In this bulletin:

• Bomb kills five Afghans, around 54 Taliban killed in clashes
• Afghan Parliament Debates 'Durand Line'
• Afghan, coalition forces capture suspected terrorist
• Canada slams NATO's Afghan role
• Only 6 months left to win in Afghanistan, NATO general estimates
• Taliban Resistance to Divide Western Alliance in Afghanistan
• Afghanistan: More dollars, please
• Five Years Later
• 5 years later, Afghanistan pays for sins of omission
• Rubin: Afghanistan at Dangerous 'Tipping Point' Council on Foreign Relations
• Slain hero protects Afghan valley - Locals attribute `safety' to slain hero Tajik leader ousted Russians, Taliban

Bomb kills five Afghans, around 54 Taliban killed in clashes

Kabul (AFP 10.9.06) - A bomb ripped through a government vehicle in eastern Afghanistan and killed five people while the army and police reported they had killed 54 militants in clashes at the weekend.

The remote-controlled bomb in eastern Nangarhar province destroyed a district's top three officials -- the chief of Khogyani district, his police commander and his intelligence chief.

A policeman and a passer-by were also killed, Nangarhar police spokesman Ghafoor Khan said on Monday. The officials were travelling to a village to visit a school that the Taliban-led militants torched late Sunday, Khan said.

Purported Taliban spokesman Yousuf Ahmadi claimed responsibility for the attack, saying his Taliban fighters detonated the bomb which was planted on a road.

The army meanwhile reported it had killed 30 "enemy elements" on Saturday in an operation with foreign troops in southern Uruzgan province. Police put the toll at 20.

In another clash in the same area in Charchino district on Sunday, three "enemies of the people of Afghanistan" were killed and four soldiers were wounded, a defence ministry statement said.

Also on Sunday 16 insurgents were killed in neighbouring Helmand province and two rebels were arrested, it said.

And in the adjoining province of Kandahar, rebels attacked men from an Afghan construction company who were doing a survey for a new road in Dand district, a police officer said.

The security guards accompanying the team fought back. "In the fighting four police were wounded, five Taliban were killed and four Taliban were wounded. The Taliban also took two Pakistani labourers," the officer said on condition of anonymity.

The coalition meanwhile announced it had arrested a suspected suicide bombmaker late Friday in the western province of Farah.

"Credible intelligence linked the individual to recent vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks in the Farah region," a US-led military statement read.

The NATO force that commands most of the foreign troops in Afghanistan said Sunday that attacks by Taliban had decreased over the past month, although the extremist movement was still a significant threat.

UN Security Council to send mission to Afghanistan

UN (AFP 10.09.06) - The UN Security Council decided to send a mission to restive Afghanistan, possibly next month, to review the threat posed by Taliban and Al-Qaeda extremists.

Japan's UN envoy Kenzo Oshima, the council president for October, said the mission would also "give Afghanistan and its people a message of assurance of the council's continuing commitment."

A statement read by Oshima said the 15 council members "reaffirmed the continuing importance of combating increased terrorist attacks with all available ways, means and measures as outlined in relevant Security Council resolutions".

The members hailed "efforts by the governments of Afghanistan and its neighboring partners to foster trust and cooperation with each other and looked forward to increasing cooperation between Afghanistan and the partners against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups."

Late last month, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said his Pakistani counterpart Pervez Musharraf had promised to crack down on Islamist militants and religious schools breeding extremism.

Karzai, speaking in a press conference about his recent visit to the United States, again blamed other countries' religious schools, or madrassas, for promoting the extremism fueling Afghanistan's Taliban-led insurgency.

He was clearly referring to neighboring Pakistan, home to madrassas from which the Taliban emerged in the early 1990s.

The strained relations between the leaders of the Islamic neighbors was clear during their US visit, during which they continued months of finger-pointing about the reasons for the increased insurgency.

The Taliban is waging a virulent insurgency in Afghanistan. The rebels, who are allied with Al-Qaeda, have attacked troops in large numbers and intensified a campaign of suicide and roadside bombings.

Around 2,500 people, most of them militants, have been killed in unrest so far this year, nearly double last year's toll. Scores of civilians have also been caught up in the violence.

US-led forces launched the war against the Taliban and its Al-Qaeda allies shortly after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States.

Meanwhile the council members also voiced concern at a recent hike in the cultivation and trafficking of opium within Afghanistan and reaffirmed their commitment to helping the Kabul government implement its national drug control strategy, according to Oshima.

Afghan Parliament Debates 'Durand Line'

RFE/RL By Amin Tarzi - During a closed-door meeting on security issues, the Afghan National Assembly's Wolesi Jirga (People's Council) on October 4 debated the thorny issue of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, referred to by Kabul as the "Durand Line," Kabul-based Tolu Television reported.

A number of Wolesi Jirga members said discussion is needed prior to finalizing a draft proposal by the defense and security committees. An unidentified parliamentary secretary told Tolu that Afghanistan "should launch a comprehensive discussion on the Durand Line at the regional and international levels," adding that "if all the problems [relating to security exist] because of the Durand Line, then we would like to resolve it as the first step."

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan takes it name from Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, who concluded an agreement with Afghanistan in 1893. Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, no Afghan government has officially recognized the boundary (see "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report, "August 7, 2003 and July 14, 2006). In a recent press conference in Kabul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai again dodged a question on whether his administration was prepared to resolve the dispute with Pakistan.

Afghan, coalition forces capture suspected terrorist

Afghan and the U.S.-led coalition forces captured a suspected terrorist from western Farah province, a press release of the coalition forces said Monday.

