Feb 07

KABUL, Afghanistan: For 25 years, Mohammed Akbar Salam painted the style that he and his colleagues knew — realism. Under the ultra-restrictive Taliban regime, depictions of the human figure were forbidden, and their work shriveled to an austere repertoire of calligraphy and still life.

Now, Afghanistan is emerging from decades of war and Taliban rule to a new world and the information age, and its art is undergoing a revolution to find an identity that is both fresh and distinctly Afghan.

"After the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan's borders opened up, and we had access to the Internet. We could connect with people abroad, so everyone is now looking for a new style," Salam said as he served tea huddled next to an electric heater in his small, cold studio.

"We're part of the 21st century. Realism is done by cameras. An artist should do something new," said Salam, 50, who teaches painting at Kabul University.

The flood of images and ideas from the outside have triggered a new wave of art and paintings that resemble European works from the early 20th century, but that are a radical change for Afghanistan. This art with its distinctly Afghan themes — war, corruption and violence — provides a rare glimpse of the country's creative psyche.

Salam's work shifted from dry, realist images of street scenes and landscapes into sad and often angry critiques of life through Afghan eyes, in a color palette and style evocative of Marc Chagall, Henri Matisse and their contemporaries.

His most striking painting, which was part of an exhibit in neighboring Iran, depicts a Chinook helicopter — commonly used by the U.S. military — flying menacingly above a pair of scared, fleeing chickens. Military aircraft and American and NATO forces are common sights in this war-torn country.

One of Salam's colleagues at Kabul University, 40-year-old Eaniyatullah Niazi, portrays the violence through the traditional Afghan game of buzkashi, in which players on horses wrangle for a headless goat carcass.

"It's a very hard, cruel game. It is a kind of tyrant's game — the poor goat is beheaded and everyone tries to grab for it," Niazi said, sitting on cushions in a red carpeted, sunlit room in his apartment where he displays his paintings. To him, the game symbolizes the violence in Afghan society today.

Niazi, whose work has been published by UNESCO in a book called "Refugee Painters," turned sharply away from realism to abstraction.

A buzkashi painting from 2004 is a frenzy of curved black lines, with horse's heads, men and a carcass in the fray. He work has become increasingly abstract, and now, though the subject is still buzkashi, the figures are barely discernible.

His work is appreciated and purchased mainly by foreigners, and his asking prices for two of his buzkashi paintings are US$350 (€270) and US$500 (€385) — a fortune for most Afghans, who earn only about US$50 (€39) a month.

Compared with the collection at Afghanistan's National Gallery, the work of Salam and Niazi are apparently entirely new genres here.

The National Gallery's collection includes blatant copies of Western masterpieces — such as a wood-chip mosaic of the iconic "Liberty Leading the People" by Eugene Delacroix. Works by Afghanistan's best known 20th-century painters, two of whom were trained in Germany, show European pastoral scenes. One painting shows a Tudor cottage.

Several artists adopted this classical style, without adding any personal interpretation or expression, for more than half a century, said Rahraw Omarzad, founder of the Center for Contemporary Arts Afghanistan.

During the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, Afghan artists were encouraged to create propaganda posters, he said. Artists fled the country during the ensuing civil war. Then, in the mid-1990s, came the Taliban which infamously destroyed two ancient Buddha statues at Bamiyan despite an international outcry.

A display case tucked away under a staircase on the ground floor of the National Gallery contains the torn up remains of hundreds of figurative artworks that were also destroyed by the hardline militia.

"They wanted to stop art completely," said Omarzad, who is also a photographer and video artist. "They were against art. Artists were allowed only to do calligraphy and nonfigurative paintings, like still life."

Omarzad hopes the contemporary arts center will nourish and encourage budding artists through workshops with foreign artists and exhibits of Afghan artwork abroad. The center has helped organize shows in New York, Istanbul and Frankfurt, he said.

His recent photos document the rough lives of Afghan children or simple everyday scenes that symbolize the shaky Afghan leadership. In one photo criticizing the government, an old wall has been painted over with another layer, crumbling because the old paint underneath was not removed.

But continuing fear of the government and warlords constrain these artists from going beyond the metaphorical when it comes to commentary on Afghan politics.

Salam's Chinook painting lashes out at the U.S. military, but his criticism of local power brokers is more cryptic. He disguises corrupt Afghan politicians as two balloons in one painting; Afghans' distrust of their leaders is depicted in a video that shows people joining a man under his leaking umbrella, only to get wet and leave.

"The government says there is freedom of speech, but if a journalist does something, he is jailed," Salam said, as he bemoaned the government's lack of support for the arts. "If I do something, the gunmen can come and take me away."

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]