In this bulletin:

• Karzai for jirga to crush Taleban
• Jirgas and the Taleban - Hamid Karzai interview
• 'Re-Talibanisation' worries India
• Experts Urge Smarter Aid, Border Security Measures to Save Afghanistan
• India expresses readiness to participate in construction of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline
• Globecomm Systems Awarded Service Contract Extensions from Afghan Telecom Valued at $2.1 Million
• CIDA silent on Afghan projects
• Agency's work in Kandahar slammed
• Harper should go on TV to explain Afghan mission to Canadians: senators
• Pentagon Rebuts Newsweek's Grim Afghanistan Assessment

Karzai for jirga to crush Taleban

By Ahmed Rashid, Kabul – BBC 10.6.06

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said he wants to hold a jirga (council) of Pashtun tribes from Pakistan and Afghanistan to end Taleban violence.

The two countries disagree on how to fight the Taleban - mostly drawn from the Pashtun tribes- on their border.

Mr Karzai said he expected both he and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to attend the meeting by the year-end.

Afghan ministers and officials are however concerned that such a meeting may be "manipulated" by Pakistan.

"I am thinking of a meeting between Afghan civil society, Afghan elders, tribal chiefs, clergy and Afghan spiritual leadership plus the intellectuals. From the Pakistan side I am hoping for the same thing," Mr Karzai told this correspondent in an exclusive interview.

"It should be a gathering of the people from one end of the Afghan border with Pakistan to the other end."

Mr Karzai said the jirga would attempt to revive Pashtun civil society on both sides of the border in order to combat what he called the growing Talebanisation of the region.

"The traditional secular Pashtun leadership of Pakistan has been undermined systematically and violently," said Mr Karzai.

"The killing of 150 Pashtun leaders in North Waziristan is a clear indication of that. This can only stop if we support civil society," he said.

The Afghan president said that if Pakistan was transparent about the jirga, it could bring peace between the two countries.

"A jirga means representative and those not representative cannot be there or called to attend. Nobody can fake a jirga in Afghanistan...and I hope there is similar transparency on the Pakistani side," Mr Karzai said.

Pakistan has long stated that it wants Afghanistan to recognise the Durand Line, the 240km-(1610 miles)-long border between the two countries.

Afghans say the British-drawn, colonial era border line robs Afghanistan of Pashtun territory now inside Pakistan.

No Afghan government, including the Pashtun-dominated Taleban regime which was recognised by Pakistan, has felt strong enough to recognise the Durand Line.

Mr Karzai said a joint commission could be set up with United Nations help between the two countries, which would decide on who would be eligible to sit in the jirga and the modalities of the meeting among other things.

Mr Karzai said the jirga plan was suggested by him at last week's dinner meeting hosted by President George W Bush for him and Gen Musharraf.

This correspondent learns that Gen Musharraf first hesitated at the suggestion.

But after Mr Bush said it was a good idea and the US government would support the idea, Gen Musharraf gave his tentative agreement.

Mr Karzai would like to involve the international community in monitoring the jirga.

Mixed feelings - It is learnt that most Western countries support the idea but are reluctant to become involved in what they describe as "complex tribal meetings", between two countries which are both allies of the West in the war on terror, but are also deeply antagonistic to each other.

However, many Pashtuns and non-Pashtun Afghans have expressed concerns about the jirga plan. They fear the meeting would allow Pakistan to infiltrate "Taleban ideas through the backdoor".

Several cabinet ministers interviewed by this correspondent said the meeting would be "manipulated by Islamabad for its own ends".

"What happens if the Pakistani nominees to the jirga declare jihad against Mr Karzai and the Americans," said one minister, who asked not be named.

Younis Qanooni, the speaker of the Afghan parliament, said it would be "more productive if parliamentary delegations between the two countries met more often rather than have the jirga".

During the interview, Mr Karzai said he felt anguish about the continuing attacks by the Taleban - some 4,000 people had died in Taleban-related violence this year.

'Outside support' - Senior Nato and Afghan officials say that Taleban fighters were being actively helped by Pakistan, a charge Pakistan denies.

A Nato and Afghan army intelligence report after the two-week long Operation Medusa launched by Nato in Kandahar province in mid-September, in which they say 1,100 Taleban were killed, shows undeniable help to the Taleban from Pakistan, according to senior Nato and Afghan officials.

The report says the Taleban had collected one million rounds of ammunition in the Panjwai district of southern Kandahar province before the fighting.

The fighters had fired off some 2,000 rocket propelled grenades and 1,000 mortar shell during the battle, the report says.

The cost of Taleban ammunition stocks alone before the battle were estimated at $5m - such money and preparations would be impossible without outside support, the Nato and Afghan officials say.

Mr Karzai is hopeful that the jirga will improve relations between the two governments and more importantly the Pashtuns on both sides, which in turn will isolate the Taleban.

"No ethnic group or nation in the world is by its own nature radical," said Mr Karzai.

"Extremism makes them suffer that's why governments must stop using this. Afghanistan's stability and peace and prosperity is in the interests of Pakistan."

Jirgas and the Taleban - Hamid Karzai interview – BBC

Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke to the BBC News website's guest columnist Ahmed Rashid in his first interview since last week's dinner in Washington with US President George W Bush and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.