"A joint Afghan and coalition forces conducted a peaceful search of a compound in the city of Farah late Sunday night and early today in an effort to detain a known terrorist and captured him," the press release added.

The release said the suspect was a car bomb facilitator. However, it did not disclose the suspect's name and nationality.

Three more individuals were also detained during the operation, it added.

Source: Xinhua

Canada slams NATO's Afghan role

GLORIA GALLOWAY - From Monday's Globe and Mail 10.9.06

OTTAWA — Canada's Defence Minister is confronting those NATO countries with troops deployed in relatively stable parts of Afghanistan — including Germany, France, Spain and Italy — saying they must lift the restrictions that prevent their soldiers from taking on the more dangerous tasks being shouldered by Canadians.

It's a problem that one former Canadian military leader says threatens the future of the 57-year-old North Atlantic Treaty Organization — an alliance founded on the principle that an attack against one of its members is an attack against all.

Canadian troops are paying the ultimate price with a frequency that has caused many at home to question Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. Trooper Mark Andrew Wilson, killed in a roadside bomb explosion this weekend, was the 40th Canadian soldier to die in the conflict.

But some of the large European countries with troops in the safer northern and western regions will not allow their soldiers to move into the danger zones when they are needed, even on a temporary basis. And some are not permitted to fight at night.

Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor said Sunday that he has raised Canada's concerns about those restrictions — called caveats — with the countries that have imposed them. Although he did not name them directly, it was clear Mr. O'Connor was referring primarily to Germany, France, Spain and Italy.

The Defence Minister also said he spoke with representatives of those countries that are sharing Canada's deadly burden in the south — the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Romania and Estonia — when he attended a NATO meeting in Slovenia at the end of September.

“For about an hour and a half, I grabbed together the counties that are in the south with us to talk about our common challenges,” Mr. O'Connor told The Globe and Mail in a telephone interview. “In the meeting I encouraged them to lobby other NATO members to remove their restrictions.”

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, like the one Canada has sent to Kandahar province, should not be expected to move about, he said.

Battle groups, however, should be given the freedom to travel to another province if there is a crisis, even for a day or two, until the danger has abated, he added.

“If we were in desperate straits, according to the caveats, they can't move south,” Mr. O'Connor said.

Those countries, such as Canada, that have troops in the south and east do not have those types of restrictions and could easily move to the north or west if there is a problem, he said.

“This is very difficult for the [UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force] commander,” he said. “He has some forces he can move around and some he can't. That's not the ideal when you are engaging the insurgents.”

Asked if he thought the reluctance on the part of some countries to let their troops go to the more dangerous regions may be fed by fears that their troops could suffer casualties, the minister gave a gruff chuckle and said: “Well, that's your interpretation.”

Retired Canadian major-general Lewis MacKenzie, a former commander of United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia, said he supports Mr. O'Connor in his demands that other countries pull more weight.

“I heartily endorse the pressure that is being brought to bear and I hope it's ratcheted up,” he said in a telephone interview yesterday.

Mr. MacKenzie pointed out that Article 5 of the treaty that created NATO after the Second World War says “an attack against one is an attack against all.”

So when member countries are involved in a joint operation, they “are not supposed to provide troops with asterisks and caveats after them,” he said, calling the restrictions a stake aimed at the heart of NATO.

“I think the alliance is threatened, seriously threatened,” Mr. MacKenzie said.

In publicly calling out those countries that are not contributing, Mr. O'Connor has to exercise diplomacy, he said.

But Canada has earned the right to talk tough about this issue, he said. “We've got influence. It's paid for with the blood of our soldiers and the gold of our taxpayers, so it bloody well gives us influence.”

Liberal defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh said he agrees that the caveats should be lifted. But he said yesterday that the Conservative government should have made sure this was done before Canada's commitment in Afghanistan was extended last spring to 2009.

“For Mr. O'Connor to be saying that today,” Mr. Dosanjh said, “shows complete ineptitude on the part of this government in the way they negotiated with NATO in terms of their rush to extend the mission.”

Only 6 months left to win in Afghanistan, NATO general estimates

FISNIK ABRASHI - Associated Press 10.8.06 - Kabul — NATO's top commander in Afghanistan warned on Sunday that a majority of Afghans would likely switch their allegiance to resurgent Taliban militants if their lives show no visible improvements in the next six months.

Gen. David Richards, a British officer who commands NATO's 32,000 troops here, said that he would like to have about 2,500 additional troops to form a reserve battalion to help speed up reconstruction and development efforts.

He said the south of the country, where NATO troops have fought their most intense battles this year, has been “broadly stabilized,” which gives the alliance an opportunity to launch projects there. If it doesn't, he estimates about 70 per cent of Afghans could switch their allegiance from NATO to the Taliban.

“They will say, ‘We do not want the Taliban but then we would rather have that austere and unpleasant life that that might involve than another five years of fighting,”' Gen. Richards said in an interview.

“We have created an opportunity,” following the intense fighting that left over 500 militants dead in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, he said. “If we do not take advantage of this, then you can pour an additional 10,000 troops next year and we would not succeed because we would have lost by then the consent of the people.”

NATO extended its security mission last week to all of Afghanistan, taking command of 12,000 U.S. troops in the war-battered country's east. The mission is the biggest ground combat operation in NATO history and gives Gen. Richards command of the largest number of U.S. troops under a foreign leader since the Second World War.

Some 8,000 U.S. troops will continue to function outside NATO, tracking al-Qaeda terrorists, helping train Afghan security forces and doing reconstruction work.

