In this bulletin:

• U.S. strike kills Afghan Taliban leader
• Insurgent raids into Afghanistan from Pak continue unabated: Top NATO Gen.
• Afghanistan: Former NATO Commander Urges Political Focus
• Afghanistan is at crossroads: UN envoy
• Pakistani minister asks Afghanistan to stop blaming game
• Pakistan urged to stop backing
• Elders support Karzai's stance
• President condemns attack on Zadran
• Qanuni satisfied with parliament role
• ADB to finance energy import from Tajikistan
• India provides $3 million equipment for Afghan army
• Afghanistan Launches Spectrum Mobile Monitoring Station
• Reconstruction proceeds in Afghan district amid show of force by Canadians
• Harper willing to take shots for Afghan mission
• Hillier Goes to Afghanistan
• AFGHANISTAN: Communist era mass grave discovered highlights need for post-war justice
• US encourages the Talibanization of Afghanistan
• The Great Game on a razor's edge

U.S. strike kills Afghan Taliban leader

Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani

By JASON STRAZIUSO Associated Press / December 23, 2006 - KABUL, Afghanistan - A top Taliban military commander described as a close associate of Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar was killed in an airstrike this week close to the border with Pakistan, the U.S. military said Saturday. A Taliban spokesman denied the claim.

Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani was killed Tuesday by a U.S. airstrike while traveling by vehicle in a deserted area in the southern province of Helmand, the U.S. military said. Two associates also were killed, it said.

There was no immediate confirmation from Afghan officials or visual proof offered to support the claim. A U.S. spokesman said "various sources" were used to confirm Osmani's identity.

Osmani, regarded as one of three top associates of Omar, is the highest-ranking Taliban leader the coalition has claimed to have killed or captured since U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime in late 2001 for hosting bin Laden.

U.S. military spokesman Col. Tom Collins described Osmani's death as a "big loss" for the ultraconservative militia.

"There's no doubt that it will have an immediate impact on their ability to conduct attacks," Collins said. "But the Taliban is fairly adaptive. They'll put somebody else in that position and we'll go after that person, too."

He was regarded as highly ideological and was instrumental in some of the excesses of the Taliban rule such as the destruction of the ancient Buddha statues in Bamiyan and the trial of Christian aid workers in 2001, Rashid said.

A purported Taliban spokesman, Qari Yousef Ahmadi, denied that Osmani had been killed, saying the airstrike instead killed Mullah Abdul Zahir, a group commander, and three other Taliban fighters.

"I confirm that Osmani is alive and is in Afghanistan," Ahmadi told The Associated Press by phone from an undisclosed location.

Collins said officials waited four days to announce the news in part so that they could be sure it was Osmani who was killed.

"The vehicle was completely destroyed, there was nothing to recognize," Collins said. "But we have various intelligence assets that we monitor, that we look at very closely, and of course we work with the intelligence agencies of the Afghan government and through those sources we are sure that he is dead."

Osmani, the Taliban's chief military commander in southern Afghanistan, played a "central role in facilitating terrorist operations" including roadside bombs, suicide attacks and kidnappings, the U.S. said.

Ahmed Rashid, a leading author on Islamic militancy, said the death was a "major blow" to the Taliban.

"It's the first casualty among the top Taliban leadership in the past five years, which makes the strike very significant," he said.

It also comes ahead of what is expected to be a major Taliban offensive in the south in February or March, and Osmani may have been preparing for that when he was killed in Helmand, Rashid said.

The Taliban militia has stepped up attacks this year, particularly in southern Afghanistan, and waged fierce battles with Western and Afghan forces. About 4,000 people have died in the violence, raising fears for the country's future and experiment with democracy after a quarter century of war.

The whereabouts of Omar, the Taliban's reclusive leader who has a $10 million reward on his head, remain a mystery.

Collins said Osmani was part of a group of "co-equals" at the top of the Taliban leadership chain just under Omar and was also in charge of the Taliban's finances.

Collins said Osmani had been "utilizing both sides" of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and that the U.S. military had been tracking him "for a while."

"When the time was right, and we thought we had a good chance of hitting him without causing any harm to civilians, we struck," he said.

Although the U.S. said Osmani was an associate of bin Laden, Omar and Afghan insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Collins said he did not know the last time Osmani had contact with any of the three.

During the Taliban regime, Osmani was the corps commander of Kandahar, the militia's seat of power.

More recently, he was regarded as one of the top three Taliban leaders under Omar, along with another senior military commander in the south and southeastern regions, Mullah Dadullah, and influential policy-maker Mullah Obaidullah.

In June, a man claiming to be Osmani — his face was concealed by a black turban — gave an interview to a Pakistani television network in which he said Omar and bin Laden were alive and well. He claimed to be receiving instructions from Omar.

Insurgent raids into Afghanistan from Pak continue unabated: Top NATO Gen.

Washington, Dec 22 (ANI): Top NATO commander, General James Jones has said that infiltration into Afghanistan by al Qaeda and Taliban elements from the Pakistan border regions was continuing unabated, despite the Waziristan peace deal between the federal government and tribal elders in the region.

General Jones, who handed over to General John Craddock as Supreme Allied Commander Europe this month, said the NATO's political leadership would raise the issue with Pakistan unless things improved.

The Pakistan government had this September, signed a peace deal with tribal elders in North Waziristan claiming that the move would help stem insurgent raids by the militia into the border Afghan regions.

General Jones said the treaty was not doing much good and militants were rather sneaking in and out more easily than before.

"I told him (General Ehsan Ul Haq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Pakistan's military staff) that the returns did not really look too encouraging, given the porous nature of the borders and some very physical evidence that fighters were still coming across and returning rather freely across the many border crossings that are there," the Daily Times quoted General Jones as saying.

"I think that from the political side that NATO will be heard through the Secretary General on this issue if it continues to be a significant problem," he said.

"The problem of the Taliban is not an Afghan problem alone. This could be a Pakistani problem if Afghanistan doesn't work out the way we want it to," he added.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and NATO commanders in Afghanistan have earlier expressed apprehension over the September 5 armistice between tribal elders and the federal government.

According to them, the treaty has been a sell out to the Taliban. The frequency of insurgent raids into Afghanistan has increased, and the militia has also gained more teeth and become more assertive than before, both in Waziristan and the neighbouring Afghan provinces.

Afghanistan: Former NATO Commander Urges Political Focus

By Andrew Tully - WASHINGTON, December 22, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- A former supreme commander of NATO said today that pacifying Afghanistan can best be done by shifting the focus away from a military solution and toward a political one.

U.S. Marine General James Jones, who led NATO forces from 2003 until earlier this year, told journalists in Washington on December 21 that the alliance's troops are still needed in Afghanistan, but establishing the country as a self-sustaining democracy can be only be done by strengthening its civil institutions and eradicating the huge trade in opium.

Jones said it's time for NATO countries to focus their attention on reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.

In his view, it's still necessary for NATO forces to help the government of President Hamid Karzai to fight the Taliban insurgency. But he said the real problem in Afghanistan is the drug trade and the money it generates.

"I think the Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem," Jones said. "I think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements -- anything to bring chaos and disorder."

Jones said that without funds from the opium trade, the Taliban wouldn't be able to afford to continue its insurgency.

In addition, Jones said, NATO and the government in Kabul have to focus on strengthening Afghanistan's judicial system and reforming the police.

Perhaps most important, Jones said, Karzai must make his central government more visible outside the capital, to show that it's in charge, especially along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, which the Taliban often crosses to escape NATO forces.

Jones made his comments during a wide-ranging presentation at the Washington offices of the Atlantic Council, a private organization that promotes understanding of the NATO alliance. For much of his appearance, he focused on the future of NATO. He said the alliance is strong, that no member seems interested in leaving, and that several nations still hope to join.

Jones said the military arm of NATO is fully in the 21st century, but its political arm remains bogged down by the priorities of individual nations at the expense of the alliance.

"How we spend our money, what we spend our money on, is definitely still in the 20th century, and sooner or later NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees, all acting on the rule of consensus," Jones said. "Is that really how you get your best advice?"