Can you elaborate on your idea of a jirga between the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan?

I am thinking of a meeting between the Afghan civil society, Afghan elders, tribal chiefs, ullema, clergy and Afghan spiritual leadership plus the intellectuals. From the Pakistan side I am hoping for the same thing and it should be a gathering of the people from one end of the Afghan border with Pakistan to the other end of the Afghan border with Pakistan. They would meet together.

But that could mean thousands of people?

It need not have thousands of people. You can have a joint committee from both sides, from the groups and personalities who would sit down and choose the membership and the mechanism.

How would you determine the membership?

We generally know and the criteria would be the same for both sides. A joint commission would be good, not just at the government level but at the people's level. Afghan parliamentarians would also be involved [as well as] all the institutions that Afghanistan has had traditionally and the [new] democratic institutions of the country.

The jirga is the biggest and oldest of such traditions. The current institutions like the Senate and the Parliament would all be involved.

There is criticism that in a way you are going backwards, back into tribalism, that you are undermining the institutions built in the past four ways?

No not undermining them, but in fact reinforcing them and reinvigoration them and involving them in matters of the country. Civil society in Afghanistan has been undermined for the past 30 years, against our elders and intellectuals and clergy. There has been a systematic campaign of weakening them. And against civil society there has been a systematic campaign of bringing in the most radical elements by force or money and with support from outside.

The same thing has happened on the Pakistani side, especially in the Pashtun territories. The traditional secular Pashtun leadership of Pakistan has been undermined systematically and violently. The killing of 150 Pashtun leaders in North Waziristan in the past two years is a clear indication of that. The strengthening of the radicals that give support to terrorism or are involved in terrorism, this has to stop. This can only stop if we support civil society.

Is there not a risk that Pakistan would nominate the Taleban or the Jamiat-e-Ullema Islam (JUI) rather than real Pashtun elders. How would you prevent such a thing from happening?

A jirga means representative and those [who are] not representative cannot be there or called to attend. Nobody can fake a jirga in Afghanistan, the elements are known and I hope there will be similar transparency on the Pakistani side. If proper representation does not come from the Pakistani side it will not help anything and so genuine representation is needed. If the JUI is coming and if they represent the people they are welcome, then they can call for any issue to be discussed and let the debate determine the truth.

Afghanistan and especially the Pashtuns in Pakistan and the Balochis as well, are suffering and this has to end. They are suffering at the hands of terrorists who we strongly believe are imposed on the communities there, that they have become hostage to the extremists.

For the sake of the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan and world security which is threatened from what is happening here, it is imperative we get together and use the help of the population to end the crisis. If the crisis gets worse Pakistan is not going to be safe and it wont be confined to just the Pashtun territories but go beyond that as well.

No country can gain nowadays from weakening the other country. It will work if the other side plays sincerely.

Do you trust the Pakistani military regime to bring about a transparent jirga?

The lack of transparency will show itself immediately, so there is only one way and that is transparency. It is like bringing a professor of some subject to a classroom and he will show immediately if he can teach the subject or not. You cannot fake a jirga, it has to be true. You can rig an election, you can undermine and intimidate people, but you cannot rig a jirga.

Would you ask for any international monitoring for this jirga?

It has become an international question as well. The bombings around the world and Afghanistan and Pakistan as well and the loss of life, show that terrorism is caused by what was going on in this region and the free hand given to extremist elements. If we don't end it, the crisis will continue and Pakistan and Afghanistan will be the negative focus of the rest of the world, so it is in the interest of the international community to participate with us. But mostly it is for us to decide with wisdom so this proposal will be taken well.

What is happening in [the Pakistani city of] Quetta with the allegations that the Taleban leadership is based there?

The focus of the jirga will be on those issues from our side no doubt, because the people of Quetta are also suffering. The focus will be on terrorism in whatever form it is.

I have raised in a very clear way the question of terrorism and sanctuaries and that no country, no government can rely on the use of extremism as an instrument of policy. If this continues, the suffering in Afghanistan will not end.

No ethnic group or nation in the world is by its own nature radical. Extremism makes them suffer. That's why governments must stop using this. Afghanistan's stability and peace and prosperity is in the interests of Pakistan. There may be some who feel in the government of Pakistan that Afghanistan's prosperity is going to draw away the sympathies or the loyalties of the people there But that is an old story. That is a colonial type of thinking.

A modern Afghanistan and Pakistan should be two countries who live in peace and prosperity with each other. Therefore nobody needs to rely on extremism for self-protection or for the weakening of the other side. This jirga will give an assurance to the government of Pakistan that Afghanistan's peace and prosperity is also good for them.

Are you worried about the growing anti-Pakistan feeling amongst ordinary Afghans?

I am very much worried and I have told President Musharraf as well, that the Afghan people are getting very angry and he should see how dangerous this is, especially Afghanistan's Pashtun belt is becoming very angry at what is coming from Pakistan. I hope they understand that its not good for relations between the two countries.

You have been under a lot of personal criticism recently. Five years on there is the lack of capacity in the government, poor governance, corruption, drugs - a long list of things. Are you rethinking your strategy?