Afghanistan is going through its worst bout of violence since the U.S.-led invasion removed the former Taliban regime from power five years ago. The Taliban has made a comeback in the south and east of the country and is seriously threatening Western attempts to stabilize the country after almost three decades of war.

Taliban militants have acknowledged adopting the suicide attacks commonly used by insurgents in Iraq, launching 78 suicide bombings across Afghanistan this year which have killed close to 200 people, NATO said Sunday.

There were only two suicide attacks in 2003 and six in 2004, according to Seth Jones, an analyst for the U.S.-based RAND Corp. He said there were 21 in 2005.

Gen. Richards, who will lead the NATO forces in Afghanistan until U.S. Gen. Dan McNeil takes over in February, said the Taliban may lose support among Afghans if it continues the attacks.

“The very cowardly use of suicide bombers, the tragic use of suicide bombers, reveals weakness on the part of the Taliban, not strength,” he said.

Gen. Richards said NATO troops have also seen an upsurge in violence along the eastern border with Pakistan since that country's government signed a deal with pro-Taliban militants last month to end fighting that broke out after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.

U.S. military officials have said the number of attacks on coalition and Afghan troops has tripled in the tribal border region. Afghan and Western officials have repeatedly accused Pakistan of not doing all it can to block the flow of insurgents over the border, but Pakistan has rejected the charge.

Gen. Richards, who will travel to Pakistan for meetings with military leaders on Monday, urged “partnership and co-operation rather than confrontation” in dealings with Pakistan.

The U.S.-led coalition and Afghan forces killed five suspected insurgents in a clash in eastern Afghanistan on Saturday, the Ministry of Defence said. One suspected insurgent was detained following the gunfight in eastern Paktika province.

Taliban Resistance to Divide Western Alliance in Afghanistan

Xinhua - 10/07/2006 - Taliban's regrouping and stiff resistance against the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are likely to divide the Western alliance as public opinion in some of the Western countries is against fighting in Afghanistan.

The number of Westerners opposing the war in Afghanistan is much higher than five years ago when the US-led military alliance invaded the war-ravaged Central Asian country to topple the Taliban regime on Oct. 7, 2001.

A majority of the people of Canada, a major ally of the United States in the war on terror, are against the military presence of Canada in Afghanistan, according to a survey conducted last month.

Fifty-nine percent of 2,038 Canadians interviewed in September were against Canada's military mission in Afghanistan, saying Canadian soldiers "are dying for a cause we cannot win".

Only 20 percent of Canadian adults between 18 to 34 years old, according to the survey, were willing to fight.

Canada has lost 39 soldiers since the beginning of its mission in Afghanistan nearly five years ago and the number is on the rise as Taliban militants are pointing their guns on Canadian troops in Taliban's former stronghold Kandahar where some 2,300 Canadian forces have been stationed to stabilize security.

Taliban-led militancy has claimed the lives of more than 2,400 people including more than 110 foreign soldiers since the beginning of this year, a figure almost double the casualties last year.

Out of the foreign troops killed in Afghanistan this year, 69 are Americans, according to the Western media reports. And the United States has lost 280 soldiers ever since it launched the campaign against Taliban regime in late 2001.

The rising casualties have caused concern among the NATO member states and allies as none of the military alliance member was willing to commit more troops to Afghanistan when their defense ministers met in Belgium last month despite appeal by NATO-led ISAF Commander in Afghanistan General David Richards.

Taliban's rapid resurgence and increasing attacks on the US- dominated forces in Afghanistan have also shocked Britain, another stanch ally of Washington in the war on terror as Prime Minister Tony Blair has admitted that the battle with Afghan insurgents has been more difficult than anticipated.

"I think the particular mission was tougher than any one expected but I am not surprised it was tough," Blair told BBC in an interview last month.

British Defense Secretary Des Browne in an address to the Royal United Services Institute in September also admitted that the battle in southern Afghanistan "had been harder than expected."

Another key ally of the United States in the war on terror in Afghanistan is Italy, which has been torn by bitter controversies over its military presence in the post-Taliban nation after one of its soldiers was killed and five others were wounded in a roadside bomb attack late last month outside Kabul.

The casualties, according to media reports, have prompted several political forces including the Communist and Green parties to urge Rome for a quick disengagement from Afghanistan.

Some 33,000 NATO-led ISAF forces and 8,000 US troops have been stationed in Afghanistan to stabilize security, track down Taliban militants and al-Qaida operatives and bolster the reconstruction process of the war-battered country.

Nevertheless, the well equipped Western military alliance and the US well disciplined army with its hi-tech military hardware have failed to root out Taliban militants in mountainous southern provinces, where the militias rose in mid last decade and impose strict law in most part of the country.

The Western military alliance's inability to eliminate a militant group and Taliban's firm resolve to fight back the world's powerful alliance speak of the alliance daunting challenges facing in Afghanistan that could undermine its credibility in the future.

Afghanistan: More dollars, please

Reuters 10/08/2006 - Forget about more troops, send more greenbacks to Afghanistan, says LA Times columnist Max Boot, as NATO prepares to take over the command of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The United States has spent more than twice as much per capita in Iraq as it has in Afghanistan and this "anaemic level of support" is nowhere near enough to tackle the country's drug problem. Time to step up the game, concludes Boot.

Some may say the States is at least investing money more wisely in Afghanistan. Instead of putting all its efforts into wiping out the Taliban, it's focussing attention on helping civilians. "The insurgents can't compete with the money we are going to pour into reconstruction," says a civil engineer involved in reconstruction projects the U.S. Army is planning in order to win the hearts-and-minds battle in Afghanistan.

