In this bulletin:

• Bhutto killing an act of 'immense brutality': Afghan president
• In meeting with Karzai, Bhutto wanted peace, democracy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
• Karzai, Musharraf 'to co-operate'
• US Backs Afghan Reconciliation Talks
• Expelled EU, UN diplomats leave Afghanistan
• Diplomats expelled by Afghanistan
• Diplomats to leave Afghanistan as new 'Great Game' played with tribal leaders
• Gird for long haul, Kabul tells Canadians
• 'No Quick Fix' In Afghanistan: Ambassador
• INTERVIEW: Afghanistan to see improvement in 2008, general says
• NATO must build a broad consensus on Afghanistan
• France Thinks Military Action Is Not the Sole Solution
• Retired general says Soviet incursion of Afghanistan justified
• Hillier's popularity backfires on Tories
• AFGHANISTAN: Blocked roads threaten food security
• Kabul's drug addicts live amid detritus of war
• Who killed Benazir Bhutto? The main suspects

Bhutto killing an act of 'immense brutality': Afghan president

by Sardar Ahmad, December 27, 2007

KABUL (AFP) - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday's assassination of Benazir Bhutto, whom he had met just hours earlier, was an act of "immense brutality" and a "big loss for all of us."

Karzai, who had held talks with Bhutto on the final day of a state visit to Pakistan, blamed her killing on the "enemies" of Pakistan and of peace who were afraid of her strength.

"We in Afghanistan condemn this act of cowardice and immense brutality in the strongest possible terms," Karzai told a news briefing called in reaction to the assassination.

"I am deeply sorry, deeply pained that this brave sister of us, this great daughter of the Muslim world is no longer with us."

"She sacrificed her life for the sake of Pakistan and for the sake of the region," he said.

Karzai returned Thursday from an overnight visit to Pakistan during which he met Bhutto and President Pervez Musharraf.

"I found her to be a very, very brave woman with a clear vision for her own country, for Afghanistan and for the region, a vision of democracy and prosperity and peace," he told reporters.

Bhutto had shown a desire for peace in Afghanistan and good relations between the neighbours, Karzai said. "This is a big loss for all of us."

Kabul and Islamabad have been at odds over a wave of Taliban- and Al-Qaeda-linked violence that has intensified in Afghanistan for two years and in Pakistan in recent months.

Afghan officials had said privately that Afghanistan had been hoping Bhutto, the main opposition leader in January 8 elections, would help to improve relations between the neighbours and their cooperation in the fight against extremism that is plaguing both.

Karzai has regularly called for this fight to be tackled at its roots, which he says is in militant sanctuaries in Pakistan, instead of being focussed in Afghanistan where there 60,000 international soldiers working to defeat a growing Taliban-led insurgency.

The Afghan president, who has survived two assassination attempts, said Bhutto's views "were so strong that no doubt those who are against peace and stability in this part of the world were afraid of her."

And "that was why through an act of cowardice, they killed her. But she's so strong and her memories are so strong that there'll be other torch-bearers of her path in peace and the fight against terror will succeed," he said.

There was no claim of responsibility for the attack but Bhutto had accused elements in the intelligence services of trying to kill her. She also said she had received death threats from Islamic militant groups including Al-Qaeda.

She had just addressed a campaign rally for the parliamentary vote when an attacker shot her in the neck before blowing himself up at a park in the northern city of Rawalpindi, killing her and at least 16 others, police said.

Afghanistan has this year seen a spike in extremist unrest, including more than 140 suicide attacks claimed for the most part by Taliban extremists.

The Taliban were removed from Afghan government in late 2001 in a US-led invasion unleashed after the hardliners did not hand over their Al-Qaeda allies for the 9/11 attacks.

After the attack, leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are said to have fled into Pakistan where they created sanctuaries in tribally administered areas.

Pakistan was one of only three countries that recognised the harsh Taliban regime.

In meeting with Karzai, Bhutto wanted peace, democracy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Associated Press / December 27, 2007

KABUL, Afghanistan - Pakistan's opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, in one of her final meetings before her assassination, told Afghan President Hamid Karzai early Thursday that she hoped for peace, democracy and good relations for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Karzai said.

Karzai said he found Bhutto to be a brave woman with a clear vision "for her own country, for Afghanistan and for the region _ a vision of democracy and prosperity and peace."

"I found in her this morning a lot of love and desire for peace in Afghanistan, for prosperity in Afghanistan and for an Afghanistan and Pakistan that would be happy, prosperous and of good relations with each other," a somber Karzai said at a news conference in Kabul late Thursday.

The Afghan president met with Bhutto while on a two-day trip to Pakistan, where he met with President Pervez Musharraf on Wednesday.

Bhutto was killed in a suicide attack as she drove away from a campaign rally just minutes after addressing thousands of supporters.

"We in Afghanistan condemn this act of cowardice and immense brutality in the strongest possible terms," Karzai said. "She sacrificed her life, for the sake of Pakistan and for the sake of this region."

Afghanistan and Pakistan both suffer from bloody insurgencies along their shared, lawless border.

Afghan officials accuse Pakistan of allowing Taliban militants of using its territory to stage attacks on Afghan and foreign troops in the country.

Relations between Karzai and Musharraf have been shaky the last several years, though military cooperation and communication along the border have improved in recent months, as have relations between the two leaders.

Karzai, Musharraf 'to co-operate' – BBC

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his Afghan counterpart, Hamid Karzai, have pledged to co-operate in the fight against Islamist militants.

At a meeting in Islamabad, the leaders said terrorism had brought suffering to people in both their countries.

Ties between the neighbours have often been strained, with mutual accusations of inaction against Taleban militants.