Capacity is not something I can deal with overnight, it means human resources which need development. You need education and young people trained and educated and capacity building will take time. Borrowed capacity we are already using but it is not very effective. We need time for that. We are trying to create public institutions.

Corruption is a problem, but not the kind of problem that is spoken about. We must work against it and we have just appointed a commission headed by the chief justice working on various means of reducing corruption. The attorney general has taken a lot of measures against corruption.

We are not weak in moving against drug traffickers, but that is depending on our capacity. We have delivered drug dealers to the US and we will continue to do that.

'Re-Talibanisation' worries India
Indrani Bagchi – Times of India 6 Oct, 2006

N EW DELHI: In Washington, Pervez Musharraf defended his Waziristan peace deal with tribal chiefs saying it would prevent Talibanisation.

On Wednesday, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, gave a similar certificate of "no Talibanisation" in the tribal areas.

So, to have the US Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, quoted in Qalat, Afghanistan, as saying that "moderate" Taliban should be included in the Afghan government, naturally sent shivers up Indian spines.

The Taliban? In government, in Kabul? That was always the dream of the Pakistani backers of the Islamised radical warriors who are giving the US and Nato forces in southern Afghanistan their bloodiest nose since 2001.

But the US advocating a deal with the Taliban? On Wednesday, Frist was quoted as saying that the Taliban should be made part of the Afghan government.

On Thursday, Frist issued a statement saying his comments had been taken out of context. The Taliban, he said, were a "murderous band of terrorists who've oppressed the people of Afghanistan with their hateful ideology long enough.

America's overthrow of the Taliban and support for responsible, democratic governance in Afghanistan is a great accomplishment that should not and will not be reversed." India breathed a barely perceptible sigh of relief.

While the danger of that may have been averted for the time being, the concern, at least in India, remains. As Jaswant Singh had said when the idea was first floated by the Pakistanis and US in 2002, "moderate Taliban is an oxymoron".

But over the past few years, it's been equally clear that the US has flirted with the idea several times, rebadging it as a "reconciliation" programme in 2004, and what have you.

Every time it was doomed to failure, because the "hearts and minds" ideas never really penetrated down to the street level.

As Afghanistan witnesses its worst ever Taliban resurgence since 2001, India, with huge stakes in the country, has watched with growing concern the deal by Musharraf with tribal elders in north Waziristan.

As Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid pointed out: "In North and South Waziristan, an alliance of extremist groups that includes Al-Qaida, Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, Central Asians, and Chechens has won a significant victory against the army of Pakistan. The army...has retreated, dismantled its checkpoints, released Al Qaida prisoners and is now paying large 'compensation' sums to the extremists."

Three weeks after the peace deal, US military in Afghanistan reported a "trebling" of Taliban attacks into Afghanistan.

Yet, when Musharraf told George Bush that his deal would save Afghanistan, Bush replied with a straight face: "I believe him."

Musharraf went back and has reportedly ordered NWFP governor Jan Orakzai to work out a similar deal in South Waziristan.

The bottom-line is that the new Taliban streaming across the Balochistan and NWFP to launch attacks in Afghanistan are a different kettle of fish from the ones that vanished into thin air during the first flush of US' Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001.

These are better trained, better armed and funded — both in religious inspiration and military training — which, says terrorism analyst, B Raman, cannot be imparted at Pakistan's jehadi camps either.

India's concerns are many. A Talibanised southern Afghanistan would mean death and destruction to Indian interests and people in the country.

India's main goal in Afghanistan is to prevent Pakistan from re-acquiring it as a strategic backyard. Taliban nurseries in Pakistan would just as easily churn out jehadis for India as well.

For Pakistan, the idea of accommodating Taliban is just what the doctor ordered. It spells death for the war on terror — and, though India shies away from articulating it — India as well.

India is hamstrung because neither Pakistan, and consequently US or Afghanistan, will allow its troops to set foot in Afghanistan. Which leaves India's goals in Afghanistan at the uncertain mercies of the US and Pakistan.

Experts Urge Smarter Aid, Border Security Measures to Save Afghanistan

Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Interviewees: Dennis Kux Stephen P. Cohen Kathy Gannon Dr. Amin Tarzi Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy Interviewer: Lionel Beehner, Staff Writer

Five years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan is beset by security and reconstruction challenges. The two are inextricably linked and pose the biggest threats to stability in Afghanistan's southern frontier, where Taliban fighters and poppy farmers have revived in recent years. CFR.org's Lionel Beehner asked five regional, reconstruction, and military experts what advice they would give to secure the Afghan-Pakistani border and accelerate Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Dennis Kux, Senior Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center

There needs to be much greater cooperation between Afghan, Pakistani, U.S. , and NATO militaries in the border areas. Joint patrols and similar arrangements should be initiated. There should also be timelier intelligence exchanges. NATO and U.S. forces should be authorized to pursue Taliban elements crossing from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Hopefully "hot pursuit" would be undertaken with the cooperation of Pakistani authorities, but should be considered even if Islamabad is unwilling. On the political side, there should be a determined effort to gain formal Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line, the frontier laid out by the British in the 1890s. This will not be easy. The Afghans have traditionally claimed the Durand Line has no standing since it was "forced" upon them by the British. Yet it has been in existence for over a century as the de facto frontier. In fact, the Afghan government accepted it de jure in the 1919 treaty ending the third Afghan war. To make things more palatable for the Afghans, a UN-sponsored international conference attended by Afghanistan 's neighbors should pledge support for the sanctity of the country's borders. Differences over the actual location of the Durand Line—maps differ on this—could be addressed by a tripartite commission with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States, or some similar arrangement.