In its second report of a three-part series, Christian Science Monitor says that so far, the response from some village elders has been very good. There has been an increase in the number of project requests and the elders sometimes provide information that helps flush out insurgents from their hiding places.

"The American help is very important," one of the elders is quoted as saying. The projects in his village include water pipes, a collection basin and a micro hydro power system. "Now there is no clean water, but there will be. At night, we stay in the dark. If we have light, it will be very good."

But it's not all good news. Anyone seen to be cooperating with the U.S. forces is targeted. In the last month, one village elder has been tortured and killed and a senior border policeman assassinated, according to the publication, which says threats are very common.

Christian Science Monitor's first report in its series points out that many Afghans are frustrated at the pace of reconstruction, which has been dogged by security problems and allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Read more in our Vice and virtue in Afghanistan blog.

The final part of Christian Science Monitor's series on Afghanistan looks at the power of radio in winning people over.

A radio station was created by the U.S. Army with the aim of publicising its local development projects in Nuristan. The six hours of live broadcasting every day and its repeat session are widely heard in the region which has one of the highest rates of illiteracy in Afghanistan.

However, all the efforts to flush out the Taliban may come to nothing. In fact, the Taliban may be making a comeback with an unlikely blessing. Bill Frist, U.S. Republican Senate Majority Leader, who travelled to Afghanistan, has advised the Bush administration that they should consider the option of bringing the Taliban into the power equation, as the Taliban fighters are "too numerous and too popular," according to the Indian Express. This remark could be dismissed as just another controversial statement from a politician, but the paper points out that Bush actually supported Pakistan's recent agreement with Taliban in Waziristan province.

Five Years Later

The Washington Post Op-ed – 10.08.2006 By Donald H. Rumsfeld

On Oct. 7, 2001, President Bush spoke from the Treaty Room of the White House to announce the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, a mission designed to disrupt and destroy al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan and the regime that had harbored and supported Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.

It was never going to be an easy mission. Afghanistan was among the world's poorest nations, with little political or economic infrastructure. Nearly three decades of war, drought and a Soviet occupation by hundreds of thousands of troops had yielded a broken, lawless nation.

Yet from halfway around the world -- with but a few weeks' notice -- coalition forces were charged with securing a landlocked, mountainous country that history had dubbed the "graveyard" of great powers.

Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that military experts and columnists raised the specter of Vietnam and "quagmires" -- both before and during combat operations. They cited the forbidding terrain, brutal weather and the Soviet Union's total failure.

Within weeks of our launching combat operations, however, the Taliban regime had been defeated, consigning yet another cruel regime to the dustbin of history. Coalition forces took control of Kabul, and since then the Afghan people have fashioned a new constitution and successfully held the first democratic presidential election in their long history.

Now, five years after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, another signpost has been marked on Afghanistan's long, difficult road to stability: NATO took control of security operations for the entire country on Thursday, as well as the 24 Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are strengthening infrastructure across the nation.

This is an unprecedented moment for the NATO alliance. In 2001 NATO forces were for the first time deployed beyond their traditional European borders. Today the number of troops in Afghanistan from nations besides the United States has reached more than 20,000 -- to add to the approximately 21,000 American troops serving there.

Not all the news about Afghanistan is encouraging. There is, for example, the legitimate worry that increased poppy production could be a destabilizing factor. And rising violence in southern Afghanistan is real.

President Hamid Karzai, speaking with President Bush recently at the White House, acknowledged the difficulties: "Afghanistan is a country that is emerging out of so many years of war and destruction. . . . We lost almost two generations to the lack of education. . . . We know our problems. We have difficulties. But Afghanistan also knows where the problem is."

The problem, he said, is poverty and extremism. Success requires a strong and capable Afghan government that can provide services and opportunities for all its people.

During the active combat or conventional phase of any war, there are clear signs of progress: battles won, key strategic points taken, enemy forces captured or killed. In the post-battle phase, however, the measure of progress is not as clear -- especially in a war such as the Global War on Terror, which relies so heavily on the development of civic institutions in places

that have known little more than war and destitution. And yet, for all of the challenges the Afghan people face, there are many promising indicators. Among them:

· Security: The Afghan National Army has grown to more than 30,000, with approximately 1,000 soldiers added each month. The Afghan National Police now number more than 46,000. Afghan forces were successful in providing security for the two national elections held since 2004.

· Economy: The size of Afghanistan's economy has tripled in the past five years and is projected to increase another 20 percent next year. Between 2003 and 2004, government revenue increased 70 percent, to $300 million. Coca-Cola recently opened a $25 million bottling plant in Kabul, and other large multinational companies are considering opportunities in Afghanistan.

· Education: In the past five years, more than 42 million school textbooks have been printed and distributed, and some 50,000 Afghan teachers have been trained. Almost 600 schools have been built, and now more than 5 million children attend school, a 500 percent increase from 2001.

· Health care: In 2001 only 8 percent of Afghans had access to at least basic health care; at least 80 percent do today. Some 5 million Afghan children have been vaccinated.

· Infrastructure: Thousands of kilometers of roads have been built or improved since the Taliban fell. Since 2004, 25 provincial courthouses have been built and hundreds of judges trained.

Building a new nation is never a straight, steady climb upward. Today can sometimes look worse than yesterday -- or even two months ago. What matters is the overall trajectory: Where do things stand today when compared to what they were five years ago? In Afghanistan, the trajectory is a hopeful and promising one.

The writer is secretary of defense.