Afghan widows stand in line for international aid on December 22 (epa) For example, he said NATO's civilian leadership has been slow to approve a piece of equipment, known as a "blue-force tracker," that helps the alliance's forces avoid friendly-fire casualties. He said the tracker is relatively inexpensive and readily available, but it's still not in the hands of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

One questioner asked Jones about the Georgia and Ukraine’s prospects for accession. He said that with the recent political reversals in Ukraine, it seems the people in that country are less eager to join the alliance. He said Georgia's effort, which has more popular support, is more likely to be successful.

But Jones cautioned that a country should be required to do more than merely want to enter the alliance.

"The standard ought to be pretty high," he said. "And I think that the standard ought to be that there is a rule of law, there is a functioning economy, there is a -- some adherence to democratic values, there is a subordination of the military to civilian authority, and there is essentially a social structure that's working and effective. My belief is that members of NATO should bring value to the alliance, and only when they have proven themselves to bring value to the alliance should the alliance offer membership."

One questioner asked about the trouble the United States has been having with its allies since U.S. President George W. Bush decided to lead an invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Jones agreed that the United States' reputation has deteriorated since then, both among allies and also throughout the Muslim world. He noted that even the Turks, whose country has long been a staunch NATO ally, believe the United States is their biggest enemy.

But Jones said Washington can restore its good name around the world if it resumes cooperation with its friends, particularly through NATO.

"We as a nation, I think, need to understand that we can't do it alone and that we need our partners and friends," Jones said. "We need to value our forward basing and express our appreciation for those bases with our allies. And I think we can turn this around pretty quickly."

Jones said his country's reputation already is improving. He recalled seeing signs of what he called "expressions of togetherness" at the NATO summit in Riga last month.

Afghanistan is at crossroads: UN envoy

The Associated Press 12/23/2006 - United Nations - Afghanistan is at a crossroads and there is no guarantee that it won't slide into a broader conflict again, the head of a recent UN Security Council mission to the country said.

Japan's UN Ambassador Kenzo Oshima told the council Thursday that security was the dominant concern during the November 11-16 mission, with many Afghans apprehensive about the rise in violence.

While the Afghan economy is growing and there are promises of reconstruction and development and strengthening of democratic institutions, he said the country faces a growing Taliban-led insurgency, widespread insecurity in the south and east, an upsurge in illegal drug production and trafficking, and pervasive corruption.

"The spread of insurgent and terrorist activity by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, coupled with corruption and failures of governance, collectively pose a grave threat to nation-building," he said.

Oshima said the mission had two messages — that international support for the government and people of Afghanistan "was unwavering" and that the Afghanistan Compact remains the blueprint for cooperation between the government and the international community. But he warned that "few can deny that Afghanistan now is at a crossroads."

The compact is a successor to the deal reached at a December 2001 meeting in Bonn, Germany, which established a political process for Afghanistan after US and allied Afghan forces drove out the country's Taliban rulers for harbouring Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

The political process culminated in last December's inauguration of the new Afghan National Assembly -- the final step to bring representative government to Afghanistan after nearly a quarter century of war that claimed more than 1 million lives.

In the new compact, Afghanistan pledged to build a functioning justice system in all its provinces by 2010 and reduce the number of people living on less than $1 a day by 3 per cent per year.

It promised to build a professional army and police force, shut down all armed militias by the end of 2007 and teach its officials about human rights. Afghanistan also vowed to provide electricity to 25 per cent of rural homes and 65 per cent of urban ones by 2010.

Oshima said the Afghan government should take action to meet the benchmarks in the compact and the international community should provide additional support "both for quick gains and for sustained progress."

"No one can guarantee that without determined efforts on the part of Afghanistan and sustained support over the long haul from the international community, the country will not slide towards broader conflict again," he warned.

But Oshima said "the mission is convinced that the government of Afghanistan and the international community have established a sound strategy to overcome these challenges." The Japanese ambassador said the challenges were widespread and difficult.

In his formal report to the council, Oshima said Afghans "cited corruption and the perpetuation of a culture of impunity as the root causes of popular Afghan disaffection and unease."

"Perceptions, however inaccurate, that the Taliban was less corrupt were undercutting government authority in some rural areas where access to formal justice remained limited," he said.

Afghan leaders acknowledged that the continued presence of warlords in government bodies contributed to insecurity, Oshima said. "Afghanistan's burgeoning narco-economy was identified ... as a primary threat to stability" by the vast majority of Afghans the council met, he said.

"It was described as a `cancer' which would spread and kill Afghan society over the long term," Oshima said, noting that "the mission was informed that in 2006 opium poppy cultivation represented 60 percent of GDP."

The mission called for greater Afghan and international efforts to help farmers move away from poppy cultivation and arrest and prosecute major drug traffickers "regardless of their position or status."

Pakistani minister asks Afghanistan to stop blaming game

A Pakistani minister Friday asked Afghan authorities to stop blaming Pakistan for unrest in their country or provide solid proof to substantiate the allegations, the state-run Associated Press of Pakistan reported.

Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao on Friday said that Pakistani government is doing its best for stability and peace in Afghanistan and is contributing a lot towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in the neighboring country, while talking to media after attending a local function.

He reiterated that a stable Afghanistan is in vital interest of Islamabad and the region as a whole. Pakistan had avoided indulging in accusations as Islamabad " wants to have good relations with Kabul," the minister said, quoted by the APP report.

This month has seen toughest allegations from Afghanistan against Pakistani government since Taliban's fall in 2001. Both the Afghan government-run newspaper Anis and Afghan President Hamid Karzai directly charged the Pakistan government for supporting the Taliban.

Pakistan has long denied these allegations and said it has sent around 80,000 troops to hunt al-Qaeda members and Taliban militants on the border, and has done its best to stop the cross movement of militants.

Pakistan said it is keen to improve the management of the border, and the challenge is to facilitate orderly traffic of goods and people while addressing the problems of drug trafficking, smuggling, terrorism and other trans-border crimes.

But Pakistan's proposal to fence the Pak-Afghan border was not acceded by the Government of Afghanistan, said Pakistan's foreign ministry.

Accordingly, Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to conduct coordinated patrols along the border, which will be conducted by Pakistan Army, Afghan National Army, international coalition forces, while remaining on their respective sides of the border.

Also, Pakistan and Afghanistan plan to hold jirgas or tribal councils on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border in an effort to persuade tribesmen to quit fighting in Afghanistan through peaceful dialogue. Source: Xinhua

Pakistan urged to stop backing Taliban

West must pressure Musharraf to crack down on insurgents, or risk new phase of war, conference told - Olivia Ward - Toronto Star 12.23.06

Western countries must persuade Pakistan to stop backing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan or risk a new and more dangerous phase of the war, say experts in the conflict in the region.

"The sanctuary that Pakistan offers to the Taliban and the support they offer are both critical to the more robust nature of the insurgency this year, and its continued success," said Larry Goodson, who heads the U.S. Army War College's department of national security and strategy.

Goodson is one of several regional experts who rang alarm bells earlier this week on Pakistan's role in the Taliban's growing resurgence.

The regional experts were attending a three-day conference entitled Afghanistan: Transition Under Threat, hosted by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo.

A newly released report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group also focused on the tribal border areas of Pakistan, which it says have become a Talibanized "state within a state," where weapons are being stockpiled for a major assault on Canadian and other troops in the spring.

And an independent Canadian military analyst, Sunil Ram, says "an endless flow of Taliban is being generated by an underground spring in Pakistan," adding the insurgents' buildup of weapons will lead to a massive spring offensive against Canadian and other NATO troops unless action is taken soon.

"All the intelligence data point to that," says Ram. "Canada has too few troops in the field to fight against these odds, and, if nothing changes, it's inevitable that many more of our soldiers are going to die," Ram says.

The heightened concern comes from steady Taliban gains in southern Afghanistan, where some 2,500 Canadian troops are stationed. They have increased during the past three months, after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf made a deal with pro-Taliban leaders in the border region of North Waziristan – standing down Pakistani troops that patrolled it, and making the leaders responsible for stopping cross-border attacks.

Since then, experts say, recruiting and training of fighters have continued, if not escalated, and both sides of the border have become "Talibanized."