Unless the security situation improves, reconstruction will continue to languish. Here, full cooperation by Pakistan remains key, along with improved local police forces. The generally positive experience with the Afghan National Army shows that results can be achieved, but not overnight. A revised, well-planned police effort is needed, not another "crash" program. And the international community must be prepared to underwrite the salaries of the "new" police force given the Afghan government's lack of resources. Afghanistan has a good economic development plan, which gained international approval at the London conference last winter. The challenge is to see that countries implement their pledges and thatAfghanistanitself achieves agreed milestones.

Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

As things are now moving, this is a lost war, beyond "reconstruction" or "improvement." The United States should have originally sought to create a neutral Afghanistan and defer the Iraq adventure until Afghanistan was secure. The former might have prevented the Pakistanis from seeking to balance Indian influence in Afghanistan; the latter just might have led the United States to put enough forces in Afghanistan to put the Karzai government on a stable footing. These are lost opportunities. At present there are only three ways to salvage the situation, all distasteful but better than the present path to defeat:

First, the United Statescould cut its losses in Iraq, staying on in Kurdistan, but sending at least 50,000 troops to Afghanistan. This, plus additional pressure on backsliding contributors, might just persuade the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stay on, and generate enough military capability to impress both the warlords and the Taliban. Absent a new American commitment, the Europeans are gong to quickly lose interest in Afghanistan and will pull out themselves. This would also permanently damage NATO's ambitions to have an out-of-area capability.

Alternatively, the United States could do a deal with the Taliban. Our true interest is in ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for al Qaeda. The Taliban, under Pakistani pressure, might ensure this if its own position was secured. This is distasteful, and might mean Karzai's departure, but it does preserve our one core interest in Afghanistan .

Third, the United States could turn to India for assistance in Afghanistan. This would put genuine pressure on Pakistan to cease its tacit and explicit support for the Taliban. It is strategically risky, and might lead to still another India-Pakistan crisis, but if coupled with a more active regional diplomacy, it might stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

Kathy Gannon, Special Correspondent for the Associated Press covering South-Central Asia and the Mideast and Author of I is for Infidel, From Holy War to Holy Terror.

It is virtually impossible to guarantee a secure border because tribal people on either side share ethnic group and family ties. The key is to figure out how to make allies of the tribal people both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The heavy-handed military approach that has dominated the strategy in both countries works against this effort and has contributed to the greater insecurity in the tribal regions. It has also resulted in the death of some valuable interlocutors and opened a space for the mullahs to be the arbiters in tribal and personal disputes. This has given them additional authority particularly in Pakistan . Making allies is a difficult and complicated approach that requires a deep knowledge of the culture, an understanding of the outstanding grievances in the area, and [the ability] to go about tackling them.

Before reconstruction can be accelerated, there must be an effort to root out corruption and mismanagement. This is not just the problem of some within the Afghan government but also [with some] within the international contractors and employees. Many (possibly the majority of) reconstruction projects are top-heavy in administrative costs, resulting in poor-quality work because the money is spent on a whole series of subcontractors. There is an overwhelming amount of duplication, as well as inadequate information and understanding of needs before investing money. In the past five years, Afghans have seen very little significant improvement in their lives; they mostly believe that the reconstruction budgets have made foreigners wealthy and their own government rich and left them pretty much as they have always been—neglected, poor, and frustrated.

Amin Tarzi, Analyst on Afghanistan for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:

Securing the border requires both physical and political measures. First, I would advise making the border a legally demarcated international boundary with no claims of sovereignty or special rights by one state on the territory of the other. This would make Pakistan less eager to destabilize Afghanistan and lessen its concerns about its Pashtun and Baluch population. Pakistan has raised the idea of fencing parts of the border, but Afghanistan has objected to this proposal on political grounds. If Islamabad believes that by fencing some strategic entry points it can guarantee a less porous boundary, then fencing should be made an option. The recent agreement between Islamabad and North Waziristan has thus far failed to produce one of its main target outcomes: prevention of cross-border activities. If Pakistan or Afghanistan is willing to grant the tribes more authority—something I do not believe is beneficial for state and nation-building processes in either country—then the tribes signing agreements should be held accountable for any cross-border activities occurring under their jurisdiction. How this could be done is still open to question. On a purely military front, enacting the proposed joint Pakistani, Afghan, and NATO patrols along the border could be a step forward.