5 years later, Afghanistan pays for sins of omission

The Baltimore Sun Op-ed – 10.08.2006 By Ali Ahmad Jalali

On the fifth anniversary of the U.S.-led military invasion, Afghanistan faces the worst crisis since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. Attacks by a resurgent Taliban and acts of suicide terrorism have taken the lives of more than 2,000 people this year; poor governance and a lack of economic opportunities erode human security daily; drug production has increased to a record high; the government is losing control of an increasing number of districts to insurgents or warlords; and corruption is rampant.

Not long ago, Afghanistan - with its successful, free presidential and parliamentary elections, improvement in women's rights and free media - was advertised as a success story among post-conflict societies. It was considered an example for Iraq. Today, the Iraqi situation inspires acts of terrorism in Afghanistan.

What went wrong? Was it the deployment of insufficient troops in a large, mountainous country or the investment of minimal funds to rebuild a heavily destroyed land? Did the U.S. war in Iraq shift needed attention and resources from an incomplete mission in Afghanistan? Were the incoherent reconstruction approaches of the international community and Afghan government responsible? Was it the failure to address the regional dimension of insurgency and terrorism? All of the above?

No one can ignore the notable progress in Afghanistan, but the current troubles are a result of what was not done rather than what was done.

From the outset, two contradictory concepts drove international intervention in Afghanistan. The country was described as the major front of a global war on terror, yet the intervention was a "light footprint" engagement. This "light footprint" continues to impair every aspect of reconstruction in Afghanistan.

The Taliban were removed from power, but neither their potential to come back nor their external support was addressed. Alliances of convenience with warlords perpetuated the influence of the most notorious human rights violators. Failure to crack down on drug traffickers and provide sustainable alternative livelihood to farmers led to record increases in illicit drug production that fuels corruption and funds terrorism and criminality. And inefficient use of insufficient funds, mostly by international contractors outside government control, failed to create economic opportunities, good governance and the rule of law.

The first two years after the fall of the Taliban offered the best window of opportunity for reconstruction. The enemy was disintegrated, public support for the policies of the central government was overwhelming, and international military forces had the hearts and minds of the population. In many cases, the people willingly cooperated in foiling acts of terrorism and freeing foreign hostages.

This opportunity was squandered. The Unites States' shift in attention and resources to Iraq came at a time when the global jihadists refocused their attention on a weak Afghan state. The Afghan government failed to act for long-term stability, opting instead for short-term deals with nonstate power holders who had their own interests.

The result has been a weak government with incompetent security forces and a poor and corrupt justice sector. The Afghan government's failure to protect rural communities, to respond to the legitimate needs of the people and to fight corruption has rejuvenated the insurgency.

The Taliban-led insurgents have training camps, staging areas, recruiting centers and havens in Pakistan. The operations of a Pakistani military force, deployed in the border region, mostly in Waziristan tribal area, have been effective against al-Qaida militants but have not done much to contain the Taliban, particularly in the Baluchistan, Bajaur, Swat and Chitral areas. There are several religious extremist groups in Pakistan that enjoy freedom of action there and do not hide their support for the Taliban. More effort is needed to crack down on these groups and stop cross-border terrorist activity in Afghanistan.

The current military response to the threat is not comprehensive. Left unaddressed is the context that nourishes the continuing violence: desperate economic conditions, lack of sufficient funds for development and reconstruction, governmental ineffectiveness, repression of communities by local thugs, and sanctuary for terrorists across the border in Pakistan. Until these issues are resolved, Afghanistan will remain a threat to international security.

The recently announced extension of NATO's security mission to cover the whole of Afghanistan comes as a peace deal between the Pakistani government and the pro-Taliban militants in the North Waziristan border area has led to a major increase in militants' cross-border attacks. But NATO's half-hearted response to calls for additional troops in Afghanistan and the restrained rules of engagement adopted by certain members of the alliance will not do the job.

Success in Afghanistan will depend on these key elements: removal of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan; sufficient funds for development and adequate troops for securing the reconstruction effort; and tougher action by the Afghan government to crack down on corruption and support the rule of law.

Missed opportunities tarnish Afghanistan's recent history. Our globalizing world cannot afford for Afghanistan to fail - and the world must not fail Afghanistan.

Ali Ahmad Jalali was interior minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to October 2005. His e-mail is jalalia@ndu.edu.

Afghanistan, Five Years On - Updated: October 6, 2006 - Lionel Beehner Council on Foreign relations

The purpose of invading Afghanistan five years ago, fresh after the Twin Towers fell, was to eliminate al-Qaeda’s safe haven. The Taliban had turned a blind eye to terrorist training camps and, once the bombs began falling in October 2001, urged global jihad against America (PBS) before fleeing across the border into Pakistan.

Five years on, the Taliban have rebounded and retaken large swaths of land along Afghanistan’s southern periphery with Pakistan. Buoyed by profits from opium, these insurgents also allegedly enjoy support from Pakistani intelligence, something Islamabad denies. Insurgents have already killed more coalition forces this year—163—than they did in all of 2005. “Afghanistan has become Iraq on a slow burn,” writes Jonathan S. Landay of McClatchy Newspapers. This CFR Slide Show is a photographic history of the first five years of the war in AFghanistan.

So what can be done? Bill Clinton, in his recent fiery interview with FOX News, accused the White House of treating Afghanistan as just one-seventh as important as Iraq (based on 20,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan versus 140,000 in Iraq). The United States has spent over twice as much per capita on Iraq as it has on Afghanistan. Yet more troops and aid are “not in the cards” ( LAT), admits CFR Senior Fellow Max Boot. Instead, he suggests playing “hardball” with Pakistan and supports a “more hands-on nation builder” as ambassador to Afghanistan, much like Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy from 2003 to 2005. NATO’s supreme commander in charge of the alliance’s operations in the country, Gen. James Jones, says success lies not in military solutions but matters such as smart reconstruction and a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy.