The cordial tone of the leaders' latest meeting contrasted with past exchanges, BBC correspondents say.

The leaders referred to their countries as twins and emphasised the shared threat from Islamist militants sympathetic to the deposed Taleban administration of Afghanistan.

"The key in fighting and enhancing the capability against terrorism and extremism is intelligence cooperation," Mr Musharraf said.

"The two intelligence agencies, on both sides, must cooperate more strongly if we are to deal with terrorists and extremists more effectively."

Mr Karzai said it was "incumbent" upon the two governments to "bring peace and stability".

He also acknowledged US reports that attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border had fallen recently.

Taleban-linked militants based in the rugged Afghan-Pakistan border have been broadening a violent campaign against both countries' governments.

Mr Musharraf and Mr Karzai are both allies of the US and have frequently accused each other of offering sanctuary to the Taleban.

They have also in the past made similar pledges to co-operate against the militants.

US Backs Afghan Reconciliation Talks

By FISNIK ABRASHI The Associated Press Thursday, December 27, 2007

KABUL, Afghanistan -- The United States supports reconciliation talks with Taliban fighters who have no ties to al-Qaida and accept Afghanistan's constitution, the U.S. ambassador said Thursday.

William Wood said the U.S. is in favor of a "serious reconciliation program with those elements of the Taliban who are prepared to accept the constitution and the authority of the elected government" of President Hamid Karzai.

"The only place where we have concern would be the members of the Taliban with close connection to al-Qaida, the reason being that al-Qaida is an international threat, it is a global threat and we don't believe that there should be separate peaces with al-Qaida," he said.

At a news conference in Kabul, Wood also said the United States was not involved in the controversy over the expulsion of two senior officials from the European Union and U.N. But he said he was confident the EU and U.N. were acting with good intentions.

The government of Afghanistan had accused Michael Semple, the acting head of the EU mission, and Mervyn Patterson, an official with the U.N. mission in Afghanistan, of holding unauthorized talks with Taliban militants in the country's south.

The decision to expel them seems to be the result of a "misunderstanding" and lack of coordination with the government of Afghanistan, Wood said.

"In any situation like this, coordination, transparency and communication among the good guys is absolutely necessary," he said.

Karzai has voiced a growing interest in meeting with Taliban leaders to try to persuade them to join the government and put down their arms.

But the expulsion of the two officials could make some Western nations and international organizations wary of making their own overtures to the militants in an effort to end the insurgency, which has left over 6,300 people _ mostly militants _ dead this year alone.

Wood said Afghan and foreign troops have killed or arrested many Taliban field commanders and other militant leaders and thwarted their offensive operations.

As a result, there have been an increase in the flow of foreign fighters into the country and also a rise in terrorist attacks, he said.

"The leadership of the Taliban may have felt that they had lost so many leaders that they could not replace them easily with Afghans, or they may have felt that the morale among their troops was falling and they needed leaders of a more ideological character," Wood said.

Following a takeover earlier this month by Afghan, British and U.S. troops of the town of Musa Qala _ which the Taliban had controlled since February _ officials discovered drugs worth $500 million in street value, Wood said. Afghan officials have said that Musa Qala hosted dozens of heroin labs.

"No clearer proof can be found of the cooperative relationship between the Taliban, who used to dominate Musa Qala, and the druggers, who were using Musa Qala as a storehouse and the center for distribution," Wood said.

Wood said that the U.S. and its allies were stepping up their training of the country's security forces, with a particular focus on its troubled police force, which is often accused of corruption. The Afghan army will reach its target of 70,000 troops by the end of 2008, he said.

Wood also said that Iran "remains an ambiguous neighbor ... providing money to finance projects that are important to Iran inside Afghanistan."

"But there have also been instances in which weapons from Iran were found to be going to the Taliban," he said.

Expelled EU, UN diplomats leave Afghanistan

by Bronwen Roberts Thu Dec 27 - KABUL (AFP) - The second most senior European Union official in Afghanistan and a top UN political advisor left the country Thursday after being expelled by the government for posing a threat to national security.

The governor of the southern province of Helmand insisted meanwhile that the EU official, a deputy head of mission, had made contact with the Taliban during a recent visit.

The claim was dismissed by the United Nations and by the insurgents themselves who accused Kabul of creating "a drama" and trying to show it was independent of its international backers.

The men -- Irish national Michael Semple with the EU and Briton Mervyn Patterson -- flew out of Kabul early Thursday after being declared persona non grata on Tuesday and given 48 hours to leave.

An unknown number of their Afghan colleagues were being questioned by authorities, Afghan officials said, refusing to give details.

The United Nations said the affair was a "misunderstanding" that arose after the men visited the Helmand town of Musa Qala to finds ways to bring stability after it was taken back from Taliban occupiers this month.

"Our discussions and negotiations are ongoing with the government of Afghanistan so we can see the return of these vital members of staff," spokesman Aleem Siddique told AFP.

President Hamid Karzai's office has not expanded on its issue with the men -- who are considered authorities on the country and speak local languages -- only that they "posed threats to the national security of Afghanistan."

But Helmand governor Asadullah Wafa said Semple had been in contact with the Taliban during regular visits to his province that were conducted without proper authorisation.

"He was inviting Taliban and was talking to them," the governor told AFP, adding, "He should have consulted with me."

Helmand is the epicentre of Afghanistan's opium production, which makes up 93 percent of world supply, and a stronghold for insurgents from the extremist Taliban movement that was in government between 1996 and 2001.

Britain is the lead nation in the province of a NATO-led force working on security and reconstruction and has thousands of troops there.