I would advise moving away from acceleration of short-term reconstruction projects toward more infrastructure projects. Sexy facades have taken precedence over sound foundations. Long-term, foundational, and infrastructure projects may not be the choice projects for politicians in Afghanistan or in donor countries. Much of the reconstruction, both government funded and in the private sector, has been of the Potemkin village type. In Kabul , glass-covered buildings are built without proper planning for sewage, water, or parking issues. For security reasons, connecting Afghanistan's main cities with a modern road system takes precedence over other infrastructure projects. While there has been progress in this sector, there are still large sections of the country which are not connected with paved roads; this is especially true in the interior and northern parts of the country. Another important step is to "Afghanize" the work. Most major projects rely on foreign contractors that build houses and schools on foreign models with elevated overhead costs. If more Afghans were engaged in reconstruction with Afghan-style building—albeit with expert supervision when necessary—more schools and houses would be built at lower cost, and they would have Afghan-ownership, not only in style but also in labor.

Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations:

Border control is often important in counterinsurgency, because sanctuary in neighboring states is often important to insurgents—cutting the insurgents off from their bases, their sources of equipment and resupply, and their sources of funds is hence important. Afghanistan is unusual, however, in at least two respects. First, the border is unusually hard to seal—this is among the most difficult, mountainous terrain in the world, so cutting off all possible infiltration routes will be extremely hard. By contrast, interdicting the Ho Chi Minh trail [network of routes from North to South Vietnam] in the 1960s was child's play. Second, the Taliban insurgents are probably less dependent on external sanctuaries than most guerillas. In particular, they can fund much more of their own activities via the opium market than could classical insurgents such as the Viet Cong. Sanctuary in Pakistan is certainly helpful to them, but even if this were completely denied it would not in itself eliminate the insurgency—the Taliban enjoys too much access to resources within Afghanistan itself.

Hence, while better cooperation from Pakistan in sealing the border and controlling its territory would certainly be helpful, I don't think it's the decisive issue for the war. Winning hearts and minds within Afghanistan is the decisive issue for this war, and border control can affect this only at the margin. Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, is a classical ideological insurgency where winning hearts and minds is the real key to success. And this takes money and resources: economic development funding, and troops to provide real security to the population. So if I could ask for one change in Afghanistan that I think could make a real difference, it would not be sealing the border—it would be more troops and more money. The standard counterinsurgency playbook of economic aid, political reform, and creation of an indigenous military to carry the war is problematic in Iraq, but is exactly the right approach for Afghanistan, and can still work there if applied vigorously enough. We need to be much more vigorous on this score if we hope to avoid defeat.

India expresses readiness to participate in construction of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline

In an interview to local journalists visiting Ashgabat state minister for external affairs of India E.Ahammed called oil and gas sector the most important sphere of bilateral cooperation.

According to the minister, India has the great experience in oil and gas processing and can make significant contribution to development of this branch in Turkmenistan. After negotiations and discussion of a number of issues it can be said with confidence that if India will have an opportunity to participate in the project of construction of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline, our bilateral relations would get opportunity to develop more effectively, the Indian minister noted.

Commenting on the results of work of the bilateral intergovernmental commission, the Indian minister said a great deal of attention was paid to the participation of Indian party in development of urban infrastructure. "The whole of Turkmenistan and particularly Ashgabat experience construction boom. And experience of India could be useful. Indian companies are well known all over the world. They render assistance and support to a range of countries both in the Central Asian region and in Asia, Africa and other regions of the world," the high-ranking Indian official was quoted by the official news agency TDH.

Education, science and technology are also priority spheres of Turkmen-Indian cooperation, the leader of Indian delegation told journalists. He said that in the course of negotiations on behalf of Indian government he made statement about intention to establish Information-technological center in Ashgabat, which would prepare young Turkmen specialists.

Some 200 Turkmen citizens have had education and training in different Indian educational establishments in the framework of the Indian government program on industrial-technical-economic cooperation. During the visit, the Turkmen leadership was informed about Indian government's decision to increase the quantity of scholarships to Turkmen boys and girls.

One of the results of talks is the agreement on opening by Turkmen aviation company of two new flights to Ahmadabad and Kochin, in addition to flights to Delhi and Amritsar.

"India and Turkmenistan has always cooperated closely and supported each other in various international forums, including United Nations Organization and other multilateral organizations. The President of Turkmenistan paid two visits to India, and we hope that the Turkmen leader will find time to visit our country one more time," the head of the Indian government delegation, state minister for external affairs E.Ahammed, said.

Globecomm Systems Awarded Service Contract Extensions from Afghan TelecomValued at $2.1 Million

HAUPPAUGE, N.Y.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Globecomm Systems Inc. (NASDAQ: GCOM), a global provider of end-to-end satellite-based communications solutions, today announced that the Company’s wholly owned subsidiary, Globecomm Network Services Corporation (GNSC) has been awarded service contract extensions from Afghan Telecom valued at $2.1 million.

Afghan Telecom Corporation is the only basic telecom service provider in Afghanistan. It aims to provide superior connectivity solutions to the people of Afghanistan. Afghan Telecom has coverage in 144 cities, towns and districts of Afghanistan, representing the largest network coverage in the region. This is made possible largely in part through their District Communications Network (DCN) and the Government Communication Network (GCN), which were designed, installed and maintained by Globecomm and its partners in the region.

GNSC has been providing teleport services, in support of international voice and Internet connectivity, to Afghan Telecom since the DCN and GCN went live.