Meanwhile, there is growing consensus that insurgencies like the ones raging in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be won militarily. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN), while visiting a military base in the Taliban stronghold of Qalat, made news by recommending that “people who call themselves Taliban” be incorporated into a national-unity government ( CSMonitor). He later backtracked from his comments, but Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution says striking a deal with the Taliban might work. “Our true interest is in ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for al Qaeda,” he tells CFR.org. “The Taliban, under Pakistani pressure, might ensure this if its own position was secured. This is distasteful, and might mean [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai's departure, but it does preserve our one core interest in Afghanistan.”

Ethnic Pashtuns on both sides of the border sympathize with the Taliban’s cause. Experts agree any solution to the Afghan conflict must involve Pakistan, whose government stands accused of harboring terrorists. “ The real question is not whether Pakistan is or is not supporting the Taliban, but why it is doing so,” writes Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. To rescue Afghan-Pakistani relations and root out the Taliban and other terrorists from the region, he suggests that military rule in Pakistan be ended and democracy installed in Islamabad. New York University's Barnett R. Rubin urges conditioning U.S. military aid to Pakistan on its cooperation in clamping down on the Taliban. Rubin tells CFR.org's Bernard Gwertzman that another way to win Pakistan's help is for U.S. officials to help allay concerns about Indian and Afghan support of the Baluch insurgency. 

Aside from security woes, Afghanistan also must overcome a number of economic, social, and political obstacles, as this new Backgrounder examines. “Levels of poverty, hunger, ill health, illiteracy, and gender inequality put Afghanistan near the bottom of every global ranking,” writes Rubin in this Council Special Report.

Rubin: Afghanistan at Dangerous 'Tipping Point' Council on Foreign Relations

http://www.cfr.org/publication/11620/rubin.html 

Interviewee: Dr. Barnett R. Rubin, New York University
Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor
October 6, 2006

Barnett R. Rubin, one of the top experts on Afghanistan, says the failure of the Bush administration to press Pakistan to halt its support for the Taliban has put Afghanistan into a very precarious situation. He says Afghanistan is "at a potential tipping point because the expectations of people in Afghanistan and throughout the region have changed quite dramatically and they really see the Taliban as having the initiative and being on the way to victory."

Rubin, who is director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, was the author of a Council Special Report on Afghanistan this year.

You've been a specialist in the field of Afghanistan and that part of the world for nearly a quarter of a century. Where does Afghanistan stand now, five years after the American invasion which led to the ouster of the Taliban government? Is the cup half full or half empty, would you say?

First, it's much less than half full and much more than half empty, but the main thing is it's standing on quite a rickety table and the whole thing could be knocked over. I think we're literally, to pursue the metaphor, at a potential tipping point because the expectations of people in Afghanistan and throughout the region have changed quite dramatically and they really see the Taliban as having the initiative and being on the way to victory.

That's what most Afghans feel, you think?

Yes, I think they do. They feel all the trends are going in the Taliban's favor and the government and the international community are really not responding to it effectively at all. I think the predominant, overwhelming perception in the region is that the United States is not serious about trying to succeed in Afghanistan. Because what do they see? They see that we immediately turned our attention to Iraq, that the day after September 11, 2001, [Defense Secretary Donald M.] Rumsfeld wanted to bomb Iraq.

They see that we've spent perhaps seven times as much money in Iraq, that we put more troops into Iraq, and that we tolerate Pakistan's support for the Taliban, while we still treat General [Pervez] Musharraf, [Pakistan's president] as an ally. And by the way, the intelligence data is extremely clear. I am told that the Pakistani intelligence service is supporting the Taliban leadership from the Taliban headquarters in Quetta, which is not in [Pakistan's] tribal territories. And yet President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Vice President Cheney did not mention the Taliban headquarters in Quetta to President Musharraf during his recent visit. Why is this?

This is because everyone perceives that containing Iran, and trying to stop Iran's nuclear program, and perhaps destroying the Islamic regime in Iran, and perhaps changing the regime in Syria, and winning in Iraq are much higher priorities for the Bush administration than succeeding in Afghanistan. And the administration thinks they can succeed in this regional objective only if they keep Pakistan relatively quiet.

When both Musharraf and [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai were in New York last month for the UN General Assembly, Karzai said he's given the coordinates to President Musharraf on where Taliban leader Mullah Omar's headquarters were in Quetta. And you say the American intelligence confirms that, right?

American intelligence and NATO intelligence. I'd note that when General James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, four-star Marine general, former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 21, he was asked by Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), "Is it true, as some allege, that the headquarters of the Taliban is in or around the Pakistani city of Quetta?" And General Jones responded, "That is generally accepted. Yes, sir." So the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, which is now in command of the entire military operation in Afghanistan, says the headquarters of the Taliban is in Quetta and yet, the top figures in our administration did not mention this, as I understand it, to President Musharraf when he was here. They focused much more on another serious issue, which is the Waziristan [in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas] issue, because al-Qaeda people are headquartered there. It's the al-Qaeda people whom they believe pose more of a direct threat to the United States. But this just reinforces the general perception in the region that the United States is not serious about succeeding in Afghanistan.

And this is the area where Musharraf made the deal that caused all this concern in Afghanistan?