"Following the accord, the government released militants, returned their weapons, disbanded security check posts and agreed to allow foreign terrorists to stay if they gave up violence," said the International Crisis Group.

Husain Haqqani, a Karachi-born academic and former diplomat, told the conference "Pakistan's own religious parties have joined the Taliban in helping them stage operations in Afghanistan ... restrictions of the kind that were imposed on Afghanistan (by the Taliban) are imposed on Pakistan now."

Musharraf fiercely denies abetting the Taliban and points out his forces have waged war against them, with a number of high-profile arrests.

He says that his border deals are useful, because the local tribal leaders are better equipped than the military to root out insurgents. But, Haqqani says, Musharraf is playing a double game with the Taliban and the West.

"By the very nature of his regime, he has to operate on two levels: playing to the West as a close ally... but at the same time he is head of an institution, the Pakistan military, which has a longstanding world view of how Pakistan should be run."

Haqqani, author of Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, said the Pakistani security services, allies of the Taliban in the fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, are hoping to turn Afghanistan back into a "client state" over which they will retain a powerful influence.

"It's natural for them to turn back to their old protégés, and that is exactly what is happening now," he said.

But Pakistan is also betting against a NATO victory over the Taliban, says Goodson, a former adviser to Gen. John Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command.

"What I am getting from Pakistan is the feeling that the U.S. has already lost in Afghanistan," Goodson says. "It may take 10 years or more, but failure is already in motion, and Pakistan should hedge its bets."

Canada, the U.S. and other Western countries must apply strong pressure on Musharraf to crack down on the Taliban before the insurgents' gains become irreversible, Goodson said.

Elders support Karzai's stance

Abdul Majid Arif  - KHOST CITY, Dec 21 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Hundreds of Pashtun tribal elders from Khost and Pakistan's border area of Kuram Agency have supported President Hamid Karzai's last week stance against Pakistan.

In a meeting held here on Thursday, tribal elders from both sides of the border said Pakistan was trying to enslave Afghans, as arrest of the two Pakistanis proved this.

Deputy head of the Tribal Solidarity Council (TSC), Mir Zaman Sabari, told Pajhwok Afghan News the desires of Pakistan regarding enslaving Afghans would never be fulfilled.

He also condemned remarks by the Pakistani president Gen Pervez Musharraf, who said that Taliban had roots in Pashtun. Sabari said: "In his remarks, Muhsarraf has revealed his animosity towards Pashtuns."

Governor of Khost Arsala Jamal urged the elders from Kuram Agency to help in restoring security to the region. He also asked them not to provide shelter or training to their children for suicide attacks. Malak Akbar Khan, head of the delegation from Kuram Agency, promised they would not allow militants to use their area for launching attacks on Afghanistan. After the meeting, the participants issued a resolution, expressing their support to President Hamid Karzai's policy against Pakistan.

The resolution also called on the Taliban to end violence and take part in reconstruction process of their country. They demanded of foreign forces to take maximum caution not to harm civilians during their military operations.

President condemns attack on Zadran

KABUL, Dec 23 (Pajhwok Afghan News): President Hamid Karzai on Saturday strongly condemned the failed attempt to kill member of the Wolesi Jirga or lower house of parliament Padsha Khan Zadran.

In a statement released from the Presidential Palace, Karzai described the heinous act as animosity towards the people of Afghanistan and their representatives. He said: "The enemies of Afghanistan, by killing people's representatives, want to disrupt the democratic process in the country."

On Friday, a suicide bomber attacked the car carrying son and grandson of Zadran in the Karta-i-Naw area of this capital city. The two relatives, along with driver and bodyguard of Zadran, and five pedestrians suffered injuries in the attack. Later, one of the wounded breathed his last at the hospital.

Zadran is opposed to the armed struggle by Taliban. Four days back, Kabul police claimed that they had arrested a man allegedly planning to assassinate Padshah Khan Zadran, member of parliament from the southeastern province of Paktia.

Qanuni satisfied with parliament role

Makia Munir  - KABUL, Dec 20 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Chairman of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) Mohammad Younis Qanuni Wednesday praised role of the parliament saying the legislative body had 80% achievements despite facing serious challenges.

Foreign diplomats, representatives of NGOs, European Union, NATO, and great number of local officials attended the ceremony held in the parliament.

Addressing the first anniversary of the parliament here, Qanuni said, with very little experience the MPs beginning from zero had showed better performance in second session as compared with the first ones.

"We are happy that at the end of nine months, the parliament had got 80% achievement," he added. He said Afghans could not reach to the current position if the MPs had not cooperated in politics, security and economy fields.

Pointing to some problems faced by the parliament, he said: "We are in primary stages, and there are serious challenges ahead of us," he added. Qanuni said: "We have a lot of serious challenges ahead, and we have to fight them all."

First and second deputy chairpersons Mohammad Arif Noorzai and Fauzia Kofi explained one year activities of the parliament. Voting cabinet members, Supreme Court members, approval of budget, approving security draft were some of the achievements by the parliament.

However, some MPs termed parliament lagged behind in achieving its goal. Ramzan Bashardost, the MP from Kabul told Pajhwok Afghan News: "The parliament has failed in making sound laws in the last nine months, as Karzai government has failed in the last five years." He said: "In the last nine months, MPs didn't carry out their duties, though expenses of the parliament were too high."

ADB to finance energy import from Tajikistan

KABUL, Dec 21 (Pajhwok Afghan News): The Asian Development Bank (ADB) will spend $56.5 million to fulfill the power shortage in Afghanistan by taping the surplus in Tajikistan.

According to a report, Tajikistan have the capacity to generate 4,405 megawatt electricity annually with an annual surplus of about 1,500 gigawatt-hours. On the other hand, Afghanistan, faces serious power shortages, which are expected to become more acute as the demand grows.

To meet the needs of both countries, the project will construct a 220 kilovolt double circuit transmission line that will link the hydropower stations on Tajikistan's Vakhsh River to the border town of Sherkan Bandar, then to Kunduz, Baglad, Pul-i-Khumri and, ultimately, Kabul.

The project will also include new investments and upgrading in Tajikistan that will help reduce the winter power deficit by boosting the available level of generation and decreasing technical losses in the south of the country resulting in an additional 320 gigawatt-hours annually.

Quoting ADB's energy specialist Xavier Humbert, the report said that the project offers a win-win situation for both Afghanistan and Tajikistan. "It will restore power supply and reduce costs for consumers in the former while allowing Tajikistan to export 300 megawatts.

The total net economic benefits of regional cooperation of the project are estimated to be $114 million, split fairly evenly between the two countries.

ADB's loans of $35 million to Afghanistan and $21.5 to Tajikistan comes from its concessional Asian Development Fund and carry a 32 year term, including a grace period of 8 years.

Other financiers of the project, which will cost an estimated $109.5 million, are the OPEC Fund for International Development, Islamic Development Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the governments of Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

India provides $3 million equipment for Afghan army

Hindustan Times/ Indo-Asian News Service Kabul, December 23, 2006|11:10 IST

As the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan with a rise in Taliban-instigated violence, India has given non-lethal military equipment worth $3 million to shore up the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood handed over the equipment to Afghan Defence Minister General (Retd) Abdul Rahim Wardak at the Logistics Depot of ANA in the Afghan capital earlier this month.

The goods donated by India included 2,500 bullet-proof jackets, 2,500 bullet-proof helmets, 150 bullet-proof observation towers (machan), 1,000 sets of Laser Aim Points and 15,000 units of spool plastic with punched tape. Other non-lethal items included wire cutters, mine detectors, magnetic and non-magnetic long prodders.

While handing them over, the Indian envoy underlined "historically close and friendly ties between India and Afghanistan" and elaborated on the wide-ranging and extensive nature of New Delhi's aid to Afghanistan in areas as diverse as building roads, schools and hospitals.

Gen Wardak thanked India for the much-needed military equipment and stressed on enduring relations between the two countries.

India has pledged $650 million for the socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan and has helped with training for Afghan Army officers.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has discussed with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the resurgence of the Taliban and the threat it poses to the security and stability of his country.