Wafa, said to be trusted by Karzai, added an Afghan general who had been travelling with Semple had been found to be carrying 19,000 dollars and a flash-disk with a list of high-ranking officials.

The governor did not elaborate, adding though he had no suspicions about the UN official. The Taliban said meanwhile it had "never met with such people".

"This is a drama by Karzai's administration trying to show off they are independent," spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed told AFP by telephone from an undisclosed location.

The UN's Siddique said the expelled diplomats had been in Musa Qala to meet "disaffected" locals and find ways to help them reconnect with the government.

"It is somewhat surprising to us that these efforts seem to have been misconstrued and that is what we are working to rectify," Siddique said.

He said there had been no talks with the Taliban and that "we don't pay terrorists money."

There has been new emphasis this year on reconciliation with Taliban willing to accept this government and on ramping up development to improve the lives of locals and persuade them to support government and not the rebels.

The US ambassador in Afghanistan, William Wood, also said the matter appeared to have been a misunderstanding. "I am absolutely confident they were acting with the best intention," he told reporters.

Diplomats expelled by Afghanistan

BBC - Two diplomats accused by Afghan officials of making contacts with the Taleban have left the country after talks to stop their expulsions failed.

One is a high-ranking British UN employee, Mervyn Patterson. The other is the acting head of the EU mission in Afghanistan, Irishman Michael Semple.

The Kabul-based pair were accused of posing a threat to national security during a visit to Helmand province. The Helmand governor says he warned the diplomats not to meet the Taleban.

The BBC's Alastair Leithead in Kabul says it has become clear that parts of the Afghan government knew Mr Patterson and Mr Semple were in Helmand and had been meeting tribal elders, so there has been some confusion over the government's decision.

As yet, there has been no explanation from the foreign or interior ministries as to exactly why the men were told to leave.

However, the governor of Helmand province Asadullah Wafa said he had warned the diplomats not to meet the Taleban who are "fighting us and training suicide bombers".

"I asked Michael (Semple) 'Why are you coming here?' and he said 'I have come to see the Taleban and speak with the Taleban as part of the ongoing process," Mr Wafa told journalists in Helmand.

"I told Michael the information I have about you is that you are supporting those people who right now are really fighting the government. I said that I am the governor of the province and you should share this information with me.

"I had told him three or four times to bring permission from the government and asked him 'Why are you meeting the Taleban and what will you talk to them about?' He just laughed and said nothing. After that I spoke to the central government and they said they had not given (the diplomats) any permission."

Mr Wafa also told the BBC's Pashto service that an Afghan travelling with them had almost $20,000 (£10,000) on him which he could not explain.

A number of Afghan nationals are still being held by the intelligence service in connection with the incident.

'Misunderstanding'

Meanwhile efforts are continuing in the hope that Mr Patterson and Mr Semple, widely considered as two of the most respected and knowledgeable international experts on Afghan affairs, will be allowed to return to the country.
The United Nations has argued that the expulsions are a result of a misunderstanding.

"We were in Helmand province to talk to the people on the ground," UN spokesman Aleem Siddique said, the Associated Press news agency reports.

Mr Siddique said the aim of the talks was "to understand from the people on the ground what their needs are, what their concerns are and that includes people who are perhaps less than supportive of the government of Afghanistan".

An EU official in Brussels told the BBC News website: "It was a misunderstanding and is not officially an expulsion." He said the work of the EU in Afghanistan would not be affected.

Despite UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown's insistence that Britain does not negotiate with the Taleban, local-level talks are seen as a vital part of the strategy to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, our correspondent says.

Diplomats to leave Afghanistan as new 'Great Game' played with tribal leaders

By Jerome Starkey in Helmand, Afghanistan - The Independent (UK) Published: 27 December 2007

Two senior diplomats are to fly out of Afghanistan today after being accused of talking to the Taliban, despite international pressure to let them stay.

The expulsion of Michael Semple, an Irishman who is acting head of the EU mission, and Mervin Patterson, a Briton who is the third-ranking UN official in Kabul, has shed light on the murky world they inhabit in the search to bring peace to a trroubled land.

For spies, diplomats and soldiers in Afghanistan are playing the Great Game today as much as their forefathers ever did.

Six years ago some military commanders believed they could beat the Taliban and stamp harmony on Helmand by force – but not any more. Titanium-plated Apache gunships, designed to fight the might and military sophistication of Soviet Russia, can still annihilate ragtag gunmen hired to fight for a few dollars a day. Heat-seeking javelin rockets designed to hit T72 tanks tearing across Europe are very good at finding insurgents cowering in compounds. Marines call it "throwing a Porsche at them", because the missiles cost £65,000 a pop. But there is a profound realisation in Afghanistan that victory will never be achieved by fighting alone. "We are going to have to sit down and do business with people who we don't like, and who don't like us," said one diplomat.

Gordon Brown's announcement that tribal engagement is the way forward was an admission of what is already happening, rather than the start of something new. It is what Mr Semple and Mr Patterson, who were given 48 hours to leave Afghanistan on Christmas Day, were doing in Musa Qala last Monday. It is what Britain's ambassador Sir Sherard Cowper Coles has championed since his arrival, and what the commander of British forces in Helmand, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, ordered all of his men to do, back in October.

"Great Britain's long association with Afghanistan has shown that we got ourselves into this country by forming tribal alliances. Equally we will get ourselves out, over time, by forming tribal alliances that support the government of Afghanistan," said Brigadier Mackay in a classified briefing document issued to top officers across Helmand on 30 October. "Everything we do will have as its singular focus our ability to influence the population of Helmand in order that we can retain, gain and win their consent."

Winning hearts and minds is a challenge given that dozens of Nato bases still have separate lavatories for their own troops and the Afghans.