Yes. Well I think it caused concern beyond Afghanistan. And Musharraf also systematically misrepresented the deal. He went the rounds, including at the Council on Foreign Relations, saying that it was a deal only with tribal leaders to limit the activity of the Taliban. But that actually is not what the agreement itself said. I guess he was counting on no one having read it. And apparently he told President Bush, when the Afghans confronted him with the text of the agreement at the dinner, that he hadn't read it himself. But the agreement says quite clearly, in both the original Urdu and the English translation, that the two parties of the deal are: One, the Pakistan government. And two, the tribal elders, local mujahadeen [holy warriors], Taliban, and Islamic clergy of the tribes of North Waziristan. Note also it says mujahadeen. Now who are these mujahadeen? What are they waging jihad against? This is what President Karzai asked. Who are these people waging jihad against? Against the Afghan government? Against the United States? But the Pakistani government is recognizing them as mujahideen, that is, people engaged in a sacred struggle. What message does that communicate?

That's very interesting. Now let's go back to my earlier question. You said it's at a tipping point? Is there some way to tip it up, so it doesn't fall?

It would require some very dramatic acts on our part, and not only by the United States, but others as well. Thus far, I see no indication that we are prepared to take such action. First of all, it would require unambiguous and very strong pressure on Pakistan to shut down the headquarters of the Taliban. But, as I said before, that issue was not even mentioned to Musharraf by the highest officials of the administration. This is a core national security issue for Pakistan, not because they're in favor of terrorism or trying to destroy us, but because they have their regional concerns about the growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan, the fact that Afghanistan has never recognized the border, and about their ambition to be a regional power, with Afghanistan under their hegemony, and grow their influence in Central Asia.

They have ambitions which are commensurate with their being a nuclear power, if not with the actual economic base of their power. But at the same time, of course, their military is very largely dependent on supplies from the United States and, of course, being an Islamist ally of the United States was very easy during the Cold War because then Islamic jihad could be projected against the Soviet Union and on the side used against India, as it has been done in Kashmir -not that there aren't other issues in Kashmir as well, very legitimate ones. But Pakistan has exploited it as an issue of jihad. That has become much more tricky for Pakistan since 9/11 but essentially the United States has failed to use the leverage that it does have, because of the very overly broad and mistaken way that we have defined our enemy in the so-called war on terror.

What would we have to do?

It's very difficult for someone outside of government-who doesn't know about all the various, secret arrangements that are taking place about intelligence operations-to make very concrete proposals. But I believe that first, we have to put the military supply relationship on the table and say, "We cannot continue to build up your military while you are hosting command control of an organization that is killing Americans, NATO soldiers, our Afghan allies, and engaging in terrorism against civilians," which is what Pakistan is doing.

Second, we should say, "We understand you're not doing this because you hate us, but because you have some regional security issues involving India. We will try to address those." For instance, Pakistan is concerned that the Indian consulates in cities near Pakistan and Afghanistan are centers for intelligence operations against Pakistan, including support for the Baluch insurgency in Pakistan. Again, the Baluch insurgency has its own nationalist roots in Pakistan, it has some legitimacy, but nonetheless, we can address Pakistan's concerns about Indian involvement by asking Afghanistan and India to try to keep those consulates small, and keeping some transparency about them.

And Afghanistan should also make some moves toward eventually recognizing the border with Pakistan and recognizing the incorporation of questioned Baluch terrorities into Pakistan, something Afghanistan has never recognized the legitimacy of.

What about within Afghanistan itself? Is the economy better?

First, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The only dynamic part of the economy is narcotics, which has skyrocketed this year. There may be as much as 60 percent more production this year as compared to last year, largely because of a decline in security in certain major opium-producing regions and the spread of production to every single province in Afghanistan, which never happened before.

Also, from the indicators I was able to gather during my most recent trip at the end of July, early August, it appears that even the kind of bubble economy that blew up in the cities as a result of the international pressure and the flow of aid money is starting to collapse. People are starting to say there is a decline in construction, a decline in demand for fruits and vegetables, a decline in employment. Largely again, this has to do with security. A number of Afghan businessmen who had come back from outside the country and made investments have now left again because there have been high-profile kidnappings of rich people-which people usually say are carried out by people in police uniforms-killings, robberies and so on.

There have been some NATO military achievements in Afghanistan recently, haven't there?

Our military commanders know this is not primarily a military battle. What the military does is to move into an area, defeat the enemy, then the enemy moves somewhere else-back to their base areas in Pakistan where they're in complete safety and shelter and can recruit new recruits, refund, retrain and so on, reequip themselves. And then what comes in after the military? We have a government that is extraordinarily weak, corrupt, and ineffective. We have a very much underfunded reconstruction effort. So it means that unless we really seriously increase our support for the Afghan government for reconstruction, there's a vacuum after our military victory. So there's no way to transform those actual victories into strategic success. One of the top military commanders I talked to in Afghanistan, an international commander, said his basic assumption was that we need to double our resources.

President Karzai comes across here as a very eloquent, competent man. But I gather in Afghanistan he's not considered very highly anymore.

Of course, no one who is head of the government in Afghanistan would be considered very highly because it is a very, very weak, ineffective, and corrupt government. But in addition, President Karzai has no previous executive experience. He has some flaws as a decision maker. The vacuum of people with real administrative experience means that he and his ministries have almost no competent staff. So just the basic machinery of government is not functioning.