This has been the most violent year in Afghanistan since the US ousted the Taliban government in 2001, killing over 4,000 people. At present, 21 ANA officers are attending various training programmes in India. In 2007, 49 more officers will be trained.

As part of military assistance to Afghanistan worth around $10 million, India had earlier provided 300 vehicles, 25 tonnes of winter clothing, 277 packages of medicines as well as musical instruments.

Afghanistan Launches Spectrum Mobile Monitoring Station

cellular-news.com December 22, 2006 - Afghanistan's Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ATRA) has taken posession of a new radio spectrum monitor to ensure that illegal radio usage does not occur in the country. At the launch, the Minister of Communications briefed the media about this useful station and said that this project has been funded by the World Bank at a cost of one million dollars, and has a particular importance, and all those companies or operators who are using frequency will benefit from it.

H. E. Minister of Communications also added that by the launching of this mobile Spectrum station we can monitor and control all operators and frequency users, who are using illegal frequency without the permission of Ministry of Communications or having the license from this Ministry.

Furthermore, the revenues from the frequency will also be increased by activating of this mobile station.

H. E. explained that by the operating of this station we will be able to know about the quality of broadcasting of local TVs, Radio stations and GSM frequencies in Afghanistan, therefore, we can enhance the quality of the broadcasting of these stations and help their broadcasting problems.

According to the Afghanistan Telecommunications Regulatory Authority's officials this station can monitor and control radio frequencies from20 MHz to 3000 MHz.

In addition, this station can simultaneously monitor and evaluate the frequency and give a real check or monitoring report of evaluation. It is worthwhile to say that this station has been activated and operated by the Afghani engineers and operators.

Reconstruction proceeds in Afghan district amid show of force by Canadians - Saturday, December 23, 2006 - Canadian Press

Saturday, December 23, 2006 - BAZAR-E PANJWAII, Afghanistan (CP) - There are troops and firepower at the ready but so far it's the soft approach that appears to be doing the trick in Operation Baaz Tsuka.

The Canadian Forces joined the NATO offensive against the Taliban on Wednesday with an impressive array of troops, tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery. They rolled into the town of Howz-e Madad without firing a shot and since then most of the work has been on providing humanitarian aid and meeting village elders.

"The overall operation has been unfolding exactly as per the plan," Lt.-Col. Omer Lavoie, commander of the Canadian Battle Group, said Friday.

"As far as the Canadians are concerned it was considered to be, as much as possible, a non-kinetic operation," he said. "In other words, we were not going in hard in a way characterized by combat operations, but certainly characterized by a lot of combat power if we needed it."

With an estimated 400 Taliban insurgents south of Howz-e Madad, the area is surrounded by Canadians to the north and east, British forces to the west, and American and British troops to the south.

NATO commanders say the Taliban in the area have nowhere to go. And with the exception of a few half-hearted rocket attacks at Howz-e Madad, it has been quiet since the Canadians joined the offensive. NATO launched Operation Baaz Tsuka - Falcon Summit - a week ago.

It's Canada's first offensive since the Canadian-led Operation Medusa in early September. NATO claimed hundreds of Taliban militants were killed in that operation.

Behind the scenes, food and medical supplies are being sent to villages in the Panjwaii and Zahri districts. And portable checkpoints are being brought in as part of the ultimate goal of putting Afghan government forces in control of the area once effective held by Taliban rebels. "Afghan security forces are now forming an inner cordon in Howz-e Madad," Lavoie said.

Sgt. Nathan Ronaldson, in charge of the provincial reconstruction team in Bazar-e Panjwaii, attended a shura - or meeting - with local leaders on Friday to discuss land claims related to the construction of a highway, Route Summit, through the region.

Before the meeting began, he told Bismallah Jan, the police chief for the Panjwaii district, that several containers had arrived with portable vehicle checkpoints.

"There's going to be a variety of checkpoints put out throughout the district. It's designed to be a 'sea can in a box,' sort of an Ikea concept," said Ronaldson, 34, from Scarborough, Ont. "You drop off two sea cans and it's everything you need to construct a vehicle checkpoint. It's designed to be temporary, around six to 12 months."

There will be 11 of the checkpoints constructed in Panjwaii district alone as NATO forces attempt to eventually put the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Auxiliary Police in charge of security in each district.

Ronaldson has been meeting village elders for the past month trying to reach a compensation package for the construction of Route Summit. Then suddenly it was done. The elders agreed on a price for the lost grape vines and land appropriated.

"Did we just close the deal?," a disbelieving Ronaldson asked his interpreter as they left the shura. Negotiations in Afghanistan are usually intense with a lot of bargaining, theatrics and mock exhibitions of rage. That was the case until Friday.

"You know it kind of went out with a whimper and not a bang," Ronaldson said. "I was expecting a much worse meeting, some dissension, some hand throwing, some yelling and they just said OK."

Harper willing to take shots for Afghan mission - By CP

Prime Minister Stephen Harper remained steadfast in his defence of military operations in Afghanistan yesterday. Harper told a Calgary radio program the UN and the international community want Canadian troops in the war-torn country.

And he said the soldiers still believe in the mission. "If they're willing to take the real bullets, we can take the rhetorical bullets back here at home," Harper said.

Canada's role in Afghanistan remains one of the biggest political issues facing Harper's minority government. In the past four years, 44 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat have been killed there, with 37 deaths coming this year alone.

Most of the casualties have occurred in the volatile Kandahar region. Earlier this month, Bloc Quebecois Leader Gilles Duceppe threatened to force a confidence vote over the military mission in Afghanistan.

Duceppe has since said his party wants to see the budget before triggering an election. Still, Harper said he fully expects an election sometime early in the new year.

Hillier Goes to Afghanistan

Jason McIntyre Saturday, December 23, 2006 - The general will spend the holidays with his troops. Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier has flown to the Persian Gulf where he is now accompaning the crew aborad the HMCS Ottawa.

On Christmas Eve, Hillier heads to Afghanistan where more than 2300 Canadian soldiers are serving along side NATO forces. Hillier says he pushed back family Christmas time by one week so he could travel to the frontlines and join his fellow troops.

Montreal rock group Jonas will perform for the soldiers. Sharing the stage will be comedians Mary Walsh and Rick Mercer.

AFGHANISTAN: Communist era mass grave discovered highlights need for post-war justice

KABUL, 22 December (IRIN) - Some 2,000 bodies are believed to have been dumped in a recently unearthed communist-era mass grave in Afghanistan's capital Kabul, officials said on Thursday.

The mass grave was unearthed one day earlier close to the communist era's most notorious prison Poli Charkhi on the eastern outskirts of the capital by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), said Dr Mohammad Halim Tanwir, director of the international press centre at the Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC).

MIC officials believe that the massacre took place between 1978 and 1986 when the Moscow-backed communist presidents, Noor Mohammad Tarakai, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal were in power.

Human skulls with bullet wounds, broken bones, pieces of clothing and shoes were seen in the several metre-long grave.

"More than 50,000 of our innocent people - who were mainly jailed in Poli Charkhi prison, were executed at that time," Tanwir asserted. "The recovered bodies show that many of them had been shot in the head and then buried."

Tens of thousands of Afghans and their family members were imprisoned and killed by the security services of the communist regimes during 1978-1992 for their alleged links with the Mujahideen groups who were waging stiff resistance against the Russian invasion and its communist regime in Afghanistan, officials say.

"The soldiers surrounded our house at night and then handcuffed my father and took him in a Russian jeep during the regime of Noor Mohammad Tarakai [the Afghan president from 1978 to 1979]," 38-year old Ehsanullah of Alingar district of Laghman province told IRIN. "He was in Poli Charkhi prison for some time and then disappeared. I am sure he might have been killed by communists," Ehsanullah claimed.

In January this year, a former Afghan intelligence chief, Assadullah Sarwary was sentenced to death for his alleged involvement in mass killings during the rule of Noor Mohammad Tarakai.

To date several mass graves belonging to the communist era [1978-1992], the period of factional fighting between Mujahideen [1992-1996] and the Taliban [1996-2001] have been discovered in Afghanistan.