Nonetheless, diplomats have been travelling to far- flung corners of the country to meet influential tribal characters for months, if not years. A few days before going to Helmand, Mr Semple was meeting former mujahedin fighters on the Pakistan border. The intelligence that officers glean from the talks lets allied power-brokers decide which warlords to smash and which ones to engage. The recent British-led battle for Musa Qala – the Taliban's last major stronghold in Helmand – began after a leading commander switched sides. Mullah Abdul Salaam, who controls thousands of men in the area, met President Hamid Karzai ahead of the battle – with British help.

Mr Semple and Mr Patterson, who travelled to Musa Qala to meet local digitaries, were given notice to quit after Afghan officals accused them of "endangering national security". The UN insists they weren't talking to the Taliban, but admitted they were talking to people who have nothing nice to say about Helmand's governor, Assadullah Wafa, or President Karzai. A UN spokesman said: "We need the support of the local community and that means we need to talk to people on the ground, and that means people who are supportive of the government and people who are less supportive. Those are the people they have to win over."

The great gamesmen of today believe the Musa Qala pair were declared personae non gratae because of a rift within the Afghan government about who to talk to in the Taliban and when to start talking to them. A Kabul expert explained: "On the one hand Karzai is telling the Taliban to come and talk and offering the ministerial jobs. But this is an opportunity for him to kick the international community and say who's 'the daddy round here'.

"There's a division in the Afghan government on the extent of peace talks, who to talk peace with and when to talk. There's no cohesive view on the part of the Afghan government or among the international community."

Mr Semple and Mr Patterson have worked in or around Afghanistan for more than a decade. They speak the languages and have forged friendships with dozens of key players. Mr Semple is also a confidant of the British ambassador. "This is a country where personalities count and these people had long-standing relationships. We'll notice their loss," said the UN spokesman.

But they were working for different masters – the EU and the UN – just two among dozens of diplomatic missions supporting a government made up of ministries which act like "fiefdoms" and governors who behave like feudal lords.

If co-ordination is the problem in this round of the Great Game, then perhaps the answer rests with Paddy Ashdown, who is due to arrive in Kabul in March to make the international community work together more closely. If the international lobbying works, Mr Semple and Mr Patterson should be back by then.

Gird for long haul, Kabul tells Canadians

JANE TABER - From Thursday's Globe and Mail - December 27, 2007

Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada wants Canadians to take a world view of the problems in his country, saying Western leaders understand there is no “quick fix.”

Omar Samad said yesterday that weekend visits to Afghan President Hamid Karzai by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd are “a political signal … that they consider Afghanistan a very important world issue.

“I hope that the message that this sends to Canadians at this point is that they should look at it as a very critical and strategic world issue that requires long-term commitment,” Mr. Samad said.

“Every one of these leaders made it very clear during their visit that Afghanistan matters, that Afghanistan is a long-term engagement and that no one should expect a quick fix.”

Defence Minister Peter MacKay, who has been visiting Canadian troops in Kandahar, is expected to meet Mr. Karzai today in Kabul.

Mr. Samad's comments come as Prime Minister Stephen Harper indicated he will hold a spring vote in Parliament on whether to extend the Canadian mission to Afghanistan from February of 2009 to 2011.

In a year-end interview with The Canadian Press, Mr. Harper said he is uncertain whether Canadians understand the importance of remaining involved in Afghanistan.

Asked whether he believes Canadians truly appreciate what is at stake, Mr. Harper replied: “I don't know, the short answer is I don't know.

“The government understands we took on an important international commitment for important reasons of international security that in the long run impact directly on our country.

“So I don't know whether Canadians do – or don't – understand.”

“I think Canadians are deeply troubled by the casualties,” he added.

The Prime Minister has said repeatedly that the mission should be extended and he recently created a non-partisan commission, headed by former Liberal deputy prime minister John Manley, to report on Canada's role in Afghanistan. The report is expected in late January.

“All we can only hope from the Manley exercise is that it causes parliamentarians, particularly in our Official Opposition – which as you know commenced this mission – to sit back and think about what is in the best interest of the country before a vote is actually held,” Mr. Harper said.

“We really have got to avoid – on this one – taking a decision for reasons of short-term politics. We must take a decision that is in the long-run interest of the country, its international reputation and the respect we should all show for the sacrifice our men and women have made to secure it.”

Mr. Samad said he would not comment on whether the weekend visits by the French, Italian and Australian leaders indicate their countries are ready to increase their number of troops or fight in the more dangerous southern region, where Canadian troops are stationed.

The issue of so-called “burden sharing” is controversial, as Mr. Harper and others have said Canadians have taken on a disproportionate load. Polls suggest Canadians believe their troops are paying too high a price and want out of the mission; 73 soldiers and one diplomat have been killed in the past two years.

Mr. MacKay said this year that he and the Prime Minister will be pressing other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries for clear commitments for increased troops and equipment in southern Afghanistan. They want these commitments to be nailed down in time for the alliance's leaders summit in Romania this April.

Experts are warning that the coming vote in Parliament about extending the mission will be messy and one the minority government will not win.

“I don't think the government can get a vote through the House,” said historian Jack Granatstein. “I think it's very sad. … It will really be a test of Canadians, whether we have the stomach to fight, to fight a war.”

Dr. Granatstein supports Canadian troops remaining in Afghanistan until 2011. But he said it will be very “tough to get the vote through” the House of Commons, adding that it will become “messy” with splits in the Liberal caucus.

But Liberal defence critic Denis Coderre said the Liberal caucus is “totally solid” on the extension issue. He said there has to be “some rotation” of troops and a refocusing of the mission.