David Hershberg, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Globecomm Systems Inc., said: “Globecomm has spent considerable time and resources in the development of a multitude of capabilities to provide the Company’s customers with one-stop-shopping for their network requirements. The ability to design, install, provide operations and maintenance, and the related service under one roof is best demonstrated by Globecomm’s performance in Afghanistan. The Company’s relationship with Afghan Telecom continues to grow and we are excited to be a part the country’s telecommunication re-building efforts.”

About Globecomm Systems

Globecomm Systems Inc. provides end-to-end value-added satellite-based communication products, services and solutions by leveraging its core satellite ground segment systems and network capabilities, with its satellite communication services capabilities. The products and services Globecomm offers include pre-engineered systems, systems design and integration services, managed network services and life cycle support services. Globecomm's customers include communications service providers, commercial enterprises, broadcast and other media and content providers and government and government-related entities.

Based in Hauppauge, New York, Globecomm Systems also maintains offices in Washington, DC, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan.

CIDA silent on Afghan projects - Development agency secretive about how taxpayer money is spent, writes Amir Attaran - Oct. 6, 2006. Toronto Star

Recently at the United Nations, Prime Minister Stephen Harper called for more help to develop peace and democracy in Afghanistan, and threw down a favourite gauntlet: accountability.

He reminded the UN that it "must become more accountable and effectively managed," and that Canadians, as financiers of the UN system, "have the right to expect stronger, more independent oversight mechanisms, more robust accountability."

What Harper omitted to add is that, under his watch, the Canadian International Development Agency is also extremely unaccountable and does not tell Canadians how it spends their money in Afghanistan.

Several months ago, as a professor who studies international development, I began to research this problem. I asked simple questions: Which projects are CIDA financing in Afghanistan? What are CIDA's project budgets and timelines? Are CIDA's projects on track to deliver auditable results and improvements in Afghans' lives?

I wanted to know if our aid money — tax money — is being well spent to help Afghans and, if not, I wanted that known, so others could help fix the failures.

Unfortunately, the information CIDA offers the Canadian public about its Afghan activities is incomplete and inaccurate. CIDA's website has a project browser, which although said to be "updated constantly" and automatically, still omits several current projects, including some worth more than $10 million.

The omissions came to my attention through a list of current projects that CIDA gave journalists — but even that document seems unreliable. For example, a $13 million project of "Support to parliamentary elections" that CIDA says would take place over "five to seven months" has, curiously, a five-year project period: from 2005 to 2010.

This sort of error is not exceptional. A comparison of CIDA's journalists-only project list and its public website shows that nearly every project has an inconsistency in its budget, timeline, or both. The public cannot know what CIDA plans to do with the $1 billion it plans to spend for Afghanistan this decade.

Worse, the public also cannot know what results this money is achieving.

In July, I used the Access to Information Act to ask CIDA for the "monitoring, evaluation, and/or audit reports for each CIDA-funded project ... carried out in Afghanistan."

I asked CIDA to show me its results; the proof that CIDA is helping Afghans with health care, education, public utilities, and the rule of law. CIDA should be delighted to answer this request.

Instead, CIDA's reply is an astonishing show of secrecy. First, it answered that it "would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the agency" to reply within the statutory 30 days; CIDA needed 90 days.

Second, CIDA answered that to process my request it needed "consultations" with others, who might object to making disclosure. This required "in addition ... a further extension of 150 days."

CIDA asked for 240 days — eight months — to divulge the monitoring, evaluation and audit reports for Canadian-funded aid projects in Afghanistan.

I asked CIDA why it needed so long to yield their results. After all, if Canadian soldiers rout the Taliban out of a village, Canadians hear of that positive result within days.

Surely Canadians deserve to hear the positive results from their second front of battle — the one for hearts and minds — in less than eight months?

CIDA explained that in nearly all projects, Canadian aid money is channelled through international middlemen, such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program.

The middlemen commingle CIDA's money with that of other countries, and when they do, CIDA refuses to divulge any monitoring, evaluation or audit reports without the agreement of those other countries.

CIDA mentioned Britain, France and Denmark, for example. Quite likely, so many consultations would censor any reports into rubbish. Nothing in the Access to Information Act obliges CIDA to consult so widely or to withhold project results; the agency's officials do so by choice.

A possible reason for CIDA's secrecy is that the prognosis for Afghanistan's development is lousy. Nearly five years after the Taliban's ouster, even Kabul, the capital city, goes without full-time electricity. This year's Afghan heroin trade will net a street value of more than $50 billion U.S. Compare that to Afghanistan's current development aid from all countries: only $1.8 billion U.S.

If Afghans follow the money then Afghanistan is not likely to develop as Canada wants. I now believe it is impossible, not to say naïve, for Canada to win hearts and minds in Afghanistan. Though frustrated with their secrecy, I also believe this is not CIDA's fault.

Successive federal governments deluded themselves into thinking of the agency like a deployable army for development. But CIDA was not made for that — it has only three staffers in Kandahar, for example — meaning it must turn to the middlemen, the same UN agencies Harper accused of being unaccountable.

Harper is correct, and the fact that Canada outsources its aid-giving to these middlemen means news of successful projects is slow to get out, and the middlemen usually usurp the credit.