In September 2005, local officials found a mass grave in southeastern Paktika province containing some 500 bodies of the communist government's soldiers, which were allegedly killed by the Mujahideen.

In 2002, months after US forces and several Afghan militia groups toppled the Taliban, the bodies of thousands of Taliban fighters were found in a grave in northern Afghanistan.

Human rights groups blamed the killings on Abdul Rashid Dostum, one of Afghanistan's most feared regional commanders, who is now an advisor to Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

But despite repeated calls from rights groups for the prosecution of those accused of mass killings and severe human rights violations during the nearly three decades of civil war, there is still no accountability, critics say.

Commenting on the recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report released on 12 December, calling on Karzai to address war crimes justice, Malalai Joya, a parliamentarian, criticised the president's current policy saying he was being too soft on the country's powerful warlords.

"The president needs to be more firm and crucial against the warlords and druglords and should not make compromises with them, because they are still being implicated in various human rights violations in our country," Joya told IRIN.

"Our people demand justice to all the atrocities whether it is committed by the communists, warlords or the Taliban," he maintained.

The HRW report said that several high ranking officials of the current Afghan government had been implicated in war crimes during the factional war that killed or displaced hundreds of thousands of Afghans in the early 1990s.

The rights group accused the parliamentarians Abdul Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, Mohammed Qasim Fahim and Burhanuddin Rabbani, Minister of Energy Ismail Khan, Army Chief of Staff Abdul Rashid Dostum, and current Vice President Karim Khalili as major human rights violators.

The report also accused former prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and current Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar, Mullah Daudullah and Jalaluddin Haqqani for human rights abuses during the late 1990s.

"Karzai and the international community have tried and failed, to establish peace without justice," said Sam Zarifi, Asia research director at HRW. "Now it's time to hold the killers accountable."

Meanwhile, considering the HRW report incorrect, Afghan President Karzai maintains that a number of Jihadi leaders have played a positive role in ensuring peace and stability in the country over the past five years.

US encourages the Talibanization of Afghanistan

By Abid Mustafa Political Affairs Magazine (New York, USA) December 22, 2006

Lately, relations between Kabul and Islamabad have taken a dramatic turn for the worse. Hamid Karzai has accused Pakistan of spurring the Taliban to carry out attacks against his fledgling government and the NATO troops that defend it. He is not alone in holding Pakistan responsible for the re-emergence of the Taliban. NATO commanders, the New York Times and the International Crisis Group (ISG) have all pointed the finger at Pakistan for fomenting the Pushtoon resistance that shows no sign of abating.

On its part, the Musharraf government vehemently denies such accusations and continues to blame Karzai’s government for its failure to include the Taliban and other militants as part of the national reconciliation drive. It must be stressed here—Pakistan is almost isolated on its present stance—evidence to the contrary shows that Islamabad has actively nurtured Taliban fighters to reassert their authority on towns and villages ceded to US led forces in the aftermath Taliban’s collapse during the winter of 2001.

Oddly enough, the White House instead of holding Islamabad to account has thrown its weight behind the Pakistani government and has suggested that a more collaborative approach between Islamabad and Kabul would stymie the rising militancy in Afghanistan. Washington’s ambivalent attitude raises the question; is America encouraging the emergence of Taliban as a way of extricating itself from Afghanistan?

The answer lies in the Afghan coalition America cobbled together to ouster Taliban. Back then, the Bush administration believed that the Northern Alliance (NA) could be used as an instrument to remove the Taliban from power, subdue the Pushtoon resistance, and bring stability to Afghanistan. But just the opposite occurred on all three fronts. From the outset of the Bonn Conference it became plainly clear that the NA was rife with internal rancor and prone to outside influences of Russia and Europe. America, having spent millions of dollars buying the fickle loyalty of warlords was left with no option, but to counter the Pushtoon resistance on her own. If this was not bad enough—America’s association with the NA enraged the Pushtoons further who felt politically isolated and indignant towards the Tajik-Uzbek dominated government in Kabul. As a result, a violent rebellion erupted against Karzai and his US masters. The epicenter of the rebellion quickly became the strip of land known as the Pakistani tribal belt that abuts Afghanistan. Fighters from all over Afghanistan opposed to the occupation sought refuge here and mingled freely with the remnants of Taliban and other Pashtoons disillusioned with American promises of a better Afghanistan.

Unable to quell the resistance, America had to change tack. In 2003 acting under the tutelage of US Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad, Karzai adopted a two prong approach to suppress the resistance. He offered an olive branch to moderate Taliban fighters and declared an all out assault against hardened Pashtoon militants and their backers. The intention was to shore up Karzai’s beleaguered government with moderate elements of the resistance movement and to win the support of tribal elders on both sides of the Afghan-Pak border. The longevity of any government in Kabul is dependent upon the support of the Pashtoons. In Karzai’s case, his constituency was diminishing and support base dwindling.

America was fully aware that the Pushtoon uprising could not be defeated unless the support structures for waging guerrilla warfare against US forces were destroyed, especially those located in Pakistan’s tribal belt region or Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). After all, it was with American money and know-how that the military infrastructure was meticulously assembled by Pakistan’s ISI. Training camps strewn across the region were established to arm and train Afghans to wage asymmetric war against the Soviets. Not surprisingly then, America turned to enlist Pakistan to deploy its army to the restless tribal areas. Musharraf promptly obliged, and in 2004 under the pretext of fighting foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda, military operations commenced in South and North Waziristan agencies.

However, the Pakistani military forays into the tribal region yielded very little success for the Americans. Instead, the Pakistan army suffered high causalities—some ranks even experienced mutiny; Musharraf, America’s stalwart in region lost credibility; the Pashtoon resistance increased in ferocity, the government in Kabul looked ever shakier and for the first time the prospect of defeat in Afghanistan troubled American officials. Confronted with these realities America decided to resurrect the Taliban. Pakistan swiftly abandoned military force and hurriedly concluded peace pacts with pro-Taliban tribal elders in the agencies.

Taliban buoyed by Pakistan’s apparent turn around, extended their reach further into Pakistan and made Quetta, the capital city of Balochistan an additional mainstay for their activities. Here they began to rearm and recruit young men from religious seminaries, replenish their front lines with valuable supplies for the planned spring offensive next year. Some of the new recruits were given senior positions in preference to old Taliban warriors whose loyalty could no longer be guaranteed by Pakistan’s ISI. Thus the Taliban were swiftly transformed from a rag-tag band of men into a force to be reckoned with. This boosted their capability to lead the Pushtoon resistance in many parts of Afghanistan. NATO was the first international organization to borne the full brunt of a rejuvenated Taliban movement. Some members of NATO were surprised by the intensity and the magnitude of the resistance. UK’s Defense Secretary Des Brown said," We do have to accept that it's been even harder than we expected."

America deftly exploited the upsurge in attacks against NATO troops to press home to alliance members at the NATO summit in Riga, the need to permanently redefine the organization’s mission, approve proposed amendments to its charter, establish a 25,000 strong rapid reaction force, and to increase troop levels to buttress NATO operations in Afghanistan. At the Riga summit

Bush said, "The Taliban radicals who are trying to pull down Afghanistan's democracy and regain power saw the transfer from American to NATO control as a window of opportunity to test the will of the Alliance…Today Afghanistan is NATO's most important military operation, and by standing together in Afghanistan, we'll protect our people, defend our freedom, and send a clear message to the extremists the forces of freedom and decency will prevail."

Nonetheless, the NATO mission in Afghanistan exposed deep fissures—over political and operational issues— amongst some of the older members of the alliance. France was unequivocal in its condemnation to make NATO duplicate functions of the UN, while Britain, America’s closet alley expressed dismay at Pakistan’s endeavors to revive the Taliban. UK‘s Ministry of Defense intentionally leaked a report that revealed the extent to which Pakistan’s ISI was providing assistance to the Taliban thereby contributing to the death of British soldiers in southern Afghanistan. The disclosure was supposed to embarrass Musharraf on his visit to London who promptly proceeded to reject the allegation that ISI was a rogue institution acting separately from the army. He said, "ISI is a disciplined force, breaking the back of al-Qaida."