And Peter Harder, former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, said a May vote is “logical.” He sees risks in a vote before then, as he believes the last thing Mr. Harper wants is for “Parliament to reject what Manley recommends …”

He said the ability for MPs to debate the mission in a non-partisan way will be critical. As well, he added, a vote before the April summit in Romania would be risky, especially if Mr. Harper loses. Mr. Harder said that would “look rather bad for Canada.”

Roland Paris, the director of the Centre for International Policy Studies at the University of Ottawa, said Canadian troops have done a professional job under difficult circumstances, given that the entire mission has not been adequately funded by NATO. He said the NATO meeting in April will be key, as announcements will be made by member countries regarding their commitment to the mission.

“I think ultimately Canadians would be open to the idea of a continued combat mission in Afghanistan,” he said.

“Is it not possible for us to consider other ways for us to play an important role? Combat and non-combat? … I think pulling out in 2009 would be a mistake.”

With a report from The Canadian Press

'No Quick Fix' In Afghanistan: Ambassador

Josh Pringle Thursday, December 27, 2007

Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada suggests Canadians look at the war-torn country as a very critical and strategic world issue that requires a long-term commitment.

Omar Samad told the Globe and Mail he wants Canadians to take a world view of the problems in Afghanistan.

Samad adds Western leaders understand "there is no quick fix."

Several Western leaders visited Afghanistan over the last five days, including French President Nicholas Sarkozy and new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay has been visiting Canadian troops in Kandahar.

Samad told the Globe "every one of these leaders made it clear during their visit that Afghanistan matters, that Afghanistan is a long-term engagement and that no one should expect a quick fix."

INTERVIEW: Afghanistan to see improvement in 2008, general says

Dec 27, 2007

Kabul - The NATO-led International Security Asistance Force (ISAF) anticipates a slight improvement in Afghanistan's security situation in 2008 after 2007 proved to be the country's bloodiest year since the fall of the Taliban.

'I expect an improvement,' German General Bruno Kasdorf, ISAF chief of staff, said in an interview with Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa in Kabul.

He added, however, that with just more than 40,000 troops, the ISAF could not get a grip overnight on the security problems of a country more than twice the size of Germany.

Another four to five years would also be required to build up the Afghan security forces, Kasdorf said.

'That will also then be the time when we will be able to think about reducing our presence,' the general said.

The more personnel and resources the international community invests in the Afghan security forces, the faster it could begin reducing the number of foreign troops in the country, he said.

'I don't have any worries about a return of the Taliban as long as international forces remain in Afghanistan,' Kasdorf said, adding that he believed Afghanistan's former ruling Islamic militia, which was forced from power six years ago, stood no chance militarily against such forces.

The rebels were dealt heavy losses in their leadership in 2007 and the ISAF 'nipped in the bud' its spring offensive, the general said, adding that unlike 2006, the Taliban avoided open confrontations this year.

The Afghan government exerted its authority over wide areas of the country, he said, adding that 70 per cent of the ambushes and attacks by the Taliban took place in 10 per cent of the country. The rest of Afghanistan remained entirely or relatively peaceful, he said.

The general said among the problems he saw ahead were the cultivation of illicit drugs, which rose dramatically in 2007 in Afghanistan, the world's biggest opium producer.

'Drugs threaten to destroy everything, much like a cancer,' he said.

The Afghans must also improve the capabilities of their government, bring rampant corruption to heel and eliminate the 'substantial deficits' of their judicial system, Kasdorf said.

NATO must build a broad consensus on Afghanistan
By Joschka Fischer - Thursday, December 27, 2007

Things aren't going well in Afghanistan. Sometime at the end of 2001, the Bush administration concluded that the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan was no longer its top priority and decided to bet instead on military-led regime change in Iraq. Afghanistan can thus rightly be seen as the first victim of the administration's misguided strategy.

But the Bush administration is not the sole culprit for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. It was NATO's job to ensure the country's stability and security, and thus NATO's weak general secretary and the European allies, especially Germany and France, share the responsibility for the worsening situation.

Yet, despite all the difficulties, the situation in Afghanistan, unlike that in Iraq, is not hopeless. There was a good reason for going to war in Afghanistan in the first place, because the attacks of September 11, 2001, originated there. Once undertaken, the West's intervention ended an almost uninterrupted civil war, and is still regarded with approval by a majority of people. Finally, unlike in Iraq, the intervention did not fundamentally rupture the inner structure of the Afghan state or threaten its very cohesion.

If the West pursues realistic aims, and does so with perseverance, its main objective - a stable central government that can drive back the Taliban, hold Afghanistan together and, with the help of the international community, ensure the country's development - is still achievable.

There are four preconditions of the West's success: First, establishment of Afghan security forces strong enough to drive back the Taliban, limit drug cultivation, and create domestic stability; second, willingness on the part of NATO to remain militarily engaged without any national reservations - with Germany and France in particular giving up the special conditions of their involvement; third, a significant increase in development aid, especially for the so-far-neglected southern part of the country; and fourth, renewal of the regional consensus reached in Bonn in 2001, under which the reconstruction of the Afghan state was to be supported by all the parties concerned.

The war in Afghanistan is not just an Afghan civil war; rather, for decades the country has been a playing field for regional conflicts and hegemonic struggles. So, while the rebirth of the Taliban is in part due to the woefully neglected reconstruction of the Pashto southern and eastern part of the country, it also has external causes. Most notably, for more than two years now, Pakistan has been moving away from the Bonn consensus, betting on the rebirth of the Taliban, and giving the latter massive support. Indeed, without Taliban sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border, and without Pakistani financial backing, the Taliban's armed insurgency against the central Afghan government would have been impossible.