Now, in those vacuums, the Taliban brought a kind of very primitive or simple type of governance by using violence. That is, if they found a corrupt person, they would treat him as a thief, cut off his hand. If there was a murderer, they would hang him after a very short and summary trial. So people would say, "At least under the Taliban there was some kind of justice." They're not contrasting that with justice that respects human rights and so on-that they would like-but we haven't offered them that. What we've offered them is nonfunctional courts, plus some training programs.

I take it at this point, you're very pessimistic.

I wouldn't say that. I'm trying to give a warning. There are two very positive elements here. One is that there is a very broad, global consensus that we want to support the current political structure and government of Afghanistan and stabilize it, defeat the Taliban militarily, though of course they can form a political party and join the Afghan system nonviolently if they want to do so. Second, the Afghan people still-even if they might be resigned to the Taliban coming back, or might be in despair over the corruption and incapacity of this government and its international supporters-wish this effort would succeed. So if we put those two things together, there still is something very important to build upon. But we have not given this the priority, the resources-military, economic and political-that it requires to succeed.

Slain hero protects Afghan valley - Locals attribute `safety' to slain hero Tajik leader ousted Russians, Taliban

Oct. 10, 2006. MITCH POTTER - MIDDLE EAST BUREAU Toronto Star

PANJSHIR VALLEY, AFGHANISTAN—Some guest lodgings come replete with hair dryer, coffee maker and alarm clock. This one comes with pre-dawn call-to-prayer and a rocket-propelled grenade under the bed.

Such are the idiosyncrasies of the impregnable Panjshir Valley, which despite the occasional surprise that lurks beneath a traveller's mattress, remains far and away the safest place in Afghanistan.

That this is northern Afghanistan doesn't guarantee security from an emboldened Afghan insurgency, a fact borne brutally three days ago in neighbouring Baghlan province, where two German journalists working for national broadcaster Deutsche Welle were slain by unidentified gunmen. That their valuables were left untouched suggests the attack was political rather than criminal.

But here in the panoramic Panjshir, a 100-kilometre ribbon of lush green farmland armoured left and right by Hindu Kush mountain ridges impassable to all but the hardiest mujahideen, worry melts away.

The rusting hulks of nearly a 100 Soviet tanks remain in situ today, including one whose cannon protrudes from the rapids of the fast-flowing Panjshir River. If their guns are silent, each still booms the legacy of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the so-called "Lion of Panjshir," whose venerated exploits shredded Communist attempts to tame the valley.

"We turned back the Russians again and again and we turned back the Taliban after that. And whatever is happening in the rest of Afghanistan, the Panjshir is safe. People here are too strong to let them in the door," says our host, Shafa Hat, 65, a former fighter under Massoud's command.

Hat smiles sheepishly as he collects the offending RPG, assuring his visitors that it is far too ancient to do damage. Someone found it recently while scaling the parched, rocky heights above his village of Malaspa and simply forgot it was left beneath the bed.

Both fiercely independent and fervently religious, Panjshiris cling not only to the warrior creed of Massoud but also to his vision of a moderate Islamic society, where the sight of a Western face is more likely to trigger welcoming smiles than the suspicious stares more common to the south.

A case in point: Hat and his friends go out of their way to demonstrate their non-Muslim visitors need not be sensitive to the daylong fasts of Ramadan, offering an almost continuous flow of food, from local apples, corn and grapes to steaming discs of homemade gotagh, a wafer-thin crepe stuffed with goat cheese and yogurt.

Blessed by flowing water underground, the Panjshir also can boast of the lion's share of reconstruction efforts, evidenced during The Star's visit by the sight of the United States AID-financed resurfacing of the only road that stretches the length of the valley.

If jobs remain scarce, stability has enabled substantial improvements in health care, schooling and farming techniques, thanks to the efforts of the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team and other non-governmental organizations.

Yet some Panjshiris, at least, have come to the understanding that relative security is a mixed blessing. With the vast majority of their kind not in the valley proper, but mired in the more volatile capital Kabul, three hours drive southeast, the people of the Panjshir know that their fate will be tied to that which awaits the whole of Afghanistan.

"When Panjshiris go to Kabul they are not so peaceful," says New York University Professor Barnett Rubin, a leading scholar on modern-day Afghanistan, citing the example of a Panjshiri role in riots that wracked the capital last May. "Because they are engaged in the same battle as everyone else: the battle for jobs."

Many Afghans are embittered by the seemingly disproportionate role Panjshiris, who are ethnic Tajiks, play in post-Taliban politics. While the fame of Massoud as the foremost national hero of mujahideen resistance remains intact, his Al Qaeda-ordered assassination five years ago — two days before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks — left little goodwill toward the ambitions of his Panjshiri followers.

Instead, the subsequent Panjshiri power grab came to be seen as a symptom of a new government, and an international community, only too willing to let warlords assume the reigns of power.

"One of the reasons the Afghan government has had difficulty winning trust is that (President Hamid) Karzai started out surrounded by a Panjshiri mafia," said one Kabul businessman who asked that his name not be disclosed.

"They grabbed power with a sense of entitlement. And it left many Pashtun leaders alienated by the feeling they were being cut out of the new political arrangement."

Karzai has since moved to address the perceived imbalance. But when Panjshiris today look beyond the cleft passageway that leads to their valley, they lament the Afghan horizon lacks a single personality to approach the unifying presence of the late Massoud.

"Massoud was the only one who loved his country," said Mohammed Azrod, 65, another veteran of the mujahideen struggle. "He saw past language and culture and could see Afghanistan as one people living under Islam. Real Islam, peaceful Islam, not what these Taliban people claim they represent.

"But now we have a battlefield and there is no person at the top, not like him," Azrod says. "Now where is our Massoud?"

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]