To redress the shortsightedness of Britain’s NATO policy in Afghanistan, Blair visited Pakistan in November, and again urged Musharraf to put a halt to the rise of the Taliban. The gravity of the deteriorating situation facing Britain’s armed forces was summed up in a speech given by Blair at

Camp Bastion in Helmand province. Blair said, "Here in this extraordinary piece of desert is where the future of world security in the early twenty-first century is going to be played out." Earlier, Bush had described Iraq and not Afghanistan—central to the ideological struggle of the 21st century. The difference in Anglo-American perspectives underscores America’s belief that General Musharraf will stabilize Afghanistan for them.

On the battlefront, acute differences have surfaced between American and British commanders. Britain ignored American sensibilities and urged her ally Mohammed Daud the governor of Helmand to secure the retreat of British forces from the town of Musa Qala via a peace deal with the Taliban. But the Americans publicly criticized the truce in Musa Qala and other Helmand towns, saying they effectively gave in to the Taliban. Exasperated by British tactics, the Americans instructed Karzai to remove Daud from power. "The Americans knew Daud was a main British ally," one official told The Independent on Sunday, "yet they deliberately undermined him and told Karzai to sack him." Americans have also been irked by the British commander of the NATO force in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General David Richards. On 10/12/06 the British paper Independent on Sunday reported that the American supreme commander of NATO, General Jim Jones, has let it be known, according to sources, that General Richards "would have been sacked if he had been an American officer."

Away from the battle field, the Pakistani political establishment confident of a Taliban victory come next spring, has begun to instill momentum in the idea that NATO must consult the Taliban prior to any political settlement. On 30/11/06 Mushahid Hussain Sayed, chairman of the Pakistan’s foreign affairs committee, told a visiting delegation of British Parliamentarians: "There has to be negotiations, a dialogue with all elements of Afghan society—ethnic or political, including, frankly, members of the resistance." Latif Khosa, of the opposition Pakistan People's Party said, "You have to open avenues for talking with the Taliban." Speaking before the press, Foreign Office Spokesperson Tasnim Aslam said, "The international community must encourage national reconciliation and undertake an extensive reconstruction program for South and Southeast Afghanistan."

It appears that America’s plan is to exploit the Taliban to take the helm of the indigenous Afghan resistance, invest the battle field gains made by the resistance into a political process, which recognizes the Pushtoon’s popular base, but is cognizant of other ethnic groups’ concerns; then convene an international conference to forge a comprehensive settlement pertaining to Afghanistan and the interference from its neighbors. The pertinent issues will be the composition of the new government in Kabul, the continuation of US bases, the resolution of the border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, resettlement of Afghan refugees and the successful integration of FATA into mainstream Pakistani life.

In this way, US policy makers hope to stabilize Afghanistan and use as a conduit for transporting the rich energy reserves of the Caspian region, conducting military incursion into the former Soviet Republics, thwarting Russian and Chinese expansions into Central Asia and foiling the re-establishment of the Caliphate. However, the success of this plan depends upon factors which may no longer be in Washington’s control such as can the Pashtoons be trusted, will the Europeans tolerate a Taliban dominated government in Kabul, and will the Russian and Chinese remain quiet as they did after 9-11.

As far as the people of Pakistan are concerned they have been duped by General Musharraf into believing that Pakistan had no choice, but to disown the Taliban and join America’s war on terror. Five years on, Pakistan has again embraced the Taliban at the America’s behest. This time it is to help the US extricate itself from Afghanistan and preserve her plan for the region. General Musharraf is right when he said that without Pakistan’s help the West would have been brought to its knees. But under his leadership it is Pakistan that has been brought to its knees in a senseless quest to preserve American interests.

--Abid Mustafa is a political commentator who specializes in Muslim affairs.

The Great Game on a razor's edge

By M K Bhadrakumar Asia Times Online December 23, 2006

The accidental killing of Alexander Ivanov, a Kyrgyz fuel-truck driver, by Corporal Zachary Hatfield, a US serviceman, at the Manas Air Base on the outskirts of the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek in December is threatening to snowball into a first-rate crisis for the United States' regional policy in Central Asia.

Manas is the lone US military base in all of Central Asia - close to the Chinese border of Xinjiang. Curiously, this was also how the year 2006 began, as Washington was grappling with the call made by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for a timeline for the withdrawal of the US military presence in Central Asia.

In a nationally televised address, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev called for reviewing the Manas base agreement with the US. The Kyrgyz Parliament passed a resolution that given the "negative perception of the American image among our country's population", Bakiyev should examine the continuance of the base. The Foreign Ministry made a demarche with the US that Hatfield shouldn't leave until the Kyrgyz due process of law took its course.

This is rhetoric out of Latin America. Yet Bakiyev had only come to power on the crest of the US-backed "Tulip Revolution" of March 2005. But US-funded Kyrgyz "civil society" groups are nowadays arrayed against him on account of his increasingly pronounced foreign-policy leanings toward Russia and China.

They turned rowdyish in November, and humiliated him, forcing on him a new constitution curtailing his presidential powers. That is to say, Washington must now seek Bakiyev's help while backstage it could be funding and instigating political activists bent on overthrowing him. Bakiyev's overthrow may help the US firm up its grip on Manas, but today his helping hand is useful for preserving US interests. Nothing could be more surreal. Nothing would so vividly epitomize the complexities of the geopolitics of Central Asia.

Great Game slows down

The Great Game in Central Asia itself may appear to have considerably slowed down in 2006. But nothing could be more deceptive an impression. True, we've witnessed nothing like the cataclysmic events of the previous year - "Tulip Revolution" or the Andizhan uprising in Uzbekistan. Yet great-power rivalries most certainly continued - passions that were largely driven underground, where they simmered without taking a confrontational character.

Partly this was because the bickering over geopolitical influence became somewhat manifestly lopsided, with Russia and China not only retaining their gains of yesteryear but also consolidating them, and the US painstakingly attempting to recoup its lost influence in the region.

The single biggest "success story" of US diplomacy in the Great Game during the past year has been that Washington prevailed on Russia and China to give consideration to its reasoning that granting full membership to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the SCO might not be consistent with their own long-term interests. This was no mean achievement, considering that both Russia and China have such high stakes in their bilateral relations with Tehran. But Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad attended the summit as a special invitee. The SCO evidently keeps open the "threat" of Iranian membership.

Equally, the fact that, unlike its previous year's summit, the SCO meeting in June 2006 did not assume an overt anti-American overtone must remain a matter of relief for Washington. In many ways, the SCO demeanor has come to be the litmus test of the United States' geopolitical standing in Central Asia at any given time. Contrary to earlier US estimations, the SCO is increasingly acquiring a swagger that is suggestive of its potential to become the main powerhouse of the Eurasian region - arguably, a leading Eurasian economic and military bloc. The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

During the five-year period since its birth in 2001, the SCO, which has as members a number of underdeveloped countries including some desperately poor ones with nothing ostensibly to bind them together except their common geography, has not only held together but has grown in size and influence.

Initially drawing on the Chinese tri-fecta of "terrorism, separatism and extremism", the SCO speaks today about the establishment of a free-trade area and about common energy projects such as exploration of hyrdrocarbon reserves, joint use of hydroelectric power and water resources. But from the US perspective, the SCO agenda continues to be laden with a heavy cloud of suspicion regarding the United States' geostrategic intentions in the Central Asian region.

This impression gets further confirmed by the SCO's decision to hold large-scale joint military exercises scheduled for the coming summer in central Russia with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the military alliance that is Moscow's answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's enlargement into the post-Soviet space. The CSTO includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

That the military exercises will take place against the backdrop of the chill that has descended on Russia-US relations in the past year or two, and in the light of the likely deployment of the first interceptors of the US missile defense systems in Central Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, is no doubt significant.

It is irrelevant whether the SCO can be called a latter-day Warsaw Pact or a "NATO of the East". What is important is that on a practical plane, when it transpired that the US aircraft deployed at Manas Air Base might be undertaking reconnaissance missions into sensitive military regions in central Russia and China's Xinjiang, Moscow and Beijing put their foot down and acted in concert within the framework of the SCO, insisting that the stated purpose of the US military presence in Central Asia must be fulfilled in letter and spirit, namely that it restricted itself exclusively to undertaking resupply missions for the "war on terror" in Afghanistan.