Pakistan's actions are explained mainly by its strategic readjustment in light of US weakness in Iraq and the region as a whole, and by the newly strengthened relationships between India and Afghanistan, resulting in an increased Indian presence in Central Asia. In this connection, Pakistan views the Karzai government in Kabul as unfriendly to Islamabad and a threat to its key strategic interests.

But, by aiding the Taliban, Pakistan is playing with fire, because there are also now Pakistani Taliban who pose a threat to the government in Islamabad. US policy toward Pakistan is also dangerously shortsighted and reminiscent of the mistakes the US made in Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution. Nevertheless, the US at least has a Pakistan policy - which is more than can be said about NATO and Europe. In fact, it is all but incomprehensible that while the future of NATO is being decided in the Hindu Kush mountains, and while thousands of European soldiers stationed there are risking their lives, Pakistan - the key to the success or failure of the mission in Afghanistan - is not given any role in NATO's plans and calculations.

Part of NATO's trouble stems from the fact that a number of member states insist on the right to make their own military and political decisions, and these "national reservations" severely limit NATO's ability to act. If NATO is to succeed, this must change without further delay.

A NATO summit, during which all members would take stock of the situation and draw the appropriate conclusions is, therefore, long overdue. The national reservations must be go, and a joint strategy for success must be adopted, including a massive increase in civilian and military aid to Afghanistan, if the country is to be prevented from descending into the same abyss as Iraq.

Moreover, a regional consensus among all the players must be rebuilt, including Pakistan, Iran, and India, whose joint responsibility for peace, stability, and redevelopment in Afghanistan must be recognized by Europe and the United States. To accomplish this, a follow-up conference to the Bonn Agreement is also required.

While the war in Iraq has been based on wishful thinking, the war in Afghanistan was necessary and unavoidable because it was there that the terrorist threat of September 11, 2001, originated. It would be more than a tragedy - it would be unparalleled political folly - if, because of a lack of commitment and political foresight, the West were to squander its successes in Afghanistan. Europe would have to pay an unacceptably high price, and NATO's future would likely be jeopardized.

Joschka Fischer , Germany's foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, led

Germany's Green Party for nearly 20 years.

France Thinks Military Action Is Not the Sole Solution

Le Figaro, 12/26/2007 By Arnaud De La Grange

A war against time is being played out in the Afghan Greater South. Rather than the Taliban, the al-Qaeda henchmen or the drug barons, the great enemy of NATO force leader General McNeill is time, which flows at such a different pace depending on whether it's seen from Western capitals or from the Pakistani-Afghan tribal regions. Won't the allies, headed by Europeans, chicken out on their military commitment before the Afghan forces are capable of holding the ground on their own? The rebel Pashtuns have the time. If NATO leaves in two, 10 or 20 years, they will still be there. General McNeill, whom Nicolas Sarkozy met Saturday in Kabul, undoubtedly pleaded for a stepped-up French commitment in Afghanistan.

Can or should France do more there? Today, it deploys some 1,600 soldiers there, mostly around Kabul. To avoid being bogged down in an uncertain conflict, it has legitimately emphasized beefing up "trainers." Rather than commit to more direct action or reinforce the Afghan army, Paris is now deploying teams of instructors (OMLT) to work inside Afghan operational units, including those in combat zones. During the summer, the Élysée decided to send three additional OMLT teams and, one month ago, still another team to the South. In Kabul, Nicolas Sarkozy let it be understood that he could beef up these kinds of units still further.

So France makes one little gesture after another. Only, now here we are, and the popular assertion "the more one does, the more one is asked to do" also applies to the "war against terrorism." The pressure from the great barons of the Alliance, headed by the United States, is very intense for Paris to commit itself still further. It's very clear that there are two "sides" among the allies: those who fight in the South and those who confront fewer dangers in the North. Last week, very symbolically, the defense ministers from the eight countries engaged in the South met in Scotland. A sort of "Club of the Eight" warrior nations to which Paris does not belong....

French timidity, long the order of the day, has been poorly understood by the Anglo-Saxons. The Germans' excessive caution is better accepted because people know about their Constitutional and historic curbs. But France? Isn't it, along with Great Britain, "the" country that counts in Europe in defense matters? In Afghanistan, all the allies have been able to observe the excellence of French troops, notably the Special Forces engaged alongside American commandos between 2003 and January 2007. And today, in Kandahar, the allied chief of staff was unstinting in his praise of the operational capabilities of French Mirage jets, which assure a good third of ground troop support missions. These last few weeks, with the American F15s grounded for technical reasons, the French fighters even played a premier role.

If, at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, France had to go beyond its reinforcements in instructors, two paths are being explored: the dispatch to the South of a French battalion that finishes its assignment in the Kabul environs in July 2008, or the return of 200 men from the Special Forces. This latter solution is preferred by the Élysée for the moment. It, in fact, presents a triple advantage: a muscular display, good acceptance of the risks by public opinion, and economy in men.

The problem is that France has been very uncomfortable with the Afghan situation since the beginning. It is divided between the necessary unity among the allies mentioned by Nicolas Sarkozy in Kabul, and the conviction that the solution "is not solely military," as the French president also reminded people Saturday. In other words, Paris deems that the Afghan affair has, ever since the beginning, dramatically lacked any real political leadership. At the end of 2006, Jacques Chirac had tried to launch the idea of a "contact group" on Afghanistan. In vain. So France will have to condition its heightened effort on a redefinition of Afghan strategy, or risk appearing to be the European auxiliary in an endless war without clear objectives.