Thus Canada receives only passing recognition for its humanitarian aid effort, and certainly, never enough to counterbalance the bellicose image of Canada's war endeavours.

The situation is galling for the Afghans, too. When Canada channels aid through the UNDP or World Bank, it is making a choice to prefer it over Afghanistan's government. Afghans are understandably annoyed by our politicians, who talk of "strengthening Afghanistan's governance," but who deny their government's priority to govern.

The Conservative government tells Canadians that we are at war in Afghanistan, not for reasons of belligerence, but for reasons of bringing development.

If so, then it is overdue that Harper compel CIDA to divulge timely, accurate accounts of its expenditures, and the audit reports that prove or disprove whether its use of tax money has improved the lives of the poor and war-shocked, as Canadians want.

To do otherwise, and to carry on justifying this war in terms of development, without transparent proof of development, is neither honest nor accountable, and is something Harper can ill afford.

Amir Attaran is Canada Research Chair of Law, Population Health and Global Development Policy at the University of Ottawa.

Agency's work in Kandahar slammed

Little evidence of redevelopment Senate committee also urges debate Oct. 6, 2006. 01:00 AM BRUCE CAMPION-SMITH OTTAWA BUREAU

OTTAWA—A Senate committee says there's little evidence that a Canadian agency is carrying out the redevelopment work it's supposed to be doing in Afghanistan.

The committee on national security and defence also said Canada's military was dispatched to the war-torn country with inadequate public debate.

Senator Colin Kenny yesterday urged Prime Minister Stephen Harper to go on national television to make the case for Canada's participation in a conflict that has so far killed 39 soldiers.

"We think there needs to be a very clear statement about what the government expects to get for putting lives at risk and for spending all of that money," Kenny, chair of the committee, told a news conference yesterday. "It's up to the government to make that case and we think if the case is made well, that there will be significant amount of public support."

The report says major deployments of troops in the future should be voted on by Parliament.

Kenny also criticized the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), saying the agency has not been able to show real evidence of its work in southern Afghanistan.

"We simply have not been able to get any figures that demonstrate that aid is going into Kandahar. This concerns us a great deal," Kenny said. "We're concerned that CIDA cannot track where its funding is going. If it's going on, CIDA can't tell you about it. We've been looking now for a number of months."

He warned that without a strong development package, the mission in southern Afghanistan was at risk. "We don't think you can change the way people think in Afghanistan with the point of a bayonet. You need to have the military there for security but at the end of the day you've got to change lives."

CIDA has not responded to a request made by the Toronto Star two weeks ago for a list of development projects in the Kandahar region. A call to CIDA was not returned yesterday.

Harper should go on TV to explain Afghan mission to Canadians: senators - Canadian Press, Friday, October 06, 2006

OTTAWA (CP) - The government has to do a better job of explaining Canada's mission in Afghanistan, a Senate committee said Thursday.

The defence committee, in a wide-ranging report entitled "Managing Turmoil," touched on Afghanistan, endorsed joining the American missile defence system and called for doubling the foreign aid budget and increasing defence spending.

The all-party committee said both the former Liberal government and the present Conservative regime have fallen down in explaining Afghanistan to Canadians.

The report said a government sending soldiers in harm's way should go through a checklist beforehand, answering questions that include:

-What is the purpose of the mission?

-Is the mandate clear and realistic?

-Can the success of the mission be measured? How?

-Does the government have the political will to persist even if the deployment becomes unpopular?

Senator Colin Kenny, the committee chairman, said two successive governments left the explanations to Gen. Rick Hillier, the chief of the defence staff.

"This was not his job."

Kenny said Prime Minister Stephen Harper should speak to the country on TV, explaining the rationale of the mission.

"We think there needs to be a very clear statement about what the government expects to get for putting the lives at risk and spending all of that money," he said. "It's up to the government to make that case and we think if the case is made well, there will be a significant amount of public support for it.

"If the case isn't made that way we think the support will fall off by default."

The unanimous report also said that Canadian aid to Afghanistan has to be better focused, especially in the troubled south, where Canadian troops have been taking casualties against insurgents. They suggested some aid money should be channelled through the military itself, rather than aid agencies.

"It's also important for the safety of our troops that local Afghanis associate the patch that they see on the shoulders of our troops with good things happening in their communities."

Development money has to give people a reason to side with Canada and NATO against the Taliban, he said.

The senators' other comments touched on several controversial areas, including foreign aid spending, missile defence and base closings.

Pentagon Rebuts Newsweek's Grim Afghanistan Assessment

Posted by Mark Finkelstein on October 5, 2006 - 19:03. Newsbusters.org

While Democrats and the MSM have revelled in stressing the tough sledding in Iraq, they had been constrained to acknowledge that the mission in Afghanistan - from the overthrow of the Taliban to the fostering of democracy leading to the election of President Karzai to efforts aimed at rebuilding a country mired in medieval poverty - has been largely successful.

But in recent weeks, Democrats and the MSM have sought to paint a more negative portrait of the situation in Afghanistan, culminating in an article in the October 2nd edition of Newsweek " The Rise of Jihadistan." 