The then-Kyrgyz president, Askar Akayev, was caught in the middle and overthrown from power in the process as a furious Washington let loose the "Tulip Revolution" on him for his perceived intransigence in turning down the US request for the stationing of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft in Manas. But the SCO quietly and firmly held its ground. Thereby it made an important point - that it had gained traction as a security organization. Not only that, the SCO proceeded to follow up at its summit in June 2005 with the call for the vacation of the US military presence in the region.

Indeed, going one step further, the SCO emphatically rallied behind the leadership of Uzbekistan in its move to ask for the vacation of the US air base at Karshi-Khanabad. On both counts - restrictions placed on the use of Manas and the eviction from Karshi-Khanabad - Washington meekly had to give in. In the process, Bishkek even renegotiated the bilateral agreement on Manas a few months ago by getting Washington to increase the annual rent of the base from US$2.7 million to between $150 million and $200 million.

The year 2006 has thus made it clear that the US is unlikely to become a single dominant power in Central Asia. Simply put, Russia and China have together put up the SCO dikes delimiting the US influence in the region, which will be difficult for Washington to breach for the foreseeable future. During the year, by and large Washington has vainly exhausted its energies in attempts to create misunderstandings between Russia and China and in pitting one SCO member state against another.

The heart of the matter is that apart from the bleeding wounds in Iraq and Afghanistan, which remain a major distraction for US diplomacy worldwide, US policy in Central Asia is seriously handicapped in two other respects. First, the United States' complete loss of influence in Tashkent after the Andizhan mishap in May 2005 is cramping overall US diplomacy in the region.

There is no denying that Uzbekistan is a key country in Central Asia. In the Soviet era, everyone from Josef Stalin down knew the axiom that Uzbekistan was the hub of the geopolitics of the region. True, the US put out several feelers to Tashkent through intermediaries for reconciliation, and lately even the European Union lent a hand, but Tashkent wouldn't budge. The laceration of Uzbek national pride by the US over Andizhan opened such

painful wounds that forgiveness may take much time coming and will extract sincere repentance on the part of Washington for its role in the Andizhan uprising. Meanwhile, the US has been left with no option but to watch Russian and Chinese influence in Tashkent expanding by leaps and bounds.

In a similar fashion, but in an even more fundamental sense, US diplomacy in Central Asia is seriously hobbled by Washington's alienation from Iran. Ten years have gone by since the famous article by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Foreign Affairs magazine calling for unconditional abandonment of the US policy of containment of Iran. Brzezinski had brilliantly argued the case (which most US career diplomats assigned to the region then also believed) that for US regional diplomacy to be anywhere near optimal in the Caucasus, in the Caspian region and in Central Asia, it must befriend Tehran. But Washington's mental block over Iran persists.

Meanwhile, the "Greater Central Asia" strategy unveiled by Washington last April with so much elan has already fizzled out. The strategy was avowedly intended to roll back Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Testifying before the US Congress that month, a senior State Department official said, "A lot of what we do here is to give the countries of the region the opportunities to make choices ... and keep them from being bottled up between two great powers, Russia and China."

The US official conjured up visions that could only belong to the world of fantasies: "Students and professors from Bishkek and Almaty can collaborate with and learn from their partners in Karachi and Kabul, legitimate trade can freely flow overland from Astana to Islamabad, facilitated by modern border controls, and an enhanced regional power grid stretching from Almaty to New Delhi will be fed by oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and hydropower from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan."

No wonder there are no takers in Central Asia for Washington's policy construct. Central Asian states are aware of the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, and reckon that peace is a distant goal. Even New Delhi seems embarrassed. Islamabad keeps quiet. The only capital to evince enthusiasm for Washington's paradigm of steering Central Asian states toward South Asian allies has been Kabul.

But failures may often hold the key to success. In a way, the current failures in regional policy may open a window of opportunity for the US in the period ahead. The point is: Without the glue of a serious US geopolitical challenge to bind them together into undertaking collective countermeasures, can the Sino-Russian condominium hold together in Central Asia for long? It is apparent that divergences have already appeared in the respective Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia.

China has used the SCO forum and the Russian influence in Central Asia to return to the region, which is indeed its back yard, for the first time in nearly 1,000 years. It is important to bear in mind that Beijing launched the idea of the SCO, and Russia accepted it. China views Central Asia as its "near abroad". As China's economic muscle grows, Beijing can afford to be more assertive.

China's soft power is already at work in the region. It is increasingly able to invoke its bilateral-cooperation mechanisms with Central Asian countries. There is hardly any need for China to ride piggyback on Russian goodwill or Russian influence in the region. China has used the SCO for acquiring local knowledge, and in building relations with the region's indigenous political, economic and military elites.

It is in the area of energy security that Chinese interests and concerns have already begun diverging significantly from those of Russia. The trend during 2006 has been that Russia's energy interests - in controlling the region's transportation routes for oil and gas, in sourcing the region's energy for meeting Russia's domestic needs that would leave an exportable surplus for meeting its commitments in Europe, in having a say in determining the price of energy in the region - are increasingly affected by China's robust quest for oil and gas in the region.

The early signs of this contradiction in Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia began appearing in 2005 when the China National Petroleum Corp acquired the PetroKazakhstan oil company for $4.18 billion.

China's gas deal with Turkmenistan in April 2006; the commissioning of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan; China's proposal for an energy-pipeline grid for Central Asia and connecting it with Xinjiang; China's cooperation agreement with Iran in the Caspian region; China's gas deals with Uzbekistan; China's interest in participating in a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline - all these are happenings within one calendar year, each imbued with strategic significance.

This past year, too, China has waded into the controversial waters of the Caspian Sea in search of oil when last January Iran's North Drilling Co and China Oilfield Services Ltd signed an oil-exploration agreement relating to the disputed deep waters of the southern Caspian. In one way or another, all these developments cut into Russian interests in Central Asia's energy sector.

Having said that, however, the China-Russia strategic partnership has a much greater regional and global logic than Central Asia, and the attempt in Moscow and Beijing will presumably be to harmonize their differences in Central Asia from spinning out of control. Also, both Moscow and Beijing realize that Central Asian states themselves will seek out Russia to balance their relations with China.

How these contradictory tendencies will play out within the SCO processes presents an engrossing topic. Clearly, the opportunity arises for the US to establish a dialogue with the SCO. A breakthrough may come in 2007. The prominent Russia hand in the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, Ariel Cohen, wrote recently, "Given that the SCO primarily serves as a geopolitical counterweight to the US, Washington stands little chance of ever receiving full membership in the group ... But US officials do not necessarily need full membership in the organization in order to work closely with the Central Asian states. It would serve Washington's best interests to remain in close contact with the SCO. To do so, it could resubmit an application seeking observer status.

"To boost the chances of success," Cohen added, "the US should engage Central Asian states by balancing democracy promotion and democratization with its other national interests, including security and energy."

Conceivably, we may expect even a NATO overture to the SCO in the coming year. In an exclusive interview with People's Daily last month, NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Schaffer held out the interesting suggestion to Beijing that there doesn't have to be a contradiction between China's membership of the SCO and China's future cooperation with NATO.

Without doubt, a palpable sense of urgency is already apparent in US thinking to the effect that the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership poses a serious threat to the United States' geopolitical position in Central Asia, and second, that China is Congress held a special hearing titled "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Is it Undermining US Interests in Central Asia?"

Moscow seems to anticipate that another US bid for observer status with the SCO is looming - and that unlike in 2005, Beijing may not oppose it this time. Curiously, at the end of December, Russia formalized a mechanism for regular political dialogue with the Mercosur grouping of Latin American countries, which has a definite slant (comparable to the SCO's) against US economic hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

Speaking on the occasion in Brasilia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "We have, by and large, been watching with the most sincere sympathy the integration processes in South America. We consider that the strengthening and elevation of the level of integration within the region works objectively in favor of the creation of a more stable and more fair world order in which all problems will be tackled multilaterally. I am certain that the partnership between Russia and Mercosur will be instrumental in attaining this goal."