The chief of American forces in another convulsive theater - Iraq - and author of Washington's new counter-insurgency doctrine, Gen. David Petraeus, noted that "forces conducting counter-insurgency operations generally start out badly." In Afghanistan, they did, in fact, start out badly. In Paris, people wonder whether the strategic aggiornamento is not perhaps already too late, since conflicts that persist have their own mechanics. After sweeping out the Taliban and their al-Qaeda guests in a flick of the wrist in the fall of 2001, the allies are engaged today in a "Seven Years War." One that, unfortunately, could last thirty.

Arnaud de La Grange is Le Figaro's Foreign Service Defense correspondent.
Translation: Truthout French language editor Leslie Thatcher.

Retired general says Soviet incursion of Afghanistan justified

KABUL, December 27 (RIA Novosti) - The invasion by Soviet troops of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 was fully justified, a retired Afghan army general said on Thursday.

"The deployment of Soviet troops was an effective response to our request to the Soviet leadership due to the growing manifestation of terrorism and external threats to Afghanistan," said Maj. Gen. Hamid (Ret.), a former member of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

He said today terrorists "are having a field day" in Afghanistan, blaming the United States.

"The U.S. established such organizations in Afghanistan like al-Qaeda, and it was the U.S. that created Osama bin Laden, who is now terrorizing the entire world," he said.

The general said the U.S.S.R. had made a significant contribution to Afghanistan's economic development, helping build 73 large industrial plants, many of which were still working today.

The war in Afghanistan was a nine-year conflict involving Soviet forces supporting the Marxist (PDPA) government against the largely Islamic fundamentalist Mujahideen insurgents. It began on December 25, 1979 and around 26,000 Soviet troops died in the conflict, over a million Afghan civilians are reported to have been killed in the war.

The war had a profound impact on the Soviet Union, and has been cited as one of the key factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

U.S. President Jimmy Carter indicated that the Soviet incursion was "the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War." Carter later placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Union on shipments of food products such as grain.

The international diplomatic response was severe, ranging from stern warnings to a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Hillier's popularity backfires on Tories
TheStar.com - December 27, 2007 James Travers Ottawa

Rick Hillier is more than the most visible military leader in decades and the Canadian face on the Afghanistan war. He's also a prototype new mandarin; one politicians are now using to their advantage and will soon deeply regret inviting on to the public stage.

Chosen by Liberals to personify more muscular defence policies and deployed by Conservatives to market the Kandahar mission, the street-smart, media-savvy Newfoundlander hasn't always been helpful to his political masters.

Apparently forgetting Paul Martin's defence budget generosity and that, for better and worse, his army in southern Afghanistan is the one Jean Chrétien funded, Hillier blamed Liberal cuts for a "decade of darkness."

He skirmished so often with Gordon O'Connor over everything from procurement to funeral expenses that Stephen Harper finally shuffled the former arms industry lobbyist he had unwisely made defence minister. More recently, Hillier darkened the rosy hue of Tory Afghanistan forecasts and redefined the job for his successors.

Hillier's folksy frankness makes him a mess hall and Don Cherry Hockey Night in Canada favourite. Reviews here are more mixed. Debate swirls over whether or not he criss-crosses the line that traditionally separates senior public servants from elected public figures. Compelling cases are made both ways, but the consensus is that Hillier is now way above the parapet most bureaucrats are comfortable staying below.

The irony is that Conservatives, now keen to change the Afghanistan channel to something more benign, wouldn't mind seeing the back of the general they found so helpful when the mission was all about 9/11 retribution and killing murderous scumbags. But Hillier is too popular with the troops and the public to be forced out and that makes the next move his.

Being trapped in a box of their own making should make politicians wary of building more. Not a chance. It's just too appealing to be able to shift responsibility from accountable ministers to theoretically anonymous deputies when things go wrong.

Once a parliamentary principle, the bargain that allows mandarins to speak truth to power from the shadows while ministers stand in the spotlight is so badly broken that few noticed when Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day left it to the border agency's Alain Jolicoeur to answer awkward questions about the how and why of the Vancouver airport Taser horror.

Sadly, Day's sudden modesty isn't an anomaly. Despite at least partly winning the last election on the strength of their accountability promise, Conservatives are accelerating the Ottawa tactic of passing the buck so often to so many people that where it stops is a mystery. More bureaucrats are appearing in public and the Prime Minister is making a habit of appointing panels answerable only to him to consider public policy issues that were once the purview of those we elect.

Short term, those methods work too well. Politicians can take credit and then bob and weave around public opprobrium while others carry the can.

Long term is entirely different. As Hillier is demonstrating to the Prime Minister's discomfort, the clout that comes with public profile is easy to loan, difficult to recover. Once established as marquee players, bureaucrats will bridle at recasting as docile supporting actors. With their own agendas to protect and careers to advance, they are sure to ad lib and their lines won't always please politicians.

Rick Hillier, take a slow, deep bow. Your fans and critics are watching.

AFGHANISTAN: Blocked roads threaten food security

KABUL, 27 December 2007 (IRIN) - Heavy snowfall has blocked roads to at least 10 districts in Badakhshan Province, northeastern Afghanistan, Monshi Abdul Majid, the governor of Badakhshan, told IRIN on 27 December.

About 200,000 people are estimated to be living in the affected area, many of them in need of food assistance, Majid said.

“Roads to over 15 of Badakhshan’s 27 districts naturally become blocked from December to April every year,” Majid said.

Home to the famous Hindu Kush mountains and the Wakhan Corridor, Badakhshan has a rugged terrain and a poor road network.

To avert a possible humanitarian crisis during the winter of 2007-2008, the government of Afghanistan, backed by international aid agencies, pre-positioned food and non-food relief in 18 vulnerable provinces across the country.