The article's sub-title states its thesis in these terms: "Five years after the Afghan invasion, the Taliban are fighting back hard, carving out a sanctuary where they—and Al Qaeda's leaders—can operate freely." And in his famously finger-pointing interview with Fox's Chris Wallace, Bill Clinton claimed that "if I were still president, we'd have more than 20,000 troops there trying to kill [Bin Laden]."

Now it's the Defense Department's turn to "fight back hard."  A Pentagon official has offered this rebuttal of a number of Newsweek's most serious allegations.

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "The 2003 invasion of Iraq did more than divert essential resources from Afghanistan; it created a test lab for new insurgent weapons and tactics that have since been adopted by the Taliban."

PENTAGON RESPONSE: Resources to Afghanistan have increased since Operation Iraqi Freedom began. In March 2003, the U.S. had about 9,500 troops in Afghanistan. Today, there are more than 21,000 U.S. forces either in Afghanistan or directly supporting missions there. This is in addition to the ongoing reconstruction efforts that continue to build infrastructure.

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "Five years after the Afghan invasion, the Taliban are fighting back hard, carving out a sanctuary where they -- and Al Qaeda's leaders -- can operate freely. Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups now have a place from which to hatch the next 9/11."

PENTAGON RESPONSE: This assertion is contradicted within the same article by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan. He points out that al-Qaeda or its successors have nothing like the liberty that allowed them to plot September 11 in the open. He states, "They have no safe haven inside Afghanistan that if we find it, we will not strike against them." It is one thing for al-Qaeda remnants to operate within Afghanistan's borders while being vigorously pursued and attacked by Afghan, NATO, and Coalition forces -- as is happening now. It is quite another thing for a terrorist organization to have an entire nation where they can plan, train, and launch attacks with impunity -- as Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan before September 11. There is simply no comparison between the situation in Afghanistan when 9-11 was "hatched" to the situation today.

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "Washington pushed Musharraf to crack down on the never-tamed Afghan borderlands, but fierce tribal resistance led to a formal deal letting the Taliban retain their bases there."

PENTAGON RESPONSE: According to Pakistan's President Musharraf, the agreement with tribal leaders had "bottom lines" that were non-negotiable. In his words, the agreement requires: "No al-Qaeda activity," and "no Taliban activity in our tribal agency or across [the border] in Afghanistan."

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "As doubts rise over Bush's global aims, NATO is hard put to find the troops it needs for the mission."

PENTAGON RESPONSE: At nearly 20,000 troops, the NATO mission is the strongest it has ever been, and Alliance forces have been directly taking the fight to the enemy in southern Afghanistan. Just last week, NATO announced that the International Security Assistance Force would take over security operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan, bringing more than 12,000 U.S. troops under NATO command. At the recent NATO ministerial in Slovenia, Poland pledged 1,000 additional troops to support ISAF.

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "In the countryside over the past year Taliban guerrillas have filled a power vacuum that had been created by the relatively light NATO and U.S. military footprint of some 40,000 soldiers, and by the weakness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration."

PENTAGON RESPONSE: Qari Mohammed Yousaf Ahmadi, generally viewed as the Taliban's current chief spokesman, stated publicly on Sept. 15th, "The Taliban forces have conducted a tactical retreat." It is difficult to fill a power vacuum if your forces are retreating.

NEWSWEEK CLAIM: "But the harsh truth is that five years after the U.S. invasion on Oct. 7, 2001, most of the good news is confined to Kabul, with its choking rush-hour traffic jams, a construction boom and a handful of air-conditioned shopping malls. Much of the rest of Afghanistan appears to be failing again."

PENTAGON RESPONSE:  Afghanistan was -- and is -- one of the poorest country's on the face of the earth. It will take years of hard work by the Afghan people and the international community to reverse the effects of decades of occupation and civil war. Improvements are not confined to Kabul, though it is true that much of the development and growth has been in larger cities, such as Kabul, Herat, and the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Nonetheless, there has been a significant economic growth and donor efforts to improve living conditions across the country. Some examples:

• Afghanistan's GDP was valued at $2.4 billion in 2001. In 2006, it was valued at $7.3 billion, and that number is projected to rise to $8.8 billion next year.
• In 2001, only eight percent of Afghans had access to basic health care. Now, 80 percent do.
• There are currently more than 5 million students enrolled in schools -- 34 percent are girls.
• Thousands of kilometers of roads have been built or improved since the Taliban fell. The U.S. portion of the Kandahar to Herat highway has reduced the travel time between those two major cities from 10 hours to 4.3 hours.
• At least 2.5 million Afghans have benefited from irrigation and road projects linking farms to market. Other agricultural improvements include 210 irrigation structures and 300 kilometers of canals that have been rehabilitated to improve 300,000 hectares of cropland.

No one anywhere near the American mainstream can dispute that going into Afghanistan to topple the Taliban was necessary.  And no one even vaguely familiar with that destitute region of the world could fail to understand that bringing a semblance of peace and prosperity to the country would be a long-term project fraught with difficulty.  That won't prevent the MSM from accentuating the negative.  But it does put their carping in context as the American military and dedicated civilians continue their work.

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]