The US estimation is basically that behind the facade of unity, China, Russia and the other SCO members and observer countries harbor serious differences of opinion. While "discord" may be too strong a word, to quote a US strategic analyst, "It is quite possible that differences will grow behind the facade of [SCO] unity. Washington must be alert to exploit any openings to gain geopolitical advantage. While the political, ideological and military dimensions of the New Great Game in Central Asia continue to heat up, it should be clear to all players that plenty of time remains in the contest. The SCO now appears to have momentum on its side, but such an advantage can dissipate quickly."

Thus the US would tell China that Russia was needlessly dragging it into an anti-American bloc, and that there was nothing irreconcilable involving US and Chinese interests in Central Asia. US strategic analysts have been arguing that both the United States and China are interested in the stability of the region; both are against the ascendancy of extremist forces in the region; both are interested in Central Asia's transition to market economies and in the region's globalization; both have stakes in the rapid development of Central Asia's hydrocarbon sector and in the diversified and efficient flow of the region's energy to the world market.

There are signs that the US is also using the oil-price issue as a wedge to divide Russia and China. The US has also been campaigning in the capitals of SCO member countries (and observer countries) that Russia is aspiring to transform the SCO into a club of energy producers and to be its dominant partner, and that if the Russian stratagem is allowed to proceed unchecked, that will be detrimental to the interests of Central Asian energy producers - and even of China and India. These are interesting straws in the wind.

The recent five-nation energy summit of major Asian consuming countries (China, Japan, South Korea, India and the US) hosted by China is partly at least an expression of Beijing's commonality of interests with Washington in leading an energy dialogue of consuming countries vis-a-vis Russia. Conceivably, Beijing may be harboring grievances that Moscow is keeping Chinese companies out of investment opportunities in Russia's strategic oil and gas fields in Russia's Siberia and the Far East, and even in the Russian pipelines leading to the Chinese market.

China may also be displeased with Gazprom's insistent attempts to get in on the Sakhalin energy projects. ExxonMobil is under pressure for a proposed gas pipeline from Sakhalin-1 to China. Russia's gas monopoly seems to want to discount any competition for its own plans for a gas pipeline to China through the Altai highlands near the Russian-Kazakh-Mongolian border. Its preference seems to be to buy all gas from Sakhalin-1 so that it remains the sole exporter of gas to China. China is also keenly watching the holdup in Sakhalin-2, being the highest-profile foreign-investment project in Russia's energy sector to date.

Important investment decisions are pending in 2007 with regard to Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2, Sakhalin-3, the Shtokman gas fields and the vast Russian energy reserves in the Far East on the whole. How the Kremlin makes these decisions will have a significant bearing on Chinese thinking and, indirectly, that can cast shadows on the geopolitics of Central Asia.

Besides, the ground reality is that according to recent studies, Russia will need to import 79 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually from Central Asia's gas-producing countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to meet its domestic needs and to fulfill its export commitments. How this plays out in Russia's overall political and economic ties with Central Asian countries will have a significant impact on the regional milieu.

It is obvious that Gazprom views Central Asia as a priority area. A major development in 2006 in Central Asia's energy sector was the agreement between Gazprom and Uzbekneftgaz to undertake a geological survey of Uzbekistan. Gazprom is committing $260 million in the coming three years alone for the exploration of the Ustyurtki oil and gas deposits in Uzbekistan. Again, Russia and Kazakhstan entered an agreement in October to set up a gas joint venture at the Orenburg gas refinery in Russia - the first time Kazakhstan was making a major investment in the Russian economy.

The joint venture is expected to process 30.6bcm gas in 2012, including 15bcm from Kazakhstan's Karachaganak gas field (which has an estimated 1 trillion cubic meters of reserves), which Russia and Kazakhstan are pledged to develop jointly.

The struggle over control of oil and gas and their transportation routes is bound to intensify in 2007. It will remain central to the geopolitics of Central Asia. In turn, pipeline politics in the Caspian can be expected to produce strange bedfellows.

Already, geopolitical circumstances in the Caspian Basin have led to a sharp deterioration in Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Again, despite all the wooing of Kazakhstan by Washington, the indefinite postponement of the Odessa-Brody pipeline project last week has stemmed from Kazakhstan having to be mindful of Russian sensitivities.

Least of all, Iran remains the wild card in the pack. Depending on which way the Iran nuclear issue develops in 2007, Iran can impact on the energy map of China, Central Asia, the Caspian, the Caucasus, Russia and Europe - and, conceivably, the United States itself.

But an entirely new ball game opens up with the sudden demise of Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov on December 21. It calls attention to the fragility of the Central Asian calculus. The political uncertainties centered on Niyazov's successor come at an extremely tricky time when Russia, China and the US are virtually preparing to besiege Ashgabat with offers and counter-offers for gaining access to Turkmenistan's gas reserves.

Will Niyazov's successor follow his policy of "positive neutrality"? Russia strives to retain its strategic leverage as the monopolist transporter and re-exporter of Turkmen gas. The European Union, supported by the US, on the other hand, is attempting to resist the Russian leverage by opening direct access to Turkmen gas.

In 2006, the US and Turkey revived the 10-year-old idea of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline project (as part of the so-called East-West Energy Corridor) to supply Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey. Turkmenistan's gas output may well approach 80bcm annually at present. The trans-Caspian pipeline envisages an annual draw of 16bcm from the Turkmen output in the first stage, to be expanded to 32bcm in the second stage. In the US geostrategy, the project is vital for reducing Europe's heavy dependence on Russian energy supplies. Niyazov had prevaricated in the light of Moscow's opposition. But what will be the outlook of Niyazov's successor?

Russia, on the contrary, will insist on the fulfillment of its April 2003 framework agreement with Turkmenistan, which provides for a 25-year contract on gas supplies to Russia, with Ashgabat pledging to supply 100bcm per year of gas from 2010 onward (a total of 2 trillion cubic meters cumulatively over the 25-year period). Moscow now seeks to tap even more deeply into Turkmenistan's gas reserves for meeting Russia's domestic needs and for re-export to Europe as "Russian gas".

Meanwhile, Turkmenistan also stands committed to supply 8-10bcm of gas to Iran's northern region, apart from occasionally voicing interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline project. China, on its part, entered an agreement with Niyazov in April for purchase of 30bcm of Turkmen gas annually from 2009 onward for a 30-year period, and jointly to explore and develop Turkmen gas deposits on the right bank of Amu Darya River.

Besides challenging Russia's monopoly control of Turkmen gas hitherto, China has also undercut the Russian practice of buying cheap Turkmen gas, by agreeing that China will pay a price "set at reasonable levels, and on a fair basis, pegged on comparable international market price". At the same time, China's deal also threatens the West, which will be a strategic loser if Turkmenistan decides to send its gas eastward instead of Europe.

The European Union's 3,400-kilometer Nabucco gas pipeline from eastern Turkey to Austria and central Europe at an estimated cost of $5.8 billion, to be commissioned in 2010, will be a net sufferer in that case, as it is predicated on the expectation that Turkmenistan can be a key supplier country.

Niyazov was always an enigmatic figure on the Central Asian political chessboard. But the biggest puzzle he has left behind was no doubt his chance remark shortly before his death in a conversation with visiting German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Ashgabat that Turkmenistan recently discovered a super-giant gas field, South Iolotansk, with proven reserves of 7 trillion cubic meters of gas.

Like Corporal Hatfield in his sentry post in Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, Niyazov didn't probably realize what a maelstrom he was creating. If South Iolotansk indeed holds such untold treasures, the impact on the energy map of Russia, Europe and China will be dramatic. And certainly, the center of gravity of the Great Game will overnight shift eastward to the home of the fabled Ahalteke race horse - away from the SCO and all that. Central Asia, then, may never be the same again.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001)

[Disclaimer: The content of this news bulletin does not necessarily reflect the view or policy of the Afghan Government, unless specifically stated as such. The collection of articles and commentaries from Afghan and international news sources is provided for informational purposes, and accuracy of the news is the responsibility of the original source.]