About 22,000 metric tonnes (mt) of mixed food items have either been stocked or distributed in Badakhshan Province to meet the food requirements of people from December 2007 to March 2008, said Ebadullah Ebadi, a spokesman for the UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Kabul.

However, the governor of Badakhshan said only 14,000 mt of wheat aid had reached vulnerable communities.

“The allocated wheat aid is not sufficient,” said Majid, adding that many people in the province were in urgent need of food aid.

“We are very concerned about the food insecurity of over 80,000 people in isolated districts who we believe will not receive aid this winter,” Majid said.

Many people in areas which remain cut-off during the winter months, also suffer from a widespread lack of health services, provincial officials said.

Meanwhile, in Bamyan Province in the central highlands, a landslide blocked a major road leading to Kehmard District.

As a result, the prices of food items, coal and fuel have increased in local markets causing a sense of uncertainty among the estimated 40,000 residents, said Kehmard District Administrator Abdul Khaliq Saliq.

A provincial emergency response commission comprised of several government departments, the UN, and aid agencies held a meeting in Bamyan city on 26 December to identify ways of re-opening the road to Kehmard District.

Mohammad Ewaz Nazari, Bamyan’s police chief, said several gigantic rocks had slipped from a nearby mountain and blocked the road to traffic.

“In the provincial government we do not have the capacity to remove those rocks from the road,” Nazari told IRIN on the phone. He said a New Zealand-led Provincial Reconstruction Team had agreed to dynamite the rocks and reopen the road in the near future.

Kabul's drug addicts live amid detritus of war

Updated Thu. Dec. 27 2007 9:29 AM ET The Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan -- The sound of gunfire once echoed in the imposing, bullet-scarred structure. Now, a stale whiff of heroin hangs in the air. The spent bullet cartridges have been replaced by used syringes.

Huddled in a tight circle, a group of men smoke hashish. In a corner, a 22-year-old man mumbles incoherently, almost invisible beneath the plastic sack wrapped around him.

About a dozen drug addicts call this once grand building - Kabul's former Russian Cultural Centre - their home. Most fled to Iran as refugees during the harsh Taliban rule. Many became addicts while away. Now, Iran is sending many of them home, often against their will.

Mohammad Sultan, 45, was deported from Iran nine months ago. He says the drugs keep him from dwelling on his problems. His wife and three children are still in Iran, and he hasn't heard from them for some time. The story is repeated around the room.

Police officers harass the addicts for money. Of the government, Sultan says, "They don't care whether we live or die. We are just like insects for them."

About half of Afghanistan's drug users are returning refugees from Iran or Pakistan, said Mohammad Zafar, the director general for policy and co-ordination in the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.

"Most of the drug users from Iran are heroin addicts and frequently use injections," he said. "Life for refugees is very hard in other countries, with no jobs, and they are introduced to the habit through drug users in other countries."

In Afghanistan, they have a ready supply: The country's farmers produce 93 per cent of the world's opium, the main ingredient in heroin.

Doctors and medics from the Zendagi-e Nawin rehabilitation centre visit the addicts often to examine and administer much-needed medicines.

AIDS is a concern. A study by Action Aid Afghanistan found that while the country does not have many HIV cases, there is a high risk that the virus could spread because of an increasing number of injecting drug users.

Nearly half of the 99 injecting drug users interviewed by Action Aid did not know HIV could be spread through sharing needles, and 69 per cent did not know where they could get an HIV test.

The former cultural centre, built during the Russian occupation in the 1980s, saw heavy fighting during Afghanistan's three decades of conflict.

Today, its battle-scarred walls are witness to a new cycle of destruction.

Who killed Benazir Bhutto? The main suspects

Jeremy Page, South Asia Correspondent From Times Online December 27, 2007

The main suspects in Benazir Bhutto’s assassination are the Pakistani and foreign Islamist militants who saw her as a heretic and an American stooge and had repeatedly threatened to kill her.

But fingers will also be pointed at Inter-Services Intelligence, the agency that has had close ties to the Islamists since the 1970s and has been used by successive Pakistani leaders to suppress political opposition.

Ms Bhutto narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in October, when a suicide bomber killed about 140 people at a rally in the port city of Karachi to welcome her back from eight years in exile.

Earlier that month, two militant warlords based in Pakistan's lawless northwestern areas, near the border with Afghanistan, had threatened to kill her on her return.

One was Baitullah Mehsud, a top commander fighting the Pakistani army in the tribal region of South Waziristan. He has close ties to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taleban.

The other was Haji Omar, the “amir” or leader of the Pakistani Taleban, who is also from South Waziristan and fought against the Soviets with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

After that attack Ms Bhutto revealed that she had received a letter signed by a person who claimed to be a friend of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden threatening to slaughter her like a goat.

She accused Pakistani authorities of not providing her with sufficient security and hinted that they may have been complicit in the bomb attack. Asif Ali Zardari, her husband, directly accused the ISI of being involved in that attempt on her life.

Mrs Bhutto stopped short of blaming the Government directly, saying that she had more to fear from unidentified members of a power structure that she described as allies of the “forces of militancy”.

Analysts say that President Musharraf himself is unlikely to have ordered her assassination, but that elements of the army and intelligence service would have stood to lose money and power if she had become Prime Minister.

The ISI, in particular, includes some Islamists who became radicalised while running the American-funded campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan and remained fiercely opposed to Ms Bhutto on principle.

Saudi Arabia, which has strong influence in Pakistan, is also thought to frown on Ms Bhutto as being too secular and Westernised and to favour Nawaz Sharif, another former Prime Minister.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]